256 —בטחון, עשיית כלי, ולימודים מאברהם ויוסף

B"H, 2nd of Kislev, 5707.

Brooklyn, NY.

To the esteemed Avrech, the nu"n vavac"h iy"a etc. the Tamim Mahar"y sheyichyeh

Shalom u'Vrachah!

In response to your questions: A) Regarding bitachon (trust in G-d), whether one must make a vessel (natural effort), or if prayer and trust alone suffice; you heard some say that tzaddikim do not need a vessel, so why did Avraham need the advice of "Imri Na Achoti At" ("Say now you are my sister")? The answer is simple: In general, besides bitachon one must also make a vessel. All of Tanach and Midrashim are full of this idea—making a natural vessel does not contradict bitachon in Hashem since it is said to him by Hashem Elokav in whom he trusts that He will bless him in all that he does specifically, not by sitting idle (Sifri Devarim 15:18). From this we understand two points: A) The vessel and cause must be made only because we are commanded to do so; but if one thinks they help or harm on their own, this damages the trait of bitachon. B) Since man is only commanded regarding what is within his power—since the Holy One does not demand from His creations what they cannot do—if he cannot make a vessel, that itself is proof that Hashem exempts him from it; this does not weaken his bitachon that his request will be fulfilled.

Still there are two questions: A) Why were we commanded to make a vessel if the vessel itself seemingly neither adds nor detracts? B) What happens if one does not make a vessel? For question A: Chassidus explains (Derech Mitzvosecha Mitzvas Taglachas Metzora Keshitaher sec. 63) that due to a deep reason, blessing from Above comes into the world of action specifically via the garment of nature; therefore man too must create such a garment through work and livelihood (see Kuntres U'Mayon Maamar Koh at length; see Chovos HaLevavos Shaar HaBitachon ch. 3—cited in Maamar Velo Zachar Sar HaMashkim Azar"t—in another way which can be reconciled; this is not the place). B) If one does not make a vessel even though he could: Our Sages said (Shabbos 32a), "Never rely on miracles lest they do not occur," and then besides his trust not being fulfilled he will also be punished for endangering himself (see Derech Mitzvosecha there and Chovos HaLevavos ch. 4); and if a miracle does occur—it deducts from his merits (Shabbos ibid.) and burdens his Creator (Ramban Shaar HaGmul cited in Maamar Velo Zachar ibid.).

Even tzaddikim whose souls are from Atzilus—that is, their soul as vested in their body is truly Atzilus (see Likkutei Torah Shir HaShirim further explanation on Yonasi Susasi)—if matters of this world still disturb them, and since influence comes via garments in this world as above—they too strive to make vessels for their needs as explained above. But tzaddikim whom worldly matters do not disturb at all due to their absolute attachment—even when engaged heavily with worldly matters—they remain truly attached Above as if literally above; since even when involved with the world it holds no place for them at all—they do not need to make vessels. Torahs Chaim Devarim Haba Ben Porat Yosef explains at length (and Maamar Vaye'asor Yosef 5656) that the Avos were on the first level—thus shepherds isolated from worldly matters—and Avraham as above; Yaakov made many strategies because of Esav; but Yosef was on the second level so did not need to make vessels—and was even punished for doing so.

This seems difficult since Torahs Chaim there ch. 13 and Maamar Velo Zachar Azar"t ask why Yosef was punished for making efforts to free himself while Yaakov made many strategies without punishment; it answers that Yosef was above seder hishtalshelus—from Tohu and Tikkun etc.—but does not explain as above in this letter. However there is no difficulty since it also answers why Yosef was unconcerned about "perhaps sin will cause..." unlike Yaakov who feared this; thus it adds to what was explained earlier—that for Yosef worldly matters did not disturb him at all since he was above all opposition.

It should be noted that Maamar U'Vavoah Lifnei HaMelech 5654 cites "I saw in the name of one great man: One who has great distress should trust in Hashem—not pray about it nor take any action like going to mikvah etc., only trust in Hashem." This is called silence—a great bittul (total self-nullification)—and it is wondrous.

Also note: There is livelihood via "bread from the earth," and livelihood via "bread from heaven," but only partially does this relate to our topic (see Maamar VeHayah Ki Savo 5666; see also Maamar Ani L'Dodi—the second—in Sefer HaMaamarim Yud Aleph).

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B) In Midrash on "Imri Na Achoti At," we learn that one may slaughter an animal for an ill person on Shabbos. The commentaries simply explain that since Avraham used strategy rather than relying solely on bitachon in Hashem, so too with an ill person we do not rely on miracles. You ask for further explanation.

You did not cite where this Midrash or its commentaries appear—which would have been helpful—for the simple explanation given is unclear: If so, why doesn't the Midrash simply say "from here we do not rely on miracles"? See Zohar I p.82a which says Avraham relied on miracles—thus descended to Egypt—and Zohar III p.52a explains he saw an angel guarding Sarah but none guarding himself so he said "Imri Na Achoti At..."

Perhaps we can explain: From Avraham asking Sarah to say she was his sister to save him—we learn it's permitted to transgress an issur (prohibition) to save another's life. But even so it's still unclear—the Midrash should have said "from here we desecrate Shabbos for an ill person," so why focus specifically on slaughtering?

To clarify: There is a well-known question—how did Avraham know Egyptians would kill him rather than violate murder just to avoid violating adultery by taking Sarah? One answer: If they killed him they'd transgress once; but if they took Sarah while Avraham lived they'd repeatedly transgress adultery with each act—so it's better to transgress one severe prohibition than many lesser ones repeatedly. Thus we learn regarding an ill person—that we slaughter for him rather than feed him non-kosher meat repeatedly (Ran cited by Shulchan Aruch Admor Hazaken Hilchos Shabbos sec. 328 par.17).

Still it's difficult—how does the Midrash know we slaughter—which incurs death penalty—once rather than feed non-kosher meat—which incurs lashes—many times? In Avraham's case both adultery and murder incur death penalty! The proof must be: Even with Avraham—how did he know Egyptians would kill him once rather than commit repeated acts with Sarah? They could have violated her unnaturally—which also gives pleasure but doesn't incur death penalty (Sanhedrin 59b)—so perhaps that's what they'd do? But since even unnatural relations are considered disgraceful—even among non-Jews who separated themselves from immorality after the flood—it follows they'd kill him instead; thus it's better to transgress one severe prohibition once than many lighter ones repeatedly—and that's why slaughtering is permitted for an ill person.

Alternatively: If Egyptians forcibly took her without being able to prevent them—it would be considered despair like bandits (Bava Kama 114a), which may effect divorce among Bnei Noach who divorce by separation rather than writing—as Rambam Melachim ch.9 halacha 8 says—so she would no longer be married but still disgraceful etc.

Blessings for immediate teshuvah and immediate redemption.

Summary

The Rebbe teaches that while trust in G-d is essential, making natural efforts—a “vessel”—is usually required except for rare tzaddikim wholly above worldly concerns. Lessons from Avraham and Yosef illustrate when action complements faith versus when reliance alone suffices.