Likkutei Sichos Vol. 4 – Ki Seitzei – Changing One’s Shlichus — Beis Shammai, Beis Hillel, and Rabbi Akiva
1. There are three opinions regarding when a man may divorce his wife: Beis Shammai say that a man should not divorce his wife unless he has found in her a matter of immorality. Beis Hillel say that even if she spoiled his dish, he may divorce her. Rabbi Akiva says that even if he found another woman more beautiful than his wife, he may divorce her, as it is stated in the verse, "And it shall be, if she does not find favor in his eyes."
In the disputes between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel, Beis Shammai are generally stringent, while Beis Hillel are lenient. The reason for this is that the souls of Beis Shammai derive from the attribute of strict justice, which is very exacting, and many things cannot be permitted or elevated. The souls of Beis Hillel, however, derive from the attribute of kindness, which finds good in everything, permitting and elevating it.
The permission to divorce a wife, although in practice it is a leniency, allowing divorce, is not, in its inner essence, an expression of the line of kindness. On the contrary, divorce is an expression of distance and separation, which comes from strictness and severity. Kindness and love are the opposite of divorce. Based on this, it is not understood how Beis Hillel, who are from the line of kindness, could allow more room for divorce than Beis Shammai. The same question applies to Rabbi Akiva, who is known for finding merit in Jews, yet he allows for divorce even if one merely finds another woman more beautiful than his wife.
The question is even stronger based on the known concept that a man and woman here below, with all their details, are analogous to their source — the Holy One, blessed be He, and Knesses Yisrael, who are called man and woman. From this, it is understood that the aforementioned dispute between Beis Shammai, Beis Hillel, and Rabbi Akiva concerns the divorce of Knesses Yisrael from her husband, the Holy One, blessed be He (from which the same dispute arises regarding divorce here below). And in this...
2. The concept of divorce in spirituality is certainly understood to come from the attribute of judgment. So how is it that Beis Hillel, who are generally more lenient, are stricter in this matter than Beis Shammai? And how can Rabbi Akiva, who finds merit in Israel, issue a ruling that even when there are no deficiencies, but merely "she does not find favor in his eyes," one should already divorce, G‑d forbid, Knesses Yisrael from the Holy One, blessed be He?
Even though "man and woman" generally refers to the Holy One, blessed be He, and Knesses Yisrael, because the soul is a literal part of G‑d above, it is also called "man," and the body (and its portion in the world) is called "woman." Every soul has a specific mission to accomplish in the world. Wherever a Jew finds themselves, they must know that it is by Divine Providence, as it says, "The steps of man are established by the L‑rd," to make that place a dwelling for Him, blessed be He. Even when various difficulties arise in the service in the place where one finds themselves, and it seems to them that in another service it would be easier or even that they would accomplish more, they should not "leave" the service and take on another.
Because since they see that Divine Providence has led them to this service, it is a sign that this is their mission. And in this, there is a dispute about in what situation one may indeed "abandon" the service in their portion of the world and take on another service:
Beis Shammai holds: A person should not divorce his wife unless he finds in her a matter of immorality. Regardless of the greatest difficulties and obstacles that arise, one should never abandon the service that has been placed upon them. Even when such obstacles arise, one should not be swayed by them, because "no one will be banished from Him," and ultimately, they will succeed in their service. Unless they find a matter of immorality, a clear ruling in the Shulchan Aruch that in this service, it is forbidden to continue (just as in the literal sense, if one finds a matter of immorality in his wife, he should not live with her), then it is a sign that the service is not for them, and they should leave it and take on another service. (As for what will happen with the service, "and she shall become another man's wife," from above, another soul will be provided, with stronger powers, to perform the service.)
Beis Hillel says even if she burned his food. If it is clearly seen that he is not succeeding in the service, on the contrary, "she burned his food" (his food), meaning that the body and its portion in the world spoil even the matters that the soul...
...had previously, he may then leave there and take on another service. Rabbi Akiva says: Even if he found another more pleasing than her, as it is stated, "and it shall be if she does not find favor in his eyes." Even when in the actual service (and in internal powers) nothing is lacking, but it lacks charm and delight, he does not find pleasure in the service (since charm and delight are encompassing), since a Jew must perform his service to G‑d with joy and a good heart, he may leave that service and take on another service in which he will find pleasure.
3. The ruling remains like Beis Hillel. If in practice nothing is lacking, it is only that he does not find charm in it, then he should not abandon the service. However, when there is an actual deficiency, "she burned his food," he feels that through this, even the matters he had previously are being ruined, then according to the law, he may leave it and take on another service. This, however, is only according to the law. The Gemara states, "Anyone who divorces his first wife, even the altar sheds tears for him," and in general, "how difficult is divorce," one should be stringent to remain with the service and fulfill the mission that has been placed upon him, until the exhaustion of the soul. And even if he was not stringent and did divorce, it is fitting for him to return to his former service. And even more: even if he found in her a matter of immorality, which according to the law he should not remain there, it is "not fitting to hasten to send away his first wife," he should first thoroughly investigate and inquire whether it is indeed true as he was told, that there is a matter of immorality in her. It could be that due to the bias of self-love, which desires an easier task, it seems to him that according to the Torah he should leave his current service — and the thorough investigation and inquiry could reveal that it is not so, and by continuing to exert the greatest effort and with all the powers of his soul in the service, there will be "a man and a woman, if they merit, the Divine Presence is between them," a dwelling place for the Blessed One in the lower realms.
4. In Parshas Ki Seitzei, the Torah commands "You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing," that when an ox or another animal...
4. In Parshas Ki Seitzei, the Torah commands "You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing," meaning that one must not prevent the animal from eating the grain while it is working. The Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe (published by the Mitteler Rebbe and his brother) concludes with the detailed laws related to the prohibition of "You shall not muzzle." In the very last section, the Alter Rebbe writes: "Cows that walk on the grain because it shortens their path are not subject to the prohibition of 'You shall not muzzle' if one muzzles them, even though the grain is threshed by their walking on it, since the intention is not to lead them there for threshing. And so it is in any similar case." As has been discussed many times, the Alter Rebbe was precise in every word of his Shulchan Aruch, and when one delves into his style of language, one sees how he clarifies and innovates many matters that are not noticed when one does not study in depth.
The source of the aforementioned law is a halacha in the Rambam. The Rambam states: "Cows that walk on the grain because it shortens their path are not subject to the prohibition of 'You shall not muzzle'." However, the Alter Rebbe adds several points to the Rambam's wording:
a) The words "even though the grain is threshed by their walking on it," which do not appear in the Rambam. Therefore, one might have understood the Rambam to mean specifically in a case where their walking on the field does not thresh the grain (and even then, it would be a novelty: one might think that nevertheless, he should be liable for 'You shall not muzzle,' since their walking on the grain is for the purpose of threshing in another field, and therefore the walking itself should be considered 'while it is threshing'). The Alter Rebbe explicitly explains "even though the grain is threshed," indicating that this applies even when they thresh the grain they walk on.
b) The reason why he is not liable for 'You shall not muzzle' — "since he does not intend to lead them there for that purpose." This reason is not mentioned by earlier authorities. The Ramban brings as a reason the teaching from the Yerushalmi "while it is threshing and not while it is treading." We must say that the Alter Rebbe holds that the teaching from the Yerushalmi is not a decree of the text, but there is a reason for the teaching — "since he does not intend, etc."
c) At the end of the halacha, the Alter Rebbe adds "and so it is in any similar case." What does he add with these words? In the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch...
5. The Shulchan Aruch, as mentioned earlier, is precise in every word, and certainly in several words, and all the more so when there is an addition of an entire concept. However, this follows from what he stated earlier: since the reason he is not liable for 'You shall not muzzle' is because he "does not intend" — and not due to a decree of the text — it is therefore necessary to say "and so it is in any similar case," that also elsewhere, if he does not intend, he is exempt.
Regarding the exemption of one who does not intend, there is a dispute among the poskim: the author of the Sheiltot holds that one who does not intend is exempt only in the case of Shabbat labors, because regarding Shabbat, the law is that "the Torah prohibited only a deliberate act," and one who does not intend is not considered a "deliberate act." However, in other prohibitions, even if he does not intend — when his action is not aimed at performing the prohibited act — he is liable. But most poskim hold that even in other prohibitions, one who does not intend is exempt. This is what the Alter Rebbe adds with the words "and so it is in any similar case" (not only similar in threshing): since the reason for the exemption of "while it is threshing and not while it is treading" is not a decree of the text but because "he does not intend," one can learn from this for "any similar case," for all other prohibitions, that also in them, one who does not intend is exempt.
6. The law that one who does not intend is exempt applies specifically in a case where the action he performs does not necessarily bring about the prohibited act, in which case he is exempt even if it happens that a prohibited act results from it. However, if the action he intends to perform necessarily results in a prohibition — in the language of the Talmud, if it is "inevitable" — then the intention of his action is transferred also to the prohibited act, and it is not considered "he does not intend." According to this, it turns out that when he leads the animals on the grain, even though he indeed does not intend to thresh, since as they walk they must inevitably thresh the grain, it is an "inevitable" outcome, and the threshing cannot be called "he does not intend."
This is in the prohibition itself. For example: when a metzora carries a stick on his shoulder which has tzaraat, and as a result, the affliction will certainly be removed, since the inevitability is in the removal of the affliction, which is itself the prohibition, it is not considered "he does not intend," and therefore a special teaching is needed to permit it. However, in our case, where the "inevitability" is not in the muzzling (he does not need to muzzle them), but in the threshing, and threshing itself is a permissible act — it is only that during the threshing one must not muzzle, but in the threshing itself there is no prohibition — the law of "inevitable" does not apply, and it remains "he does not intend," and therefore he is not liable.
6. A new law (with a preface): Just as there is a prohibition of "You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing," there is also a prohibition of "You shall not thresh with a muzzled ox." According to the above, it follows that the law regarding "cows walking on the grain, etc., he does not transgress 'You shall not muzzle'" applies specifically when he muzzles the cows later, after he has already led them onto the grain (and they are walking on their own — "walking"), for then there is no "inevitable" outcome concerning a prohibited matter. However, if he muzzled the cows before he led them onto the grain, since the "inevitable" outcome is then concerning a prohibited matter — threshing with a muzzled ox — he transgresses "You shall not muzzle" even when he does not intend to thresh.
Seemingly, if so, why does the Alter Rebbe not explicitly state that the law applies only if he muzzled them later and not earlier? The reason is that, as it appears in several places, one of the principles in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch — similar to the same principle in the Rambam's Yad HaChazakah — is that the Rambam does not (explicitly) bring novel laws (except in certain places, where he says "it appears to me"). The Alter Rebbe only adds the reason for the law (also detailing the law), from which one can derive additional specific laws. Therefore, the Alter Rebbe did not explicitly present the distinction in law between muzzling the cows earlier and later, but he suffices with stating the reason that he does not transgress "You shall not muzzle" because he "does not intend." Together with the fact that the Alter Rebbe further adds "and so in all similar cases," that everywhere the law is that one who does not intend is exempt — "this comes to teach and ends up being learned": since from there we know the exemption of one who does not intend in other prohibitions, it is understood that also here — regarding "You shall not muzzle" — the criteria of "does not intend" are upheld, as in all prohibitions. From this, one can already derive the distinctions in law, whether the muzzling was earlier or later.
7. As mentioned above, one must study the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch with depth, delve into the style of his language, and be precise in his wording. Through this, many explanations and clarifications will be added to clarify the law in its place and also to derive from it for other areas in Torah, both those connected with the law itself and in matters connected with other fields of Torah.
8. As we see from the aforementioned section, in the style and precision of the Alter Rebbe's language, he innovates several matters: a) that one is not liable even when the grain is threshed by the walking of the cows; b) the reason for the exemption is because "he does not intend"; c) it follows that the exemption applies specifically when it is not a "psik reisha"; d) that the exemption of "does not intend" is not only regarding the labors of Shabbat (as per the view of the Sheiltot) but applies to all prohibitions in the Torah.
May the Almighty grant that we study the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch and Tanya with depth — especially in this year, the bicentennial of his passing — (and similarly regarding the general study of Nigleh and Chassidus), and that we study in a manner of "you have toiled," laboring with all three faculties of the intellect: wisdom, understanding, and knowledge. Then, as our Sages promise, "you will find"; not only will one achieve according to the measure of the toil, but "you will find" — much more than the measure of the effort, like a discovery that comes not through labor but unexpectedly, until one is granted the Torah as a gift, which then becomes an eternal acquisition for him, similar to how we find that when Moshe Rabbeinu was given the Torah as a gift, it was the solution to "forgetfulness," and he no longer forgot it.
9. The custom of Israel is to conclude a book with its beginning. The beginning of the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch is the laws of rising in the morning, and the beginning of this is: "Yehuda ben Tema says: Be bold as a leopard and light as an eagle... to do the will of your Father in Heaven." One can explain the connection between the conclusion of the Shulchan Aruch and its beginning:
In the final words of the Shulchan Aruch, "and so in all similar cases," the Alter Rebbe intends to say, as mentioned earlier, that the exemption of "does not intend" is not only in the case of muzzling (due to the decree of the text) and not only on Shabbat (where it must be a thoughtful labor), but — in all prohibitions of the Torah, if they are done in a manner of "does not intend," one is exempt and does not transgress any prohibition.
Regarding mitzvos, there is a dispute whether mitzvos require intention or do not require intention. The ruling remains (according to several authorities) that several types of mitzvos do not require intention. That is, if one performs them incidentally, without intending to fulfill the mitzvah, even more so: (in several mitzvos...
10. Even if one instructs a Jew to perform the mitzvah, he fulfills it. This means that regarding intention, there is a distinction between a mitzvah and a transgression: for transgressions, if one "does not intend" (even not for the action itself), he does not transgress any prohibition. In contrast, for mitzvos, even if performed without intention, one fulfills the mitzvah.
We must understand the reason for this distinction. On the contrary, it seems that the opposite should be true: the essence of mitzvos is connection and unity; a mitzvah causes the person who performs it and the physical object with which it is performed to become connected with the Divine. A transgression, on the other hand, causes the opposite: through committing a transgression, the person and the physical object become separated from G‑dliness. Physical things, by their nature (including the body and the animal soul), before a mitzvah or transgression is performed with them, are under the dominion of the kelipah nogah of this world, which is mostly evil. Therefore, they are closer to evil than to good. It would seem, then, that making the physical separate should be easier than achieving a connection and unity with G‑dliness. So why is it that to effect separation, one must have specific intention, whereas connection and unity can be achieved even without intention?
The explanation for this is found in the beginning of the Shulchan Aruch: the laws of rising in the morning... to do the will of your Father in Heaven, and (in the manner of) "be bold as a leopard, etc." Since in the morning, at the start of the day, every Jew connects with the Divine by saying "Modeh Ani" and similar expressions, he is thereby connected with G‑d for the entire day. Therefore, even if later (in specific actions) he does not intend to perform the mitzvah, the act of the mitzvah contains the connection with G‑d from the start of the day (similar to the case of betrothal, where if they are engaged in that matter, and he gives the woman a coin without explicitly stating it is for betrothal, she becomes betrothed to him).
This, however, applies only to mitzvos. In contrast, with a transgression: as long as he does not explicitly intend the action (through which one transgresses a prohibition), "does not intend" — it is not a transgression. Because a) there is no intention in his action, no soul to the body of the action, which would make it a transgression. b) Furthermore, by saying "Modeh Ani" and similar expressions at the start of the day, he has (all day, at least subconsciously) an intention that is contrary to the concept of "transgression," similar to the opinion that holds mitzvos do not require intention, that if he has an opposite intention during the mitzvah, explicitly intending not to fulfill it, he does not fulfill the mitzvah, and the same applies to an opposite intention regarding a transgression.
8. However, we still need to understand: The law regarding mitzvos not requiring intention and the law that for transgressions, if one does not intend, he is exempt, apply to every Jew. This includes even one who at the beginning of the day did not perform any action to connect with the Almighty, and did not even say "Modeh Ani." Why, then, does this distinction in the law of "not intending" exist between mitzvos and transgressions for such a Jew?
The fact that even such a Jew is exempt when he commits a transgression without intention can be understood: Although he is in a state of rejecting the yoke of Heaven, his previous, concealed intention of rejecting the yoke does not affect every specific transgression (so that it would be considered "engaged in that matter") — because in the realm of klipah, there is no unity. Klipah is characterized by separation; each moment in klipah is distinct from the other. Therefore, it is not (always) applicable to say that one moment influences the other. However, it is not clear: Why, for such a person who is in a state of rejecting the yoke, do mitzvos not require intention? It seems that for him, it is not applicable to say that he has a concealed intention to connect with the Almighty.
The truth is, however, that every Jew, in the innermost part of his soul, has a desire to do good. And even though this desire is concealed within him, it is still connected to his actual matters. Therefore, it is similar to being "engaged in that matter." This is analogous to the case of sacrifices, where even if the Kohanim do not have the specific intentions required for the sacrifices, the "heart of the court stipulates on their behalf" — due to the inner dedication of every Jew to the court (and their rulings), the stipulation of the court helps, and it is as if the Kohanim themselves had the proper intention.