Pirkei Avos, Chapter 5 — Ben Hei Hei: "According to the Pain Is the Reward"*
1. "בן הא הא אומר לפום צערא אגרא" ("Ben Hei Hei says: According to the pain is the reward").1 The Bartenura explains: "כפי רוב הצער שאתה סובל בלימוד התורה ועשיית המצוה יהי' שכרך מרובה" ("According to the greatness of the pain that you endure in Torah study and in performing the mitzvah, so will your reward be great").
Receiving reward for mitzvos is an obligation according to halachah [as is also evident from the fact that the Rambam brings it in his (halachic) book, the "Yad"2; and moreover, he elaborates on it there and explains several of its detailed laws*2]. That is, according to the laws of the Torah, the A-lmighty is, as it were, "obligated" to give a person reward for his service, similar3 to the obligation of an employer to pay a worker for his labor.4
The novelty of the statement "According to the pain is the reward" (in its plain meaning) consists in this: the reward is calculated according to the pain, not according to the action and the benefit and improvement it brings. Accordingly, when a person's service brings little benefit, to the point that "ההוצאה והצער והטורח יתרים על השבח" ("the expense, the pain and the toil exceed the improvement")5 (his exertion and pain are greater than their result and accomplishment), the reward is not calculated according to the improvement; rather, he receives the full reward for his work and his pain.
This needs to be understood: The reward for mitzvos is, from the very outset, bound up with the expense, effort, toil and pain that they demand, as our Sages say in many places: "אם בחוקותי תלכו, שתהיו עמלים בתורה" ("If you walk in My statutes — that you toil in Torah")6 ... "ונתתי גשמיכם" ("and I will give your rains") ...; "עובד ... לא עבדו" ("one who serves ... one who has not served Him") — "אינו דומה שונה פרקו מאה פעמים לשונה פרקו מאה ואחד" ("one who reviews his chapter a hundred times is not comparable to one who reviews his chapter a hundred and one times") ... [as with a donkey-driver hired] for two zuz7 (because he goes against his habit8); "ונפש כי תקריב" ("When a soul brings an offering")9 ... "מי דרכו להביא מנחה עני מעלה אני עליו כאילו הקריב נפשו" ("Who usually brings a meal-offering? A poor person — I regard him as if he had offered his very soul").10 And many more such statements.
The same applies to an employer and a worker: what we find (in the Talmud and the halachic authorities)*10, that a worker is paid only for the "improvement" when the expense "exceeds the improvement," applies only in specific cases: when the employer did not hire the worker, but the worker did the work on his own initiative ("היורד לתוך שדה חבירו ונטעה שלא ברשות" — "one who goes down into his fellow's field and plants it without permission"11); or when he did it differently from what the employer instructed him ("אדום וצבעו שחור, שחור וצבעו אדום" — "[told to dye it] red and he dyed it black, black and he dyed it red"12); or when he deliberately caused damage ("צבעו כאור" — "he dyed it badly"13).
But when the worker did the work just as the employer told him to, then even in a case where the expense exceeds the improvement — and even when he accomplished nothing at all, his work not having brought the benefit it was supposed to bring, as in "השוכר את הפועל להביא כרוב ודורמסקין לחולה והלך ומצאו שמת" ("one who hires a worker to bring cabbage and plums for a sick person, and he went and found that he had died")14 — since "עביד שליח שליחותיה" ("the agent has carried out his mission"), and he, for his part, did the work completely (it is only that for some reason the purpose and intent of the work did not come about), the law is that "נותן לו שכרו משלם" ("he pays him his wage in full")14 (even in a case where "שכרוהו בשביל החולה יותר ממה שהי' ראוי לשוכרו" — "they hired him for the sake of the sick person for more than he would ordinarily be hired"15).
Accordingly, it is not understood: since in our case "the agent has carried out his mission" — he has done as much as he can in Torah and mitzvos, and moreover, the work has brought benefit (even if it is small compared to the effort and pain) — then all the more so must the reward be paid in full16, including his expense (the pain)17, even though the expense exceeds the improvement. So in what does the novelty of "According to the pain is the reward" consist?
2. In the above-mentioned laws, the effort and work (the "expense") of the worker are something separate from the benefit (the "improvement") that the employer will have as a result of his work; and even when "the agent has carried out his mission," this means only that he performed his action completely, but this did not (always) bring about the purpose for which the employer hired him.
In our case, however, the "pain" of fulfilling Torah and mitzvos is not something separate from the gain and improvement. As the Rambam says in "Shemoneh Perakim"18: "שהמתאוה לעבירות ונכסף אליהם הוא יותר חשוב ויותר שלם מאשר לא יתאוה אליהם ולא יצטער בהנחתם כו' ולא דים זה עד שיאמר ששכר המושל בנפשו גדול לפי רוב צערו במשלו בנפשו ואמרו לפום צערא אגרא ויותר מזה שהם ציוו להיות האדם מתאוה לעבירות כו' לא יאמר אדם אי אפשי כו' אלא אפשי ומה אעשה אבי בשמים גזר עלי" ("One who desires transgressions and longs for them is more worthy and more complete than one who does not desire them and does not suffer in refraining from them ... And not only this, but they said that the reward of one who rules over his soul19 is great according to the greatness of his pain in ruling over his soul, and they said, 'According to the pain is the reward.' And even more than this, they commanded that a person should desire transgressions20 ... 'A person should not say, I do not want it ... rather: I do want it, but what can I do — my Father in Heaven has decreed upon me'").
Accordingly, it is even less understood what the novelty is in "According to the pain is the reward": the expense and pain itself is a matter of improvement, to the point that he was actually commanded21 regarding it22 — so what is the novelty that he receives reward for the "pain"?
And it is very forced to say that this is indeed the contribution of the Mishnah and that it is the source for this idea, as the plain wording of the Rambam, who cites it in this context, would suggest — since there are many statements of our Sages on this, as mentioned above.
3. The explanation of this may be as follows: With "According to the pain is the reward," the Mishnah intends to teach something new — not pain in general, any pain at all, but especially and specifically a real pain (without the admixture of the pleasure one has in fulfilling a command, for that is what we are speaking about) — such pain in Torah and mitzvos in which the person is not obligated, but which he takes upon himself —
[Accordingly, it is all the more fitting that the Mishnah "According to the pain is the reward" stands in Tractate Avos, and at its very conclusion and seal — the tractate that speaks about "מילי דחסידותא" ("matters of piety")23, matters that are beyond the letter of the law, as will be explained below in Section 5;
and as is also alluded to in the fact that the Mishnah calls the author of the statement ("According to the pain is the reward") not by his personal name, but by the appellation "Ben Hei Hei," which emphasizes that he was a convert ("בן אברהם ושרה שנתוספה ה"א בשמם" — "a son of Avraham and Sarah, to whose names the letter hei was added")24 — to indicate25 that this refers to when he takes upon himself a pain in which he is not obligated at all, like the entire existence (as a newborn child) of a convert: he converts26, though there is no obligation whatsoever to do so, and on the other hand he takes upon himself the difficulty and pain of fulfilling all of Torah and mitzvos] —
and therefore one might have thought that for such pain*26 he receives no reward, but only according to his accomplishment and improvement — as is the law regarding one who works his fellow's field on his own initiative, who receives payment (not for his full "expense") but only according to the measure of the "improvement." So the Mishnah says, "According to the pain is the reward": he is given reward also for his effort and pain (although he was not commanded to undertake it).
It should be noted: with a convert, this is his entire existence; but there is something similar to it with everyone — with a hiddur mitzvah (an enhancement of a mitzvah), or a good practice, or an appointment to a matter of holiness, etc. — which he takes upon himself27 of his own accord.*27
4. One can ask, however: when someone works his fellow's field, if the owner has revealed his mind that it is agreeable to him, he must pay the worker for the entire expense (even when the expense is greater than the improvement)28. Accordingly, the question returns to its place: since the A-lmighty is "pleased"29 with what a person does beyond the letter of the law, with what he was not commanded — what is the novelty that "According to the pain is the reward" [to the point that this is (as mentioned in Section 3) a matter of the attribute of piety]?
The explanation of this:
When one takes upon himself effort and pain (in Torah and mitzvos) without being obligated in it — such as a hiddur mitzvah or a good practice and the like — and afterwards (after having kept it three times) he does not keep the hiddur and practice, it emerges that his having taken the pain upon himself (simply, without specifying that it is "בלי נדר" — "without a vow")*29 is like "negligence": it causes the later loss30 —
[And all the more so with a convert who converted and afterwards does not fulfill the mitzvos as required: his conversion is like negligence. For since "קשים גרים לישראל כספחת" ("converts are as difficult for Israel as a sore")31, because "אין בקיאין בדקדוקי מצות וישראל למדין ממעשיהם" ("they are not expert in the fine points of the mitzvos, and Jews learn from their deeds")32 — and according to law one must first caution and warn a convert who wishes to convert: "מה ראית שבאת להתגייר וכו' דאי פריש נפרוש כו'" ("What did you see that you came to convert ... so that if he is to withdraw, let him withdraw ...")33 — and since he nevertheless converted without thinking about the difficulty that could result (not fulfilling the mitzvos in all their details), it is like "negligence"] —
therefore, were it not for the novelty of "According to the pain is the reward," one could have assumed that he receives no reward for the "pain" — similar to a worker who undertook to transport "חבית ממקום למקום" ("barrels from place to place") and they broke because of his negligence (because he carried them along a bad road, and the like), where the law is that the employer need not pay him for the work [on the contrary: the worker must pay for the broken barrels]34. Thus the contribution of "According to the pain is the reward" is that even when the "pain" he took upon himself caused a loss (as it were) to the Owner (the Holy One, blessed be He)35, he is nevertheless given reward for the "pain" and effort, beyond the letter of the law*35; just as in the above-mentioned case of one who "transports barrels from place to place," that (if he has nothing to eat36) "מצוה היא לעשות לו לפנים משורת הדין וליתן לו שכרו" ("it is a mitzvah to act toward him beyond the letter of the law and give him his wage").37
5. Although this law ("it is a mitzvah to act toward him beyond the letter of the law and give him his wage") was stated specifically where the employer hired the worker to transport the barrels — whereas in our case he undertakes the conversion, the hiddur and the good practice on his own initiative — nevertheless, since the employer is pleased with the worker's work in general, then even when he was negligent in one detail
[for example, when, transporting the barrels "במקום רעוע" ("through a shaky place")*37, only one barrel broke, and the profit from the barrels that were transported is greater than the loss of the single broken barrel, in which case the employer is pleased with the act of transporting the barrels (he is only not satisfied with the manner in which he did it)],
the employer must, by the attribute of piety, give him the full pay for his work (including for transporting the barrel that broke). For since the employer is pleased with the act in general, it is as if he had hired him to do it.38
And it is therefore likewise in our case: since the Owner (the A-lmighty) is pleased that a person takes upon himself39 the effort and pain of a hiddur mitzvah, etc. (it is only that the manner in which he took it upon himself was not proper, without stipulating "bli neder")40, He gives the full reward for the pain — "According to the pain is the reward."
And similarly with a convert who converted: since conversion itself is something desired by the Owner (by the A-lmighty)41, then even though afterwards there was "negligence" on his part in that he does not fulfill the mitzvos with all their fine points, he receives reward for his conversion42 (although it caused a loss).43
6. It may be said that the reason the author of the statement "According to the pain is the reward" is called here by the appellation "Ben Hei Hei," in order to emphasize that he was a convert, as mentioned above — even though with a (born) Jew, too, it is possible to take upon oneself pain and toil (in Torah and mitzvos) in which one is not obligated according to law — is because specifically with conversion there is an acceptance of pain in which one is entirely not obligated.44
The explanation of this:
The entire creation of a Jew is "לשמש את קוני" ("to serve my Maker").45 It is understood from this that one must use all of his powers for this service — the service of G‑d — to the point that, as our Sages say46, every Jew is obligated to say, "מתי יגיעו מעשי למעשה אבותי אברהם יצחק ויעקב" ("When will my deeds reach the deeds of my fathers, Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov?"). Therefore, with a Jew it is hard to find an effort and pain in the service of G‑d in which he is not obligated at all. For even matters that are beyond the letter of the law and matters of piety are, after all, not things from which a Jew is exempt, since he is obligated "to serve my Maker" with all his powers.
A convert who converted, however — before his conversion he has no obligation whatsoever to convert (on the contrary: to a convert who comes to convert we say, "What did you see that you came to convert..."33), so that the acceptance of pain through conversion in order to fulfill Torah and mitzvos is in a manner in which he is not obligated at all.47
Nevertheless, the matter ("According to the pain is the reward") is brought in Tractate Avos, which pertains to all Jews (and not only to converts), because when a Jew, too, takes upon himself additional pain in Torah and mitzvos in which he is not obligated by law — especially when this is not in keeping with his nature and habit, to the point that because of this (the pain and the change of habit) it is as if he is taking upon himself an entirely new thing — it is comparable to a convert who converted.48
Moreover: the Mishnah ("According to the pain is the reward") stands (according to several versions49) precisely at the conclusion of (the Mishnayos50 of) Tractate Avos51, which means that this is the highest level in "matters of piety," as mentioned above — because the Mishnah speaks of such an acceptance of pain that is entirely contrary to his nature and habit, and for this reason it is the loftiest level in the attribute of piety.
7. Now, concerning what was said earlier (Section 1), that the reward for mitzvos is an obligation according to halachah (that according to Torah law a Jew must receive reward for his service of Torah and mitzvos), one can ask:
The definition of the obligation that people have to pay a worker for his work (a day-laborer, a contractor, and the like) applies specifically to one who has no obligation to work for the employer, and whose work is done for the sake of the wage. Not so a servant, who has upon himself the obligation to serve his master because he is acquired by him; and likewise a son, who is obligated to serve his father because of the mitzvah and obligation of honoring one's father52 — with them there is no category of paying wages for their service and work.53
Now, since the relationship of Jews to the A-lmighty is "אם כבנים אם כעבדים" ("whether as children or as servants"), and moreover, the purpose of a Jew's creation is "to serve my Maker," it is understood that a Jew's being acquired by and obligated "to serve my Maker" is (according to halachah) to a far greater degree than the acquisition and obligation of a servant to his master — and certainly more than the obligation of a son to his father.54 How, then, can one say that the Jew is due (by law) a reward55 for serving the A-lmighty?56
8. The explanation of this:
Since Torah and mitzvos were given by the A-lmighty to Jews, it is understood that in them there are definitions that stem from the side of the Giver (the A-lmighty), and definitions that stem from the side of the recipient (Jews).57
Therefore we find two extremes in the Torah: "אין דברי תורה מקבלין טומאה" ("words of Torah do not contract impurity") — when a Jew who is not pure learns them — because they are "דברי (כאש)" ("My words — (like fire)")58: the A-lmighty's words. And nevertheless, "רב שמחל על כבודו כבודו מחול" ("a teacher who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone"), because "תורה דידיה היא" ("the Torah is his")59 (it is (like) the teacher's own Torah). That is, in certain matters the Torah remained in the "ownership" of the A-lmighty, and in other details it was handed over to the recipient, to the Jew.
And just as this is so regarding Torah and mitzvos themselves, so it is also with regard to the obligation to learn Torah and fulfill mitzvos — these two definitions are present in it:
From the side of the definition of the Giver, the Jew has an obligation to fulfill Torah and mitzvos in the manner of the obligation of service of a son to his father and a servant to his master. And from the side of the definition of the recipient, his engagement in Torah and mitzvos is the kind of obligation that is (according to Torah)60 bound up with receiving reward61, like a contractor and a hired worker.61
[These two opposite definitions in the obligation of fulfilling Torah and mitzvos are expressed (also) in the distinction between the two categories of mitzvos — the mitzvos (idolatry, forbidden relations and bloodshed) regarding which the rule is "יהרג ואל יעבור" ("be killed rather than transgress"), and the other mitzvos, about which it is said, "אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם" ("which a person shall do and live by them") — "וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם" ("'and live by them' — and not die by them"):62
With these [other] mitzvos, their definition of obligation from the side of the recipient is emphasized; and therefore with them the recipient matters — and even more, they are concerned for the recipient — as our Sages say, that "I was created" in order that there be "to serve my Maker" — "and live by them."63 Whereas in the three above-mentioned matters (mitzvos), their main64 definition of obligation is from the side of the Giver; therefore65 with them there is no such thing as "transgress" — "be killed rather than transgress."]
9. The above point regarding the reward for Torah and mitzvos — that it stems from the definitions of the recipient — is further emphasized in the fact that the manner of the reward is "according to the pain," according to how much pain and effort the recipient had in it.
With this comes an additional explanation of the connection of the statement "According to the pain is the reward" to Tractate Avos — matters of piety:
The concept of "matters of piety" (beyond the letter of the law) fits only from the side of the recipient. But from the side of the Giver — according to which man's entire purpose is only "to serve my Maker" — there is no limit to his obligation to serve the A-lmighty (to the point, as mentioned at the end of Section 7, that he is therefore obligated to give up his life), and consequently the definition of "beyond the letter of the law" does not apply either.66
And this provides (another67) reason why Tractate Avos begins with the wording "משה קבל תורה מסיני" ("Moshe received the Torah from Sinai") (and not "the Holy One, blessed be He, gave the Torah to Moshe at Sinai," or the like): because the matter of "matters of piety" (the content of Tractate Avos) is relevant only in connection with "received," with the definition of the recipient of Torah and mitzvos.
And "נעוץ תחילתן בסופן" ("their beginning is wedged in their end")68 — therefore the conclusion of (the Mishnayos of) Tractate Avos is also about reward69 — and within this, the matter of "According to the pain is the reward" — which stems from the definition of the recipient, as mentioned above.
10. The way in which "According to the pain is the reward" expresses "the definition of the recipient" is not only in that the reward ("agra") is commensurate with the pain and effort ("lefum tza'ara"), but also in the "pain" itself, in the manner of the pain and effort.
Since we are speaking here (as mentioned in Section 3) of pain in the service of Torah and mitzvos in which the person is not obligated by law, but which he accepts upon himself entirely of his own will — similar to the acceptance of the mitzvos (the pain) by a convert, which comes entirely from his own choice and will (having no obligation to convert, as mentioned above) — it follows that the "pain" in the service of Torah and mitzvos (whether a convert's acceptance of the mitzvos as a whole, or70 a matter of piety and the like by a Jew)*70 belongs entirely to the person.71
With this comes an additional explanation of the connection of the end of Tractate Avos with its beginning66 (in addition to what was said in Section 9): for at the Giving of the Torah, too, when "Moshe received the Torah from Sinai" (where the word "received" emphasizes the definition of the recipient and his role, as mentioned there), all Jews were converts.72
11. Based on the above, the connection of the statement "Ben Hei Hei says: According to the pain is the reward" to the statement immediately preceding it will also be understood: "בן בג בג אומר הפך בה והפך בה כו'" ("Ben Bag Bag says: Turn it over and turn it over ...") [to the point that according to several versions73 both statements are one Mishnah]:
Ben Bag Bag, too, was a convert (or the son of converts74). And just as the appellation "Ben Hei Hei" alludes (as mentioned in Section 3) to his having been a convert — "a son of Avraham and Sarah, to whose names a hei was added" — so too the appellation "Ben Bag Bag" alludes to this, because "Bag Bag" has the numerical value of hei hei75 [and it is also alluded to in the acronym of "Bag Bag"76: "בן גר בן גיורת" ("son of a male convert, son of a female convert")].77
And for the same reason (as mentioned regarding "Ben Hei Hei"), the author of the statement is here too called (not by his name, but) by the appellation "Ben Bag Bag" (which points to his conversion) — to allude that the fact that the author of the statement was a convert is connected to his statement78 "Turn it over and turn it over."79
Since a Noahide is obligated in the Seven Mitzvos, it is understood that his Torah study, too (the laws and details of the seven mitzvos), although it is a lofty matter — to the point that "נכרי ועוסק בתורה הרי הוא ככהן גדול" ("a gentile who engages in Torah is like a Kohen Gadol")80 — nevertheless, his Torah study is not a goal in itself, but merely (a "means") to know how to fulfill the mitzvos, and it does not have the virtue of a Jew's Torah study. Specifically at the moment that he converts and becomes obligated to learn Torah as a mitzvah and an end in itself, a fundamental change takes place in his Torah study; it attains the elevation and wondrous virtue of "הפך בה והפך בה דכולא בה" ("Turn it over and turn it over, for everything is in it").
And this is also the connection of "Ben Bag Bag" to the statement "Turn it over and turn it over" (i.e., what moved him to say this statement was this): because the command and elevation of Torah expressed in "Turn it over and turn it over" is felt by a convert in a special way.
Accordingly, the connection between the two statements is understood — "Ben Bag Bag says: Turn it over ..." and "Ben Hei Hei says: According to the pain is the reward": the content of both statements has a special connection to a convert.
And the order of the two statements is precise — first the statement "Turn it over ...," which speaks of Torah study (learning), and afterwards the statement "According to the pain is the reward," which is the pain and effort involved in the performance of the mitzvos — for "תלמוד מביא לידי מעשה" ("study leads to action").81
12. All matters in the Torah — including the names of the authors of the statements — are utterly precise. It is understood from this that the connection of the two statements ("Turn it over ..." and "According to the pain ...") to the two Sages (Ben Bag Bag and Ben Hei Hei) is not only a general one, in that both of them were converts, but that the two distinct names allude to the different matters of the two statements.
[A proof of this: according to one opinion82, "Ben Bag Bag" and "Ben Hei Hei" are two names of the same Tanna. Since with the statement "Turn it over" he is called "Ben Bag Bag," and with "According to the pain" — "Ben Hei Hei"83, one must say that the difference between the names corresponds to the difference in content between the two statements.]
The explanation of this:
In the appellation "Ben Hei Hei" (the author of the statement "According to the pain is the reward"), the allusion to a convert is more evident than in the appellation "Ben Bag Bag." In the words of the Rashbam (in the name of R. Y. ben HaRosh)84: "Bag Bag" (which is only numerically hei hei) "יותר נסתר ונעלם" ("is more hidden and concealed").85
And similar is the difference between their statements: "Turn it over" speaks of a matter that is "hidden and concealed," which one must turn over and turn over again; whereas "pain" is something revealed.
The explanation: "Turn it over and turn it over" refers mainly (as mentioned in Section 11) to engagement in Torah as a goal and purpose in itself (learning in order to understand and grasp G‑d's Torah, and not only "לדעת את המעשה" — "to know what to do"). It is therefore understood that this encompasses not only the halachic matters that pertain to practice (revealed matters), but mainly the study of give-and-take and the like (which are concealed beforehand, and even after the give-and-take something remains "concealed" in them, and one can continue the give-and-take further).
And as commentators86 explain the meaning of "Turn it over and turn it over": "לפי שמצינו .. שהי' דורש מ"ט פנים טמא ומ"ט פנים טהור ואפי' שהיו אלו היפך אלו .. לכן אמר .. הפך בה והפך בה ודרוש דברים הפכיים מ"ט פנים לטהר ופנים לטמא דכולא בה ואלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים" ("Since we find ... that he would expound forty-nine aspects for impure and forty-nine aspects for pure, even though these were the opposite of those ... therefore he said ... turn it over and turn it over, and expound opposite things — forty-nine aspects to declare pure and aspects to declare impure — for everything is in it, and 'these and these are the words of the living G‑d'").87
It follows that the difference between "According to the pain is the reward" and "Turn it over ..." is the difference between "revelation" and "concealment": the "pain" (in Torah and mitzvos) that a Jew accepts upon himself pertains to a specific (revealed) thing (a practice and the like)88; whereas in "Turn it over ...," the novelty is that he engages (also) in that part of Torah (the depths of Torah, forty-nine aspects this way and forty-nine aspects that way) in which the directives are "סתומות ולא מפורשות וגלויות וידועות" ("hidden, and not explicit, revealed and known").89
Therefore, although in both sayings the matter of a convert is emphasized (which is the central point of both statements), in the statement "Turn it over ..." it is in the name in a manner that is "hidden and concealed," and in the statement "According to the pain is the reward" — in a revealed manner.90
(From the sichos of 10th, 13th and 15th of Shevat 5739)
Notes
*) And the conclusion of Tractate Avos (in the Mishnayos) (see the following note). A second edition of this Sicha (in Hebrew) was printed at the end of the book Biurim L'Pirkei Avos (Kehot).
1) In the Mishnayos it is at the end of chapter 5. See below, notes 49 and 51.
2) "This work is (a compilation of) laws upon laws" (the Rambam's introduction to the Yad).
*2) See Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah, ch. 3 (halachos 1–5). See also there, chs. 8 and 9; end of Laws of Kings.
3) The reasoning to negate this is only "מי הקדימני ואשלם כי תחתי לו נשמה כו'" ("Who has preceded Me, that I should repay? ... For I placed a soul within him ..."), as our Sages said (Vayikra Rabbah 27:2).
4) Cf. Avos 2:14 and 2:15: "your Employer ... the reward for your work." And there, 2:16: "and the workers ... and the Master of the house ..." Cf. also Toras Kohanim (cited in Rashi on the verse), Bechukosai 26:9: "A parable to a king who hired workers ..." See below, Section 8.
5) The wording of the Midrash Shmuel at the end of Tractate Avos (explaining "According to the pain is the reward").
6) Toras Kohanim (cited in Rashi), beginning of Bechukosai.
7) Chagigah 9b. See also below in the text, Section 7 [?].
8) Tanya, ch. 16 [?]. See also Sotah (11b), that women's work given to men constitutes crushing labor.
9) Vayikra 2:1.
10) Menachos 104b. Cited in Rashi on the Torah, there.
*10) For "מגיד דבריו ליעקב חוקיו ומשפטיו לישראל" ("He tells His words to Yaakov, His statutes and judgments to Israel") ... "what He does, He tells Israel to do ..." (Shemos Rabbah 30:9; see also Jerusalem Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 1:3). From this it is understood that the laws of an employer's payment of wages to a worker are a parallel to the reward that the Holy One, blessed be He, pays.
11) Bava Metzia 101a. Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 375.
12) Mishnah, Bava Kamma 100b. Shulchan Aruch, ibid., 367 [?]:3.
13) Bava Kamma, ibid. (see Rashi there). Shulchan Aruch, ibid. See also (and regarding what follows below) Encyclopedia Talmudis, entry "Uman" (craftsman).
14) Bava Kamma 109a [?], end, ff. And in the Rambam (Laws of Hiring 9:8) and Shulchan Aruch (ibid., 335:3): "he gives him his entire wage."
It should be noted that from the plain wording of the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema (ibid., par. 2), "One who hires a worker to bring him something from place to place, and he went and did not find there what he was to bring, he gives him his wage in full, for he has already carried out his mission," it is implied that here, too, he gives him the entire wage that was stipulated (see Pischei Teshuvah there, sub-par. 3*; Biur HaGra there, sub-par. 16). However, the Sma (there, sub-par. 8; and at length, the Derishah there, sub-par. 2) and the Nesivos HaMishpat (sub-par. 2 there) did not explain it so.
*) And see there what he answers to the question of the Lechem Mishneh (Laws of Hiring, ibid.): why is this different from the law of one who went down to rescue and did not rescue, who receives only his wage (cited [below], note 16)? See also Machaneh Ephraim, Laws of Hiring, ibid. And elsewhere.
15) Tosafos s.v. "Lehavi," Bava Kamma (ibid., beginning of side b; cited in the Beis Yosef, Choshen Mishpat, ibid.). Nimukei Yosef, ibid. Prishah, ibid., beginning of 264, sub-par. 4. Nesivos HaMishpat, cited above. And so it is implied in the Rambam, ibid. [OCR unclear], "he gives him his entire wage" (see Hagahos Maimonios there; Chasdei David on the Tosefta, Bava Metzia 7:2, at the end)*. See also Toras Chaim, Bava Kamma, ibid. (and regarding the question raised by Tosafos s.v. "Ein lo," Yevamos 106a — see the responsa Lechem Rav, cited in the margin of the Talmud there).
*) But see Derishah, ibid., 335, sub-par. 2, at the end.
16) For even with "one who went down to rescue and did not rescue," he is given wages for his work (Bava Kamma, ibid.; Rambam, Laws of Robbery and Lost Objects 12:14; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, beginning of 264:4). However, there he receives only the wage due to him, and is not paid for his donkey that he lost because of his rescue attempt, since "he did not carry out the mission" (Bava Kamma, ibid.), for "he was hired to rescue, and he did not rescue" (Shitah Mekubetzes, ibid.). Not so in our case: since the command to a person concerns the doing and the action (for success does not depend on him), it is understood that he has carried out his mission, and he is paid his wage in full (even more than what is due him). This is not the place to elaborate.
17) As for what we find concerning one who hires a worker to bring him something from place to place, and he went and did not find it ..., that if what he was to bring was a heavy thing, [the employer] deducts from his wage, since it is not comparable ... (Shulchan Aruch, ibid.) — that is because his action and effort were actually lighter (since he did not bring it). Not so in our case, where, on the contrary, his action and effort are complete.
18) Ch. 6. Note that in the Commentary on the Mishnah (of the Rambam), Avos, end of ch. 5, he explains it differently.
19) Note that the virtue of one who conquers his inclination — and likewise the reward for it — is a matter of halachah (see Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah 6:4).
20) So it reads in our edition of the Commentary on the Mishnah; but in Rabbi Kafich's translation [it is noted] that the words "they commanded ... transgressions" are not in the original and are an addition of the translator. In his translation: "they commanded that a person should conquer his inclination" (and in the continuation of the passage there are also several differences in style).
21) However, he distinguishes that what they said, "A person should not say, I do not want it ... rather: I do want it, but what can I do ...," applies only to the traditional laws (chukim and the like); but regarding the rational mitzvos (things that are bad also from the standpoint of reason), one must say "I do not want it." See there.
22) See Tosafos Yom Tov on the Mishnah here, from the Derech Chaim: "And this is regarding the reward for the pain of the toil itself, that if it is great, his reward is great; but the reward of the mitzvos themselves — you do not know their reward." See there (in the Derech Chaim) at length.
23) See Bava Kamma 30a.
24) Tosafos, Chagigah 9b (and there regarding "Bar Hei Hei"*). Midrash Shmuel here. And in Machzor Vitri, end of ch. 7 [?]: "And likewise, Hei Hei is five, like the letters of Avraham."
It should be noted that "Ben Hei Hei" here** is spelled out with an alef — although with Sarah one may say that it is spelled out with a hei (for then hei-vav has the numerical value of the yud that was taken away).
*) In Meleches Shlomo here he writes that he (the one in Chagigah) was an Amora. In Yuchasin, entry Ben Hei Hei, he is uncertain (as above) whether he was a Tanna or an Amora. See also there, entry Hihi; and Dikdukei Sofrim, Chagigah, ibid.
**) But in Chagigah, ibid., it is spelled out with a yud. — It should be noted that the change in spelling-out is in the letters alef-yud-hei (see Yahel Or, p. 165). See the subject of the spellings-out in the book Ashalech Le'Iyuna (and the explanation of [OCR unclear] there — Or HaTorah, Inyanim, p. 240 ff.). This is not the place to elaborate.
25) In the Midrash Shmuel here (from the Rashbam in the name of R. Y. ben HaRosh): he was called so in order to hide them from informers (and in Machzor Vitri there: he did not want to make it public, and the editor referred to him in modest and clean language). But since all matters in the Torah — including the names of the authors of the statements — are eternal, it is understood that it pertains to the content of his statement, as in the text. See below, note 79.
Especially since, seemingly, one should not remind a convert that he is a convert (especially in the (conclusion of the) tractate of matters of piety — Avos).
26) See below, Section 6 and note 47.
*26) As for the pain itself being a matter of improvement (as mentioned in Section 2) — see below, Section 4.
27) Cf. the category of mitzvos "that a person is not obligated to strive and pursue until he does it ... which is not an obligation but akin to an option" (Rambam, Laws of Blessings 1:2).
*27) See below in the text, Section 4 (and in the notes), and Section 6.
28) Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, end of 375:3, and the Sma there, sub-par. 6.
29) And even more so, he is like one who went down with permission — in which case all agree (even according to the view of the Rosh, Bava Metzia ch. 8, sec. 22, cited in the Tur there) that he receives even the expense that exceeds the improvement.
*29) See below, note 35.
30) Like one who accepted upon himself an appointment and the like (in which he is not obligated), and this caused something like [what is said in] Yoma (86a): "What constitutes desecration of G‑d's Name? Rav said: For example, if I take meat from the butcher and do not pay immediately."
31) Yevamos 47b, and the sources cited there.
32) Tosafos s.v. "Kashim" (see also Rashi there, s.v. "De'amar"), and so too in Rashi there, 109b.
33) Yevamos, ibid.
34) Bava Metzia 83a. Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, beginning of 264 [?].
35) In the inner dimension of things, it may be said that the loss caused to the Owner is not only in certain cases (where he does not keep the hiddur properly and did not stipulate "bli neder"), but in every case. For since, in light of the true immensity of His greatness and exaltedness, even true service is as nothing, and on the contrary, "is considered a sin ..." (discourse beginning "Hechaltzu" 5659, ch. 3, see there at length; and similarly in the discourse "Vayikan'u Ami" 5651), then (granted, with mitzvos that were commanded, the loss caused does not come through his negligence, since he was commanded to fulfill Torah and mitzvos; but) when he takes upon himself a hiddur and the like in which he was not obligated, it turns out that the loss (that his service is not "as it should be done" (Kesubos 66a) relative to the immensity of His greatness, and even more so, as above) comes through his negligence, and the expense exceeds the improvement.
*35) Accordingly, it is also answered what practical difference — in a person's conduct — there is in "According to the pain is the reward." For it seems forced to say that this is only to encourage him in fulfilling Torah and mitzvos (especially since at the beginning of the tractate (Mishnah 3) it says explicitly, "Be not like servants who serve the master for the sake of receiving a reward ...," and after (fulfilling) this directive and all the directives up to the end of the tractate, would they then direct a person to fulfill Torah and mitzvos (even when this involves pain) by announcing that he will receive reward even for the pain?!).
— For (in addition to the fact that it may be said that it informs us of the conduct of "the attribute of piety" — beyond the letter of the law — of the Holy One, blessed be He, and "cleave to His ways"), it thereby informs us that even accepting such a pain, from which a loss may come ..., is pleasing to the Holy One, blessed be He, as explained below in Section 5.
36) In the Bach, ibid., [it is explained] that the meaning of "he has nothing to eat" is that he does not have "enough for that day's meal" [and it requires investigation whether this is according to all opinions — since this is not mentioned in the other halachic authorities]. In our case it may be said that the full measure of the capacity of the Holy One, blessed be He, to give each tzaddik 365 [?] worlds (Sanhedrin 100a, end; Rashi there) — this becomes the person's "meal of the day."
37) Tur, ibid. (from Bava Metzia, ibid.). Sma, ibid. Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Laws of Borrowing and Hiring, sec. 19.
As for what is stated in Bava Metzia there, that Rabbah bar bar Chanan held that he need not pay wages, and Rav, too, did not bring him a proof (that he must pay wages) from Avos — this is because from the conduct of the Holy One, blessed be He, it does not at all necessarily follow that a human being is obligated in it in all its exact details [see also the saying of our Sages (Vayikra Rabbah 27:2) on the verse (Iyov 41:3), "Who has preceded Me, that I should repay?"]. Especially since the conduct of "According to the pain is the reward" is a novelty, even relative to the conclusion of the Gemara (in Bava Metzia, ibid.), as in note 38.
*37) The wording of the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, ibid.
38) Nevertheless, this is not exactly like hiring a worker — and therefore it is only an attribute of piety [whereas with hiring a worker, it is a mitzvah to act toward him beyond the letter of the law, to the point that he is compelled to do so (Bach, ibid.)]. Accordingly, the novelty of "According to the pain is the reward" over the law of "וארחות צדיקים תשמור" ("and keep the paths of the righteous") in Bava Metzia, ibid., is understood. See note 43, and this requires further investigation.
39) Cf. Tosafos s.v. "Ve'atah," Shabbos 87a.
40) And even according to what was said above in note 35, the Owner (the Holy One, blessed be He) is pleased with the very matter that he takes upon himself an additional hiddur, etc., and the loss is only in the manner of his service, as mentioned above.
41) As it is written (Rus 2:12): "ישלם ה' פעלך ותהי משכורתך שלמה גו' אשר באת לחסות תחת כנפיו" ("May G‑d repay your deed, and may your reward be complete ... under Whose wings you have come to take shelter"); and as the Midrash there (R. Chasa said) explains, "under Whose wings you have come to take shelter" — that is, "your deeds that you did" — "may G‑d repay ..." See, even more so, Yevamos (48b, end): "Why are converts in this era oppressed, and suffering comes upon them? ... Because they delayed entering under the wings of the Shechinah. R. Abahu said ... What is the verse? 'May G‑d repay your deed ... under Whose wings you have come ...'" See Rashi, Tosafos and Chiddushei Aggados there. See also the following note.
42) And the novelty of Ben Hei Hei over the verse in Rus according to the Midrash's interpretation is simple: there the matter of pain in fulfilling Torah and mitzvos is not explicit at all, and the plain meaning of the verse speaks of an entirely different matter.
43) Accordingly, the novelty in the conduct of the Holy One, blessed be He, "According to the pain is the reward," is understood even more — even beyond [OCR unclear] the "piety" of giving wages for the act of transporting the barrels when the employer is pleased with the act as a whole (see above in the text and in note 38) — for since there is no such thing as half a conversion, it turns out that the entire act of conversion becomes (afterwards) like "negligence" — especially if we say that conversion is an ongoing act — (unlike the transporting of the barrels, where the negligence is only in the manner of transporting them, in that he transported them through a shaky place); and nevertheless, since the Owner is pleased with the conversion in itself, He gives him his reward for it.
44) And in addition: the novelty of "According to the pain is the reward" is also mainly with a convert who converted — see the previous note.
45) End of Tractate Kiddushin.
46) Tanna Dvei Eliyahu Rabbah, beginning of ch. 25.
47) Another matter that relates specifically to a convert: the service of a convert in all [OCR unclear — the rest of this note is missing from the source].
48) [OCR unclear — the text of this note is missing from the source.]
49) So it reads in the Talmud and in the Mishnayos. And so in the first printing of the Mishnayos (Naples, 5252), the Kaufmann manuscript, the Yemenite manuscript, and the Parma manuscripts (A) and (C). See Shinuyei Nuschaos LaMishnayos, Kafich edition.
But in the Alter Rebbe's Siddur and in several prayer books (and elsewhere), the chapter concludes with the Mishnah "He used to say: At five years old ..." See Shinuyei Nuschaos to Mishnah 20. See also below, note 51.
50) For chapter 6 is a Baraisa. See Midrash Shmuel, beginning of ch. 6. Note that in Machzor Vitri (cited in Shinuyei Nuschaos LaMishnayos), the statement "According to the pain is the reward" (and the statement of Ben Bag Bag) is at the end of ch. 6.
51) And even according to the version that concludes with the Mishnah "He used to say: At five years old ..." — see Midrash Shmuel on that Mishnah, that these are not the words of R. Yehudah ben Teima, nor are they from the editor of this tractate*, but the Sages juxtaposed and added them here. See also what he writes at the beginning of this Mishnah (cited in Tosafos Yom Tov). See also Shaar HaKollel, ch. 30, sec. 3.
*) As is evident in the Mishnayos of the Rambam's version and in the Kaufmann manuscript. In the above-mentioned Parma manuscript, the Mishnah "He used to say: At five years old ..." is missing there.
52) Rambam, Laws of Rebels 6:3. Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, end of 240.
53) For with a Canaanite servant we hold that the master may say to him, "Work for me, and I will not feed you" (Rambam, Laws of Servants 9:6; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, beginning of 267, par. 20). And even with a Hebrew servant, where the master is obligated to treat him as an equal in food and drink, clothing and lodging (Rambam, ibid. 1:9), and is also obligated to sustain his wife, sons and daughters (ibid., beginning of ch. 3) — this is in the category of a master's obligations to a (Hebrew) servant — for he is "like one who acquires a master for himself" (Kiddushin 20a) — and not as wages for work. This requires further investigation.
54) As is also evident from the obligation of self-sacrifice for the sanctification of G‑d's Name — unlike a son, who is not obligated to give up his life for his father, for "your life takes precedence" (Bava Metzia 62a), to the point that between his own lost object and his father's lost object, his own takes precedence (ibid. 33a).
But cf. Likkutei Torah, Rosh Hashanah 62d: "And this (that a son is not obligated to give up his life for his father) is because he has become a separate being; but the soul is not so, rather it is all one and is not separate from Him at all" — from which it is implied that the obligation of self-sacrifice for the sanctification of G‑d's Name is also because the Jewish people are children of the Holy One, blessed be He (since they are not separate). See also Tanya, end of ch. 24: "even for a minor transgression ... it is a decree of Scripture" (which seemingly implies that the decree of Scripture concerns "be killed rather than transgress" — although one could have argued that one should transgress once in order to keep [the mitzvos] many times). This is not the place to elaborate.
55) Cf. Avos 1:3: "Be not like servants ... for the sake of receiving a reward ..." And in the explanation [OCR unclear] there: that even those who serve in order to be repaid with reward, he calls servants ..., see there.
56) Cf. Chasdei Avos (by the Chida) here.
57) See at length the first Hadran on Tractate Pesachim (printed in the Haggadah with Likkutei Taamim, Minhagim U'Biurim (Kehot, 5746), p. 464 ff.). See there many examples of this.
58) Berachos 22a.
59) Kiddushin 32a, end, ff.
60) There are two aspects to this: a) In the person's intention — since service out of love "is a very great virtue, and not every wise man merits it" (Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah 10:2), therefore the service of most people, and especially of the young ..., is "in order to receive reward" (see Rambam, ibid., halachah 5). b) That the Holy One, blessed be He, is obligated (as it were) to give a person reward for his service (even when his service is not for the sake of receiving a reward), like the obligation to pay a hired worker.
61) Note that regarding the Jewish people in the time of exile we say (Berachos 3a): "A father who exiled his children ... children who were exiled from their father's table."
62) Acharei 18:5. Sanhedrin 74a, and the sources cited there. Rambam, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, beginning of ch. 5.
63) Accordingly, it is all the more fitting that the Rambam says "and live by them" a second time.
64) But it is obvious that they, too, have the definition of the recipient, and therefore they, too, are included in "(I was created) to serve my Maker." It may be said that this is why he is not liable to punishment if he transgressed (Rambam, ibid., halachah 4).
65) But cf. the Likkutei Torah cited in note 54.
66) Cf. what is explained in the Hadran on Tractate Pesachim (cited in note 57) concerning the dispute between R. Yishmael and R. Akiva (Sotah 3a) on many matters in the Torah, whether they are "optional" or "obligatory" — that this dispute is part and detail of their general approach to the definitions of Torah and mitzvos: whether they are (mainly) in the definitions of the Giver or in the definitions of the recipient. Therefore [R. Yishmael] holds that every matter in the Torah (where there is no compelling reason to interpret it as "obligatory") was given over to the "ownership" of the person — "optional"; whereas R. Akiva's approach is that Torah and mitzvos are (mainly) in the definitions of the Giver, and therefore he holds that every matter in the Torah remained in the "ownership" of the Holy One, blessed be He, and was not handed over to the ownership of man — "obligatory."
67) See Midrash Shmuel, beginning of Tractate Avos, for reasons why "the matter is attributed to the recipient" and not to the giver (as in "and he transmitted it to Yehoshua, and Yehoshua to the Elders, etc.," which is attributed to the giver).
68) See the above-mentioned Hadran, sec. 3 (and in the notes there). Above, p. 135 (marginal gloss to note 31): that the widespread custom of connecting — in the Hadran — the end of a tractate with its beginning is (not merely for the sake of sharpening the mind and the like, but) because the end of a tractate has a connection with its beginning.
69) Note that the conclusion of the Rambam's Yad HaChazakah, too, is about the reward that will come in the Time to Come.
70) But not exactly — see above, Section 6.
*70) Cf. [OCR unclear] above, p. 325 ff.
71) In the Hadran on Tractate Pesachim (cited in note 57) [it is explained] that R. Akiva's view, that Torah and mitzvos are in the "ownership" of the Holy One, blessed be He [OCR unclear] (as mentioned in note 66), is because R. Akiva was the son of converts (see Seder HaDoros, under his entry), and converts trace their lineage mainly not "to Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov (Israel), but to 'He Who spoke and the world came into being'" (the Rambam's responsum to R. Ovadyah the convert — Responsa of the Rambam (Jerusalem 5723), vol. 2, sec. 293; Rambam, Schulsinger edition — New York 5707 — end of vol. 1, sec. 19 [?]).
But this does not contradict what is said in the text — for what is said here concerns the act of conversion (which was handed over to the person's ownership); whereas converts' tracing their lineage "to He Who spoke and the world came into being" is after they have converted*.
*) It may be said that these two matters depend on each other: since the surrender to the will of the Holy One, blessed be He (accepting the mitzvos) came from the person himself, his surrender and self-giving is total, and therefore he is related to the Holy One, blessed be He.
Cf. what is explained in the Hemshech 5666 (p. 326 ff.) regarding the virtue of a "simple servant": since his giving himself over as a servant is "by his own power," his surrender and self-giving is such that "his existence is only the existence of the master." See there at length.
72) See Yevamos 46a–b. Kerisos 9a.
73) And so it reads in Tractate Avos in the Alter Rebbe's Siddur.
74) See the sources cited in the following note — that he was a convert. But according to the interpretation (cited below in the text) that "Bag Bag" is an acronym for "son of a male convert, son of a female convert," he was the son of converts. And the expressions (in the places cited in the following note) "he was a convert," "they were converts," can be interpreted to mean that they were sons of converts [and indeed in the Midrash Shmuel, in the name of "some say" (cited in note 77), that it is an acronym for "son of a male convert, son of a female convert," he wrote, "and he was a convert." And Seder HaDoros (cited in the note there) brought from Tosafos Chagigah (9b): "And so it appears in Tosafos, Chagigah ch. 1, that Ben Bag Bag and Ben Hei Hei were sons of converts (see there), and they did not write ..."]; and in several places [we find] that even the son of a male and female convert, for several generations, is called a "convert" — see Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Relations 15:18, and elsewhere (see Encyclopedia Talmudis under its entry, and the sources cited there).
75) Tosafos, Chagigah, ibid. Midrash Shmuel here, from the Rashbam in the name of R. Y. ben HaRosh. Machzor Vitri, in its second interpretation. And in the first interpretation: "and so [Bag] amounts to five, i.e., the son of Avraham, which has five letters."
76) There is a version (see the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Kafich edition) "Ben Bagbag" — as one word, and likewise "Ben Ha'ha." One may suggest (at least as an intellectual exercise) a difference between the two versions — according to the interpretation that he was "son of a male convert, son of a female convert": when both are one word, this indicates that the conversion of his father ("son of a male convert") and of his mother ("son of a female convert") took place in one generation; whereas "Bag Bag" as two [?] words indicates that the conversions of his father and of his mother were not in one generation.
77) Seder HaDoros, entry Ben Bag Bag. Midrash Shmuel, from R. Yosef ibn Nachmias, in the name of "some say." Some proof of this may be offered: if he were called Ben Bag Bag only because it has the numerical value of hei, or "son of Avraham, which has five letters" (as in note 75), he could have been called by another combination that amounts to five, such as "Ben Gav Gav" or "Da Da" and the like. See Or HaTorah, Lech Lecha (vol. 4), end of p. 724. Shaar Maamarei Razal (of the Arizal) on Avos here (cited and explained in the Hemshech 5666, p. 417 ff.).
78) See Likkutei Amarim [OCR unclear: author], sec. 78.
79) And similarly one must say regarding all the statements that are in the name of Ben Bag Bag. Not so in Kiddushin (70b), where it is "Yochanan ben Bag Bag."
And from this (that he is also called by his name, "Yochanan") there is a proof (in addition to what was said above in note 25) that in places where only "Ben Bag Bag" is cited, it is not (only) "to hide him from informers" and the like.
80) Bava Kamma 38a, and the sources cited there.
81) Kiddushin 40b, and the sources cited there.
82) Midrash Shmuel here, from R. Yosef ibn Nachmias, in the name of "some say." This opinion is also cited in Seder HaDoros, ibid. (though he does not hold so).
83) And even according to the opinions that they are two people, one should have called the first (if we say so) Ben Hei Hei, which shows openly that he was a convert, and the second Ben Bag Bag, which is only a numerical value ("in order to recognize and distinguish between one and the other" — Midrash Shmuel, ibid., from the Rashbam), as below in the text and in note 85.
84) Cited in the Midrash Shmuel here.
85) And this point [that "Bag Bag" is "more hidden and concealed"] holds also according to the interpretation that "Bag Bag" is an acronym for "son of a male convert, son of a female convert." For the hei that was added to Avraham and Sarah — which the name "Ben Hei Hei" indicates — shows openly their connection to converts (see Lech Lecha 17:5 and Rashi there; ibid., 15 and Rashi there), whereas the matter of "convert" in "Bag Bag" is alluded to only in its acronym (see also Or HaTorah, ibid.).
In addition: the name "Ben Hei Hei" implies that he himself was a convert, whereas the acronym "Bag Bag" is (only) "son of a male convert, son of a female convert" (see above, note 74).
86) Midrash Shmuel here. See also the Hemshech 5666 (cited in note 77, and before it, p. [OCR unclear] ff.).
87) Eruvin 13b.
88) Similarly in the statement of Bar Hei Hei in Chagigah (cited in note 48): although he chose the example of "one who serves G‑d" in Torah study, he emphasizes not engagement in the hidden part of Torah ..., but "one who reviews his chapter a hundred (times) and one."
89) The wording of the Alter Rebbe in Iggeres HaKodesh, sec. 29 (151a) — regarding the Written Torah. But it is understood that the same applies to the Oral Torah, in the part of give-and-take and the like of the Oral Torah. As is also understood from the fact that he concludes in Iggeres HaKodesh there with the virtue specifically of one who studies halachos.
90) [OCR unclear] it is like the matter of a convert that is possible in every person, as mentioned above: in the statement "According to the pain is the reward" it is in a revealed manner, and even constantly, in one's service in the manner of a convert — in practices one has taken upon himself, while saying "bli neder," and especially when from time to time he adds and accepts upon himself additional practices and hiddurim (cf. the conduct of the Rebbe Rashab (Sefer HaMinhagim — Chabad, p. 56) and the directive of the Previous Rebbe (Likkutei Sichos, vol. 2, p. 386)). Whereas in the statement "Turn it over and turn it over ...," the matter of a convert in it is "more hidden and concealed," for it is not recognizable in his Torah study, but only when one mentions the manner of his learning before he converted.
Key Lesson
A convert takes on the whole yoke of Torah and mitzvos when he had no duty to do so, and every Jew can do something like this by taking on, of his own free will, an extra hiddur or good practice beyond what the law requires, especially one that goes against his nature. This Sicha teaches that G‑d is pleased with such a step and rewards the effort itself in full ("According to the pain is the reward"), even if one later falls short in keeping it. So one should keep adding such practices from time to time, saying "bli neder."













