6936 —שאלות על תנחומא, כלבים בבית הכנסת, וחיובי השתתפות

B"H, 16 Tammuz, 5719.

Brooklyn.

Havavac"h iy"a nu"n etc. Yitzchak Fried

Shalom u'Vrachah!

We acknowledge receipt of your letter from the 13th of Tammuz—the day of redemption of the Rebbe zatzukal lehe nbgm zya—along with its enclosure. Here is a copy of what was recorded by the Rebbe shlita on your letter and its enclosure:

a) It is explained in Tanchuma Bamidbar that although in future generations one who disregards the words of a prophet is not punished with lashes, for the generation of the desert this atonement (death by Heaven) was given. Now, if we want to explain that according to Tanchuma this is his own reasoning and a novel idea—with no basis anywhere else—then the questioner's difficulty is nullified from the outset. There is no need to seek innovations; rather, we should interpret Tanchuma simply—that he holds (for the generation of the desert?) those liable for capital punishment are lashed and atoned thereby. In my opinion—it is strange to say that Tanchuma innovates lashes for one who disregards a prophet's words, which goes against the fundamental logic that a prohibition derived from a positive commandment does not incur lashes.

b) Regarding bringing a dog into a synagogue: One cannot bring proof—from the kasda in Sifrei—to actually prohibit it. Nor can prohibitions be learned from homiletical matters, even if you wish to say that such a prohibition appears in Kli Yakar; especially as noted also on the margin of the responsum you sent—that there is no proof from Kli Yakar because his style is not precise etc.—this is common among commentators even when explaining reasons for prohibitions.

c) Additionally (and it is surprising I have not yet found anyone who has addressed this), the reason given by Kli Yakar and also Sefer HaChinuch regarding dogs is refuted by what it says (Yoma 21b) that in the Second Temple era, fire on the altar crouched like a dog. And if you wish to say otherwise—this itself would be proof there is no prohibition in bringing a dog into a synagogue. Seemingly one could explain (with difficulty at least) that it does not mean that the fire was literally in the form of a dog (or lion—in the First Temple), but rather this was said about how the fire crouched: in the First Temple it was as written 'crouched like a lion and like a dog who will rouse him,' meaning steadily and not jumping up—which is not so with dogs. But this does not hold up because both forms—a lion and a dog—were present there, as Rashi explains on site and as found in Zohar III (211a), Tikunei Zohar Tikun 21 (62b), etc., where they saw images of both lion and dog.

d) At the end of your responsum you write there is no obligation to go to synagogue etc.—see Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim section 90:9 onward and other places—it is explicit in many places that one should strive and it is a mitzvah to run etc., etc. What you wrote quoting Maharil—in Magen Avraham section 415:2—that Maharil was uncertain; but according to what he wrote etc., certainly so. (In Ba'al HaChadash there—see Chavos Ya'ir responsum 12 and R' Moshe Ziskind's responsum at end of section Aleph—they rejected Magen Avraham's words, but I do not have them at hand.) In such cases there is another special point based on Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim end section 85: it causes great distress when everyone gathers while some stand outside (even though Shulchan Aruch only refers to two weeks per month and even then not always; unlike for someone blind etc.). It follows one can arrange entry into synagogue with human assistance; but here we are discussing whether there is reason for his entry (either due to distress or due to importance of prayer specifically in synagogue), then ways should be sought to enable entry—and this suffices.

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Certainly acknowledge receipt of this letter—and thank you very much.

Summary

The Rebbe addresses complex halachic questions with careful analysis—clarifying how sources should be interpreted regarding punishment for ignoring prophets, animals in sacred spaces, and communal prayer obligations—emphasizing fidelity to tradition while seeking practical solutions.