439 —בחירה חפשית וידיעת ה' מראש, מענה לשאלות קלאסיות

B"H, 22 Teves, 5709.

Haraha"ch vavac"h iy"a nu"m etc. Moreinu HaRav Yosef Altien

Shalom u'Vrachah!

In response to your letter: Without a vow, I intend to answer your questions from your previous letter at a time when I am less busy or at least when my work in printed Chassidus brings me to these topics—so that I will not be standing in one tractate and answering from another—and I trust you will not take offense at this. As a sign of my good will in this matter, I will respond now to your current question, though I am presenting and organizing it somewhat differently than in your letter, so as to proceed from the general and earlier points to the specific and later ones.

a) Can we say that the knowledge Above is general knowledge—as stated by the Rambam in Hilchos Teshuvah end of ch. 6—that the decree "and they shall serve them and afflict them" was not on specific Egyptians but on the nation as a whole, and each Egyptian individually had free choice whether to participate? If so, could an individual Egyptian have avoided enslaving Jews (and see Raavad's objection there)? Answer: We cannot say so, for it contradicts Scripture and our Sages. See Vayikra Rabbah ch. 26:7: "The Holy One showed Moshe... each generation and its oppressors... each generation and its prophets... He showed him Shaul... the priests he would kill." And in the blessing "You remember": "Everything is revealed and known before You... You see and observe until the end of all generations."

b) Can we say that Divine knowledge encompasses everything except matters of fear of Heaven which are not in G‑d's hands? Answer: Based on what was explained above in section (a), it is understood that even regarding Torah and mitzvos there is specific Divine knowledge.

c) Can we say that human free choice is only an illusion—that a person is actually compelled in his actions? Answer: G‑d forbid to say so! Free choice is a fundamental principle; it is a pillar of Torah and mitzvah. Without it, what place would there be for all of Torah? How could there be judgment or reward/punishment—"Shall not the Judge of all the earth do justice?" (Rambam Hilchos Teshuvah ch. 6 halachah 4; see also Shemoneh Perakim ch. 8). On a deeper level, based on Chassidus: true free choice means that after weighing all factors equally—yes or no—a person can truly choose. For example: A starving man faces a burning furnace on one side and a table set with royal delicacies on the other; he can either satisfy his hunger or throw himself into the fire—but this is not true choice deserving reward or punishment. Another example: An animal can either throw itself into a river and drown or graze in a good field—yet there is no real choice here because its nature compels it. This applies throughout creation—none can change their role at all (see Tanya chs. 24 & 29). The exception is only humankind—to whom was given permission and ability to go against their Creator's will (see Tanya ch. 29). The inner reason for this is because man's root comes from such a high level that nothing restrains him (see Likkutei Torah Parshas Emor explanation to "Vehenif," p. 83)—and it requires further study whether true free choice exists among non-Jews; see also "Kavod Malchuscha," Teres Shalom 5600. This is not the place for full discussion.

d) Seemingly, knowledge (foreknowledge) and free choice contradict each other—as asked by Rambam there and many other books? Answer: By way of introduction—there are matters which truly contradict each other; it's impossible for both to apply simultaneously to one subject—either one must be nullified completely or they cannot both apply at once. In our case—free choice versus decree—they contradict; therefore one (decree) must be nullified entirely—as stated by Rambam (ibid.) that human actions are not decreed from Above—or else decree does not apply where free choice does; as above regarding "they shall serve them," which applied to the nation as a whole while free choice applies to individuals.

There are also matters which do not inherently contradict but one may try to bring proof from one against the truth of another—in such cases three possibilities exist: (1) As above, one is nullified completely; (2) As above, they do not both apply simultaneously; (3) Even if both are true together regarding one subject, still no contradiction arises because the proof isn't valid.

In our case—Divine knowledge does not contradict free choice. For example: My certain knowledge that if I throw a stone tomorrow it will eventually fall to earth does not itself contradict someone claiming that the stone has free choice whether to fall or remain suspended—for even according to such an opinion it's possible for the stone to choose falling! Rather, my knowledge simply proves there's no real choice for the stone—the logic being: since my knowledge is certain beyond doubt, if you claim there's real choice how could I know beforehand what it will choose? Thus—even if it's incomprehensible how I could know beforehand what it will choose—there's no actual contradiction.

Or another example: Reuven knows future events concerning Shimon who lives at earth's end (i.e., Reuven cannot influence him at all)—Reuven knows Shimon's future actions/choices—but Reuven's knowing doesn't affect Shimon's choices; rather Reuven knows what Shimon will freely choose! That means Shimon's choosing determines Reuven's knowing—not vice versa—the choice causes the knowledge just like after-the-fact knowledge follows after-the-fact choices—it’s obvious there's no contradiction since the choosing was truly free because it wasn't influenced by prior knowledge; rather, prior knowledge depends on what was chosen—and this is how G‑d’s knowing works so-to-speak.

As our Sages said (Yerushalmi Rosh Hashanah ch.1 halachah 3): "The Holy One sees what will be born." And if you ask: since free choice is absolute how can anything be known beforehand? Rambam answers there that G‑d’s knowing isn’t like ours—we cannot comprehend how He knows.

On this topic see Torah Or & Toras Chaim end Parshas Vayeira; Likkutei Torah Behar explanation "Shabsosai," p.83; Bamidbar end explanation "Besha’ah Shehikdimu." Shaarei Teshuvah by Admor HaEmtza’i Gate of Choice etc.; also Pirush HaMishnayos Avos 3:19 "Everything is foreseen yet permission granted." Views of Jewish philosophers are gathered in Ohr Sameach on Rambam Hilchos Teshuvah there.

I am enclosing Kuntres LeChad Daat Tov and a letter from my father-in-law the Rebbe shlita as well as correspondence from Machane Yisrael organization.

Since this matter concerns every soul—it should certainly be arranged for many people in an appropriate manner—and thank you in advance! Please confirm receipt of this letter.

Summary

The Rebbe explains that although G‑d knows everything—including future choices—this does not negate human free will. Our choices remain genuine despite Divine foreknowledge, an essential foundation for Torah life. This understanding should be shared widely with others.