5491 —פדיון פטר חמור, קדימות הפדיון לעריפה, וסדר הרמב"ם

B"H, 1st of Sivan, 5717.

Brooklyn.

Haraha"g vaharaha"ch iy"a nu"n oseik btz"tz etc. Ephraim Eliezer HaKohen

Shalom u'Vrachah!

I acknowledge receipt of your letter from the third of Naso with its enclosure. Yesterday, when I was at the holy resting place (the Ohel) of my father-in-law, the Rebbe zatzal, I mentioned you all for blessing. Since holiness is never uprooted from its place (see Iggeres HaKodesh sec. 27 for explanation), it is understood that the leader of Israel, even after his soul ascends on high, stands and arouses abundant mercy for all those connected to him and their matters.

Since today is "on this day they came to the Sinai desert," I will conclude with a matter relevant to the day and in the language of my father-in-law, the Rebbe: "to receive the Torah with joy and inwardness."

With blessing, M. Schneerson

P.S. Enclosed are the new Torah insights from his son-in-law shlita; and for extra affection for the matter I am sending at least some comments hastily since time does not permit more.

In Bechoros 12b it is taught: "Valuations are at their time; pidyon haben after thirty days; redemption of a firstborn donkey immediately." The Gemara asks: "But we have a contradiction: there is nothing in valuations, pidyon haben, nazirite vows, or redemption of a firstborn donkey less than thirty days—and one may add forever." Rav Nachman says: This means that if one redeemed earlier it is valid; ideally one should wait thirty days as with pidyon haben but after-the-fact it is valid immediately—though he has not fulfilled the main mitzvah as Rashi explains. Rav Sheshet answers: It means he does not transgress; i.e., always the mitzvah is to redeem immediately but he does not transgress until thirty days have passed—after that he transgresses.

Rami bar Chama challenges Rav Sheshet from a braisa: "Its mitzvah is all thirty days; after that if he redeems it—he redeems it; if not—he breaks its neck." Does this not mean that one must wait thirty days like Rav Nachman? This challenges Rav Sheshet. The Gemara answers: No—it means its mitzvah is to redeem throughout all thirty days. The Gemara asks: If so, after that it should say either redeem or transgress? The conclusion: Rava says there is no contradiction—one follows Rabbi Elazar who compares bechor behemah to bechor adam; one follows Rabbanan who do not compare them.

Rashi explains: Rava says there is a mitzvah to wait—but still I do not answer like Rav Nachman nor resolve his difficulty. The phrase "all thirty days mitzvah to wait" follows Rabbi Elazar who compares animal to human firstborns; "immediately" follows Rabbanan who do not compare them.

The Rambam (Hilchos Bikkurim ch. 12 halacha 6) writes: From when is one obligated to redeem? From birth until thirty days; after thirty days if he wishes he may break its neck or redeem it—there is only a mitzvah to delay (mitzvas ikuv). The Kesef Mishneh writes that we rule like Rav Sheshet in prohibitions; therefore Rambam concludes there is only a mitzvah to delay—that is what Rav Sheshet calls "transgresses."

The question arises: If we rule like Rav Sheshet how could Rambam write as in the braisa which was challenged against Rav Sheshet—using its language "either redeem or break its neck," whereas according to Rav Sheshet it should say "or transgress," which was left unresolved? This question was raised by Mahari Kurkus z"l.

In halacha 1 Rambam writes: If one does not wish to redeem it there is a positive commandment to break its neck as it says "and every firstborn donkey you shall redeem with a lamb; if you do not redeem it—you shall break its neck." The Raavad objects that breaking its neck is not a mitzvah but an aveirah (sin), causing loss to the Kohen.

Rabbi Yom Tov Algazi writes that these two views derive from Mechilta Parshas Bo: "If you do not redeem—it shall be broken." From here they said: The mitzvah of redemption precedes breaking its neck. Another interpretation: If you do not redeem—break its neck; since you have lost property belonging to a Kohen your own property will be lost. The first teaching matches our Mishnah (Bechoros 13a) that redemption takes precedence over breaking its neck; the second matches Levi's teaching (Bechoros 10b) about losing property—which aligns with Raavad and Rambam rules like our Mishnah.

Rashi explains on Levi's teaching: Therefore his property will be lost—the court forces him to break its neck after thirty days as explained in this chapter—and it becomes forbidden for benefit. Later authorities ask how we know Beis Din can force him? And if it's because any positive commandment can be enforced by beating until compliance—why don't they force him regarding redemption itself since redemption takes precedence?

It seems Rashi was troubled by Levi's teaching versus our Mishnah—Levi implies breaking its neck is a penalty while our Mishnah implies it's a mitzvah. Thus Rashi holds both are true: Breaking its neck is a mitzvah upon Beis Din—to impose penalty judgments as with all penalties where Beis Din must judge them—and if so there must be an appointed time for imposing penalties otherwise he could always redeem at any moment. This fits with the Gemara's wording "he has lost property belonging to a Kohen," yet why call it lost if he can still redeem? Rather once time passes penalty begins—that's why Rashi explains Beis Din forces him after thirty days as we've explained—a mitzvah upon Beis Din to impose penalty judgments.

After these points let's examine Rambam's wording in halacha 6 where he writes after thirty days if he wishes he may break its neck or redeem—it seems odd since in halacha 1 he rules redemption takes precedence over breaking its neck so why here list breaking before redemption? As we've explained—the obligation for breaking only begins after set time (Chazal set this as after thirty days); thus Rambam lists breaking before redemption because after thirty days that's when breaking becomes relevant—and his source is Levi's teaching as explained above. However here Rambam disagrees with Rashi holding breaking itself is also a mitzvah like redemption.

This resolves Mahari Kurkus' question on why Rambam doesn't use braisa language which challenged Rav Sheshet—instead carefully writing breaking before redemption indicating that redemption has an appointed time while afterwards breaking becomes obligatory just as Rav Sheshet says transgression begins after thirty days.

Regarding what I heard quoted from my father-in-law shlita in name of Admor MiLubavitch shlita about giving gifts to bride and groom on their wedding day—I thought simply since Chazal say all sins are forgiven then it's considered before sin and before decree "by sweat you shall eat bread," so their livelihood comes without toil.

Summary

This letter explores intricate halachic debates about pidyon peter chamor (redemption of firstborn donkey), clarifying how Talmudic sources and Rambam address timing and priority between redemption and arifah (breaking its neck). It highlights careful textual analysis and legal reasoning in Torah study.