10200 —הסדרים חלקיים, אסטרטגיה צבאית, והערכה כנה של מצב ישראל

B"H, 3 Elul, 5731.

Brooklyn, NY.

Shalom u'Vrachah!

It was a pleasant surprise for me to receive a letter from you after such a long pause—even though I certainly inquired about your well-being and that of your friends through our acquaintances in the Holy Land. May this letter also be a good beginning for positive content in future correspondence from now on.

Regarding the main topic of your letter—about the partial agreement—I am somewhat surprised that the tone of your letter gives the impression that the entire matter is uncertain and open to debate as to whether it should be accepted or rejected altogether. It is well known abroad—and surely you and your colleagues know—that in the current situation, only details and timing are at issue, as well as what will be received in exchange for concessions, etc.

I have already said on an appropriate occasion—though not for publication but in conversation with those whom I hoped would convey my opinion to your circles and those close to you—that in the usual language of Jewish law, this situation is "its beginning is by will and its end by compulsion." I mean that even though a year ago—and all the more so two years ago—the matter depended entirely on Israel's will (whether to withdraw from the canal or remain there), immediately after the Six-Day War began with an announcement to all concerned that Israel was ready to return occupied territories (and apparently even then there was precision not to use the term "liberated territories"), an announcement repeated many times in various contexts. Perhaps even more important was the care not to block up the canal so thoroughly that it would take years to reopen—it was all a clear declaration inviting others to open negotiations over the canal.

It is obvious that no one ever thought of giving ownership of the canal to Israel or even to America; rather, there was doubt whether ownership would go solely to Egypt or Egypt together with its ally Russia, or Egypt as a satellite of Russia. And it is also known—even to any beginner in engineering—that what was written in some newspapers about it being impossible to destroy or properly block up the canal has no basis. Especially since its length is over 100 km and on its eastern bank there were no observers every night.

This impression grows stronger when it becomes known that despite immediately after the ceasefire—and literally within the first day—new missile batteries were brought to the western bank and this continued throughout without any response from Israel (except verbal protests which had little chance of changing anything; at best they might get some more weapons from America—but still much less than what Russia supplied daily across the canal).

Since the gap between forces kept shrinking and there was no way for Israel to match either quantity or quality of Russian arms with American arms—as stated above: what began by will turned into compulsion due to pressure from all sides—including so-called friends—so that for at least half a year now there has been no choice left. And surely you know as well as I do that there is no need for what is called "pressure" (in diplomatic language) from America; just stopping arms and money supplies suffices.

What is even more painful is that although similar situations occurred twice before—the withdrawal from the canal in 1956 and again in 1967 when readiness was declared to return occupied territories—these did not change Egyptian attitudes nor those of Russia or even America toward Israel; instead, these stances were interpreted as weakness by those setting policy in Israel regarding Egypt, Arabs generally, America, and Russia. In our world—which is not yet a world of truth, justice, or honesty—weakness invites pressure rather than compassion leading to real action. Yet despite all this they continue along this path—not only verbally but also practically—and try calming public opinion with strange explanations.

For example: claiming Israel has friends among world governments; or because Israel helped African countries in various ways they will cooperate at least by voting at UN so Egypt expels Russia; or recently heard explanations—with apologies for mentioning this since it was publicized by military circles—that IDF strength now far exceeds what it was during Six-Day War. While this statement may be true per se, it has nothing to do with current realities: what matters is today's balance between IDF strength versus forces across the canal now—not compared with three years ago. It is well known today's balance is much worse than in 1967—even worse regarding manpower since Russian military personnel now present in Egypt are several times more numerous both quantitatively and qualitatively than those present in 1967.

True—a miracle happened: for reasons still unclear Egypt has not yet signed even a scrap of paper whose content consists of conditions nobody expects them actually to fulfill; thus everything remains unresolved. But as above—it requires serious consideration whether this strengthens Israel's position on either side of the canal.

By nature I am not pessimistic; obviously I wish each year would bring positive changes. But despite strong desire one must never deceive oneself about anything—certainly not about such serious matters.

To end on a positive note: I have seen improvement regarding internal conditions within Egypt and among Arab states themselves and their mutual relations. If this relates at all to our conversation during your visit here about these matters—it would be a great merit for you through your influence in this direction; surely you know better than I how important this truly is.

I conclude my letter as I began: May your next letter bring joyful news regarding these matters discussed above—and generally—and may it include blessings for a good sweet new year coming upon us all according to traditional Elul wishes exchanged between friends: "Kesivah v'Chasimah Tovah" (may you be inscribed and sealed for good) for Rosh Hashanah—the month of Elul being fitting preparation for this.

With honor and blessing—and please convey my regards also to your colleagues—for which I am grateful if you pass along wishes for a good sweet year.

P.S.: Of course you may share my letter's content with whomever you see fit—and I certainly look forward at least to your response regarding its content; thank you in advance.

If I may permit myself—since you raised partial agreement—perhaps you can explain my longstanding puzzlement (for about three years): Since it is universally accepted among experts without exception that nowadays defense based on fortifications like Maginot Line etc.—meaning relying on bunkers with attached army units—is simply not suitable today (the era of jets/paratroopers etc.), especially when fronts stretch hundreds of kilometers (including both canal front and Mediterranean front). Instead military strength lies in mobility—the ability quickly move forces where needed etc.—even when there are some natural strongpoints like hills/mountains behind lines; how much more so when stationed in desert! Even if line has some depth (several km), still minimum requirement for partial agreement must exceed width of line itself! Yet huge sums/effort invested into such defensive line. True—there was psychological benefit saving those stationed there from boredom (a very serious problem under such conditions)—but it's unlikely this alone decided things. If permitted please share reasons/arguments behind these decisions—I would appreciate hearing details if possible.

Summary

The Rebbe urges honest evaluation rather than self-deception regarding national security decisions. He analyzes how international pressure shifted Israeli policy from voluntary choices toward compulsion and requests clarity on military strategy rationale while emphasizing hopefulness rooted in realistic assessment.