003a - הלוקח עובר חמורו פרק ראשון בכורות דף ג, ע"א

Is it not about the animal?^[1]

מאי לאו אבהמה - this refers to what it teaches, “they fine him” — that we fine him to redeem the animal. It follows that he sold the animal for her offspring, for kabbalah is nothing but an arrangement over the offspring; and we fine him both according to Rabbi Yehudah and according to the Rabbanan, for the Rabbanan disagree with Rabbi Yehudah only with regard to bechorah.

No.

About the fetus.

לא אעובר - we fine him, for it was already in her womb and he sold it outright; but offspring that she is destined to conceive — we are not concerned about.

The language is also precise,

דיקא נמי - that it refers to the fetus, from what it teaches “he gives its whole value to the kohen”; and if it were about the animal, what business has a kohen with it?

for it teaches: they fine him up to ten times its value.

Learn from it.

It supports Reish Lakish,^[2]

מסייע ליה - this which it teaches, “they fine”.

for Reish Lakish said: one who sells a large animal to an idolater — they fine him up to ten times her value.

Is it precise, or not precise?^[3]

או לאו דוקא - that we do not fine him so much; or alternatively, that we fine him more than this, if the idolater does not agree to that.

Come and hear: for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: one who sells his slave to an idolater — they fine him up to a hundred times his value.

ת"ש - since with a slave it teaches a hundred and here ten, learn from it that it is precise; for if it were not precise, let it teach both as a hundred or both as ten.

A slave is different, for every single day he removes him from mitzvos.^[4]

לעולם - an animal is not precise, for we do not fine him so much; but with a slave, it is because every single day, and so forth.

And some say: Reish Lakish said: one who sells a large animal to an idolater — they fine him up to a hundred times her value.^[5]

But we learned: and one who gives to him in kabbalah, though he is not permitted — they fine him up to ten times her value?

A sale — he has severed her from himself;

kabbalah — he has not severed her from himself.

Is it precise, or not precise?

דוקא - a hundred, or not precise? In the second version we read, with a slave, “up to ten times his value”; it follows that the hundred stated for an animal is not precise, for a slave, whom he removes from his mitzvos, and we fine only ten.

Come and hear: for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: one who sells his slave to an idolater — they fine him up to ten times his value.

A slave is different, for he does not return to him.^[6]

שאני עבד - for this reason we do not fine him more: because when he redeems him he does not return to his master, for we hold in Maseches Gittin (43a) that one who sells his slave to an idolater, the slave goes free.

An animal — what is the reason? Because she does return to him.

וקפריך - an animal — what is the reason that we fine him more? Because she returns to him.

Let us fine him one more?

ה"ג אי הכי א"כ ליקנסיה טפי חד - the measure of her value — let us fine him more than ten, for in what returns to him he gains only her value, and the fine is only ten; therefore let it teach eleven times her value and no more.

Rather: a slave is an uncommon matter, and in any uncommon matter the Rabbanan did not decree:^[7]

And the Sages say: whenever the idolater’s hand is in between, etc.:^[8]

Rabbi Yehoshua said: and both of them expounded one verse:

every firstborn [שמות יג, ב].

כל בכור - in Israel. The Rabbanan hold: had it been written “a firstborn in Israel”, it would have implied that even part of a Jew’s firstborn is liable to bechorah.

The Rabbanan hold: firstborn implies part of a firstborn;^[9]

so the Torah wrote every — until the whole of it is there.

Rabbi Yehudah holds: firstborn implies the whole of a firstborn;

so the Torah wrote every — that even any part at all suffices.

Or if you wish, say: all agree that firstborn implies the greater part of it.

One master holds: every comes to complete,

למלויי אתא - until the whole of it belongs to a Jew.

and one master holds: it comes to diminish.

לגרועי - for every implies any amount at all, as in your maidservant has nothing at all in the house (Melachim II 4).

And how much must the idolater’s partnership be for it to be exempt from bechorah?^[10]

Rav Huna said: even its ear.

אפי' אזנו - even if the idolater’s partnership is only in the ear of the bechor, it is not sanctified.

Rav Nachman objects: but let him say to him,

ולימא ליה - the kohen to the idolater.

take your ear and go?

שקיל אזנך וזיל - for even if it were a blemished bechor, it is given to the kohen.

It was stated: Rav Chisda said: something that renders it a neveilah;^[11]

נבילה - such as where the idolater has a share in its gullet or its windpipe; since its life is in the idolater’s hand, it is considered as though the whole of it were the idolater’s.

and Rava said: something that renders it a treifah.

In what do they disagree?

מאי קמיפלגי - Rav Chisda and Rava.

In whether a treifah lives.

The one who says “something that renders it a treifah” holds that a treifah does not live;

רבא סבר טריפה אינה חיה - therefore it is considered as though the whole of her were the idolater’s.

and the one who says “something that renders it a neveilah” holds that a treifah does live.

ורב חסדא סבר טריפה חיה - therefore only something that renders her a neveilah counts.

The Rabbanan said before Rav Pappa: this of Rav Huna, and Rav Chisda and Rava, do not disagree.^[12]

לא פליגי - Rav Chisda and Rava with Rav Huna; but Rav Chisda and Rava do disagree with each other.

This one is about it,

[הא בו] - if the idolater has a share in the bechor itself, even in its ear, it is not sanctified.

and this one is about its mother.

באמו - either a neveilah or a treifah.

Rav Pappa said to them: what is different about it, that we require every firstborn and there is not? [בכורות ב, א]

About its mother too, we require all your cattle, the males [שמות לד, יט] and there is not?

כל מקנך תזכר - if all your cattle should be male — if yours should be male, you shall sanctify it, as we translate: the males you shall sanctify.

Rather, there is no difference.

Mar bar Rav Ashi objects: what is different about nefalim, that although they are not viable, they are sanctified?^[13]

מתקיף לה - on all of them.

For the master said: the issue of an animal [שמות יג, ב] — an issue within an animal.

שגר בהמה שגר בבהמה - an issue in the belly of an animal, whose time to emerge has not yet come. Another reading: “the issue of an animal” — what an animal sends forth and miscarries. It follows that although they are not viable, they are sanctified; so here too, if the idolater had in it something that renders it a neveilah, let the Jew’s share be sanctified, even though it is not viable.

There, since no unconsecrated portion is mixed in them, we call them, in an animal, every firstborn;

here, since an unconsecrated portion is mixed in them, we do not call them every firstborn.^[14]

Rabbi Elazar did not go into the beis midrash.

He found Rabbi Assi.

He said to him: what did the Rabbanan say in the beis midrash?

He said to him:^[15]

Tosafos

ורבי יהודה סבר כוליה בכור משמע - this is astonishing: in the chapter Kisuy Hadam (Chulin 88a) it says the opposite — Rabbi Yehudah says its blood means part of its blood, and the Rabbanan hold all its blood?^[16]

And Rabbeinu Tam explained that there, because blood would imply all the blood, the Torah wrote its blood to mean part of its blood — as it says here that it wrote every to mean even any amount at all.

And it is difficult, for there Rabbi Yehudah expounds its blood to divide?

And further, according to what Rabbeinu Tam ruled like Rabbi Yehudah, as I explained in the first chapter of Gittin (7b), there is a difficulty of one ruling against another?

For the halachah is not like Rabbi Yehudah here, as it says shortly: there is none who is concerned for this of Rabbi Yehudah, who said that partnership with an idolater is liable.

Therefore it is better to explain that one should draw a comparison only where the Gemara itself draws it,

like that case of “a virgin — even partial virginity” in the chapter Haba al Yevimto (Yevamos 59a).

And in the chapter Almanah Nizones (Kesubos 97b) it compares them to the dispute over “part of the money is like all the money”,

for those do resemble one another. This is a different matter: when the signs of virginity were diminished and part of them remained, it is as though all of them remained;

and likewise the money of the kesubah — part remained, and she has maintenance, as though all of it remained.

And there are many expositions that should not be equated:

“a lamb — even part of a lamb”, over which Rabbi Elazar and the Rabbanan disagree in the chapter Oso Ve’es Beno (Chulin 79b) and the chapter Hazroa (ibid. 132a);

and the dispute of Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseira and the Rabbanan over every soul.

And even if we were to equate that case of its blood with this one here, there is no difficulty from the fact that it rules here not like Rabbi Yehudah, while there it says: there is none who is concerned for this of Rabbi Shimon, who said we do not say part of the money is like all the money?

For on the contrary, it is a support that the halachah is like the Rabbanan — that firstborn implies part of a firstborn were it not for every; and there too, a virgin implies partial virginity.

One may further answer that there is no difficulty of Rabbi Yehudah against Rabbi Yehudah,^[17]

because the plain sense of the verse deals with ordinary animals, which are theirs and in which an idolater has no partnership; therefore, were it not for every, we would establish the verse as speaking of a whole firstborn.

Or alternatively, because it is written every firstborn in Israel [במדבר ג, יג], and in Israel implies the whole, as it says in the chapter Mitzvas Chalitzah (Yevamos 102a) — and with regard to chalitzah, until his father and his mother are of Israel; but elsewhere it does indeed imply a part:

רב חסדא אמר דבר שעושה אותה נבלה רבא אמר דבר שעושה אותה טריפה - in the first chapter of Temurah (11b) the reading is reversed, regarding one who says “the leg of this one is an olah”; and of the reversed readings, this is one of them — and the one there is the primary reading.^[18]

for it says there: Rav Chisda said, Rabbi Yehudah agrees in something that renders it a treifah; Rava said, in something that renders it a neveilah; Rav Sheishes said, in something it dies of, and so forth — each master adding to his fellow.

And in this way it fits that here Rav Huna said “its ear”, Rav Chisda adds a treifah, and Rava adds a neveilah.

And similarly in the chapter Hamapeles (Niddah 20b), regarding a sealed body up to the knee, and one adds up to its navel.

And as for what Rava said there, that if its gullet is perforated its mother is tamei with the tumah of childbirth — even if we read Rava in our sugya, since he is after Rav Chisda, there is no difficulty of Rava against Rava there?

for although a perforated gullet is a treifah, they did not compare it to a lack up to the knee:

הא דרב הונא ורב חסדא ורבא לא פליגי - this is obvious, that Rav Chisda and Rava do disagree.^[19]

Rather, this is what it means: this of Rav Huna does not disagree with Rav Chisda and Rava:

מ"ש מנפלים - although the verse wrote it there, we should have learned from there; or else let nefalim be learned from partnership, where it is written every firstborn, and let us equate all the expositions in one manner:

1. 1. The daf opens on the last proof of the sugya from 2b. The question is what the fine of ten times the value in the beraisa was imposed for — the animal or the fetus — since that decides whether selling an animal for her future offspring is forbidden.
2. 2. The answer is settled and the beraisa turns out to support Reish Lakish, whose ruling on selling large livestock to an idolater the Gemara now examines in its own right.
3. 3. The new question: is “ten times its value” an exact figure, or a round way of saying a heavy fine? The Gemara tests it against the fine for selling a slave.
4. 4. The answer in the first version: the figures are exact, and the slave carries the heavier fine because every day in an idolater’s hands costs him mitzvos he would otherwise perform.
5. 5. A second version of the whole passage, in which the figures are reversed — a hundred for the animal and ten for the slave — and the reasoning runs the other way: the slave goes free when sold, so his owner loses him outright, while the animal can be bought back.
6. 6. Selling a slave to an idolater sets the slave free, so the seller has lost him entirely; the fine need not be large to leave him out of pocket. An animal returns to the seller’s hand on redemption, so a bigger fine is needed to make the sale unprofitable.
7. 7. The conclusion of the second version: selling a slave to an idolater is rare enough that the Rabbanan never made a decree about it at all, so no comparison between the two figures holds.
8. 8. A new sugya. The Gemara quotes the closing clause of the Mishnah — the Sages’ rule that any share held by an idolater exempts — and now asks what Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages are each reading in the verse.
9. 9. The elegance of the answer: both sides read the same two words, every firstborn, and differ only over which word is doing the work. For the Sages firstborn alone would have included a part, and every restricts it to the whole; for Rabbi Yehudah firstborn alone would have meant the whole, and every extends it to any part.
10. 10. Having settled that a share exempts, the Gemara asks how small a share still does it. Rav Huna’s answer — even the ear — is the ruling that the rest of the sugya tests and refines.
11. 11. Rav Chisda and Rava both narrow Rav Huna: the idolater’s share must be in a part whose loss would kill the animal. They differ over how far that goes, and the difference turns on whether a treifah is regarded as living.
12. 12. Rav Pappa’s students propose that the three statements are not in conflict at all but address different cases — a share in the bechor itself, where even an ear suffices, against a share in its mother, where a vital organ is needed. Rav Pappa rejects the distinction.
13. 13. Mar bar Rav Ashi’s objection: a nefel — a non-viable newborn — is still sanctified as a bechor, which shows that viability is not what sanctity depends on. So why should a share in a vital organ make the difference?
14. 14. The answer, and the principle the sugya ends on: the disqualification is not about viability but about wholeness. A nefel is entirely the owner’s, so the verse’s every firstborn is satisfied; a jointly owned animal has something of the unconsecrated mixed into it, and the verse is not.
15. 15. The daf ends mid-conversation: Rabbi Elazar asks Rabbi Assi what was said in the study hall, and the answer begins on 3b.
16. 16. Tosfos’ long opening question, and the one this Tosfos is known for: in Chulin the same two parties take the opposite positions on whether a word implies a part or a whole. He works through several ways of reconciling them and ends by cautioning that expositions of this shape should not be lined up against each other unless the Gemara itself does so.
17. 17. Tosfos’ own preferred answer: Rabbi Yehudah’s reading here is not a general rule about the word firstborn but a reading of this verse in its plain setting, which is about a Jew’s own animals, where partnership is not in view at all.
18. 18. Tosfos reports that the Gemara in Temurah assigns these statements the other way round, and holds that version to be the correct one — on which the three Amoraim are not disputing but each adding a further case to the one before.
19. 19. A short correction of the Gemara’s own phrasing: Rav Chisda and Rava plainly do disagree with each other, so the statement must mean that Rav Huna does not disagree with them.