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Likkutei Sichos Vol. 34 – Eikev 2 – Teshuvah, Justice, and True Change

This class explores the Torah's statement that Hashem does not show favor or take bribes, examining how teshuvah is uniquely accepted as a "bribe." The discussion delves into the nature of teshuvah, its transformative power, and why only true inner change leads to forgiveness.
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"For the L‑rd your G‑d is the G‑d of gods... who does not show favor nor take bribes."

We need to understand:

The difference between "showing favor" and "taking bribes" is that showing favor means (in practice) waiving the punishment by forgiving a person's sin (and not changing the ruling to say that a sin is permissible, etc.), whereas the act of taking a bribe is to blind the eyes of the wise, to rule contrary to the law.

Therefore, the fact that "He does not show favor" is novel, because since the Jewish people are children to the Omnipresent, it might be thought that due to G‑d's mercy (our Father in Heaven) on His children, He would show favor to them. As it is explicitly stated in the Priestly Blessing, "May the L‑rd lift His countenance upon you," meaning that G‑d shows favor to Israel by suppressing His anger and forgiving their sins. [As explained by the commentators, this is the reason Rashi interprets "He does not show favor — if you remove His yoke," meaning that only when the Jewish people (not just sinning in general, but) completely reject His yoke, G‑d does not show favor to Israel.]

However, regarding "He does not take bribes" — it is puzzling — what would be the assumption that G‑d would take a bribe, G‑d forbid? (Additionally, taking a bribe is explicitly forbidden in the Torah: "You shall not take a bribe," "And you shall not take a bribe," and our Sages said, "What He does, He tells Israel to do.") How could it be that "the L‑rd G‑d of truth" would take a bribe, G‑d forbid, to pervert true justice?

Even more puzzling: We find that G‑d indeed takes a bribe — "And He takes a bribe from the bosom of the wicked," and it is explained in the Midrash, "And what is the bribe that G‑d takes from the wicked in this world? Repentance and good deeds. G‑d said to Israel, 'My children, while the gates of repentance are open, repent, for I take a bribe in this world, but once I sit in judgment in the World to Come, I do not take a bribe, as it is said, 'He will not show favor to a ransom.'" — This means that the concept of repentance is considered as taking a "bribe."

Now, according to the above Midrash, we understand the novelty in our verse that "the L‑rd your G‑d... does not take a bribe" — that even though we find the concept of taking a bribe by G‑d, it is only in the matter of repentance, but G‑d does not accept any other matter — even matters of Torah and mitzvos — as a "bribe." As Maimonides writes, "He does not take a bribe of good deeds, as a person might do a thousand good deeds and one bad deed, and the Holy One, blessed be He, will not forgive that transgression due to his many good deeds, nor will He deduct from his thousand good deeds even one or more, but He will punish him for that one bad deed and reward him for all those good deeds."

Additionally, it needs explanation (besides the above question of how the L‑rd G‑d of truth could take a bribe) — since taking a bribe is forbidden, what is the unique aspect of repentance that "permits" this prohibition, and "G‑d takes (a bribe) from the wicked in this world, repentance and good deeds"?

In the Midrash Shmuel, the difference between the "bribe" of repentance and the "bribe" of Torah and mitzvos in general (as in Maimonides there) is explained — "The matter of repentance is separate and the matter of other mitzvos is separate, for the matter of repentance that atones, the reason is that when a person regrets the sin... with this repentance, he cleanses the blemish of the sin, but one who has thousands upon thousands of mitzvos and a few sins... and did not confess them, certainly those transgressions will remain in their place, and how will they be removed without removing them."

But according to this, it is not understood from the other side — since through repentance the sin is cleansed and nullified, why is (the atonement of sins through) repentance called a bribe, which implies giving pleasure to sway judgment — for there is no (sin — the cause of) judgment here?

It seems one could say based on what our Sages said, that through repentance out of love — "intentional sins become merits," meaning that not only does repentance out of love completely nullify the sin (to the extent that "the sin is uprooted from the beginning"), but it transforms the sin into a merit — and this matter (that the sin becomes a merit) has no place according to the law of the Torah.

They asked the Torah, "What is the punishment for a sinner?" It replied, "He should bring a guilt offering, and it will atone for him." They asked the Holy One, blessed be He, "What is the punishment for a sinner?" He replied, "He should repent, and it will atone for him." The novelty in G‑d's response, "and it will atone for him," is that (through repentance out of love) "intentional sins become merits." This has no place according to the Torah itself, and therefore, the "Torah" (on its own) cannot give this advice. Only G‑d innovated that "he should repent, and it will atone for him."

Therefore, repentance is called a "bribe," because through repentance (out of love), G‑d changes the (laws of) Torah (beyond the letter of the law) and makes the intentional sins into merits.

However, it is difficult to interpret the Midrash in this way, because:

a) "Intentional sins become merits" occurs only through the highest level of repentance, repentance out of great love, and the Midrash implies that it applies to all forms of repentance.

b) The novelty that "intentional sins become merits" is not related to the atonement of the sin (since erasing and uprooting the sin suffices for that) — and from the simple language of the Midrash ("He takes... until the gates of repentance are open, they repented"), it implies that it refers to the aspect of repentance that brings atonement for the sin.

c) Therefore, it seems to me the opposite, that the "bribe" in repentance is that there is no need for "perfect repentance" in its entirety for complete atonement of the sin. Rather, any act of repentance effects "atonement and forgiveness of the sin, that it is completely forgiven for transgressing the command of the king when he does complete repentance, and nothing is mentioned to him on the Day of Judgment to punish him for it, G‑d forbid, in the World to Come, and he is completely exempt from judgment in the World to Come."

In other words, the complete erasure and uprooting of the sin (so that no trace remains) is only through repentance out of love. Therefore, according to the strict letter of the law, one might say that as long as he has not reached this state, his sin is not erased, and he cannot be completely atoned for his sin. This is the novelty in the "bribe" of repentance, that since a person has fulfilled the mitzvah of repentance according to the laws of the Torah, meaning he has resolved in his heart to abandon the sin and not do it again, with confession and asking for forgiveness — his sin is completely forgiven.

Nevertheless, this "bribe" is not contrary to the Torah's command "and do not take a bribe" — because the fact that the atonement of repentance is considered a "bribe" is only regarding human beings, for a judge has only what his eyes see, and since there is no "perfect repentance" in its entirety, therefore the atonement is a "bribe" (and this is the intention of the verse "and a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise"); but from G‑d's perspective, who sees into the heart and recognizes the truth of the matter, in every act of repentance (according to the Torah) there is a change in the person (as will be explained at length), and thus repentance has the power to completely forgive the sin (and therefore, in truth, it is not considered a bribe).

And we should preface with the words of Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance, where he writes: "Among the ways of repentance is for the penitent to constantly cry out before G‑d... and to give charity... and to distance himself greatly from the matter in which he sinned, and to change his name, saying, 'I am another person and not the same one who did those deeds,' and to change all his deeds for the better and to a straight path, and to exile himself from his place, for exile atones for sin because it causes him to be humble and lowly of spirit."

Now, a) the commentators have noted that the source of the matters listed by Maimonides here is in Tractate Rosh Hashanah — "Four things tear up the decree of a person... charity, crying out, changing the name, changing the deed... and some say even changing the place." Seemingly, there is no source here for what Maimonides wrote — "and to distance himself greatly from the matter in which he sinned."

b) What does it mean "and to change all his deeds for the better and to a straight path," for if he has not changed all his deeds for the better (and he still has not good deeds) — his repentance is not complete [and Maimonides here speaks about the behaviors and "ways of repentance" of the "penitent" (from before)]?

Therefore, it seems that the source of Maimonides is (also) in Bereishis Rabbah, where it states: "Three things annul harsh decrees... prayer, charity, and repentance... Rabbi Huna... said even changing the name and good deeds... and some say even changing the place." Here, two things are specified: (a) repentance, (b) "and good deeds."

This is also the intention of Maimonides, who first enumerates "to distance oneself greatly from the matter in which he sinned," which is the aspect of repentance related to that sin. Then, after the matter of "changing the name," he adds "and to change all his deeds for the better..." — "good deeds" (and afterwards "and to exile himself from his place..." — "changing the place").

According to this, we can say that what Maimonides writes, "and to change all his deeds for the better," is (also) a detail in "changing the name" — for "changing the name" means (as Maimonides writes, as mentioned above) that "I am another person and not the same one who did those deeds," and it is impossible to say that he is a "different" person and not "the same one who did those deeds" until he "changes all his deeds for the better and to a straight path."

Furthermore, it can be said: For a person to become a "different" person, it is not enough to change his bad deeds; rather, it must be evident in all his matters that "he is not the same person," and therefore he must also change his good deeds and ways, doing them with added beauty, etc., "changing all his deeds for the better and to a straight path."

Explanation of the matter:

Regarding the atonement of the sin and the forgiveness of the punishment, there are two approaches:

a) From the perspective of the change in the object of the sin — through proper repentance, the sin is erased and uprooted, and consequently (it is atoned and forgiven and) the punishment is nullified.

b) From the perspective of the change in the person — through repentance, the existence of the sinner is nullified, and he becomes a completely new entity. Since the person is not "the same one who did those deeds," it is impossible to punish him for "those deeds."

We can say there is a practical difference — concerning matters that are in the category of "a crooked thing that cannot be made straight" because the result of his sinful act remains ("his sin is revealed and remembered"):

The fact that repentance does not help in such a situation refers to repentance whose nature is the change of the deed (through regret over the deed) — since the sin is "revealed and remembered," repentance cannot change it, to effect atonement for it; but when he performs a greater repentance, to the extent that the repentance is in the manner of "changing the name," where he is not "the same one who did those deeds," then the state (of the result of the act) of the sin does not matter, because this act is not his.

In this way, we can resolve the question of the Maharsha regarding the wording of the piyut "Repentance, prayer, and charity remove the evil of the decree" — "that the poet only mentioned these three," and why he did not mention "changing the name and changing the place?"

According to the above, we can say: The things that annul a decree (and also the punishment for a sin) are divided into two types:

The three matters of "repentance, prayer, and charity" bring atonement (and annulment of the decree) by nullifying the object of the sin, as Maimonides states that "he distances himself greatly from the matter in which he sinned," meaning that even after he has resolved in his heart not to do it again, he continues to distance himself "greatly from the matter in which he sinned," and the more he adds to this, the more excellent his repentance is and the more it nullifies the impression of the sin.

[However, this alone is not sufficient, and to completely annul the punishment, prayer and charity are also needed. It can be said that this is similar to when the Temple was standing, they also needed a sacrifice for atonement, which is like "an advocate entering" before the king to appease him];

Whereas "changing the name" is a completely different matter: the penitent becomes a completely new entity, to the extent that he becomes like a different person, and consequently, there is no one here to punish, as mentioned above.

This is also the reason why there must also be "changing the deed" — and "changing all his deeds for the better" — because only then is there no trace left of his previous existence (which is evident in his previous deeds), and he becomes a completely new entity, he is a "different" person.

Based on all the above, we can also explain why the atonement achieved through teshuvah is not considered a "bribe" in a negative sense (even if it is not the "excellent teshuvah" that completely erases and uproots the sin). This can be understood in light of what has been explained elsewhere, that the transformation of a person into a new entity through teshuvah also has practical legal implications. Through teshuvah, a person changes from being a wicked person (disqualified from giving testimony, etc.) to a kosher individual ("one who acts with your people"), to the extent that through mere contemplation of teshuvah in the heart, he is called a "complete tzaddik."

It has been clarified that although this transformation (where a person changes from wicked to righteous) is achieved through the fulfillment of the "mitzvah of teshuvah from the Torah, which is merely abandoning the sin" [and it is sufficient even with just contemplation of teshuvah in the heart (as mentioned above) without verbal confession, and as explained by the later authorities, even if his teshuvah does not help him to atone for his sin, he still becomes a complete tzaddik through "abandoning the sin alone"], whereas "changing the name" to annul a decree from a person, etc., must be in a manner of "changing all his deeds for the better" (as mentioned above) — nevertheless, this too is a "new entity." Indeed, the essence and foundation of the change is accomplished through the fulfillment of the mitzvah of teshuvah, "abandoning the sin alone," and all the details of teshuvah that follow are only to ensure that the point of "change" spreads throughout all aspects of the person, until he "changes all his deeds for the better."

[Just like a newborn in a simple sense, whose new existence is created in a single moment, and at that moment, it is only a single point; afterwards, this point spreads and forms, initially into a general form (male or female) over forty days, and then into a specific form in all its limbs and sinews (down to the hair and nails) over nine months.

Similarly, in the matter of teshuvah, the point of the "new entity" created through teshuvah is through "abandoning the sin alone... that he resolves in his heart with complete sincerity not to return to folly" — and therefore the halachic ruling is that through abandoning the sin alone, one changes from wicked to righteous as mentioned above;

And the details of teshuvah (starting from confession and asking for forgiveness, to enhancing the quality of the teshuvah so that it becomes "excellent teshuvah," etc.) — their purpose is that the point of renewal (achieved through the essence of teshuvah) spreads and penetrates all aspects of his existence, until he "changes all his deeds for the better" — so that in all his matters it is evident that he is a "different" person].

Accordingly, it is understood why teshuvah is considered a "bribe," and even though it is written "He does not take a bribe":

The strict letter of the law dictates that the act of teshuvah according to halachah — abandoning the sin with confession and asking for forgiveness — without it being "excellent teshuvah," and certainly not in a manner of "changing all his deeds for the better," is not sufficient for his sin to be completely forgiven — both because of the object of the sin, whose impression still remains (and is not completely uprooted), and because of the person, whose existence has not visibly changed to the extent that it can be said he is not "the same person who committed those deeds" — therefore, the forgiveness of the sin is considered a "bribe" (regarding human beings);

But in truth (and regarding the Holy One, blessed be He), it is not a "bribe" — because since through "abandoning the sin," the point of renewal is created, in which everything is included [like the point of a new fetus, in which all the details of the limbs, etc., are included] — it is understood that (at least potentially) he is a new entity.

Therefore, although concerning the object of the sin, it is impossible to completely forgive his sin until he performs such a great teshuvah that it uproots the sin from its inception — nevertheless, regarding the "change in the person" effected by teshuvah, since the point of renewal in the person has already been created through the act of teshuvah, it is (revealed before Heaven that) he is a completely new entity (and it is only a matter of time until the point spreads throughout all aspects of the person), and therefore "he is completely forgiven for what he transgressed against the command of the king, etc., and is completely exempt from judgment in the World to Come" — because the existence of the sinner has been nullified and there is no one here to punish, as mentioned above.

Based on this, we can further explain a detail in the wording of the aforementioned Midrash (section 1) — "And what is the bribe... repentance and good deeds." At first glance, what is the relevance of "good deeds" here? On the contrary, G‑d does not accept a bribe of "good deeds", only that of repentance.

[Additionally, in the Midrash Shocher Tov, the version reads "repentance, good deeds, and prayer" (or "repentance, prayer, and charity"), concluding with "as long as the gates of prayer are open, engage in prayer and repentance"].

In Midrash Shmuel, it is explained that "the mention of good deeds with repentance is to inform us that after repentance, one should not return and repeat the sin... otherwise, it is like immersing while holding an impure object... And even according to the version in Shocher Tov, the mention of prayer does not refer to the mitzvah of prayer... rather, it refers to the matter of prayer and repentance... true repentance is when one prays to his G‑d, etc., and asks from Him, blessed be He, for forgiveness, pardon, and atonement, etc."

However, this does not seem to be a sufficient answer — because what is the relevance in this Midrash (regarding the matter that repentance is a "bribe") to emphasize that repentance without good deeds (and prayer) is not proper repentance? This belongs in the laws of repentance or in Midrashim that come to explain the essence of repentance.

According to the above, we can say that this relates to the "bribe" aspect of repentance. As explained earlier, it is understood that the reason repentance does not (simply) have the power to effect complete forgiveness — even though one has changed from wicked to righteous — is because this change has not yet penetrated all aspects of the person.

This is what the Midrash says: when a person's repentance causes him to also perform good deeds (and engage in prayer), in such a way that the point of repentance in the heart begins to penetrate into the person's actions — this is a "bribe" that is accepted as if a complete "change in the person" has occurred (that "he changes all his deeds for the good") and "he is completely forgiven."

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