









Parshas Kedoshim*
1. Regarding the difference between the prohibition "לא תגנובו" ("You shall not steal") — in our parsha1 — and the prohibition "לא תגנוב" ("You shall not steal") in the Ten Commandments2, the Gemara says3 (and Rashi cites it here) that our parsha speaks of one who steals money4, while the "You shall not steal" of the Ten Commandments speaks of one who steals people (kidnapping).
Concerning the prohibition of stealing money, our Sages say5 that "כל הגונב" ("whoever steals") is "כאילו עובד עבודת כוכבים" ("as if he worshipped idols").
When our Sages say about certain sins that one who transgresses them is "as if he worshipped idols"6 (and the like), it is understood — knowing the utmost precision of the language of our Sages — that this is not meant merely to bring out the severity of the sin, that it is as grave as the most severe sin (which is "worshipping idols"); rather, the sin itself contains a resemblance to idolatry.
[Moreover: in truth, all sins have a connection to idolatry, as the Alter Rebbe explains at length in Tanya7 that "לא יהיה לך" ("You shall have no [other gods]") "כולל כל שס"ה מצות לא תעשה" ("includes all the 365 prohibitive commandments")8 — because through every sin by which one transgresses the Supreme Will, one is, at the time of the deed, severed from G‑dliness just as through the sin of idolatry9 —
and since, together with the fact that this (the connection to idolatry) is a common factor in all sins, we nevertheless find that our Sages singled out specific sins in the category of "as if he worshipped idols"10, this itself is proof that these particular sins have a special aspect in their connection to idolatry.]
This needs to be understood: what is there in theft — which is one of the mitzvos between man and his fellow — that resembles idolatry11?
2. This will be understood based on the explanation of a matter at the conclusion of tractate Sanhedrin12, where we find a special severity regarding theft. The Gemara there discusses what is stated in the Mishnah: "ולא ידבק בידך מאומה מן החרם" ("And nothing of the banned property shall cling to your hand")13, "שכל זמן שהרשעים בעולם חרון אף בעולם, אבדו רשעים מן העולם נסתלק חרון אף מן העולם" ("for as long as the wicked are in the world, fierce anger is in the world; when the wicked perish from the world, fierce anger departs from the world"); and on this the Gemara says: "מאן רשעים? אמר רב יוסף: גנבי" ("Who are the wicked? Rav Yosef said: thieves").
This is not understood — both the Gemara's question and Rav Yosef's answer: a) Why does the Gemara ask, at the conclusion of tractate Sanhedrin, "Who are the wicked?", when the word "wicked" already appears in Tanach (many times) and is a central subject in the content of the earlier chapters of the tractate? b) What is the answer that "wicked" means "thieves" — anyone who transgresses a prohibitive commandment is called wicked (and is disqualified from testimony, as was already learned earlier14)?
The commentators15 explain: since the conclusion of the Mishnah follows what was discussed previously concerning the subverted city (Ir HaNidachas), and the verse "And nothing shall cling to your hand … so that G‑d may turn from His fierce anger" also appears at the conclusion of the passage concerning the subverted city —
the question is: what does the Mishnah mean by "as long as the wicked are in the world"? It cannot mean the inhabitants of the subverted city, since the words "And nothing shall cling…" appear in the verse after the words "הכה תכה את יושבי העיר" ("You shall surely strike the inhabitants of the city")16, i.e., it is already speaking of the time after the inhabitants of the subverted city were punished and they are no longer in the world. This is the Gemara's question, "Who are the wicked?": which wicked people are being spoken of here in connection with the subverted city?
And to this Rav Yosef answers: "thieves" — those who stole from the banned property, from the spoils of the subverted city, as is derived from the verse "And nothing of the banned property shall cling to your hand, so that G‑d may turn from His fierce anger": as long as the wicked who took from the banned property are present, there is "fierce anger in the world."
However, this is not understood: why does Rav Yosef use the expression "thieves"? The emphasis on wickedness here is not in the sin of theft (in general), but in the fact that they took from the banned property of the subverted city. He should have used an expression that emphasizes the main sin, such as "those who took from the banned property," or along the lines of the verse, "cling to your hand from the banned property"17?
— Moreover: regarding stealing from the banned property — from objects forbidden for benefit — there is an entire discussion whether the definition of theft applies to it at all18. And although we find the expression "גונב את החרם" ("one who steals the banned property")19, and so too the verse says regarding Achan: "וגם גנבו" ("and they have also stolen")20, this means only that the term "theft" can also be applied to banned property21. But in Rav Yosef's answer, what should have been brought out is (not the detail of theft, but) the matter of the banned property — so why does he say "thieves" (and not mention the banned property at all)?*
3. The matter will be understood by explaining one of the differences between the wording of the Mishnah and that of the Baraisa at the conclusion of the tractate:
The Baraisa states: "תנו רבנן: רשע בא לעולם22 חרון בא לעולם, שנאמר23 בבוא רשע בא גם בוז ועם קלון חרפה; רשע אבד מן העולם טובה באה לעולם, שנאמר24 ובאבוד רשעים רנה" ("Our Rabbis taught: When a wicked person comes into the world, wrath comes into the world, as it says, 'When the wicked comes, contempt comes too, and with ignominy, reproach'; when a wicked person perishes from the world, good comes into the world, as it says, 'When the wicked perish, there is joy'"); and it concludes: "צדיק בא לעולם טובה באה לעולם, שנאמר25 זה ינחמנו ממעשנו ומעצבון ידינו" ("When a righteous person comes into the world, good comes into the world, as it says, 'This one will comfort us from our work and from the toil of our hands'").
That the Baraisa here elaborates more than the Mishnah is understood: Rebbi arranged the Mishnayos (as the Rambam writes26) with "קוצר מלי" ("brevity of words"), as "דבר קצר וכולל ענינים רבים" ("a short statement that includes many matters"); but in a later generation, when intellectual capacities diminished, there was a need for the manner in which matters are set out in the Baraisos — with greater length and detail, proofs from verses, etc. — as we find many times in the Talmud that the same matters that appear briefly in the Mishnah appear in the Baraisa at length and in detail.
What is not understood is the opposite difference between the Mishnah and the Baraisa: the wording of the Mishnah is "חרון אף" ("fierce anger"), while the Baraisa abbreviates and says "חרון" ("wrath") plainly — for either way: if the Baraisa says this as a continuation of the Mishnah, then the Baraisa too should have used the expression "fierce anger"; and if it is connected to the verse that is cited afterwards in the Baraisa — that verse does not mention "wrath" at all27, and the conclusion of "a wicked person comes into the world" should have been "רעה28 באה לעולם" ("evil comes into the world") — in contrast to the wording used when "a wicked person perishes from the world, good comes into the world"?
4. The explanation of this:
There is a difference in content between the Mishnah and the Baraisa. The Mishnah speaks about the subverted city, and so too at the conclusion of the Mishnah, "And nothing of the banned property shall cling to your hand29, for as long as the wicked are in the world, fierce anger is in the world," what is meant is the sin of the subverted city, the most severe sin — idolatry. Therefore the Mishnah uses the expression "fierce anger in the world," because the expression "(fierce) anger" (af) is found specifically in connection with idolatry (as the Rambam says30).
The Baraisa, however, does not speak of a wicked person through the sin of idolatry (especially since the evil inclination for idolatry had already been eliminated31), but of wicked people in general — not of a category that is not common at all (like the sin of idolatry, and especially the subverted city). Therefore the Baraisa begins with the expression "a wicked person comes into the world" — simply a wicked person who transgresses sins (but not the sin of idolatry) — and accordingly the wording of the conclusion is also apt: "wrath (plainly) comes into the world," without mentioning the word "af," which comes in connection with idolatry, as above, in the Mishnah31*.
There is, however, a common content in the Mishnah and the Baraisa: the Mishnah says that "as long as the wicked are in the world, fierce anger is in the world"; so too in the Baraisa, the intent of "a wicked person comes into the world, wrath comes into the world" (the "wrath" comes together with the "wicked person") is that as long as there is a "wicked person," there is "wrath" — until the time when "a wicked person perishes from the world."
Accordingly, however, the question arises: granted that in the Mishnah it is understood why there is "fierce anger" in the world "as long as the wicked are in the world," since it speaks here in connection with idolatry, and as long as idolatry ("banned property") exists there is also "fierce anger" (and as it says in the Sifri32: "כל זמן שעבודה זרה בעולם חרון אף בעולם" ("as long as idolatry is in the world, fierce anger is in the world")); but why should, with other sins of "a wicked person (plainly) comes into the world," the "wrath" remain (and be drawn out) even after the sinful act, when the effect of the sin no longer exists33?
5. The explanation of this is: from the fact that the Mishnah is precise and says "as long as the wicked are in the world, etc." — and not as stated in the Sifri, "as long as idolatry is in the world, etc." — it is evident that according to the Mishnah the "fierce anger" is not (only) because there still exists idolatry ("banned property") in the world, but because of the wicked who transgressed the sin connected with idolatry, who transgressed "And nothing of the banned property shall cling to your hand"34 — even when the object of the banned property itself no longer exists.
On this the Gemara asks, "Who are the wicked?": what kind of wicked people are meant here — what wickedness is it that draws down here the "fierce anger" of idolatry even after the idolatry no longer exists?
And to this Rav Yosef says, "thieves": the Mishnah means the wicked whose connection with idolatry is through theft (from the spoils of the subverted city). And since it is in the manner of theft, therefore "as long as the wicked are in the world — fierce anger is in the world": the "fierce anger" continues even when the banned property has already been burned and has passed from the world34.
6. The reasoning for this: the prohibition of theft (or robbery) contains a special severity in that it is a continuous action. Every moment that one does not return the stolen (or robbed) object, one transgresses "You shall not steal" (and "You shall not rob").
With this the Rogatchover35 explains why the Rambam36 counts the prohibitions "You shall not rob" and "You shall not steal" in the category of "a prohibition that is given over to payment" and not in the category of "a prohibition that is converted into a positive command." With a prohibition converted into a positive command, one transgresses the prohibition only at the time of committing the sin; accordingly, since the Torah gave a positive command to undo and rectify the prohibition, one must say that the rectification takes effect retroactively upon the sinful act. But with theft and robbery, one transgresses the prohibition as long as he has not paid, every moment from the time of the act and afterwards — it is a "continuous action." Hence, when he returns (the stolen or robbed object), it is only "a prohibition given over to payment" — in the present, so that from now on he will not transgress (the continuous action is cut off); it does not, however, rectify the prohibition in the past37.
7. Accordingly, the novelty in our case is understood: since theft is a continuous action, and he transgresses "You shall not steal" every moment as long as the "payment" has not been made, it follows that even when the banned property of the subverted city no longer exists, the wickedness of the act of theft still continues with the "thieves"38 — for we do not find that this lasts only until the banned property is burned.
And since the wickedness is a continuous action of stealing the banned property of the subverted city — idolatry — therefore "as long as the wicked are in the world," i.e., they have not yet done teshuvah for stealing idolatry, the "fierce anger" of idolatry also continues in the world.
8. This also provides an explanation of the words of the Baraisa, "a wicked person comes into the world, wrath comes into the world," even after the commission of the sin:
Since the Mishnah here is not speaking about a case where idolatry exists in the world, but about the continuation of the sin on the part of the person who transgressed the sin of theft,
this very point can therefore be found also with other sins, even with those whose sinful act is not a continuous action: when a Jew commits a sin, there immediately falls upon him39 the mitzvah and obligation to do teshuvah for the sin40 — and as long as he has not done teshuvah, he transgresses the mitzvah of teshuvah every moment41.
Therefore the Baraisa says, "a wicked person comes into the world, wrath comes into the world": as long as he is still called "wicked"42 (comes into the world) — until he does teshuvah — there is always "wrath (comes into the world)." And since the Baraisa does not specify a particular sin, it means the wickedness of every sin — that as long as the non-fulfillment of the mitzvah of teshuvah continues, the "wrath" also continues, in a constant manner43.
9. According to the above explanation, it is also understood why the sin of theft resembles the sin of idolatry more than other sins: just as we find with idolatry that even after the sinful act it still causes "fierce anger in the world" — and in the words of the Sifri, "as long as idolatry is in the world, fierce anger is in the world," i.e., as long as idolatry exists in the world, fierce anger is continuously drawn into the world — so too with the sin of theft: since it is a continuous action, as long as the thief does not do teshuvah for it, he continuously draws the wrath of the Holy One, blessed be He, into the world.
This is not so with other sins. Although through them too there is wrath in the world (and they too have a connection and resemblance to the sin of idolatry), the continuation of the wrath is not on account of the sin itself, but because he refrains from fulfilling the mitzvah of teshuvah — unlike theft, where the sin of theft itself is a continuous action, as explained above44.
10. However, it still remains not understood: a) Why does Rav Yosef say "thieves" and not "robbers," or "thieves and robbers" — the definition of a continuous action exists both with theft and with robbery? b) Why does the Baraisa say "wrath comes into the world" and not "evil comes into the world," which is the opposite of "good comes into the world" that it says regarding "a righteous person comes into the world"? c) "Wrath" is more severe than mere "evil" — why should sins cause not only "evil" but even more — "wrath"?
This will be understood based on the words of the Gemara45: "שאלו תלמידיו את רבן יוחנן בן זכאי: מפני מה החמירה תורה בגנב יותר מגזלן? אמר להן: זה השוה כבוד עבד לכבוד קונו, וזה לא השוה כבוד עבד לכבוד קונו; כביכול עשה עין של מטה כאילו אינה רואה ואוזן של מטה כאילו אינה שומעת, שנאמר … עזב ה' את הארץ" ("His students asked Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai: Why was the Torah more stringent with a thief than with a robber? He said to them: The one [the robber] equated the honor of the servant with the honor of his Master, while the other [the thief] did not equate the honor of the servant with the honor of his Master; as it were, he treated the Eye Above as if it does not see and the Ear Above as if it does not hear, as it says … 'G‑d has forsaken the land'")46.
This reasoning adds a further reason to Rav Yosef's answer that by the "wicked" who bring "fierce anger" the Mishnah means "thieves" (plainly, without mentioning that it speaks of the "banned property"): because the very essence of the sin of theft is akin to idolatry — the thief too acts as if "G‑d has forsaken the land and G‑d does not see" — and therefore through "thieves" too there comes (a semblance of) the "fierce anger" that comes through idolatry.
This also explains the Baraisa, which says that every sin causes "wrath comes into the world" (not merely "evil"), for in every sin there is a relationship to "the honor of his Master" similar to that of theft: the very fact that a person dares to commit a sin is proof that it seems to him as if "the Eye Above does not see," along the lines of the verse47 "אם יסתר איש במסתרים ואני לא אראנו" ("Can a man hide in secret places that I shall not see him?"), and as Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai said to his students48: "יהי רצון שתהא מורא שמים עליכם כמורא בשר ודם. אמרו לו תלמידיו: עד כאן? אמר להם: ולואי! תדעו, כשאדם עובר עבירה אומר שלא יראני אדם" ("May it be His will that the fear of Heaven be upon you like the fear of flesh and blood. His students said to him: Only that much? He said to them: If only it were so! Know that when a person commits a sin, he says, 'May no person see me'").
It is thus understood why the Baraisa says that on account of the sin of "a wicked person comes" there comes the punishment of "wrath": this is measure for measure — and as the cited verse emphasizes, "When the wicked comes, contempt comes too, and with ignominy, reproach" — since through the sin he shows contempt for "the Eye Above," wrath therefore comes into the world — a result of the contempt, etc.49
And even after the sin has already been committed, the wrath is still present as long as there is a "wicked person" — because as long as he has not done teshuvah, the cause of the "wrath" still remains: he is still in the same state of "treating the Eye Above as if it does not see."
11. It is known50 that the conclusion of every tractate has a connection and relation to the beginning of the tractate (and also to the name of the tractate as a whole), which is why — in a hadran — one connects the conclusion of the tractate with its beginning.
So too in our case51: in the first Mishnah (as it is arranged in the Mishnayos printed in the Gemara52), the detailed laws of the courts and the Sanhedrin are explained, beginning with "דיני ממונות בשלשה" ("monetary cases [are judged] by three") up to "the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one." And although each court (of three, etc., twenty-three, seventy-one) has its own specific category of cases that it judges, they are nevertheless all alike in that the general content and purpose of all courts is not only to judge the sinner and punish him — in order that "ובערת הרע מקרבך" ("you shall eradicate the evil from your midst") (to remove the existence of evil and of the sinner) and "למען ישמעו ויראו וגו'" ("so that they will hear and fear, etc.") — but to caution that from the outset there should be no place for evil and sin.
As it says in Tanna D'vei Eliyahu Rabbah53, the Sanhedrin of seventy-one had the task "לקשור חבלים של ברזל במתניהם ולהגביה בגדיהם למעלה מארכובותיהן ויחזרו בכל עיירות ישראל … בכל מקומות ישראל וילמדו את ישראל כו'" ("to tie iron ropes around their loins and lift their garments above their knees and go around to all the towns of Israel … in all the places of Israel, and teach Israel, etc."). Seemingly this is astonishing:
The members of the Sanhedrin were "מופלגין בחכמת התורה בעלי דיעה מרובה וכו'" ("outstanding in the wisdom of the Torah, possessors of great knowledge, etc.")54, and their place was in the Chamber of Hewn Stone55 — so much so that if they are not there, they do not have the legal status of the Great Sanhedrin56. How, then, can one demand that they tie "iron ropes around their loins … and lift their garments above their knees"? How does such conduct57 befit such people, outstanding in the wisdom of the Torah, possessors of great knowledge — and especially to leave the Chamber of Hewn Stone — and all this to guard and teach a Jew who is found somewhere in the "towns of Israel"?
The explanation of this is found in the conclusion of the tractate: when there is a "wicked person in the world," this brings about the "wrath" of the One Above in the world — and not only at the time of the sinful act; rather, it is a "continuous action,"
not only as a constant extension in time, but also as an extension in space! The "wrath (that) comes into the world" affects not only the transgressor, but the entire world58, and it affects all Jews, including them, the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one.
Hence it is understood that upon them lies the duty and responsibility to caution that, from the outset59, one should not come to a situation that would cause "wrath to come into the world."
12. Based on the above, another matter can be explained. All matters of the Torah are instructions for every Jew60 — and accordingly the question arises in our case: what instruction does a Jew learn from the teaching that "a wicked person comes into the world, wrath comes into the world … a righteous person comes into the world, good comes into the world"?
It is difficult to say that it is only to learn from it the severity of a sin — that a sin causes the wrath of the Omnipresent — and conversely, that through good deeds there is good and reward. For already in the Chumash, in the commands and mitzvos of the Torah, the reward for mitzvos and the punishment for a sin, etc., are so extensively explained and emphasized, up to the general declaration: "אם בחקותי תלכו גו' ונתתי גשמיכם בעתם גו' שלום בארץ גו'" ("If you will walk in My statutes … I will give your rains in their season … peace in the land …").
But according to the explanation above, a wondrous instruction emerges from this matter. When a Jew stumbles in a sin, Heaven forbid, he may think: certainly I need to do teshuvah, and I will indeed do teshuvah — but what is the hurry! So he postpones the teshuvah to a later time and meanwhile is occupied with other matters (especially if these are good matters);
and similarly on the side of good: when someone decides to do a good thing, a mitzvah, but he does not hurry to do it, and meanwhile is busy with permitted, mundane matters, etc. —
the Gemara warns about this and teaches a Jew that there must not be such conduct, because as long as he has not done teshuvah there is constantly "wrath" in the world, not only at the time of the sinful act. Moreover: this does not concern him alone, but the whole world: as long as he has not done teshuvah, the wrath rules over the entire world.
And similarly, through doing good [for "righteous" here does not necessarily mean the true title of "tzaddik," but also a tzaddik in the borrowed sense61], he brings good not only to himself, but to the entire world, and in the manner of a continuous action.
And when a Jew reflects on this — that upon him depends such a tremendous accomplishment: that the "wrath" depart from the world one moment earlier, and that the good of the Holy One, blessed be He, come into the world one moment earlier — this will surely shake him and help him bring his good resolution into actual deed as quickly as possible, and thereby immediately bring good into the world.
(From the sichos of Yud Shevat and Shabbos Parshas Beshalach 5735)
Notes
*) And the conclusion (siyum) of tractate Sanhedrin.
1) [Vayikra] 19:11.
2) Yisro 20:13.
3) Sanhedrin 86a. Mechilta, Yisro, ibid.
4) In the Rambam, beginning of Hilchos Geneivah (in our printed editions), the verse cited is "לא תגנובו". However, the Chinuch, mitzvah 224, quotes the Rambam's wording as "לא תגנוב". So too the Rambam writes in Sefer HaMitzvos, prohibitive commandment 244, and in the count of the mitzvos at the beginning of the Yad: "לא תגנובו". So too in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, siman 348, se'if 2 (and see Rambam, beginning of ch. 9 there). And in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, Hilchos Gezeilah u'Geneivah, end of se'if 2: "[transgresses] 'bal tignovu'". This is not the place to elaborate.
5) Tractate Semachos 2:11.
6) For a collection of many such statements of our Sages, see Torah Shleimah, vol. 19, Miluim, p. 301.
7) Ch. 20 ff.
8) Ibid., ch. 24–25.
9) And see Iggeres HaTeshuvah, ch. 7.
10) Perhaps it can be said that this is the precision of the Alter Rebbe in Iggeres HaTeshuvah, end of ch. 7, that these sins "are literally like idolatry." And see Tanya, end of ch. 22, which explains specifically, "and therefore our Sages said that haughtiness is literally equivalent to idolatry, etc." (except that there he explains that this point, which exists in all sins, is most emphasized and prominent in haughtiness). And see Iggeres HaKodesh, sec. 25 (p. 138b), the explanation of our Sages' statement, "Whoever becomes angry is as if he worshipped idols."
11) What is stated there in Tractate Semachos, "כל הגונב הרי זה שופך דמים" ("Whoever steals is as one who sheds blood"), is simply understood, since he takes [his fellow's] very life* (see Tanya, ch. 37 — p. 48b). And see below, note 44. And see the version and explanation of the above statement of our Sages in the Maharal's Chiddushei Aggados at the end of Sanhedrin.
*) And see regarding robbery — Bava Kamma 119a; Rambam, Hilchos Gezeilah, 1:13; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, siman 359, se'if 3. Explained in Likkutei Sichos, Kedoshim 5749.
12) According to the order in which the chapters are printed in the Babylonian Talmud; and this is the view of Rashi (see Rashi, beginning of Perek Chelek; Chochmas Shlomo there), the Meiri, and Kol Bo, siman 40 [OCR unclear]. Whereas according to the order in the Mishnah and the Jerusalem Talmud, it is chapter 10, and Perek HaNechnakin is chapter 11; and this is the view of the Rambam in his Commentary on the Mishnah (see on all this Tosafos Yom Tov and Meleches Shlomo, beginning of Perek Chelek).
13) See [Devarim] 13:18.
14) Sanhedrin 27a. One who transgresses a positive commandment (and even a Rabbinic prohibition) is also called wicked — see Tanya, ch. 1; below, note 42.
15) See Yad Ramah here; Toras Chaim (cited in Etz Yosef on Ein Yaakov); Be'er Sheva here; the commentary of HaRif on Ein Yaakov; She'eilas Yaavetz, part 1, siman 79.
16) See ibid., 16.
17) It is a strain to say that the emphasis in our case is "one who steals the banned property," based on what is written in Tractate Semachos (2:9), that one who steals customs duty or banned property is as if he worshipped idols, etc. (see Maharatz Chayes here), because: a) this is unrelated to what is discussed in the Mishnah specifically regarding the subverted city, and to the verse "And nothing shall cling to your hand" which follows it; b) he should then have emphasized the main point (as in the text): "one who steals the banned property" and the like.
18) See Kerisus 24a (regarding an ox that is to be stoned); Rashba, Nedarim 85a; and the Ran there (in the name of the Rashba). But see the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, siman 435, Kuntres Acharon, sub-par. 2.
19) In Tractate Semachos, cited in note 17.
20) Yehoshua 7:11. See on this Yad Ramah (and similarly in [OCR unclear], cited in the "Likkutim" in the Mishnayos here). However, from the Radak (and others) on Tanach there, it is implied that the verse intends to emphasize that they did not take it publicly, but in secret.
21) But seemingly it is not fitting, for this reason, to include them in the category of "thieves." And see Yad Ramah here: "and it applied to people who benefit from the banned property, who are called thieves, etc."
*) Accordingly it is also understood that it is difficult to explain (as in Yad Ramah here) that the "wicked" are so only on account of being "thieves," and on that account they bring "fierce anger" — based on what is written in Tractate Semachos, cited at the beginning of the Sicha, and along the lines of what is written in the Maharal's Chiddushei Aggados here, and in She'eilas Yaavetz there. And see Iyun Yaakov here.
22) The expression "a wicked person comes into the world" — even though "righteous or wicked is not decreed" (Niddah 16b) — it can be said that the intent is from the time he transgresses sins, when he becomes wicked, and thus a wicked person comes into the world, as explained below in the text.
It can also be explained, seemingly, according to the verse "זורו רשעים מרחם" ("The wicked are estranged from the womb") (Tehillim 58:4), and as our Sages interpreted it (Yoma 83a); and see also Rus Rabbah (on 3:13, and elsewhere; this is also the version of Tosafos, s.v. "Shuvu," Chagigah 15a — in the Jerusalem Talmud) concerning Elisha Acher, whose mother smelled [the food] while she was pregnant and was compelled to eat of that kind (of offerings to idols), and this caused him to go astray. And see Ibn Ezra on Mishlei 18:3; Anaf Yosef on Ein Yaakov here, citing the Sfas Emes.
But according to this, "wrath comes into the world" must be interpreted as meaning only potentially, not actually.
23) Mishlei 18:3.
24) Ibid. 11:10.
25) Bereishis 5:29.
26) In his Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah (s.v. "Achar kein ra'ah lehistapek").
27) In the Tosefta, Sotah 10:11, it appears at greater length; and "wrath comes into the world" is not there, but rather "retribution comes, etc.," and following this it says there: "and it says, 'so that G‑d may turn from His fierce anger, etc.' — as long as the wicked are in the world, fierce anger is in the world; when the wicked perish, etc." (as in the wording of our Mishnah). And see below, note 31*.
28) See this version in Dikdukei Sofrim.
29) So it is in our Mishnah. In several printings, and so too in the Jerusalem Talmud, the Mishnah also cites the continuation of the verse, "so that G‑d may turn from His fierce anger, etc." — see Shinuyei Nuschaos on the Mishnayos; Dikdukei Sofrim here.
30) Moreh Nevuchim, part 1, ch. 36. And see the commentators on the Moreh Nevuchim there. In any event it is understood here, since the passage speaks of the subverted city — the sin of idolatry.
31) Yoma 69b.
31*) The fact that in the Tosefta the expression "fierce anger" is used as in the Mishnah (see above, note 27) may be explained by the fact that it speaks there of all kinds of wicked people, and especially the most severe — idolatry. In other words: this Tosefta includes the Mishnah within it, as is evident from its wording and as is also implied by the length of the Tosefta. Whereas the Baraisa in Sanhedrin, which is brief (and concerns a plain wicked person), is a continuation of and addition to the Mishnah, which deals with the "fierce anger" of idolatry.
32) Re'eh, 14:18 [as in the OCR]. Also cited in Rashi on the verse.
33) Seemingly one could have said that here too there is a difference between the Mishnah and the Baraisa: in the Mishnah it says, "as long as the wicked are in the world, fierce anger is in the world; when the wicked perish, etc.," meaning that it exists in the world all this time; while in the Baraisa it says (not "as long as," but rather: the moment that) "a wicked person comes into the world," and the wrath does not continue after the time that he came —
But it is obvious that this is not so. The reason for the change of wording is that the Mishnah, which speaks of the fierce anger of the subverted city mentioned earlier, says "as long as, etc., fierce anger is in the world," meaning that the fierce anger that existed previously remains; whereas the Baraisa speaks of wrath that comes when the wicked person comes. But it is obvious that in the Baraisa too the intent is that the wrath exists as long as the wicked person is in the world.
34) See Rambam, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 4:6; Sefer HaMitzvos, prohibitive commandment 24; Chinuch, mitzvah 466.
34) The Be'er Sheva writes that Rav Yosef found difficulty with the wording of the Mishnah, "as long as the wicked are in the world," rather than as in the Sifri, "as long as idolatry, etc." To this Rav Yosef answers "thieves" — those who covet taking from the spoils of the city and thereby cause the spoils of the idolatrous city to remain in the world, etc.; see there. But: a) it is difficult (as above in the text, section 2) — he should not then have said "thieves," for what difference does it make in what manner they took it? b) Accordingly, in the Mishnah too the reason for the fierce anger would be on account of idolatry in the world, only that the wicked cause it to remain; if so, the main point is missing from the wording of the Mishnah.
35) Tzafnas Pane'ach, Hilchos Terumos (in the omissions), 52c; Hashlamah, p. 63. Cited in Mefane'ach Tzefunos, ch. 5, sec. 34; ch. 13, sec. 4; and sources cited there.
36) Hilchos Sanhedrin 18:2.
37) It requires slight further study how his explanation fits with what the Rambam writes at the beginning of Hilchos Gezeilah va'Aveidah*: "One does not receive lashes for this prohibition (of robbery), for the verse converted it into a positive command … this is a positive command; and even if he burned the robbed object he does not receive lashes, since he was obligated to pay its value, and for any prohibition that is given over to payment one does not receive lashes" (and so it is in Sefer HaMitzvos, prohibitive commandment 245**). And see the discussion among the Acharonim regarding the Rambam's view in the Encyclopedia Talmudis, entry "Gezel," and sources cited there. This is not the place to elaborate.
*) The fact that in Hilchos Sanhedrin the Rambam did not distinguish, regarding the prohibition "You shall not rob," whether [the object] is still intact or not — it can be said that he relied on what he wrote in Hilchos Gezeilah va'Aveidah, which precedes it (see Yad Malachi, Rules of the Rambam, sec. 6). And as for the fact that in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Makkos 3:1, he also writes in the second category, "a prohibition that is given over to payment, one does not receive lashes for it … 'You shall not steal' … and 'You shall not rob,'" without distinguishing there whether it is intact, etc. — he concludes there, "for whoever transgresses this prohibition is liable to monetary payment."
**) In our printed Sefer HaMitzvos: "and even if he nullified the positive command he does not receive lashes, because it is a prohibition converted into a positive command for payment." But in the Arabic manuscript it reads: "a prohibition given over to payment" — see Sefer HaMitzvos, Heller and Kafich editions.
38) From the Tzafnas Pane'ach there it is implied (and especially from what is written in the second edition, 76d, cited in Mefane'ach Tzefunos, ch. 5, sec. 33) that its being a continuous action applies when the robbed or stolen object is still intact. But it can be said that this is only with regard to the robbed object itself, etc., which he "robs at every moment"; but with regard to the person who transgresses the prohibition of robbery and theft, it is a continuing matter even if [the object] is no longer intact, as long as he has not paid.
39) See Yoma (86a): "If one transgressed a positive commandment and repented, etc., he is forgiven, etc." — it is explicit that as long as he does not repent he is not forgiven and lacks atonement, etc. And especially according to the version in Iggeres HaTeshuvah, that the light is absent, etc. And similarly with prohibitive commandments, etc.; see there.
40) As explained (Likkutei Sichos, Naso [year OCR unclear]; Chiddushim u'Biurim b'Shas, siman 18; printed also in Likkutei Biurim b'Tanya, vol. 2, p. 40 ff.) that the view of the Rambam and the Alter Rebbe is that teshuvah is an obligatory mitzvah, and not as the Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 364) writes in the Rambam's view.
And in my humble opinion (as compelled by the Gemara in Yoma cited above, by the plain meaning of several verses, and by reasoning), even those who disagree about this do so only in that it is not counted among the mitzvos (rather, its confession is counted; and similarly with Torah study and prayer — the speech), as explained at length there; but all agree that one is obligated to do teshuvah — in accordance with the plain wording of verses in the Torah, Prophets, and Writings — though several Acharonim did not explain it so. This is not the place to elaborate.
41) See Minchas Chinuch there: if you say that teshuvah is an obligatory mitzvah, it follows that as long as he has not done teshuvah, he transgresses the positive commandment of teshuvah every single moment.
42) See Shevuos (12b); Zevachim (7b): "This positive commandment — what is the case? If he did not do teshuvah, 'the sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination.'" And see Tanya, ch. 1; Turei Even on Rosh Hashanah 29a. And see Likkutei Perushim on Tanya, ch. 1, p. 32.
43) Accordingly it will be understood why Rashi explains at the conclusion of the tractate, "When a righteous person comes into the world — the evil ceases, as it says, 'This one will comfort us.'" For seemingly: a) the Gemara says something greater than this — "good comes into the world"; b) why does he also quote the verse "This one will comfort us," which is already cited in the Gemara? c) he omits the end of the verse cited in the Gemara. The explanation: since the intent of the Baraisa, "a wicked person comes into the world, wrath comes into the world," is that it is a continuous action, and afterwards it continues, "a righteous person comes into the world," it is not enough that "good comes into the world," for there still remains the evil that was drawn out by the action of the wicked person. Therefore Rashi explains that "the evil ceases," meaning that not only does good come into the world, but also "the evil ceases." His compulsion for this is from the words "This one will comfort us," which he interprets [OCR unclear] — and also according to the plain meaning of the verse (Rashi on the verse) — as "יניח ממנו" ("he will give us rest"), i.e., will cause [the evil] to cease.
44) Accordingly, one can add an explanation to what is written in Tractate Semachos there, "[is as one who] sheds blood" (see above, note 11): bloodshed too is a continuing matter, since the sin continues forever (Tzafnas Pane'ach, Makkos 5b, and elsewhere). And in our case, his taking of [his fellow's] life continues constantly until he pays him.
45) Bava Kamma 79b. And see the Maharal's Chiddushei Aggados here.
46) See Likkutei Sichos, vol. 15, p. 265 ff., and sources cited there.
47) Yirmiyahu 23:24.
48) Berachos 28b.
49) See Rashi here.
50) See above, p. 135, gloss to note 31; Likkutei Sichos, vol. 16, pp. 311–312; and sources cited there.
51) In addition to the simple [connection], that the Mishnah begins, "Monetary cases by three, etc. … double payment, etc." (and "a subverted city is decreed only by a court of seventy-one").
52) As opposed to the separate Mishnayos, where it is divided into six mishnayos; and this has halachic relevance regarding one who betroths a woman on condition that "I know how to learn" — see Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer, siman 38, Chelkas Mechokek, sub-par. 40; and see Likkutei Sichos, vol. 4, p. 1175, note 1; and elsewhere.
It can be said that the fact that in the Gemara all the laws of the Sanhedrin, from a court of three to a court of seventy-one, are set in one Mishnah alludes to the essential content of the Sanhedrin, whose matter is that they be ordained (semuchin)* one from the mouth of another, back to Moshe Rabbeinu (Rambam, beginning of ch. 4 of Hilchos Sanhedrin), meaning that they are one continuum and one matter**; and this is alluded to in that all kinds of Sanhedrin (from three to seventy-one) are in one Mishnah.
*) The view of Rava is that loans and admissions also require ordained judges, but in order not to lock the door before borrowers, they instituted that three laymen suffice (Sanhedrin 3a). And see the following gloss.
**) And also regarding a court outside the Land of Israel and in our times, we say: "we are acting as their agents" (Bava Kamma 84b; Gittin 88b; Rambam, ibid., 5:8; Tur, Choshen Mishpat, siman 1).
53) Ch. 11.
54) See Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin, ch. 2.
55) Middos 5:4; Sanhedrin 86b (in the Mishnah); Rambam, ibid., 14:12.
56) That they cannot judge capital cases (Avodah Zarah 8b). And according to the Ramban (in his glosses on Sefer HaMitzvos, positive commandment 153), "all the laws dependent on the Great Court were nullified" (not only capital cases).
57) Note the statement of our Sages regarding the cloak of a Torah scholar: any [cloak] beneath which the undergarment is not visible by a handbreadth (Bava Basra 57b). And see also Taanis 23a, end; Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim, beginning of siman 2.
58) Note the Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 3:4: "Every person should see himself … and so too the whole world … he has tipped himself and the whole world [to the side of merit], etc."
59) See Rashi, Devarim 1:13 (from the Sifri there).
60) See Zohar III, 53b.
61) See Tanya, ch. 1.
Key Lesson
A sin is not a single moment that passes; as long as a person has not done teshuvah, the Divine wrath it causes continues, and it affects the entire world — just as a good deed brings ongoing good to the whole world. Knowing that the world's wrath or blessing can change one moment sooner because of him, a Jew must not delay his teshuvah or his good resolutions, but carry them out immediately.