234 —ההבדל בין האבות כמרכבה ועבודת כל אדם

B"H, Wednesday, 27 Sivan 5706.

Brooklyn.

Shalom u'Vrachah!

In response to your letter from 13 Nissan: A) You commented on what I wrote in Kovetz Lubavitch (Booklet 3), explaining the difference between the level of merkavah (chariot) for every person and how the Avos themselves were a merkavah in two ways (which are one, as is understood): A) Their service as a merkavah was all their days; B) With all their limbs—unlike every other person. You wanted to add another distinction: that the Avos felt the Rider (and certainly your intent is that they sensed only the wondrousness of the Rider and His distance from their comprehension—see Likkutei Torah, discourse "LeSusasi," first and second). This is not so with every other person. You support this from Tanya chapter 34: "Let him answer his heart that since my intellect is small and my soul's root cannot contain being a true chariot and dwelling for His unity in absolute truth..."—thus, being a true chariot depends on intellect. If we accept your interpretation—that sensing the wondrousness of the Rider is an aspect and part of being a true merkavah—there are several difficulties: A) In the analogy itself this is not so at all. B) In Tanya chapters 20, 39, Iggeres HaKodesh 25, and other discourses where he discusses the service of merkavah by the Avos, he does not mention this at all, even though he explains other details. C) In chapters 34 and 46 he brings this in another context (related to the level of the Avos), but not when discussing specifically their service in those chapters. Therefore it seems to me there is a distinction here between cause and effect: In general, being on the level of merkavah means nullification before the Rider—even though in truth there is an advantage regarding the Rider (which is why it brings Him to places He could not reach on His own). The nullification is total until there is no independent will at all (and everything belonging to it is nullified to the Rider—as stated in "Ata Hu," year 5700 regarding merkavah of Avos; but from its wording it seems this applies to every level of merkavah; so too in Biurei HaZohar beginning Beshalach). Even though it has its own essence, therefore it is only bitul ha-yesh—the lower nullification like that of Seraphim, Chayos, Ofanim—or bitul b'metzius—the higher nullification like that of Avos or souls of Atzilus; likewise also physical limbs performing mitzvos (whereas the mitzvah itself is unity—as explained about keilim of Sefiros Atzilus over souls of Atzilus in Iggeres HaKodesh section 20; see also "LeHavin Ma Shekasuv" Likkutei Torah chapter 23; stated explicitly on 24 Teves 5613). How does one reach this service? The cause and path are one's soul root, intellectual greatness, comprehension etc. Thus there is no difficulty that in the analogy this aspect does not exist—the analogy refers only to being a merkavah itself, not how one attains it (in an animal it's natural; for man it's not—see Likkutei Torah Emor discourse "VeHenif HaKohen"). It also explains why whenever discussing service as a merkavah this isn't mentioned—because it's only a cause or path to service except in chapter 34 where he wants to explain that one should not despair if he hasn't reached bitul like chapter 33 or service like merkavah; what should he do then? He explains that lacking prior conditions—small intellect or soul root—is why he hasn't attained such service. Just as after Sinai they couldn't bear [the revelation] so they made a Mishkan; similarly one should set times for Torah study—and likewise chapter 46 where it's necessary to explain how anyone can say "your G-d" just as "G-d of Avraham," even an ignoramus.

B) Regarding what you asked about what Admor Hazaken writes in Hilchos Shemirat Guf v'Nefesh end section seven: "One should not drink mixed drinks that sat overnight after being mixed with water which was ours [drawn before Pesach] in metal or earthenware vessels (and certainly water itself that sat overnight in metal vessels)..." To answer: A) In Eretz HaKodesh it's impossible to be careful about this because courtyard waters are kept in metal vessels. B) There are Talmudic sources questioning this. I have not heard anything about this from my father-in-law, Admor shlita. Following your suggestion I am responding with my thoughts: A) You wanted to justify Eretz HaKodesh custom by interpreting Admor Hazaken's words anew—not forbidding drinking water that sat overnight in metal vessels but continuing from previous law about mixed drinks. The Rebbe adds: if water was ours in metal vessels then mixed into drinks which then sat overnight—certainly forbidden. My reservations with this explanation: A) The main point seems missing from Admor's words—especially since here he elaborates more than Talmudic language. B) He should have written: "certainly if water itself sat..." since his wording implies it's law about water itself. C) Where did Admor get such a new law? Water isn't mentioned at all in Talmudic sources! One must say it's because water is more susceptible to ruach ra'ah than other drinks—as seen from laws brought earlier which apply only to water—and thus only mixed drinks are forbidden because of water within them; thus "certainly" applies primarily—that one shouldn't drink our water kept overnight in metal vessels.

In Sefer Shu"t Bnei Tzion section ten note eleven (by R' Dovid Shapira Jerusalem), he wants to interpret Admor Hazaken's words that "mixed drinks" means drinks (including water) mixed specifically for drinking—not referring at all to mixing with water per se; see there. Besides issues with this explanation itself, Admor Hazaken clarifies his view by writing: after being mixed with water etc., certainly water etc.—proving he's interpreting "mixed" as mixing with water and prohibition on plain water comes only via "certainly," not explicit Talmudic source. Perhaps that's why also this law about plain water appears surrounded by parentheses—a sign there's doubt about this law—as written elsewhere (Sha'ar HaKolel beginning)—the doubt being whether we derive kal vachomer reasoning here.

Personally I wanted to justify Jerusalem custom by saying prohibition applies only when kept overnight in detached vessels—as usual everywhere—but if vessel is attached/connected to building or ground then for many purposes it's no longer considered a vessel; regarding ruach ra'ah we don't add stringencies beyond explicit sources—we follow only what's written clearly.

In truth I don't know if all these justifications are needed—the main point seems that since many people are lenient here "Shomer Pesa'im Hashem" applies (as stated Shabbos 129b etc., cited Shu"t tzt"z Even HaEzer end section eleven). Moreover where there's natural danger—as Shabbos Yevamos 72a, Avodah Zarah 30b etc.—one must still take precautions because danger isn't annulled—but here since it's purely segulah-based perhaps widespread practice annuls it entirely—in which case even scholars may rely on it—even if some authorities hold otherwise when "Shomer Pesa'im Hashem" applies only for laymen—a hint for annulling such matters can be found at end Yerushalmi Pe'ah quoting verse "Al Tasig Gevul," meaning expelling something entirely.

Another proof—from Pesachim 111b and ruled Shulchan Aruch Admor Hazaken there section nine—that hanging bread brings poverty but meat/fish don't because that's their usual way—but perhaps that's different since reason isn't air exposure but disrespecting bread by hanging it—as Berachos 24a—and since meat/fish are usually hung there's no disrespect so irrelevant here—even though sages said "find solutions for danger," I'm only trying to justify already established custom.

B) Regarding what you asked citing Sefer Over Orach (I haven't seen it myself) on Admor Hazaken from Chullin 55b about blackened utensils—you answered well that who says they didn't pour out those waters afterwards especially since lungs were soaked there overnight—but your second answer—that presence of any substance prevents ruach ra'ah—I don't accept because then source should have said so explicitly as elsewhere Bava Metzia 29b cited Shulchan Aruch Admor Hazaken end section four—and even there allows only substances commonly added.

You further asked from Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim section five-five permitting post facto using our waters kept overnight in copper vessels—it may be explained we never find anywhere permitting even if kept all night but rather initially forbidden drawing into copper vessel but post facto permitted—but regarding keeping overnight that's not discussed at all—and what Admor Hazaken writes there end section nineteen permitting even if waters stayed many days means without nights—not clarified explicitly since unrelated here but rather Hilchos Shemirat HaGuf—and just as he doesn't clarify re Pesach laws initially not keeping overnight in any metal vessel—though somewhat forced explanation.

Perhaps one can say Talmudic wording refers specifically to drinking mixed drinks etc.—since it's segulah-based unlike exposed liquids—we follow its novelty forbidding drinking them but when mixing into dough or non-drinking uses there's no issue—we don't compare cases just as we don't find prohibition against any use like washing hands with morning netilas yadayim waters Orach Chaim four—and through distinguishing prohibition applies only to drinking resolves also question from Sukkah 48b where they would keep nisuch hamayim waters overnight in gold barrels—even though Yerushalmi says requires Jewish-owned liquid—but according to Bavli per Rashi/Tosafos that's different—and see Shu"t Bnei Tzion discussion there.

Summary

The Rebbe distinguishes between levels of spiritual nullification exemplified by the Avos versus ordinary people and clarifies halachic nuances regarding customs around drinking water left overnight. He emphasizes following established practice while recognizing deeper spiritual causes behind these customs.