6171 —בשאלת הצפור במצורע וכוונה בשחיטה

B"H, 9th of Nissan, 5718.

Brooklyn.

Haraha"g vavac"h iy"a nu"n ish rav pe'alim Yaakov Neiman

Shalom u'Vrachah!

Regarding Kiddushin 57a and the Talmud's question about the Metzora's bird: if it was slaughtered and found to be treif, why is it permitted for benefit? Where was its prohibition (i.e., its sanctity) permitted? (Rashi). Your honor asks: why not say that since this possibility existed from the outset, it was never fully sanctified—similar to Bava Kama 100b. But this cannot be said; otherwise, when its blood is spilled, why must the sent-away bird die—as per the end of that Mishnah (Negaim ch.14 m.5)? The reason we do not say "since this possibility existed from the outset" can be explained for several reasons. What seems closest to me is as Tosafot writes on "since this possibility existed..." (Bava Kama there): one does not consider such possibilities in advance; likewise here, one does not consider it in advance since we do not suspect treifot—especially according to the Talmud in Kiddushin that it became treif through slaughter—and most who are involved in slaughter are experts. Especially with offerings that require intent, and even more so according to halacha regarding the Metzora's bird whose slaughter must be by Kohanim—who are diligent. Alternatively: once it is slaughtered, one cannot claim "since this possibility existed..." (and also does not wish to make such a condition during slaughter), since that would render it as non-sacred slaughter in the Temple courtyard. Or: once it is slaughtered—it is already under the Kohen's authority. And if conditions were made as above... This parallels questions regarding Terumah and offerings which do not fall into these two categories (Nedarim 59a; Darkei Moshe and Shach Yoreh Deah 323:2).

Summary

The Rebbe analyzes a complex halachic issue about intent and status in ritual slaughter, teaching us to carefully consider both precedent and context before applying logical assumptions in Torah law.