176 —דיני שבת לגבי חולה שיש בו סכנה, דחויה או הותרה

B"H, Sunday, 8 Tevet, 5705.

Shalom u'Vrachah!

In response to your letter regarding the third candle, as you requested, your letter has been copied here and my comments are attached. You wrote: Regarding the question about the law of Shabbat concerning a dangerously ill patient—whether it is considered overridden (dechuyah) or permitted (hutrah)—your pure eyes have already seen the dispute among the Rishonim as brought in Beit Yosef on Hilchot Shabbat, Tur Orach Chaim siman 328. However, from the plain words of our great teacher the Rambam z"l in chapter 2 halachah 1 it appears that he holds it is dechuyah, and so understood the holy Gaon in Mishnah Berurah there. But after further analysis it seems to me that from what Rambam writes in his commentary on Mishnah Shabbat chapter 18 (a), his opinion is that Shabbat is dechuyah regarding pikuach nefesh—as is clear from his language at the beginning of chapter 2 of Hilchot Shabbat. This is explicitly written by Beit Yosef (in Beit Yosef siman 328 and Kesef Mishneh), Bach, Rama (Darkei Moshe siman 330), Korban Netanel (end of Yoma), Rabbeinu HaZaken (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim siman 328 se'if 13), Machatzit HaShekel, Minchat Chinuch (end of mitzvah 32), and others. See also Biurei HaGra on Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah end of siman 266. The author of Aruch HaShulchan (Yoreh De'ah end of siman 266) says that Rambam was imprecise in his wording and holds that Shabbat is hutrah; but he later retracted this (Orach Chaim siman 328 se'if 3) and wrote "there is no need to interpret Rambam's words differently." That this violation was only permitted due to great necessity—see there—and our teacher did not omit bringing this law about great necessity in his halachot; thus it shows he changed his mind in old age from what he thought when young. The intention here is deep and clear: as he established in Hilchot Shevuot chapter 5 halachah 20 regarding one who swears not to sleep three days or not to eat seven days—that we lash him and he eats or sleeps whenever needed; see Kesef Mishneh on Ran's opinion there—meaning that what is permitted due to danger actually nullifies the prohibition itself (while Ran holds the prohibition remains but danger overrides it). Analyze this well.

So too here: Rambam's intent is not just that there remains a law of Shabbat but danger merely overrides it; rather, the essence of Shabbat itself is pushed aside for danger. This precision in Rambam's wording—"dechuyah"—is not just about terminology used in the Talmud but emphasizes that for a dangerously ill patient, it's as if there never was a law requiring Shabbat observance at all—similar to what was said above about oaths. Based on this we can understand the reasoning behind Mechilta Parshat Ki Tissa tractate deShabbata on "Mechalaleha"—Ribbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: since we have already desecrated part of it we may desecrate all of it; "Mechalaleha mot yumat" teaches even for an instant (c). The verse needs to obligate for violating after danger has passed because since...

(b) It requires further study whether the law about one who swears not to eat seven days applies here at all. There—the reason according to those who say he must eat immediately is because it's a vain oath since he swore against a mitzvah or something impossible; so what's the difference if it's impossible due to hutrah or dechuyah or nature? And according to Yerushalmi's reason that the oath takes effect—it may be because it's not against nature nor against mitzvah since mitzvah only applies once there's danger. More can be said; see Teshuvot U'Biurim section four (Kovetz Lubavitch booklet four).

(c) The intent of Mechilta seems clear: we need an extra verse so as not to say that since this Shabbat has already been desecrated by these people, "Mechalaleha" should apply only where it hasn't yet been desecrated—not where it's already been violated—as with Chazal's teaching about Nazir (42b). In Nazir where there's no extra verse that's indeed the law—and thus one can reject proof from Shabbat to Nazir as asked by Minchat Chinuch (mitzvah 264) on Rambam Hilchot Avel end ch.2. Also see Tzafnat Paneach by Gaon Rogatchover vol I p26a-d: time is continuous so when Shabbat is pushed aside it's as if it never existed; therefore even for part of Shabbat—even an instant—the verse must teach liability.

Indeed, this question—whether it's dechuyah or hutrah—originates in Yerushalmi Eruvin ch.10 halachah 2 where one opinion applies it to a child in danger and "his friends" ask if they may bring him via a prohibited method; answer: if possible via permissible means do so—see commentaries there. Thus "friends" hold hutrah and this seems to be the basis for dispute (d). But most Rishonim agree with Maharam MiRothenburg—the Rosh's teacher—that regarding a dangerously ill patient, Shabbat is like Yom Tov where food preparation is allowed; see Teshuvot Tashbetz vol III siman 37 s.v. Haramban z"l; likewise Beit Yosef rules so in Shulchan Aruch se'ifim 14 &12 explaining why extra verses are needed for liability even after desecration occurred—unlike Nazir where each act stands alone and one must learn exemption if already violated.

An example: someone who ate on Yom Kippur—is he obligated to fast the rest of the day? In Sefer HaMoadim BaHalacha I saw references discussing similar cases in Teshuvot Bnei Tzion I, Shaarei Deiah II, Maharsham I—but I don't have these books available.

However according to this explanation in Mechilta there's still difficulty with lengthiness—what difference does it make how exactly it was desecrated? But perhaps there's more room for discussion.

(d) Seemingly there's no real dispute here but rather question and answer. In any case: see Yoma (6b)—even according to those who say hutrah, if there are pure people available impure ones don't perform service; same should apply here. Even according to those who permit impure ones there because service involves two aspects: A) performing service B) priest fulfilling his mitzvah though not overriding impurity—and according to those who say hutrah there's no prohibition at all so why should impure priest override his own mitzvah? Not so with Yerushalmi where bringing via public domain isn't itself a mitzvah.

See also Tosafot d.h. Shelo (Shabbat 130b).

(e) From Beit Yosef's language on Tur it's clear he holds dechuyah and there's no reason to say he changed his mind later in Shulchan Aruch. Magen Avraham sec.9 brings reasons for slaughtering animals for sick people both according to hutrah and dechuyah but doesn't clarify which view Shulchan Aruch follows; Pri Megadim also writes that from Shulchan Aruch it appears dechuyah—and seemingly conclusive proof comes from se'if16 about estimating two... (as explained by Gra above). Also see Terumot section7 about feeding small amounts at intervals etc.

Moreover since Rambam (at least per Beit Yosef), Rashba and Ran hold dechuyah—the Rosh stands alone against them—and these opinions are cited by Beit Yosef who generally rules like majority view.

This seems also Magen Avraham sec9's view which we follow.

Tosafot on Shabbat133 d.h Lo'es b'Shinav doesn't prove those who say otherwise as quoted by Rama section12 distinguishing between circumcision and other illnesses—as Magen Avraham explains based on Maggid Mishneh section330 s.k2.

I found Yeshuot Yaakov Orach Chaim section328 s.k2 brings clear proof for those poskim holding hutrah—from Shabbat30a: If we're dealing with dangerously ill patient then "permitted" should be used—not just "exempt." If only dechuyah then as stated in Beitzah22a about extinguishing candles etc.—if possible another way must be used first before outright violation unless absolutely necessary—which fits with saying only exempt but not permitted unless truly necessary.

Therefore plain reading supports Rosh/Tur/Beit Yosef/Shulchan Aruch holding full permission regarding dangerously ill patients; see also Chatam Sofer Orach Chaim85 distinguishing between work on Shabbat versus impurity during Temple service based on Menachot64a/Mishnah133a/Tosafot/Magen Avraham etc.—all support distinction between hutrah/dechuyah depending on context.

(f) I do not have Yeshuot Yaakov at hand but see Rambam’s commentary there stating “this patient refers specifically to one whose life is endangered provided he cannot be moved elsewhere or shielded from light”—matching language of Mishnah “for sake of patient” meaning no other reason applies such as reluctance etc.; thus Yeshuot Yaakov’s proof falls away.

(g) From Menachot64a regarding estimation for patients—from Mishnah133a about chewing with teeth—even though that's a dangerously ill patient per Tosafot—and Magen Avraham’s distinction fits only if one holds there remains some prohibition merely overridden—not so if fully permitted per Rabbeinu’s ruling above.

The usual phrase “Pikuach nefesh docheh…” (“danger overrides…”) implies dechuyah—not full permission—but sometimes same phraseology used even when truly permitted depending on context.

Blessings for immediate repentance and immediate redemption,
M. Schneersohn

Summary

This letter explores whether saving a life on Shabbat involves merely overriding prohibitions or fully permitting them. Drawing upon many sources, the Rebbe concludes most authorities—including Rambam—hold that saving life fully permits necessary actions on Shabbat for a dangerously ill patient.