9083 —ביאור הקשר בין מיתת השור ובין בעליו

Shalom u'Vrachah! [6 Shevat 5726] From this it is understood: 1) This is not a gezeiras hakasuv (a scriptural decree), 2) Nevertheless, one can learn the death of the ox from the death of its owner (even though, seemingly, this is deriving monetary law from capital law). The reasoning here is so straightforward that even Rashi and Tosafos (not just the Gemara) did not need to elaborate due to its obviousness. It can be simply explained that this logic is clear and evident in this very verse: "The ox shall be stoned and also its owner shall be put to death"—meaning, when judging about the ox, it is not only monetary law as elsewhere in Torah, but also its owner shall die (by Heaven—as stated in Kesubos and brought plainly in Tosafos s.v. Eima Sanhedrin 15b: meaning, also for Sanhedrin's discussion, 'he shall die by Heaven' if he does not pay ransom). Furthermore, one can add explanation here—the reason for punishing the owner can be explained in two ways: A) Because he did not guard (the owner) his ox and it killed (and therefore there is no ransom for a tam), or B) Because his property (his ox) killed. In the first way—the owner's sin and the killing by the ox are sequential as cause and effect. In the second way—at the moment when the ox kills, then the owner sins (similar to how one's courtyard is considered his hand); accordingly, there would be a practical difference in law if one sold an ox on condition that if it kills, the sale takes effect immediately before the killing. The Gemara's wording (Sanhedrin 15b): "You do not execute him for his ox's murder." This can be interpreted according to both approaches: For approach A—because at the moment of murder—the cause (the owner) is no longer present, only the ox. For approach B—because all aspects of murder pertain only to the ox, and all connection of the owner is only because it is "his ox." If we say like approach B—it is more understandable why we do not separate between discussing about the ox and deducing about its owner—since their sin occurs in one act.

And it seems that overall approach B is more correct: A) According to approach A, why does Scripture need to say by a tam that "the owner of the ox is exempt," as R. Yosi ben Betaira explains 'exempt from Heavenly judgment'—it should be obvious; what could he have done with a tam? (Perhaps this is where his colleagues disagree with R. Yosi ben Betaira.) B) According to Ragatchover Gaon (see Tzafnas Paneach on Sanhedrin 15b): everywhere in that Gemara (unlike above). Now, seemingly one might say that Yerushalmi disagrees with Bavli (since it does not mention gezeiras hakasuv here), for it explains that it is a gezeiras hakasuv that an ox should be stoned (Perek Aleph Seif Aleph & Beis), especially according to Pnei Moshe on Yerushalmi who says it's a gezeiras hakasuv that it should be stoned with twenty-three judges like execution of owners. But I did not understand Pnei Moshe's explanation—for if so, then the main point (that execution requires twenty-three judges) is missing in Yerushalmi! Furthermore, according to him—the fact that an ox is stoned would also not be secondary; what difference would his question there make? And similarly his explanation there—that "property" means judged by three judges—is unclear. In my humble opinion, Yerushalmi means simply: An ox sentenced to death remains entirely property—and property throughout Torah receives monetary penalty; only here there is a gezeiras hakasuv that this property’s penalty is stoning as well (in addition to paying money by its owner). Therefore there’s no difference between property causing stoning or property causing payment. Accordingly, Yerushalmi’s phrase "an ox sentenced to death remains entirely property" makes sense.

Still further analysis is needed since even this gezeiras hakasuv isn’t mentioned in Bavli. Perhaps they follow their own reasoning: Bavli explains (as above) "also its owner shall die by Heaven," so: 1) It’s not entirely property—for according to this explanation—"entirely" would have to include also owners; 2) R. Elazar’s question in Yerushalmi: whether he should pay money before judgment does not arise since payment comes as a result of Heavenly death sentence. In our Yerushalmi sugya perhaps they hold halacha overrides Scripture here (see Aderes Eliyahu on Mishpatim), as explained elsewhere (Perek Aleph Halacha Beis): "its owner shall die etc." partner with bandits like bandits etc.—he said you lived by a reed etc.—he said just as execution of owners so too etc.—and analyze carefully; here there’s no death at all and it’s entirely property. There’s much more to elaborate but this isn’t the place.

It seemed at first glance possible to explain why death of an ox parallels death of owners (even though one concerns monetary law and one capital law): 1) Based on Mechilta cited by Ramban (Beshalach 17:3)—(a logical reason rather than gezeiras hakasuv)—that a person’s animal constitutes his life; this is halacha not aggadah (see Shulchan Aruch Admur HaZaken Orach Chaim Siman 248:13 from Magen Avraham). And there’s no difficulty from other laws regarding one’s animal which don’t follow capital law—for Mechilta refers specifically to “to kill… their cattle,” i.e., specifically capital punishment for an animal—but this cannot suffice because then capital law should apply even when an animal was entrusted to guardians etc.

2) Like Rashba on Bava Kama 112a—if we interpret literally as cited in attached letter—that death of an ox itself counts as death of owners (not because it constitutes their life as above from Mechilta). However according to this—it becomes a unique gezeiras hakasuv without parallel elsewhere. There’s no logical reason why only execution by twenty-three judges applies for an executed ox but none of other ten requirements found in capital cases apply; especially difficult per Rashi’s wording there s.v. “no”—that analogy comes for main ruling etc., “why should we pity an ox?” etc.—such debate fits logical matters rather than gezeiras hakasuvs (especially such a decree contrary to logic).

Therefore I explained that execution of an ox counts as capital case because then “also its owner shall die” and not inherently due to itself—as I’ve written previously—and even Rashba can be interpreted thus.

Printed in Likkutei Sichos vol. VI p.329, completed based on secretariat copy. This answers Avrech Reb Nachum Zevin’s question: How can we learn execution of owners from execution of an ox (Sanhedrin 2a), since execution for an ox concerns monetary law while for owners it concerns capital law? And Rashi/Tosafos do not mention that this derives from gezeiras hakasuv.

Summary

The Rebbe explores whether laws regarding an ox that kills are scriptural decrees or logical derivations, analyzing Talmudic sources and commentaries. He clarifies how punishment connects between animal and owner, emphasizing nuanced understanding over simple categorization.