14 —טבע הטוב בנפשות לא יהודיות וקיום המצוות

B"H, Alef 28 Menachem Av, 99 Paris.

Yaakov Benyaminson.

Shalom u'Vrachah!

I hereby acknowledge receipt of your letter, and it appears from your wording that my previous letter regarding the matter of tzimtzum arrived in due time. Regarding what you wrote about what is stated in Tanya, beginning of chapter one, that the souls of non-Jews are from the other side and have no good at all—“If so, how can it be said about them that all they do is for themselves, etc., and in general what relevance do all the commandments they were commanded have for them, and how can they be punished for this when they have no free choice for good?”—the matter was not sufficiently clear to me, and I am not certain what exactly troubled you in all this.

In Tanya it is written that the animal soul in a Jew is from kelipat nogah which contains good, and from it come the positive traits naturally found among Jews such as compassion, etc., which is a natural aspect in a Jew like fire’s tendency to separate from a wick. In contrast, non-Jews are from kelipot that contain no good; thus there cannot be any aspect of inherent goodness in them—for only something inherently good seeks to do good. It concludes there that when we see them doing good deeds, their intention is not to do good but rather for their own benefit—to boast or similar motives. For example, Nebuchadnezzar gave charity not because he had an innate trait or was compelled to give charity but because he wanted his kingdom to endure; when he learned that charity would achieve this goal, he gave charity. Therefore Rashi comments (Bava Batra 10b) “and he regretted it”—the matter is natural: his desire was for his kingdom’s endurance—for himself.

Similarly regarding the commandments given to non-Jews—their fulfillment and punishment for transgressing them—this does not relate to an inherent tendency toward good or evil within their soul but rather pertains to descriptions such as “chasid” (righteous) or “one who controls his nature,” as explained by Rambam in chapter six of Shemoneh Perakim. Also see mitzvat remembering Amalek (Sefer HaMitzvot by tzt"z), where even fulfilling out of fear of punishment suffices. In Mishneh Torah Laws of Teshuvah chapter ten Rambam writes that even among Jews this is how service begins until knowledge increases. Even serving out of fear of Heaven—see Sotah (31a) regarding Job’s fear; Rashi explains there as well.

In Bava Batra (15b) it says Job was a non-Jew; similarly in Sotah (11a). Thus fear of Heaven because His awe is great and weighs upon creatures does not necessarily stem from inherent goodness (it just opposes Amalek’s brazenness). Human nature is such that when one sees many ministers bowing to one man, awe falls upon him—as it says: “Who would not fear You, King of nations?” (Yirmiyahu 10:7). Clearly all this remains external fear as explained in the note on Tikkun Chatzot cited in Tanya chapter 41 note 2; see also Rashi’s version cited by Tosafot Sotah (31a).

On a more subtle level according to Chassidus: one may ask—however a gentile intends when doing good or fulfilling any commandment—in the end he performs a good deed or fulfills a mitzvah; how can he do so if there is no inherent good at all? This question becomes even stronger regarding the sitra achra and klipah themselves—they are agents of G‑d and fulfill His command as stated in Tanya chapter seven and Kuntres U’Maayan MeBeit Hashem by Admor Hazaken at length—how can this be if they are entirely evil with no good?

The answer given in Torah Or discourse “Padah Beshalom” (and similarly in discourse “Nachamu Nachamu”) is: What Tanya means by “in kelipot hatmeiot there is no good at all” does not mean there isn’t any spark whatsoever—for nothing can exist without some surrounding light; therefore there must be some spark present. However, this spark has become so distant and darkened that it is like evil itself—that is, there remains no sense whatsoever of G‑dliness within it.

This may also be what Kuntres U’Maayan section four means by adding to Tanya’s wording “even though he does not perceive”—that is: without their awareness. Similarly Sefer HaMamarim by tzt"z writes regarding mitzvat unity of G‑d: The sitra achra’s main place is in Asiyah (the world of action), and all souls of idolaters derive from there; only a thin ray from holy light remains there since ancient times—therefore they are obligated to believe in the Creator.

Note also matters such as sins becoming merits and tests as discussed in discourse “Acharei” and its explanation printed at end of Derech Mitzvosecha. Consider further: since non-Jewish commandments are matters of refinement—they must come through Yaakov specifically… See printed Ohr HaTorah discourse “Re’eh Reiach Beni.”

Perhaps this refers to spiritual/inner aspects of halacha—see Mishneh Torah Laws of Kings chapter eight halacha ten/eleven: Moshe Rabbeinu commanded through G‑d’s word to compel all people to accept the commandments given to Noah’s descendants… One must accept them before three friends… provided he accepts them because G‑d commanded through Moshe—not just because Noahides were previously commanded.

While discussing this halacha I recall its novelty: It appears here—and also Laws of Circumcision chapter one halacha six—that for merely refusing acceptance (even without actual transgression) a Noahide incurs capital liability. What is its source?

Summary

This letter explores deep questions about whether non-Jews possess inherent goodness according to Tanya, clarifying that while sparks exist within kelipot hatmeiot enabling action, these sparks are so concealed they lack any sense of G‑dliness. The discussion highlights distinctions between intention versus action and how halacha regards fulfillment by non-Jews.