10847 —הערות על הרמב"ם, דיני גלות, ובהירות באיסורי תורה

B"H, 26 Tammuz, 5733.

Brooklyn.

Haraha"g vavac"h iy"a nu"n etc. Shimon Moshe

Shalom u'Vrachah!

I received your letter from the 13th of Iyar along with your books "Mas'at HaMelech": a) on the Rambam, b) novellae on tractate T. Thank you for your attention in sending them to me. Surely you will continue to do so in the future as well, and thank you in advance.

For the sake of affection for the matter—especially since the beginning of this sefer is in this week's parsha—I glanced through its pages, even though there was not enough time for proper study. In line with the saying: "Do I not know that it is good etc., but as it was when he would ask etc., thus the teaching is enriched" (Bava Metzia 84a, section 1), I will note a few comments as follows:

At the beginning of the book (on Rambam) - 1:1: "not to take... exile." I have long surmised that even the count of mitzvot before the main halachot in Rambam is by Rambam himself—and I was pleased to see at the end of Rambam printed by Schulsinger (5707)—a facsimile of Rambam's manuscript at the beginning of Hilchot She'eilah u'Pikadon—in the manuscript: two positive commandments: a) law etc. As you wrote at the end of Melachot B:2 "rather he shall be put to death," and did not write at Melachot D:4 "rather he shall be exiled" (in your book B:1)—this is as written in our parsha. The reason seems simple: we hold that one may not accept ransom even after fulfilling what was required—to exile an unintentional killer—to return to live in his city. According to Rashi on tractate T.—this is what Melachot refers to. And according to Rambam chapter 25 it seems he omits the end of the verse "to return and dwell etc." (which is Rashi's foundation)—implying that he interprets Melachot as including both cases equally.

If ransom (in an ox that killed etc.—and from its types we learn about all ransom cases being one category) is also a fundamental obligation or comes instead of death penalty, there is a practical difference when the ox is exempt from death penalty (see Bava Kamma 43a and there; Tzafnat Paneach Hilchot Terumot—quoted in Tzafnat Paneach Klalei HaTorah Mitzvot by Rabbi Kasher). Seemingly: death by court is immediate while ransom is imposed later; it says "if ransom be imposed upon him" (even if it's not dependent), ox's death and owner's death are equated. And perhaps one should say you only have what is explicitly stated regarding ransom*, but from its very content—it seems ransom comes instead of [death]. For further analysis, perhaps it depends on a dispute: a) Damages paid by damager (if it's instead of his own execution by court), or damages paid to victim; b) Is there ransom without intent or not (Bava Kamma ibid). It is known that Rambam rules: damages paid to victim and there can be ransom without intent (Hilchot Nizkei Mammon ch.1; ibid ch.10:13).

At the end of your aforementioned book: When one cannot return to his studies afterward—is a mitzvah that cannot be done by others override Torah study? See Hilchot Talmud Torah Admor Hazaken ch.3 sec.4-5 regarding Torah study for many (specifically)*.

In your novellae on tractate T.: (104a) In Marzav's explanation—if something is clear to you like your sister who is forbidden to you—say it (Sanhedrin 7b): specifically your sister etc.; see Margaliyot HaYam (by Rabbi R. Margaliyot there) for more explanations.

In my humble opinion, in several places it appears that: a) There are similar examples elsewhere among prohibitions (including his explanation that since we derive a law from this case—it proves it's clear; also regarding 'one does not punish based on deduction,' he brings from Mechilta that we also learn this from digging a pit). b) From adding 'who is forbidden to you' and from stating concisely 'like your sister,' it implies two clarities are needed: a) she is your sister (as explained by Rashi); b) that a sister is forbidden—but here no distinction is made whether she is forbidden by law or verse etc.; so too one can infer from his language here 'clear' (unlike Kiddushin 30a and Sifrei Devarim 6:7; see Torah Temimah there). Note also Marzav who preceded with 'clear... like morning,' where even morning means 'clarity' etc.

Therefore it seems—and perhaps this explains Marzav's unique interpretation—that 'clear' means selection—between two strong logical arguments—and specifically regarding one's sister does Scripture clarify and reject even strong logic: marriage between man and woman must be like 'your creation taken from man,' thus precedence specifically for marrying one's sister who is half one's flesh. But this example in its completeness applies when she is both paternal and maternal sister—and here clarity applies.

Another reasoning related above—that creation was such that marriage with one's sister was necessary (Yerushalmi Yevamot ch.1 mishna 1), or marriage with one's mother (Chava). Similarly regarding one's mother—the fetus [is] part of its mother until separated after birth and literally part of Adam Harishon—but it's not entirely similar to a sister—for practically speaking, survival depended on marrying a sister—a sister being half his flesh like Adam and Chava—unlike with mother which is opposite.

Note also Rashi Yevamot (62b) and Sanhedrin (103b): "Do you have any benefit..." According to all above one can say similarly about clarity like mother—as per Sheiltot Mishpatim (quoted in Margaliyot HaYam there). Note also Berachot (58a): one who cohabits with his mother... his sister.... No need to elaborate further*.

See Sefer HaMitzvot Admor Hazaken tzt"z mitzvot arayot—wondrous things.

With honor and blessing,
M. Schneersohn

* And perhaps conversely: since deaths are equated—even though owner's death differs because ransom applies—so necessarily ransom has practical significance.
* To Achaz M.: Regarding prayer [Shulchan Aruch] Admor Hazaken Orach Chaim sec.108 subsec.5.
* To Achaz M.: See above regarding Hilchot Talmud Torah Admor Hazaken ch.2 sec.3.

Summary

The Rebbe expresses gratitude for scholarly works sent, offering deep insights into halachic topics such as exile laws, monetary penalties, and clarity needed in Torah prohibitions—demonstrating how careful analysis leads to greater understanding in learning Torah.