10535 —אם שתי הלחם או קרבן העומר הוחמצו מחמת אונס

Shalom u'Vrachah!

The later authorities have raised a difficulty regarding the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, in Hilchot Temidin uMusafin 5:15, that the Shtei HaLechem (two loaves) which were waved with the lambs are mutually dependent; if the lambs are lost, the bread is lost, and new bread and lambs must be brought. How is this possible? For it is established that baking the Shtei HaLechem does not override Yom Tov, and even if they become invalid, one does not bring another set, as is evident in Yoma 24a regarding a case where no invalidation was found in the Shtei HaLechem and in Rashi there. Yet in Menachot 46b it says one brings another bread. See Shut Imrei Yosher vol. II sec. 127 who brings this question in the name of the Gaon of Kuntzk, of blessed memory.

What he attempts to answer there is essentially based on Tosafot Yoma 46b s.v. aval, who seem to say that if there was an unavoidable circumstance (ones) and they did not offer a communal offering, they can offer it the next day. See Mishneh Lamelech Temidin uMusafin ch.1 regarding "if its time has passed, its offering is void"—this only applies when there was no unavoidable circumstance; see there. Thus, if the bread became invalid due to an unavoidable circumstance, they could bring lambs and bread on a weekday. However, Mishneh Lamelech's words here require further analysis as discussed in my sefer Tal Torah Yoma 46b regarding Musafim—certainly they were not offered after their time had passed.

See Rambam Pe'er Hador Temidin uMusafin 2:2 where it is explicitly stated that any communal offering whose day has passed—its offering is void; it appears even in cases of absolute ones (unavoidable circumstances), and so too for Tamid offerings. See also what I wrote above regarding Tal Torah about Tamid offerings and certainly for Musafim and Shtei HaLechem—the law is as stated: if its time has passed, its offering is void—as explained in Temurah 14a.

However, from Mishneh Lamelech it seems that if it was an unavoidable circumstance regarding Tamid offerings we do not say "if its time has passed, its offering is void," and so he holds. This is clarified from Admor Hazaken's words in his Shulchan Aruch Hilchot Tefillah sec. 108:2: "If one erred or was prevented by circumstances beyond control (ones) and did not pray Minchah, he must pray Ma'ariv twice—the first for Ma'ariv and the second as compensation (tashlumin). And although prayers correspond to sacrifices we do not say since its time has passed its offering is void because prayers are requests for mercy and whenever one prays he receives reward for prayer—just not for prayer at its proper time." Thus it is clear that even when prevented by circumstances beyond control we do say "if its time has passed its offering is void" even for Tamid offerings; he begins with 'erred or was prevented,' then says we do not say 'since its time has passed...' making clear that even for Tamid offerings—even when prevented—we do say 'if its time has passed...' contrary to Mishneh Lamelech above and Tosafot Yoma 46b who imply that for Tamid offerings we do not say this when prevented by circumstances beyond control.

However, Rashba Menachot 4a on Rish Lakish's statement about Minchat HaOmer whose kemitzah was done with improper intent being valid etc., brings another Omer meal-offering; Rashba asks how can another meal-offering be brought on that day since its harvesting takes place at night—so one would need to wait until after another harvest at night? I do not understand this—what sense does it make to wait until tomorrow night for a second harvest after the day of waving the Omer has already passed? Thus from Rashba's words above it appears that if there was an unavoidable circumstance preventing bringing the Omer at its proper time—it can be brought on the next day; we do not say here 'if its time has passed...' The reason seems to be that what we learn about 'if its time has passed...' comes from Temurah 14a from 'its appointed day' or 'the burnt-offering of each Sabbath on its Sabbath'—this applies specifically to Musafim or Tamid offerings where these verses are written but with regard to Omer we do not find this applied; thus Rashba correctly says that Omer can be brought on a later day as well.

Accordingly it seems that since Shtei HaLechem permits bringing meal-offerings in the Temple—even though they only permit ideally as explained in Menachot 68b ('permits ideally')—so too we do not derive from Tamid or Musafim; if impurity or unavoidable circumstance occurred they may be offered on a later day. This resolves Rambam's statement above about bringing other bread on Yom Tov—even though baking Shtei HaLechem does not override Yom Tov—for if there was an unavoidable circumstance preventing their offering they may be offered on a later day.

Summary

The Rebbe analyzes whether missed communal offerings like Shtei HaLechem or Omer due to unavoidable circumstances can be brought later. He distinguishes between types of korbanot based on sources and concludes some exceptions exist where "if its time has passed" does not apply.