676 —הבהרות על ברכות, חומרות הלכתיות, וטעמים לתקנות חז"ל

B"H, 16 Menachem Av.

Hash-yit Haraha"ch vavac"h iy"a no"m etc. MehoRaD shiy.

Shalom u'Vrachah!

In response to your two letters—from Monday and Tuesday:

a) In the sichah of 12 Tammuz, a note was omitted, which reads: One should not question from the case of "the loss of one's father and the loss of one's teacher's teacher takes precedence" (Bava Metzia end of ch. 2), and "the teacher takes precedence over the father everywhere" (end of Kerisos)—because there the reason is due to the obligation of honor. Here it depends on who did him a favor, and even a small favor in Olam HaBa is greater than all life in this world. Furthermore (Kerisos ibid.), even one's father is obligated to honor his teacher. This differs from a miracle—for which one recites a blessing because he too experienced the miracle—and here the relationship between father and son is clearer. And this suffices.

b) Regarding your wonder at what is written in Shnei Luchot HaBrit (Shaar HaOtiyot, Kuf, p. 172b)—I am surprised at what he found novel here; during our conversation I told him to look at what Ramban writes (Bereishis 31:35; Vayikra 18:19), which are exactly the words of Shelah.

c) As for wanting to derive from this support for prohibiting touching due to impurity rather than concern for habitual sin—this is not so; for according to the above reasons, speech and visual contact with a niddah (even if he does not see her) are more severe, as it is explicitly written: The Torah did not prohibit this at all; on the contrary—the Sages were diligent in safeguarding Jewish women even in this matter. As our Sages said (Shabbos 64b): The earlier elders... until Rabbi Akiva came and taught..., see Rashi there; also see Kesubos (61a): All labors etc. The reason speaking etc. is permitted—in Rambam's words in his responsa (printed in Rambam Sluzinger ed., Sefer Kedusha sec. 169): "Because matters of impurity and purity are separate from forbidden and permitted matters among the Rabbis."

d) Why did our Sages not prohibit as above due to impurity or defilement? Several reasons can be given: a) As Shelah writes—they saw that people could not bear it; b) Because of women's sadness etc., as written in Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim sec. 288; c) For modesty reasons—that household members should not notice; d) The Karaites adopted several such stringencies claiming they are Torah law (see Rambam's responsa ibid.), so to distinguish ourselves from them our Sages refrained from prohibiting these things for any reason (except for rare individuals who practiced such stringency). We find an even greater example regarding Parah Adumah (Parah ch. 3 mishnah 7). In such cases we say: since many have become accustomed to it, 'G‑d protects the simple,' and even those aware of danger are protected—as ruled by tzt"z in his responsa Even HaEzer end sec. 11.

Summary

The Rebbe clarifies distinctions between different halachic categories—such as obligations stemming from honor versus those related to miracles—and explains why certain rabbinic decrees were or were not enacted by our Sages, emphasizing both practical considerations and separation from sectarian practices.