לקוטי שיחות חלק לט - תצא (תנש"א)

1. The Rambam writes at the beginning of the laws of marriage: "Before the giving of the Torah, a man would encounter a woman in the marketplace. If he and she desired to marry, he would bring her into his home and consummate the marriage privately, and she would become his wife. Once the Torah was given, the Jewish people were commanded that if a man wishes to marry a woman, he must first acquire her in the presence of witnesses, and then she becomes his wife, as it is stated, 'When a man takes a wife and comes to her.'

The Rambam continues in the subsequent laws, stating that 'this acquisition is a positive commandment... it is called kiddushin or erusin everywhere... and once the woman is acquired and becomes betrothed, even if she has not been consummated or entered her husband's home, she is considered a married woman... and if he wishes to divorce her, she requires a get.'

At first glance, it is puzzling why the Rambam begins with a description of the status of marriage before the giving of the Torah, rather than starting with the laws of marriage after the Torah: 'If a man wishes to marry a woman, he must first acquire her... and then she becomes his wife...'

Seemingly, the practical implication of this in our times is regarding a Ben Noach, as the Maggid Mishneh writes here, 'It is clear and explained in many places that for non-Jews, mere designation is sufficient for her to be his wife, and once he has relations with her for the sake of marriage, she is considered a married woman, and another non-Jew is liable for her, as mentioned in chapter 9 of the laws of kings and their wars.'

However, this does not seem to be a reason to introduce this matter at the beginning of the laws of marriage, which only discuss the laws of marriage for Jews. It should have been mentioned in the laws of kings, where the laws of the children of Noach are explained.

Similarly, in the laws of divorce, at the beginning of the laws of divorce, the Rambam only writes about the laws of divorce for Jews (without prefacing the manner of divorce before the giving of the Torah) — 'A woman is not divorced except by a document that reaches her, and this document is called a get... as it is stated in the Torah, "and he sends her from his house," it does not mean that the divorce is not complete until she leaves his house, but once the get reaches her hand, the divorce is complete even if she is still in his house'; and only in the laws of kings does he explain the laws of divorce for a Ben Noach — 'From when is a friend's wife considered like our divorcee? From when he sends her from his house and sends her on her own, or when she leaves his domain and goes on her own, for they do not have divorce by document.'

It must be said that this preface regarding the status of marriage before the giving of the Torah is relevant to the laws of marriage for Jews (after the giving of the Torah).

2. At first glance, this could be explained based on what is explained elsewhere, that before the giving of the Torah, there was no concept of "acquisition" as there is after the Torah. The concept of "married woman" (in simple terms) is not that the woman is owned by the husband like an object acquired by a person, but rather that this woman and this man become like one entity through marriage, as the verse states, "and he shall cleave to his wife." Therefore, without the Torah's command that a man "must first acquire her... and then she becomes his wife," there is no basis to say that there is an "acquisition" that can effectuate the status of "married woman" when she is not yet "his wife" in the simple sense, because "she has not been consummated and (even) has not entered her husband's home," and only the Torah's command creates the reality of "acquisition" that makes the woman a married woman.

It can be said that there is also a practical implication in our times for a Ben Noach, that if a Ben Noach acquires a woman through one of the methods of acquisition for the sake of betrothal, etc., nothing is effectuated by this act, and she remains single as before the act of acquisition. As the Rambam states in the laws of kings, "A Ben Noach is not liable for another's wife until... after she has been consummated by her husband, but if she is betrothed or has entered the chuppah and has not been consummated, they are not liable for her."

Based on this, it can be said that for this reason, the Rambam prefaced the laws of marriage before the giving of the Torah, to emphasize the novelty in the concept of kiddushin after the giving of the Torah, as we see that before the giving of the Torah, the only way to create the status of marriage was by living together as husband and wife — "he brings her into his home and consummates the marriage, etc."

However, this explanation is not sufficient, because seemingly there is no practical implication for the laws of marriage for Jews.

7. Furthermore, what is the difference between kiddushin and divorce, that the Rambam did not preface the laws of divorce before the giving of the Torah, even though the aforementioned differences between Jews and Bnei Noach regarding the laws of kiddushin and divorce are interdependent? Since the concept of marriage for a Ben Noach is created through bringing her into his home (i.e., actual marital life), similarly, sending her away from his home effects the divorce. In contrast, for Jews, marriage is created through acquisition and "lekuchin," and therefore the annulment of this acquisition is specifically through a document. Thus, just as the Rambam prefaced the laws of marriage before the giving of the Torah to emphasize the novelty in the concept of lekuchin after the giving of the Torah, he should have also prefaced the laws of divorce before the giving of the Torah to emphasize the novelty in the laws of divorce after the giving of the Torah (that she is divorced through a "document," even while still in her husband's house).

8. This can be understood by first examining another precision in the Rambam here:

In the concept of marriage for Jews, there are two stages — erusin, which is the acquisition and lekuchin (through money, a document, or cohabitation), and nisuin (through entering the chuppah). Although even through erusin alone, the woman is already considered a "married woman," nevertheless, many obligations (even those of the Torah) only apply through nisuin, at which point they are husband and wife in all matters.

Based on this, it is puzzling that at the beginning of the laws of marriage, the Rambam only explains the concept of kiddushin (erusin), whereas the laws of nisuin are not mentioned until chapter ten, where he explains that when "he brings her into his home and they seclude themselves, and this seclusion is called entering the chuppah, and this is called marriage everywhere... and she is his wife in all matters." Seemingly, he should have explained the concept of "nisuin" immediately at the beginning of the laws of marriage, together with the explanation of kiddushin and erusin.

Moreover, kiddushin is only the beginning of the mitzvah of marriage... erusin without nisuin certainly does not complete the mitzvah yet, and therefore it is even more puzzling that he did not explain the concept of nisuin immediately at the beginning of the laws of marriage.

It is even more perplexing because in the first two chapters of the laws of marriage, the Rambam explains twenty terms related to these laws, and at the end of chapter two, he lists all twenty terms, starting with the term "kiddushin" (and concludes "keep all these terms in mind... so that we do not need to explain each term whenever we mention it") — yet the term "nisuin" is not mentioned there at all.

9. It seems that the Rambam holds that the primary novelty of the Torah regarding the concept of marriage for Jews is only in the aspect of kiddushin. As mentioned earlier, the entire concept of these lekuchin was innovated by the Torah's command. However, regarding nisuin, the essence and nature of marriage did not change from what it was before the giving of the Torah. The concept of nisuin itself is the reality of marital life, in the Rambam's words, "he brings her into his home... and she becomes his wife," and in this, there is no fundamental change between before and after the giving of the Torah.

This is why the Rambam is precise in his wording: "Once the Torah was given, the Jews were commanded that if a man wishes to marry a woman, he must first acquire her... and then she becomes his wife," and he goes on to detail these "lekuchin" and not the aspect of "marrying her" (nisuin), because the Torah's novelty is not in the aspect of "marrying a woman" ("she becomes his wife") itself, as this aspect remained as it was before the giving of the Torah, but only in the lekuchin that precede the nisuin, "he must first acquire her (and then she becomes his wife)." This is precisely the reason the Rambam prefaced...

4. Regarding the order of the concept of marriage "before the giving of the Torah," this is not merely a preface to understand the novelty of kiddushin for Jews, but rather to explain the term nisuin (even now after the giving of the Torah), which is the main aspect of marriage. It turns out that not only did the Rambam not omit the explanation of the term nisuin here, but on the contrary, this is the beginning of the laws of marriage [he explains how it was "before the giving of the Torah," since this did not change after the giving of the Torah] — and only afterward does he explain the twenty specific names related to the concept of marriage (starting with the name "kiddushin").

Based on this, we understand the difference between marriage and divorce, as here the Rambam precedes the law of marriage before the giving of the Torah, unlike in the case of divorce. This is because regarding marriage, the nature of marriage before the giving of the Torah remains even after the giving of the Torah in the aspect of nisuin (and the novelty of the giving of the Torah is in the lekuchin that precede the nisuin); whereas in divorce, the departure (and sending away) from the husband's house as it is with the Bnei Noach does not apply at all to Jews.

5. It can be said that this matter is relevant to halacha — because this is the foundation of the Rambam's view on the concept of chuppah (which is what effects nisuin), where we find several opinions about what constitutes entering the chuppah, and the Rambam rules that entering the chuppah means "yichud," "that he brings her into his home and secludes with her and designates her for himself" — and this is very close to the description of marriage before the giving of the Torah, where "he brings her into his home and consummates the marriage, etc." This is because the Rambam holds that the concept of nisuin after the giving of the Torah is the same as the concept of nisuin before the giving of the Torah, which is the act of marital life, and therefore, for a woman to be considered "married," it is equivalent to the way of marriage before the giving of the Torah.

And although there is a practical difference between nisuin before the giving of the Torah and nisuin after the giving of the Torah, as before the giving of the Torah (and also for Bnei Noach after the giving of the Torah) there must be actual marital relations ("consummation, etc."), whereas for Jews, yichud alone suffices to consider her married, as the Rambam writes that "once she enters the chuppah, she is called married even if she has not consummated the marriage" — in addition to this, the concept of yichud (for the sake of marriage) itself is like the act of marriage [especially since the Rambam specifies that yichud alone is not sufficient but must be in a manner of "designating her for himself," as explained in the poskim that it must be in a permanent manner, not bringing her into his home temporarily, etc.], the Rambam writes that this yichud must be "fit for consummation, but if she was a niddah, even if she entered the chuppah and secluded with her, the nisuin is not completed, and she is still considered betrothed." According to the above, the reason is simply understood, because this is the entire nature of the concept of nisuin, bringing her into his home and living together as husband and wife, and therefore the yichud must be fit for marital life.

6. Based on the above, we can explain in a homiletic manner the connection and relationship between the beginning of the Book of Nashim and the end of the Book of Zmanim that precedes it.

To preface, as it is known the great precision in the order of matters in the Rambam's books, it is reasonable to say that there is a thematic connection between the fourteen books of the Rambam, where the beginning of each book follows the conclusion of the previous book.

In our case — the Book of Zmanim and the Book of Nashim — the connection between them is clear and explicit: the last halacha of the Book of Zmanim is "if he has before him the lamp of his house and the Chanukah lamp, etc., the lamp of his house takes precedence because of the peace of his home, for the name is erased to make peace between a man and his wife, great is peace for the entire Torah was given to make peace in the world, as it is said, 'Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace.'" And this is the content of the entire Book of Nashim, the matter of "peace between a man and his wife."

Additionally, at the beginning of the Book of Nashim, it emphasizes not only the matter of "peace between a man and his wife," but also the detail that the matter of peace is achieved through (the giving of) the Torah, as the very conclusion of the Book of Zmanim states, "for the entire Torah was given to make peace in the world."

6. In the initial halachos of the Book of Nashim, the Rambam emphasizes (as mentioned earlier) the innovation introduced by the giving of the Torah regarding marriage: "Before the giving of the Torah, a man would encounter a woman in the marketplace, etc. Once the Torah was given, the Jewish people were commanded that if a man wishes to marry a woman, he must first acquire her, etc., and only then will she be his wife." It is understood simply that this order, requiring acquisition before she becomes his wife, indicates the strength and permanence of their bond. Before the giving of the Torah, as soon as he and she desired, "he would bring her into his house, etc.," and it is understood that there was no strong bond, as just as he brought her in, he could send her away from his house immediately when he wished, similar to "a son of the night was and a son of the night perished." However, after the giving of the Torah, since he does not bring her into his house immediately upon encountering her, but only after the preliminary step of "first acquiring her, etc.," it is understood that this has a greater permanence and strength. And he cannot send her away immediately when he wishes, but "if he wishes to divorce her, she requires a get."

[Based on this, it is also understood why the Rambam continues with another law that was innovated with the giving of the Torah — "Before the giving of the Torah, a man would encounter a woman in the marketplace, etc., and this is what is called a harlot. Once the Torah was given, harlotry was forbidden, etc.," which also has the content of increasing peace, as the Rambam explains in the Guide for the Perplexed regarding the reason for the prohibition of harlotry, that "the benefits... preventing quarrels... if harlotry were permitted... they would not escape disputes, and most often they would kill each other or kill her, etc."].

7. It can be said that what was explained earlier regarding the Rambam's intention at the beginning of the laws of marriage, that the innovation of the Torah is primarily in the matter of betrothal, while the matter of marriage is similar to the pre-Torah state of marriage, is connected to the Rambam's words at the end of the Book of Zmanim.

This can be understood by first examining the precise language of the Rambam, "the Torah was given to make peace in the world," and yet the Torah was given specifically to Israel, "an inheritance of the congregation of Jacob." Therefore, it should have said "to make peace in Israel" (or similar), so why does it say "to make peace in the world"?

At first glance, this could be explained based on the Rambam's words that "Moses our teacher commanded by the word of the Almighty to compel all the inhabitants of the world to accept the commandments that the children of Noah were commanded," and also that a non-Jew who accepts upon himself the seven Noahide commandments and is careful to observe them is not of the pious among the nations unless he does them "because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah." Therefore, the effect of the Torah is also upon the non-Jews, for through the observance of the seven Noahide commandments, peace is achieved among them.

[Based on this, the double language in the verse "Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace" can also be explained: the difference between "way" and "path" is that a way is a broad and large road, while a path is a narrow and small trail. In our context — "way" refers to the 613 mitzvos of the Torah given specifically to Israel, which is the larger and main part of the Torah, while "paths" refers to the seven Noahide commandments, which are only a very small part, etc.

This is why regarding "ways" it uses "pleasantness" specifically, and regarding "paths" it says "peace": the effect of the Torah on the non-Jews is the very nature of peace, whereas for the Jewish people, "every Jew... as one man, friends," "all Israel are brothers," there is an aspect of peace due to the very nature of their souls, and the effect of the Torah is to add to the peace itself, so that there is also an aspect of "pleasantness"].

However, this is not a sufficient explanation, because from the language of the Rambam "the entire Torah was given to make peace in the world," it is proven that when he says "peace in the world," he does not mean the effect of the seven Noahide commandments on the non-Jews, but rather the effect of the 613 mitzvos of Israel.

6. It can be explained as follows: In the effect of Torah and mitzvos, there are two categories: behaviors in matters of holiness that pertain exclusively to the Jewish people and are not inherently related to the "world"; and matters that, in general, have parallels among the nations of the world, but through the giving of the Torah, a fundamental change occurs within them, in a way that the Torah brings "peace in the world," adding an element of peace to worldly matters.

This is what the Rambam writes, that the primary intention of giving the Torah below is not so much for the effect of Torah and mitzvos in elevating the Jewish people above the world, but rather, on the contrary, for the renewal and addition of "peace" within the matters of the world itself ("peace in the world").

This concept is emphasized in the matter of "peace between a man and his wife," which the Rambam continues to discuss at the beginning of the laws of marriage, regarding the nature of marriage before the giving of the Torah. Even then, there was a concept of marriage, a way to establish the matter of marriage, "and she shall be his wife," which itself is a matter of "peace." However, the Torah affects "peace in the world" by adding to the concept of "peace" in a way that includes (in addition to "peace") also the aspect of "pleasantness," by requiring that before marriage, one must first acquire the woman, "and then she shall be his wife."

8. This concept can be further explained in the context of betrothal and marriage according to the inner dimensions of the matters:

It is known that man and woman, groom and bride, are an analogy for the relationship between the Holy One, blessed be He, and the congregation of Israel. The connection of Israel to their Father in Heaven is compared to betrothal and marriage. The difference between them is: betrothal, which is "kiddushin" — from the term "forbidden to all the world like a consecrated item" — indicates the drawing down of a higher holiness upon the person, which is far above the worldly matters, and therefore it is separate from the world — holiness from the term separation — which causes the person to be separate and distinct from the world (prohibition, negation); whereas the concept of marriage is when this holiness is drawn into the person internally, so that the person, even as they exist within the limitations of the body and the world, becomes a vessel for this holiness.

This is why the concept of marriage itself (i.e., the union and internalization) is not the primary innovation of the giving of the Torah, because the movement of drawing down the light of holiness internally existed even before the giving of the Torah (i.e., in the limited divine light, relative to the worlds); the primary innovation of the Torah is in the matter of betrothal, which is the drawing down of holiness that is above the worldly matters, which is not within the power of a person by themselves but only through the power of the Torah.

However, after a person is given the power to draw down this holiness, the subsequent marriage, in which this higher holiness is drawn internally, occurs naturally in a completely different manner, in a way of permanence and strong connection, because the internalization is from this holiness that is above the worldly matters.

On the contrary: the ultimate purpose is not in the matter of betrothal (where the light remains in a state of separation and surrounding), but specifically in the matter of marriage, as the Rambam states, "the entire Torah was given to make peace in the world," which is the drawing down of holiness specifically into the world, and this matter will be revealed in the future, as our sages say that at the time of the giving of the Torah, there was only the matter of betrothal, and the matter of marriage between the Holy One, blessed be He, and the congregation of Israel will occur in the true and complete redemption through our righteous Moshiach, may he come and redeem us and lead us upright to our land, speedily in our days, amen.

4. See the commentary of the Rashash on the Rambam here, that a non-Jew acquires only through relations, "and perhaps the uniqueness mentioned by Reish Lakish is without witnesses."

5. This is so. — However, there the novelty is the opposite, that one is not obligated through betrothal or entering the chuppah but only "after she has been intimate with her husband," whereas here the novelty is that "through mere seclusion (even without betrothal or chuppah) she becomes his wife."

6. Especially since this matter of "through mere seclusion she becomes his wife" is not explicitly stated in the Laws of Kings there, as mentioned in the previous note.

7. There, law 5.

8. Our parsha, 24:2.

9. There, law 8.

10. Likutei Sichos, volume 30, page 243 and onwards. — And see there (and in note 34 there) the explanation of the term 'betrothal' in Rashi's commentary, as well as what is written "give me my wife". And more.

11. Genesis 2:24.

12. In the Tzafnas Paneach on the Torah, Shemos, that Amram "added the law of marriage" before the giving of the Torah. However, it can be said that there the emphasis is on "marriage," meaning entering the chuppah, as the language of the Gemara cited there (Bava Basra 120a) "he seated her in the canopy, etc." But in the Maharatz Chayes to Sotah (12a), it is explained that Amram added "the mitzvah of betrothal." See Likutei Sichos there, note 42. Likutei Sichos, volume 18, page 290, note 57.

13. There, law 7.

14. And what is written that "they are not liable for her," which implies that initially it is forbidden — it can be said that this is not because she already has the status of a married woman, but because since she entered the chuppah, etc., it is like a commitment to marry, and it is similar to deception or theft, etc.. And this is not the place for further discussion.

15. Like the distinction between a betrothed maiden who is liable to stoning and a married woman who is liable to strangulation; the distinction in the manner of annulling vows of a betrothed woman and a married woman. And more.

16. Law 1.

17. The response of Rabbi Avraham, son of the Rambam, brought in Kesef Mishneh here, chapter 1, law 2 "to betroth, which is not a mitzvah... to marry... which is a mitzvah").

18. As is emphasized in the response of Rabbi Avraham, son of the Rambam there.

19. Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer, beginning of section 55 and in the Rema there. And see the Talmudic Encyclopedia, entry "chuppah" at the beginning. And elsewhere.

20. Laws of Marriage, chapter 10, law 1.

21. There, law 2.

22. As ruled by the Rambam "the witnesses of seclusion are the witnesses of intimacy."

23. Beit Shmuel and Chelkat Mechokek to Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer there.

24. There, law 2.

25. See the beginning of Sotah: "Since the Tanna concluded with Nazir, what did he teach that he taught Sotah?" And similarly in the beginning of Shevuot. And more. Tosafot at the beginning of Bava Metzia and the beginning of Bava Batra.

26. Proverbs 3:17.

27. See above, note 12.

28. As the language of the Rambam (Laws of Kings, chapter 9, law 8) "when he sends her away, etc., or when she leaves, etc., whenever he or she wishes to separate from one another, they separate."

29. Jonah 4:10.

30. Note from the Guide for the Perplexed (part 3, chapter 49) on the reason why divorce is not achieved by words alone or by sending her from his house, but only through a document.

31. Law 4.

32. There.

33. Berachot 33d. Sanhedrin 59a. Rambam, Laws of Kings, chapter 8, law 10.

34. Laws of Kings there.

35. Laws of Kings there, law 11.

36. See Ohr HaTorah on Nevi'im and Ketuvim, volume 1, on the verse in Proverbs there (page 554). And elsewhere. Maamarim of the Mitteler Rebbe, Bereishit, page 6.

37. Sefer Shoftim, chapter 20, verse 11. Tanya, Iggeret HaKodesh, end of chapter 22. There, chapter 31. And see the next note.

38. See the commentators brought in Ohr HaTorah on the verse in Proverbs there.

40. Primarily, these are the mitzvos between a person and their fellow. It is worth noting the language of the Sages (Shabbat 31a), "This is the entire Torah," and Rashi's commentary there (in his second explanation), "such as robbery, theft, adultery, and most of the mitzvos."

41. Kiddushin 2, beginning of page 2a.

42. See Tanya, chapter 46 (66a).

43. It is noteworthy what is explained in various places that Kiddushin (betrothal) is an encompassing aspect, which is why the betrothal is specifically done with a ring (Torah Or, end of Parshat Vayigash, and in various places).

44. Note from Likutei Torah, Shemini Atzeret 91a.

45. Shemot Rabbah, end of chapter 15. Explained according to Chassidus in Torah Or there. Likutei Torah, Shir HaShirim 48a. And more.