Parshas Metzora
1. In the order in which the Torah sets out the laws of nega'im (leprous plagues), one finds something remarkable:
Earlier, in Parshas Tazria1, the detailed laws of plagues of a person, and also of plagues of garments, are set out — but only the laws pertaining to the plagues themselves: a) which are impure and which are pure; b) when and how the purification from the (impurity of the) plagues takes place.
Afterwards, in a separate sidrah — Parshas Metzora — the Torah returns to plagues of a person and says, "תורת המצורע ביום טהרתו" ("the law of the metzora on the day of his purification")2: the laws (and the procedure) of a metzora "on the day of his purification," etc. — "ולקח למטהר גו'" ("and he shall take for the one being purified, etc.")3: the bringing of offerings, etc.3
And after the section of "the law of the metzora on the day of his purification" comes the section on plagues of houses4; and that section includes both the laws of the plagues themselves and the procedure for the purification of the house (through two birds, etc.), similar to the procedure of a metzora on the day of his purification.
This is seemingly puzzling:
a) Why does the Torah divide the laws of a metzora into two separate sidros — the plagues themselves in Parshas Tazria, and the procedure of "the day of his purification," etc., in our parsha — and not state them in one continuous sequence, that is: (a) not interrupt in the middle with the laws of plagues of garments, and (b) state both in the same sidrah5?
b) Why does the section on plagues of houses come after "the law of the metzora on the day of his purification," and not before it (at the end of Parshas Tazria), in continuation of the laws of plagues of (a person and) garments6?
c) Why are plagues of houses different from plagues of a person, in that with them the "procedure" for the purification of the house (with "birds," etc.) comes immediately in continuation of the laws of impurity and purity of the plagues themselves (unlike plagues of a person, where their detailed laws and "the law of . . on the day of his purification" are divided apart, as mentioned above)7?
2. Another unique matter is found specifically with plagues of houses: G‑d announced from the outset, "כי תבואו אל ארץ כנען גו' ונתתי נגע צרעת בבית ארץ אחוזתכם" ("When you come into the land of Canaan, etc., and I will put a plague of tzara'as in a house of the land of your possession")8.
There are two explanations of this, and they are opposites:
a) In Rashi's commentary on the Torah — and likewise in the Midrash9 — it says: "בשורה היא להם שהנגעים באים עליהם לפי שהטמינו אמוריים מטמוניות של זהב בקירות בתיהם . . על ידי הנגע נותץ הבית ומוצאן" ("It is good tidings for them that the plagues come upon them10, because the Emorites hid treasures of gold in the walls of their houses . . through the plague he demolishes the house and finds them").
b) In the Zohar11 (after it brings the reason mentioned above — "לאשכחא מטמונין דאטמרן בבתייהו" ("to find the treasures that were hidden in their houses")), it says that since the Canaanites were idol worshippers, a "רוח מסאבא" (a spirit of impurity) therefore rested in their houses. And therefore "I will put a plague of tzara'as in a house of the land of your possession"12, so that the Jews would demolish the houses and thereby remove the "spirit of impurity"; and the houses that the Jews would afterwards build must be of "אבנים אחרות . . ועפר אחר" ("other stones . . and other earth")13, so that the Jews would live "בקדושה ובדיורא קדישא" ("in holiness and in a holy dwelling").
It follows that "I will put a plague of tzara'as in a house, etc." was for two opposite reasons14: a) because of the abundance of good that was hidden in the houses; b) because of the lowliness — the "spirit of impurity" — that was there, which required that the houses be destroyed15.
Furthermore: It is understood that "I will put a plague of tzara'as in a house of the land of your possession" does not mean that G‑d put a "plague of tzara'as" in all the houses of "the land of your possession" — such a great novelty would have had to be stated somewhere16 — but only in a certain portion, and it is reasonable to say — a small portion.
And although most (or — all) of the Canaanites were idol worshippers, and in general "מעשיהם . . מקולקלים מכל (האומות) עמים" ("their deeds were . . more corrupt than those of all (the nations) peoples")17 — so a "spirit of impurity" rested in all their houses — why then were there not plagues in all the houses?
— The reason for this is understood18: Simply put, within the "spirit of impurity" itself there are several levels19. When the "spirit of impurity" was not so great, it departed from the house through the very entry of the Jew (and his holiness) into the house, especially since it had become his property — his house20 — or at least through his affixing a mezuzah in his house, and the like. Only in those houses where there was an extremely low impurity (due to the most corrupt conduct of the Canaanites of that house) did plagues come, because in order to remove such a (severe) impurity, the house must be demolished21.
According to this, however, it emerges that the place where the "treasures of gold" were hidden was specifically22 the houses in which the "spirit of impurity" was at its very lowest level!
3. Similar to the two extremes mentioned above regarding plagues of houses — that specifically in the most debased houses the "treasures of gold" were hidden — one finds also regarding the general matter of nega'im:
The impurity of nega'im is a most severe impurity. As the law23 is that the metzora is sent outside all three camps, and he must be separated from other impure people24 — "שלא יהו טמאים אחרים יושבים עמו" ("so that other impure people should not sit with him")24* — because a plague of tzara'as is the most severe impurity; and in the words of Sefer Yetzirah25, "אין ברעה למטה מנגע" ("There is nothing in evil lower than nega (plague)").
On the other hand, however, the purpose of nega'im is to bring about an elevation in the person. As the Rambam rules as halachah in his Yad HaChazakah26, nega'im are not "ממנהגו של עולם" ("of the natural way of the world") (a natural phenomenon), but rather "אות ופלא הי' בישראל כדי להזהירן מלשון הרע" ("a sign and a wonder that was among Israel to warn them against lashon hara"): G‑d makes this change (of nega'im) in creation in order to bring a Jew to teshuvah (for the sin of lashon hara).
And since a baal teshuvah is higher than a tzaddik, as our Sages say27, "מקום שבעלי תשובה עומדין צדיקים גמורים אינם עומדין" ("In the place where baalei teshuvah stand, completely righteous people do not stand") — it follows that nega'im (which in themselves are the most severe impurity, "there is nothing . . lower than nega") come in order to elevate a Jew to the greatest virtue, that of a "baal teshuvah."
[And it may be said that this is also alluded to in the continuation of the wording in Sefer Yetzirah there: "אין בטובה למעלה מענג ואין ברעה למטה מנגע" ("There is nothing in good higher than oneg (delight), and there is nothing in evil lower than nega (plague)"). "Nega" and "oneg" have the same letters28, which alludes that through the purification of the metzora one transforms the "nega," below which there is nothing, so that from it itself there should come about "oneg," above which there is nothing.]
And this is also the explanation (in the inner dimension of the matter) of why the "treasures of gold" came to the Jews through a plague of tzara'as (and specifically through the most debased houses, as mentioned above): this is in keeping with the general concept of nega'im, that specifically through the descent (nega'im) below which there is none, there afterwards comes the ascent (teshuvah) above which there is none. And with plagues of houses this was seen openly — one saw how the intent of the plagues is for the sake of the ascent, extending even to a material good29.
And this is why the verse is precise in saying "I will put a plague of tzara'as in a house of the land of your possession": with plagues of houses it was openly evident how the plagues come from the outset from Above ("I will put") — because with them one clearly saw the intent of the plagues.
It remains unexplained, however: what is the unique quality of plagues of houses, that specifically with them this is revealed?
4. This will be understood by first explaining the saying of our Sages30 that through teshuvah out of love, "זדונות נעשות לו זכויות" ("willful sins become for him merits"):
From the wording of our Sages, "become for him merits" — and not "willful sins become merits"31 — one could seemingly infer that this is merely a matter in the "gavra" (the person)32:
Since the willful sins brought him to the elevated level of teshuvah33, they are counted for him as "merits" (because just as through "merits" a Jew comes closer to G‑d, so too the "willful sins" brought him to teshuvah34); but the willful sins themselves (the "cheftza," the object) remain "willful sins" (a forbidden thing35)
— However, the Alter Rebbe says in Tanya36 (regarding forbidden things) that they remain forbidden forever — "עד כי יבוא יומם ויבולע המות לנצח כמ"ש ואת רוח הטומאה אעביר מן הארץ או עד שיעשה תשובה גדולה כל כך שזדונות נעשו לו כזכויות ממש" ("until their day comes and death is swallowed up forever, as it is written37, 'And I will remove the spirit of impurity from the earth,' or until he does such great teshuvah that willful sins become for him like actual merits"). From this comparison it is understood that "willful sins become for him like actual merits" is in the same manner as at the time when "I will remove the spirit of impurity from the earth": just as then the existence of evil will be entirely nullified, and consequently the very "cheftza" of the forbidden things will be changed (their connection38 to evil will be nullified) — so too through teshuvah (out of love) the cheftza of the willful sins is transformed into merits39.
5. According to this, however, something puzzling will emerge — that every sinful act has a status similar to "דבר שיש לו מתירין" ("a thing that can become permitted"). With vows, the law40 is that since it is a mitzvah to request annulment of the vow (and have it annulled through a sage), it has (even while it is forbidden) the status of "a thing that can become permitted" (which indicates a lessening and weakening in the severity of the prohibition41):
And similarly in our case: although we are speaking of a sinful act, since through teshuvah, as mentioned above, the cheftza of the willful sins is transformed into merits — and teshuvah is, after all, a mitzvah42 — it would follow that the sinful act should from the outset be in the category of "a thing that can become permitted"43!
The explanation of this may be said as follows:
A forbidden thing can be in the category of "a thing that can become permitted" only when, at the time of the prohibition, "it stands to become permitted"44. This is obvious with vows, where the sage's annulment uproots the vow from its inception45, because it comes through46 "regret and an opening," so that it is like a vow made in error, which never took effect from the outset;
but even with a "permitting" that helps only from now on — such as hekdesh and maaser sheni, which are in the category of "a thing that can become permitted" because they can be redeemed47 — the thing stands to become permitted even at the time of the prohibition: the Torah from the outset gave room for the prohibition to be nullified later. It is as if the prohibition was made conditionally48, so that it can later be permitted, and therefore it is called "a thing that can become permitted" even while it is forbidden.
With teshuvah, however, one cannot say that teshuvah helps because, at the time the sin is committed, the possibility of teshuvah was given from the outset — for the very nature of a sin is that one acts contrary to G‑d's will, and consequently also contrary to G‑d's will that one should do teshuvah49. Furthermore: "האומר . . אחטא ואשוב אין מספיקין בידו לעשות תשובה" ("One who says . . 'I will sin and repent' is not given the opportunity to do teshuvah")50 — at the time of the sinful act there is (from the standpoint of the Torah's will) no room for teshuvah.
Therefore a sinful act is not in the category of "a thing that can become permitted" — because at the time it is forbidden there is no room for its "permission"; and what teshuvah accomplishes, that willful sins become for him like merits, is entirely in the manner of a novelty: the later teshuvah transforms the earlier willful sins into merits.
6. It follows from this that in teshuvah's power to change the past (so that the earlier "willful sins" become "merits"51), there is a novelty in comparison with other matters of Torah which take effect "retroactively":
With other matters of Torah that take effect retroactively, it is not a matter of changing the past (literally)52, but rather it is because the thing was done from the outset in a manner that gives room for its nullification from the outset, as mentioned above [similar to when one does something conditionally and stipulates "from now," so that when the condition is fulfilled the thing takes effect retroactively — the reason the condition can take effect retroactively is that the thing was made from the outset based on that condition53].
Teshuvah, however, must completely transform the past54: from the standpoint of the past, it is an absolutely forbidden thing, without any "room" for permission; and now, through teshuvah, it is transformed into merits.
And this is also the explanation of why the matter of "willful sins become for him merits" is accomplished specifically through teshuvah out of love30, and as the Alter Rebbe adds in Tanya36, that this means (within teshuvah out of love itself) "תשובה מאהבה מעומקא דלבא באהבה רבה כו'" ("teshuvah out of love from the depth of the heart, with great love, etc.") (by which the Alter Rebbe means the "תשובה דצעקת הלב . . שהוא בעצם הנפש כו'" ("teshuvah of the cry of the heart . . which is in the essence of the soul, etc.")55)
— because how can a Jew change the past56? It is because57 the essence of a Jew's soul is bound up with G‑d, for Whom past, present and future are as one. Therefore, through teshuvah out of love (from the essence of the soul), a Jew stands above the limitations of time and can change even the past58.
7. In light of all the above, one will also understand the order of the section of nega'im:
Since nega'im are a matter of the ultimate evil — "there is nothing in evil lower than nega" — at the time of the impurity there is no "room" for his purification; he is entirely excluded from any connection whatsoever with (the realm of) purity. And the purification of the metzora comes about as a novelty: it is something new that comes from the kohen, who effects59 purity60.
And this is what the Torah alludes to by dividing the laws of plagues of a person and "the law of the metzora on the day of his purification," etc.61, into two separate sidros: because the impurity of the metzora and his purification are two opposites which do not come "together."
This, however, is only from the standpoint of the person; but from the standpoint of Above, the entire intent62 of nega'im is, from the outset, for the sake of the purification (and the ascent that results from it), as mentioned above (section 3).
And this is the reason why specifically regarding plagues of houses it says "I will put a plague of tzara'as" (and why (only) with them it was openly recognizable that they came from the outset for the sake of the good [OCR unclear]) — because a person's house, which is not limited according to the height, etc., of the one who dwells in it — a distant makif (encompassing level) — is connected with the level of Yechidah in the soul63 (the hidden treasures of the soul), as our Sages say, "כל אדם שאין לו קרקע לבנות עלי' בית אינו אדם" ("any man who has no land on which to build a house is not a man")64, which is entirely above the measures and limitations of the body
[The levels of the soul which shine within the person, or the level connected with the person's garments (clothes), which is at least a close makif, are connected with the measures and limitations of the body; whereas a house, which is a distant makif, is connected with the level of Yechidah, which is above the measures and limitations of the body],
and from the standpoint of the Yechidah of the soul — "יחידה ליחדך" ("the singular one, to unify with You") — it is sensed how matters come from Above65.
And for this reason, with plagues of houses: a) there is no interruption between the laws of the impurity of plagues of the house and the procedure for the purification of the house; b) the entire section on plagues of houses appears (not in continuation of the laws of the impurity of plagues of a person and garments (at the end of Tazria), but rather) in continuation of "the law of the metzora on the day of his purification" — because with plagues of houses it is openly stated how the entire matter of the plagues is solely for the sake of the ascent that comes about through their purification.
And just as this applies to plagues of houses in their plain sense, so too in spiritual matters — exile and the destruction of the House, etc.66 — the intent from the outset67 is that there should come about the "purity"68 and the revelation of the hidden treasures: the building of the third Beis HaMikdash, which, being specifically "אד' כוננו ידיך" ("which Your hands, O L‑rd, have established")69, is above the limitations of time, and consequently — speedily in our days, literally.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Metzora 5741 and Motzaei Shabbos Parshas Vayeilech (6 Tishrei) 5739)
Notes
1) 13:1ff.
2) Our parsha, 14:2.
3) Ibid., 3ff.; ibid., 10ff.
4) Ibid., 33ff.
5) See Or HaChaim on our parsha, 14:34.
6) And although only regarding plagues of houses does it say (our parsha, ibid.) "When you come into the land of Canaan, etc.," since they apply only in the Land (Toras Kohanim (and Ra'avad) on the verse; Nega'im 12:4), or because in the desert there were no houses to be afflicted (Or HaChaim, ibid.) — it would nevertheless have been possible to write the section on plagues of houses, with the introduction "When you come, etc.," before it, at the end of Parshas Tazria. It should also be noted that in the view of the Ramban (Tazria 13:47), plagues of garments too "לא ינהגו אלא בארץ" ("apply only in the Land").
7) Our parsha, ibid.
8) Vayikra Rabbah 17:6.
9) The wording of Rashi. In Vayikra Rabbah, ibid., it appears with several variations (explained in Likkutei Sichos, Metzora 5747).
10) This wording ("It is good tidings . . upon them") is also cited in Toras Kohanim on the verse; Horayos 10a (see Rashi and the commentary of the Rosh there).
11) Tazria 50a.
12) See also Kli Yakar on our parsha, on the verse (at its end), in the name of "some say."
13) Our parsha, 14:42.
14) As is evident in the Zohar there ("אי עובדא דא הוה לאשכחא מטמונין בלחודוי" ("if this matter were solely to find treasures")), that these are not two explanations that disagree, but rather that "בשביל ב' טעמים בא הצרעת בבתים" ("tzara'as came upon houses for two reasons") (Nitzotzei Oros there). — Or HaChamah on the Zohar there (50b) explains that "לעיל דחו אותו הטעם דהי' לאשכחא מטמוני הכנעניים" ("above, they rejected the reason that it was to find the treasures of the Canaanites") [and note what is written there, on the Zohar, 50a, s.v. Ishtemodan, "שיש ב' מיני נגעים קצתם הי' ליסורים לבד וקצתם היו לאשכחא מטמונים" ("that there are two kinds of plagues: some were for suffering alone and some were to find treasures")]. But even according to this explanation, at any rate according to the beginning of the Zohar there (50b), it "בא להכריע שני הפי' כי כולם דברי אלקים חיים" ("comes to reconcile the two explanations, for they are all the words of the living G‑d"). — And note the Alshich on our parsha here, that plagues of houses come both "למען ייסר בעליו על עון אשר חטא" ("in order to chastise its owner for a sin that he committed") and "ליתן לו אוצרות כשכר על איזה מעשה טוב אשר עשה" ("to give him treasures as a reward for some good deed that he did") — "שני הפכים לאיש אחד על שני גופי מעשיו" ("two opposites for one man, for two aspects of his deeds"). See there.
15) See also Zohar, ibid., 50b.
16) And see Chinuch (mitzvah 177): "בקצת בתים" ("in some houses"). But note the above-cited Or HaChamah: "כדי שלא יהי' עליהם לטורח לבנות כל א"י מחדש כי כולה מלאוה הכנעניים מגילוליהם" ("so that it should not be a burden on them to rebuild all of Eretz Yisrael anew, for the Canaanites had filled all of it with their idols"). — In Parshas Va'eschanan (6:11) it is stated explicitly "to give you . . and houses, etc."; but in Vayikra Rabbah and in the Zohar there [it is stated] that the intent of the verse "ובתים מלאים כל טוב" ("and houses full of all good things") is the treasures that were revealed through (the plagues and) the demolition of the house.
17) Toras Kohanim and Rashi, Acharei 18:3.
18) And see Kli Yakar (cited in note 12) for another explanation.
19) See also Or HaChamah on the Zohar there (50a, s.v. Vida'as), where several levels in this are explained — based on what is stated in the Zohar there, that the spirit of impurity rested (not only because of the very [OCR unclear] that was built, but) because "כד שראן למבני הוו אמרי . . בפומייהו" ("when they began to build, they would say . . with their mouths"). See there.
20) As our Sages say (Bereishis Rabbah 58:8) on (Chayei Sarah 23:17) "ויקם שדה עפרון" ("And the field of Efron was established") — cited in Rashi on the verse: "תקומה היתה לו" ("it had an elevation").
21) And within this itself there are several levels: whether it suffices to change the house with other stones and other earth, or whether the house must be demolished (see Or HaChamah, ibid.).
22) Although, with difficulty, one could say that there were two types of houses: a) of treasures; b) of a spirit of impurity — and the Zohar speaks of separate cases. — See above, note 14.
23) See Pesachim 67a; Toras Kohanim (and Rashi), Tazria 13:46.
24) Regarding other metzora'im — see Likkutei Sichos vol. 22, p. 74, and the notes there.
24*) Pesachim, ibid.; Rashi, Tazria, ibid. And see Toras Kohanim and the commentary of the Ra'avad there; Likkutei Sichos cited in the previous note.
25) Ch. 2, mishnah 2.
26) End of the Laws of the Impurity of Tzara'as. And so too in several places. And see Likkutei Torah, Tazria, the maamar beginning "Adam." — And see at length Likkutei Sichos, ibid., p. 72, and the sources cited there.
27) Berachos 34b; Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah 7:4.
28) See the commentators on Sefer Yetzirah there.
29) Except that arriving at this good is through the demolition of the house, the breaking of the impurity, etc.
30) Yoma 86b.
31) In Eitz Chaim, Sha'ar 49, end of ch. 8: "הזדונות הנעשות זכויות" ("the willful sins that become merits") — and there it is explained as referring to the cheftza of the willful sins. And see further in the text.
32) Note what is explained in a similar vein (Likkutei Sichos vol. 4, p. 1351) regarding the wording of our Sages (Yoma 72b) that the Torah "נעשית לו סם" ("becomes for him a poison"), since the Torah itself does not receive impurity (Berachos 22a). But see Sefer HaMaamarim Melukat vol. 1, p. 155, note 47. See there.
33) See Tanya ch. 7 (12a): "הואיל וע"ז בא לאהבה זו" ("since through this he came to this love"). But there it is given as the reason that the willful sins themselves became merits. See there. And see at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 9, p. 187ff.
34) See Likkutei Torah, Acharei 26c.
35) See Likkutei Sichos vol. 3, p. 985, and the notes there (and elsewhere), regarding eating a forbidden thing in a permitted manner (in a case of danger to life and the like).
36) Ibid.
37) Zechariah 13:2.
38) Note the discussion as to whether a prohibition applies to the form and not to the matter (Mefa'aneach Tzefunos ch. 1 ([OCR unclear], and elsewhere), and the sources cited there), and in any case — not to the primordial matter. — And see at length the sichah of Shabbos Parshas Acharei 5744 (based on Likkutei Torah, Chukas 56d ff.).
39) See also (at length) Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, ibid. (p. 184ff.), and the sources cited there.
40) Nedarim 59a.
41) That is, "שאין דבר זה חלוק מן ההיתר לגמרי . . שהרי . . סופו להיות ניתר" ("this thing is not entirely distinct from what is permitted . . since . . it will ultimately become permitted") (Ran, Nedarim 52a). And on this basis the reason is explained there why a thing that can become permitted is not nullified in a majority: because the similarity (in terms of prohibition and permission) causes them not to be nullified, and it is like a mixture of the same kind. See there at length.
42) See Likkutei Sichos, ibid., p. 210, note 40. And at length — Likkutei Sichos, Naso [OCR unclear]; Chiddushim U'Biurim BaShas (Jerusalem 5739), sec. 18.
43) Obviously, the intent is not the law of a thing that can become permitted in its plain sense, since the discussion concerns the sinful act, which no longer exists [for in a case where the forbidden thing (which became an existing forbidden entity through the sinful act) still exists, the person's teshuvah will not make it permitted*!]. Rather, the intent is in the spiritual dimension of the matter, regarding the vitality, etc., of the sinful act (explained in Tanya ch. 7, and in several places). And perhaps it may be said (at least as an intellectual exercise) that there is a practical difference: if we were to say that a sinful act is in the category of a thing that can become permitted (which is not nullified), then a person's judgment would not have to be in the manner of being judged according to the majority (Rashi and Tosafos, Rosh HaShanah 16b; Tanya ch. 1).
*) On the contrary — this impedes teshuvah (atonement), in the words of our Sages, "לא יוכל לתקון" ("it cannot be rectified") (Chagigah 9a; Yevamos 22b; Tanya, end of ch. 6); and see Rashi, Yevamos (ibid., s.v. Hashta): "עונו גלוי ונזכר" ("his sin is revealed and remembered"). On the other hand, through exceedingly great teshuvah — "גם מה שהוליד . . ימות" ("even what he begot . . will die") (Sha'arei Teshuvah by the Mitteler Rebbe, part 2, 42d; and similarly there, part 1, 54d. And see the introduction to Pokeach Ivrim, p. 30ff.).
44) Therefore, a thing that can become permitted only through effort and expense is not included in [the category of] a thing that can become permitted ([OCR unclear] Avodah Zarah 73b, and elsewhere — cited in Encyclopedia Talmudis, s.v. Davar Sheyesh Lo Matirin, p. 7).
45) Kesubos 74b.
46) See Encyclopedia Talmudis, s.v. Hataras Nedarim, p. 389ff., and the sources cited there.
47) Tosafos s.v. Mar Zutra, Nazir 22a. And see Encyclopedia Talmudis, ibid., p. 337, and the sources cited there.
48) Nedarim 58a, top; Rashi, Tosafos, and others there.
48*) Note also the Kli Yakar cited below in note 53.
49) Therefore, although the mitzvah of teshuvah (and the possibility of it) exists also at the time of the sin (and see Likkutei Sichos vol. 8, p. 122ff., on the concept of "תקנתא דתשובה" ("the remedy of teshuvah"); see there), nevertheless this cannot be attributed to the person, for from the standpoint of his state he opposes this will. This is readily understood.
50) Mishnah, end of Yoma (85b).
51) For the meaning is not that they become like merits only from now on, but rather that they become merits retroactively, as is cited regarding one who betroths on condition that she has not sinned — and she had sinned and afterwards did such teshuvah — that she is betrothed (see Tzafnas Pa'neach on the Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah 2:2, at the end; Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 185). And see the explanation of the Alter Rebbe (cited above, note 33) on the reason they became like merits: "הואיל וע"ז בא לאהבה וכו'" ("since through this he came to love, etc."). And it is stated explicitly in Rashi, Yoma (86a, s.v. Kan me'ahavah), that through teshuvah out of love "נעקר עונו מתחלתו" ("his sin is uprooted from its inception"); and all the more so with teshuvah out of exceedingly great love, which makes the willful sins into merits, which is a loftier manner than [ordinary] teshuvah out of love (see at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 10, cited in the above note).
52) Although in them too there is something akin to a change of the past; for example, in the annulment of a vow, where at any rate until the sage annuls the vow it was forbidden (see Rosh, Nedarim 52b, and elsewhere), and likewise with a condition, even when one says "from now" (see the sources cited in Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 54, note 39; ibid., p. 92, note 36; vol. 8, p. 58, note 48*).
53) And likewise with the annulment of vows, as mentioned in the text, that it is through regret and an opening.
And even according to the views that the husband's annulment also uproots the vow from its inception (see Encyclopedia Talmudis, s.v. Hafarah, p. 113ff., and the sources cited there; Likkutei Sichos vol. 21, p. 325, note 45, and in the gloss there), even though the husband's annulment is not through regret — nevertheless, by Torah law the possibility of annulment was given from the outset, at the time the vow was made (similar to what was said above in the text, section 5, regarding redemption, except that there it takes effect only from now on); and similar to the concept that "whoever betroths does so on the authority of the Rabbis," so that the betrothal is annulled retroactively (Kesubos 3a, and the sources cited there). And see similarly Kli Yakar, Matos 30:3 — except that there he writes that since the woman is under the authority of her husband or father, it is as if she vowed with their consent. And regarding hatarah (annulment) he explains that "כל איש מישראל הוא ברשות ב"ד . . וכל נודר דומה כאלו התנה בשעת הנדר ע"מ שיסכימו הב"ד עמו" ("every Jew is under the authority of the beis din . . and everyone who vows is as if he stipulated at the time of the vow on condition that the beis din agree with him"). And see Tziyunim LaTorah by Rabbi Yosef Engel, principle 23.
54) In Tzafnas Pa'neach on the Rambam, ibid., he compares the concept that "his sin is uprooted from its inception" (through teshuvah out of love) to a sage uprooting a vow. It may be said that his intent in this is only regarding the degree (manner) of the uprooting (that it is uprooted retroactively); but regarding how teshuvah effects the retroactive uprooting — in this respect teshuvah is superior to a sage's annulment, as in the text.
*) In simple terms, this is the intent of Rashi (Yoma, ibid.), "his sin is uprooted from its inception" — that the sin is uprooted from the person; whereas the concept that willful sins become merits is in the cheftza, as explained in the text.
55) Sefer HaMaamarim 5679, p. 17. And see also Sefer HaMaamarim 5670, p. 22.
56) Regarding the person himself (the "gavra"), it is possible to say that since inwardly every Jew is good even at the time of the sin (see Rambam, Laws of Divorce, end of ch. 2; Tanya, end of ch. 24), and especially since he will certainly ultimately do teshuvah (Tanya, end of ch. 39; and see also the Alter Rebbe's Laws of Torah Study 4:3), it is therefore similar to the concept of a "condition," which "clarifies" that from the outset too he was good (see at length on this Likkutei Sichos vol. 4, p. 54, and the notes there. And note also Ikkarim, Ma'amar 4, ch. 26 (where he compares this to the annulment of a vow through an opening of regret; and see, in the manner of Chassidus, Or HaTorah, Matos, p. 1288ff., p. 1319ff., and elsewhere)); but regarding the cheftza — the willful sins themselves — one cannot say so.
57) See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, ibid.
58) And so too from the standpoint of the content of the matter: the power to transform willful sins (which are contrary to the Supernal Will) into merits derives from the Essence of the Master of the Will, Who is not bound by His will, etc. (Sefer HaMaamarim 5670, p. 21; and see at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 66ff., and the notes there; vol. 7, p. 23; and elsewhere); and therefore it is accomplished specifically through teshuvah out of love from the essence of the soul (see the sources cited in note 55; and see Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 249, note 59; vol. 7, ibid.). This is not the place to elaborate.
59) See Rambam, Laws of the Impurity of Tzara'as 9:2.
60) See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 102ff.
61) And note that sometimes Tazria and Metzora become one sidrah.
62) Note Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 65ff., and the notes there.
63) See Imrei Binah, Sha'ar HaKerias Shema, ch. 43; Toras Chaim, Beshalach 254b, bottom, ff.; and elsewhere.
64) Cited in Hemshech 5666, p. 502, and elsewhere. And see Yevamos 63a, top, and Tosafos s.v. She'ein sham.
65) That is why only teshuvah that stems from the essence of the soul — Yechidah — brings about that willful sins become like merits (see above, [OCR unclear], and note 58) — for from the standpoint of Yechidah it is sensed how the descent is for the sake of the ascent, etc.
66) Vayikra Rabbah 17:7.
67) See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 22, p. 197ff., and the notes there (in explanation of the above-cited words of Vayikra Rabbah).
68) See Vayikra Rabbah, ibid.
69) Beshalach 15:17, and Rashi there; Zohar III, 221a.
Key Lesson
Even the lowest descent — a "nega," below which there is nothing — is intended from the outset by G‑d for the sake of the highest ascent, "oneg." Through teshuvah that comes from the essence of the soul, a Jew rises above the limits of time and transforms even past willful sins into merits. So too, the exile and destruction are intended from the outset for the revelation of the third Beis HaMikdash, speedily in our days.