Parshas Matos
1. In Laws of Nedarim1, the Rambam cites (from the Mishnah2) the law regarding the vows of a minor. In his words:
"קטן בן שתים עשרה שנה ויום אחד וקטנה בת אחת עשרה שנה ויום אחד שנשבעו או נדרו . . בודקין אותן ושואלין אותן אם יודעין לשם מי נדרו . . נדריהן קיימים . . ואם לא ידעו אין בנדריהם ובדבריהם כלום. וצריכין בדיקה כל השנה כולה שהוא שנת י"ב לקטנה ושנת י"ג לקטן" ("A boy of twelve years and one day and a girl of eleven years and one day who swore or vowed . . are examined and asked whether they know in Whose Name they vowed . . their vows stand . . and if they did not know, there is nothing in their vows and in their words. And they require examination the entire year, which is the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy") (that is3: a girl — from the beginning of the twelfth year (eleven years and one day) until she becomes twelve years and one day; and a boy — from the beginning of the thirteenth year (twelve years and one day) until he becomes thirteen years and one day).
(And in the following halachah4 he continues:) "כיצד הרי שנדרו . . בתחלת שנה זו ושאלו אותן ונמצאו יודעין ונתקיים נדרן ונדרו נדר אחר אפילו בסוף שנה זו צריכין בדיקה ואח"כ יתקיים. ואין אומרין הואיל ונמצאו יודעין בתחלת השנה אין צריכין בדיקה אלא בודקין אותן את כל השנה הזו כולה" ("How so? If they vowed . . at the beginning of this year, and they were asked and found to know, and their vow was upheld, and they then made another vow, even at the end of this year, they require examination, and only afterwards is it upheld. We do not say, 'Since they were found to know at the beginning of the year, they do not need examination'; rather, they are examined throughout this entire year").
The Kesef Mishneh asks: "איני יודע מאין לו זה דבגמ' הכי אמרינן . . בודקין כל י"ב למה לי סד"א . . היכא דבדקנא ל' (יום) ולא ידעה להפלות אימא תו לא ליבדוק קמ"ל. ומשמע דטעמא משום דלא ידעה להפלות, הא אם ידעה להפלות לא צריך תו בדיקה" ("I do not know his source for this, for in the Gemara5 we say thus: . . Why do I need 'they examine throughout the twelfth year'? You might have thought . . that where we examined her for thirty (days) and she did not know how to distinguish, say we should not examine her any further — it teaches us otherwise. This implies that the reason is because she did not know how to distinguish; but if she knew how to distinguish, no further examination is needed").
And he concludes: "ואפשר שרבינו הי' גורס היכא דבדקנא ל' וידעה להפלות אימא תו לא ליבדוק קמ"ל" ("It is possible that our master's reading was: 'Where we examined her for thirty days and she knew how to distinguish, say we should not examine her any further — it teaches us otherwise'")6.
The Radbaz, too, says: "ונראה דגרסת רבינו היא וידע להפלות וכו'" ("It appears that our master's reading is 'and he knew how to distinguish,' etc."), and he adds: "וזו גרסא נכונה דאי לגרסת הספרים איכא לאקשויי וכי מפני שלא ידע להפלות בתחלת השנה לא ידע להפלות בסוף השנה ומאי קמ"ל תנא דאמר בודקים כל השנה, ולפי גרסת רבינו קמ"ל טובא" ("And this is a correct reading, for according to the reading of the books one could ask: just because he did not know how to distinguish at the beginning of the year, will he not know how to distinguish at the end of the year? What, then, does the Tanna who says 'they examine throughout the year' teach us? But according to our master's reading, it teaches us a great deal")7 (namely, that even though "they were found to know at the beginning of the year," he is not established on the presumption that he "knows how to distinguish"; rather, he requires examination once again, "even at the end of this year"8).
However, in his Commentary on the Mishnah9 the Rambam writes explicitly: "נבדקים כל י"ב . . הי' עולה במחשבתינו . . אם ישאלום שלשים יום ומצאם שלא יבינו נסתלקה חקירתם אמר אין הענין כן" ("They are examined throughout the twelfth . . it would have occurred to us . . that if they questioned them for thirty days and found that they do not understand, the inquiry about them would end; [the Tanna] said: the matter is not so") — that is, the Rambam too had the reading in the Gemara, "and she did not know how to distinguish"10.
2. In the Meiri it states: "שבודקין בכל השנה ר"ל שאפילו בדקנו בתחלתה . . ולא ידעו ואחר כך נדרו אין אומרין כבר נבדקו ואינן יודעין, שמא למדו וידעו, וכן בהפך אפילו נמצאו יודעין בתחלת השנה וידעו ונתקיים נדרם ואח"כ נדרו אין מקיימין אותן אלא אחר בדיקה" ("'They examine throughout the year' means that even if we examined them at its beginning . . and they did not know, and afterwards they vowed, we do not say, 'They were already examined and they do not know,' for perhaps they learned and now know. And likewise in the reverse: even if they were found to know at the beginning of the year, and they knew and their vow was upheld, and afterwards they vowed, they are not upheld except after examination").
Accordingly, one could say12 that the Rambam holds that although the reading in the Gemara is (as we have it), "You might have thought . . where we examined her for thirty days and she did not know how to distinguish," the law (of the obligation to examine) nevertheless applies also "in the reverse" — that "even if they were found to know at the beginning of the year, and they knew and their vow was upheld, and afterwards they vowed, they are not upheld except after examination."
And as for the fact that the Rambam cites only the case of "even if they were found to know" — this can be explained: in this case there is a greater novelty than in the law that "even if we examined them . . and they did not know" an examination is required (as above from the Radbaz).
But this answer is seemingly not smooth13, for whichever way you look at it: if this law indeed contains a greater novelty, why does the Gemara not say it? From the fact that the Gemara does not state this novelty it is understood (as above from the Kesef Mishneh) that "if she knew how to distinguish (at the beginning of the year), no further examination is needed" (because one establishes him on the presumption that he "knows how to distinguish").
3. In recent years the Mahadura Basra (final edition) of the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah has been printed11, and there it indeed states: "והי' עולה בדעתינו שלדעת האומר כן אם נשאלו . . ומצא" ("And it would have occurred to us that according to the one who says so, if they were asked . . and found") [OCR unclear] that until he is examined a second time his vow is no vow at all, not even out of doubt14 (and as is stated even more explicitly in the wording of the Tur15: "אינו נדר עד שיבדקום פעם אחרת" ("It is not a vow until they examine them another time")) — even though he has already been established as one who "knows how to distinguish"!
— One must certainly find an extremely strong reason why the Rambam retracted from his Mahadura Kama (first edition), and adopts the less widespread reading and the novelty that in our case one does not rely on the presumption at all (not even as a doubt).
4. This will be understood by first introducing another difference between the two editions of the Commentary on the Mishnah — regarding the time of "onas16 nedarim17" (the age of vows) [that is, the law regarding vows that one need not be an adult; rather, even of a "מופלא הסמוך לאיש" ("one of discernment who is close to manhood")18, the vow stands]:
In the widespread Commentary on the Mishnah (Mahadura Kama) it states: "בודקין כל שנת י"ב לנקבה וי"ג לזכר וכל עוד שנמצאום יודע נדריו קיימין ואע"פ שהם קטנים וזו היא עונת נדרים הרמוז אלי' בכל מקום" ("They examine throughout the twelfth year for a female and the thirteenth for a male, and as long as they find him knowing, his vows stand, even though they are minors; and this is the 'age of vows' alluded to everywhere"). That is, the "age of vows" begins in the year before adulthood (for a female, when she becomes eleven years and one day, and for a male, twelve years and one day), and their vows are examined as to whether "they know in Whose Name they vowed" [and this is the view of Rashi19 and other Rishonim].
In his Mahadura Basra, however, the Rambam changes this and says: "ואחר שתים עשרה לנקבה וי"ג לזכר אינן נשאלין ונדריהן קיימין ואע"פ שהם קטנים" ("And after twelve for a female and thirteen for a male, they are not questioned, and their vows stand even though they are minors") (and on this he concludes:) "וזו היא עונת נדרים כו'" ("and this is the 'age of vows,' etc."). That is, the "age of vows" begins (for a female) when she becomes twelve years and one day (and for a male, thirteen years and one day), even if she has not brought two hairs, and they do not need any examination, since their vows stand "אפילו אמרו אין אנו יודעין" ("even if they said, 'We do not know'")20 [which is the view of [OCR unclear]21].
[And so the Rambam rules in the Yad22: "הבן בן י"ג שנה ויום אחד והבת בת י"ב שנה ויום אחד אע"פ שאמרו אין אנו יודעין לשם מי נדרנו . . דבריהן קיימין . . ונדריהן נדרים ואע"פ שלא הביאו שתי שערות וזו היא עונת נדרים האמורה בכל מקום" ("A boy of thirteen years and one day and a girl of twelve years and one day, even though they said, 'We do not know in Whose Name we vowed' . . their words stand . . and their vows are vows, even though they have not brought two hairs; and this is the 'age of vows' mentioned everywhere") (and the law of "a boy of twelve years etc., if they know in Whose Name they vowed . . their vows stand" (cited above in section 1) is a separate law, as will be explained below in section 7).]
Accordingly, it can be said that the difference between the two editions (mentioned above in section 3) regarding the reading in the Gemara — "and she did not know how to distinguish" or "and she knew how to distinguish" — also depends on the two views mentioned above regarding the "age of vows."
5. The point of the explanation is as follows:
According to the Rambam's view, the concept of chazakah (presumption) does not apply at all to the understanding of a minor. For the meaning of chazakah is that the matter is strong and firmly fixed, and so it will surely remain; but in a minor there is no firmness in his intellect, since he lacks (true) daas — one of the characteristics of (one who possesses) daas being that he has an intellectual decision and conclusion in a manner that does not change. And as we see tangibly, a minor is subject to changes, incapable of a firm decision, and one can easily reverse23 a minor's decision.
[As is known, the explanation24 of why a minor under thirteen, even if he is "חריף ובעל השגה ותפיסא ובקי בדיני מ"ע ומל"ת בכי טוב" ("sharp, possessed of comprehension and grasp, and thoroughly versed in the laws of the positive and negative commandments"), is not punished if he transgressed a mitzvah — because he lacks daas.]
Therefore the Rambam rules, "We do not say, 'Since they were found to know at the beginning of the year, they do not need examination'; rather, they are examined throughout the entire year" — because it is a simple logic (about which there is no dispute) that in this matter one cannot rely on a chazakah25.
And the difference between the two readings in the Gemara — "and they did not know how to distinguish" or "and they knew how to distinguish" — is:
The reading in the Gemara, "You might have thought . . where we examined her for thirty days and she did not know how to distinguish, say we should not examine her any further," follows the view that the "age of vows" means "the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy" (and they know in Whose Name they vow) — because according to this view there is a greater novelty in this law than in the law mentioned above (in the Rambam) that "they are examined throughout the year" even though "they were found to know at the beginning of the year" (as will be explained below in section 8).
Whereas according to the view that the "age of vows" means "after twelve for a female and thirteen for a male" (as the Rambam concludes), there is no room to think that if "we examined . . and she did not know how to distinguish," one would not need to examine again. Therefore the Rambam must adopt the less widespread reading: "You might have thought . . where we examined . . and she knew how to distinguish" (as will be explained there).
6. The explanation of this:
The definition of vows in "the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy" — that "if they know in Whose Name they vowed . . their vows stand" — can be understood in two ways26:
a) The novelty lies in the age: for vows one need not wait until the age of adulthood (thirteen years and one day); rather, even a boy of twelve years and one day can make a vow. And the requirement to examine "whether they know in Whose Name they vow" serves merely to remove an impediment27: since the law is that "if they did not know, there is nothing in their vows and in their words," and he is, after all, still a minor, one must be certain that he does not lack the knowledge.
b) The innovation lies in the matter of understanding: for vows, a lesser understanding suffices to make a vow; and the requirement to be twelve years and one day is merely a sign, because only at this age is sufficient understanding for the matter of a vow possible (whereas before this, even weak understanding is absent).
7. It can be said that in this there is a practical difference between the two views mentioned above regarding the "age of vows":
The two approaches mentioned above apply only according to the view that "the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy" is the "age of vows," and that this is the (Torah's) novelty of "one of discernment who is close to manhood"
[which is why one can deliberate here as to what is the main novelty28: the detail of "mufla" (that he knows how to distinguish); or the detail of "samuch l'ish" (that in this year he is close to the time of adulthood)]:
Whereas according to the view that the "age of vows" is "בן י"ג שנה ויום א' כו' בת י"ב שנה ויום א' . . ואע"פ שלא הביאו שתי שערות" ("a boy of thirteen years and one day etc., a girl of twelve years and one day . . even though they have not brought two hairs"), it is logical that the entire definition of the vow in the year before adulthood — "the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy" — consists (not in years, but) solely in the fact that "they know in Whose Name they vowed."
For this is precisely the content of the difference between the two categories of the "age of vows" mentioned above — (a) "a boy of thirteen years and one day and a girl of twelve years and one day . . even though they have not brought two hairs"; (b) "the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy," and they know how to distinguish:
The Torah's novelty regarding "a boy of thirteen and one day and a girl etc., even though they have not brought two hairs" concerns years: the age of vows begins immediately when one becomes thirteen years and one day (and this law is indeed not connected with understanding — as the Rambam rules (as above) that "even though they said, 'We do not know' etc., their words stand"):
And then there is a second novelty, that of "the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy," in which the definition is (not connected with years, but) that by virtue of his "knowing how to distinguish," his vow is a vow.
[All the more so according to the explanation of the Rogatchover29, that in the Rambam's opinion "מופלא סמוך לאיש דאורייתא זה רק בבן י"ג או בבת י"ב ולא הביאו ב' שערות" ("the mufla samuch l'ish of Torah law is only a boy of thirteen or a girl of twelve who have not brought two hairs") (as is implied by the plain continuation of the Rambam's wording30: "הואיל והגיעו לשני הגדולים נדריהם קיימין אע"פ שלא הביאו . . סימנין . . ודבר זה מדברי תורה שהמופלא הסמוך לאיש הקדשו ונדרו נדר" ("Since they have reached the years of adults, their vows stand even though they have not brought . . signs . . and this matter is from the words of the Torah: that one of discernment who is close to manhood — his consecration is valid and his vow is a vow")), whereas the law of "the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy" is (according to the Rambam's view), according to all opinions, only Rabbinic31.
— It is surely logical that the Sages' enactment is connected (not with the actual age of the twelfth and thirteenth years, but) with the fact that he already "knows in Whose Name he vowed"31*, and therefore the Sages said that his vow is a vow.]
8. Accordingly, the difference between the two readings in the Gemara is understood:
According to the view that the "age of vows" means "the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy," it is understandable how one could think that "where we examined . . and she did not know how to distinguish, say we should not examine her any further" — because it is possible that the main definition of "one of discernment who is close to manhood" is on account of years, i.e., the Torah revealed that the age of eleven years and one day can effect a vow:
And since we see that the girl, being of this age, "did not know how to distinguish," this is a proof that in her case the time did not effect adulthood (to be able to make a vow), and consequently her "age of vows" is pushed off until the age of actual adulthood32.
On this the Mishnah teaches us that the main (Torah) novelty is that the understanding of the twelfth year for a girl (and the thirteenth for a boy) can effect a vow; and therefore, as soon as she obtains this understanding (during the twelfth year), her vow is a vow. And therefore one must always examine — even if at the beginning of the year "she did not know how to distinguish" — for perhaps she has since gained understanding.
[And it is understood that this supposition has much more room than the supposition "Since they were found to know at the beginning of the year, they do not need examination" — as above, that simple logic dictates that the concept of chazakah does not apply to the understanding of a minor.]
But according to the Rambam's conclusion, that the definition of "the twelfth year for a girl and the thirteenth year for a boy" is solely on account of the definition of understanding (as above, section 6) — on the contrary: there is no room to say that because he lacked understanding at the beginning of the year one need not examine again, for perhaps he afterwards gained understanding (as must happen naturally):
So the Rambam must adopt the reading, "You might have thought . . and she knew how to distinguish" — and this itself is what it teaches us: that although the minor has enough understanding to effect a vow, it is nevertheless not true daas, to which a chazakah can apply.
9. The reason of the Rambam (according to the Tzafnas Paneach's explanation) for deciding in favor of the opinion that the "age of vows" is specifically from when one reaches the years of adulthood (only he has not brought signs) can be explained:
In the matter of vows there is a wondrous novelty — that a Jew has the power to attach to something permitted (by Torah law) a status so that it becomes forbidden like an offering, to the point that a holiness (resembling the holiness of an offering) takes effect upon the forbidden object33.
In this there is a novelty even compared with actual offerings34 — for offerings have several limitations, and only certain kinds of animals (and plants and inanimate things) are fit to be offered on the altar; whereas with vows these limitations do not exist — as long as one attaches it to a vowed object, it may even be an impure thing, and a holiness takes effect (through his vow) upon the vowed object.
The result is a thing and its opposite: specifically with vows, which require an extra measure of power (even more than other mitzvos), the Torah says that even a minor (who is not subject to any of the other mitzvos) can effect this holiness (if he is "one of discernment who is close to manhood")!
Therefore the Rambam holds (according to the Tzafnas Paneach's explanation, as above) that it suffices to state this novelty regarding a minor who has reached the years of adulthood but lacks (only) the signs; but not to state an even greater novelty, that the "knowing how to distinguish" of a boy of twelve years and one day should be able to effect such holiness (without limitations)!
10. Nevertheless, the opinion of several Rishonim35 (and according to several Acharonim36, also the opinion of the Rambam) is that "one of discernment who is close to manhood" (whose vow is a vow by Torah law) means (at least also) a boy of twelve years and one day who knows how to distinguish.
This will be understood according to how the Tzemach Tzedek37 explains the reason why vows lack the limitations that exist with offerings (as above): the concept of offerings is that "נעשה קדש ע"פ גזירת התורה שהיא החכמה עליונה" ("it becomes holy by the decree of the Torah, which is the Supernal Wisdom"), whereas through vows a holiness is drawn down from a level that is higher than "wisdom."
This is the allusion in the wording of the verse38, "איש גו' כי יפליא לנדור" ("A man etc. who shall set apart [yafli] to vow") — that vows come from a level called "yafli," a term related to "pele" (wonder)39, which is higher than wisdom (of Torah) and intellect.
And the power for this (to reach higher than the wisdom of the Torah) exists in Jews by virtue of the fact that the Jewish people "קדמו לתורה" ("preceded the Torah")40 — the bond between Jews and G‑d is deeper and higher than Torah [which is why "ישראל אע"פ שחטא ישראל הוא" ("A Jew, even though he has sinned, is a Jew")41 — even a Jew who, Heaven save us, does not observe the Torah does not, G‑d forbid, cease to be a Jew]; and this is expressed in the matter of vows, in which a person's speech effects holiness according to his will (without the limitations of offerings, etc.).
[Nevertheless, vows are also a mitzvah in the Torah, because all matters of the service of G‑d are revealed through the Torah — similar to the matter of teshuvah42, which is "higher" than Torah, as our Sages say43: "שאלו לתורה חוטא מה עונשו א"ל יביא אשם כו' שאלו להקב"ה כו' א"ל יעשה תשובה ויתכפר לו" ("They asked the Torah: A sinner — what is his punishment? It told them: Let him bring a guilt-offering, etc. They asked the Holy One, blessed be He, etc. He told them: Let him do teshuvah and he will be atoned") (that is, the matter of teshuvah comes not from the Torah (in itself), but from the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself)
— which is why teshuvah has the power to fill the deficiency of what one failed to do in fulfilling the Torah —
and nevertheless it is specifically the Torah that reveals to a Jew the possibility and power of teshuvah, to the point that teshuvah becomes a mitzvah in the Torah.]
And this is the explanation of why a Jew has the power for vows even before he becomes obligated in all the other mitzvos of the Torah44 — because vows are connected with his very existence as he "precedes" the Torah45.
And this is the advantage of "one of discernment who is close to manhood" (who knows how to distinguish):
Here the quality of understanding is not so relevant — that becomes complete only when he becomes an adult — but rather the fact that he has the "lehafli," that at this time there enters into him, in a revealed manner, the level of "pele" (in the soul) "that is above wisdom."
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Eikev (20 Menachem Av) and 21 Menachem Av, 5744)
Notes
1) Ch. 1, halachah 1.
2) Niddah 5:6 (45b).
3) And this is likewise the meaning of "the twelfth year . . and the thirteenth year" wherever it appears later in this sichah.
4) And so in the Beis Yosef on the Tur, Yoreh De'ah, sec. 233.
5) Niddah, there.
6) See also Smag, negative commandments 242.
7) The Bach on the Tur, Yoreh De'ah there, still raised a difficulty. See also Mishnah Acharonah on Mishnayos Niddah there (and see Chochmas Betzalel cited in note 13): what relevance is there to keeping her in the presumption of minority (Rav [Ovadiah of Bartenura] on Niddah there; and likewise Rashi on Niddah there, s.v. "tu lo nivdok"), especially since she is liable to change, for the older she gets, the more she comes to understanding (see in detail Encyclopedia Talmudis, entry Chazakah (2) — Chazakah DeMei'ikara, [OCR unclear], and the sources cited there). See below, notes 13 and 25.
8) See the Meiri on Niddah there: "It seems to me that the reason is lest, when we examined them and they knew, it was by chance"; and the Bach there: "for one can say that perhaps at the end of the year they forgot." See below, section 3 and section 5.
9) Niddah, there.
10) As several commentators have noted.
11) Kafih edition (and translation) (based on a Yemenite manuscript).
12) See the commentators on the Talmud on Niddah there (Chochmas Betzalel, Chiddushei Chasam Sofer, Mei Niddah, and others).
13) As the Mei Niddah asked (on Niddah there); and see the discussion in Chochmas Betzalel (on Niddah there). [It is obvious that this is not comparable to the case where she "did not know how to distinguish" at the beginning of the twelfth year, where we do not keep her in the presumption of minority (and examine throughout the twelfth year) — because the older she gets, the more she comes to understanding, as above, note 7.]
14) See also Mei Niddah (on Mishnah Niddah there). See there.
15) Yoreh De'ah, there. And similarly is the wording of the Meiri (cited above at the beginning of section 2): "they are not upheld except after examination."
16) Mishnah Terumos 1:3. Gittin 65a. And in many places.
17) See also the change in the explanation of "onas nedarim" in the editions of his Commentary on the Mishnah, Terumos there (see Kafih edition there). [In the Commentary on the Mishnah, Nazir 4:6 — also in the widespread edition — "'Onas nedarim' means thirteen years and one day, when he has not brought two hairs." Perhaps for tractate Nazir the translator had the Mahadura Basra. This is not the place to elaborate.]
18) Nazir 62a. And in many places.
19) Gittin there. Niddah 46b, s.v. "le'onas nedarim" (and there, end of 46a, s.v. "ki yafli"), and elsewhere. And so it is also in the She'iltos, Bechukosai, She'ilta 116.
20) Whereas in the Commentary on the Mishnah, Mahadura Kama, he wrote: "That which we said — a girl of twelve years and one day . . their vows stand even if they said 'We do not know' — is on condition that she has brought two hairs." This difference between the two editions, too, depends on the difference in the explanation of "onas nedarim": According to what is written in the Mahadura Kama of the Commentary on the Mishnah, that onas nedarim is the year before adulthood, if they know how to distinguish — from where would one say that a boy of thirteen years and one day and a girl of twelve years and one day who have not brought two hairs and said "We do not know" — their vows are a vow? (And as in the Talmud's question, Niddah 45, end of side b (and as Rashi explains there, s.v. "katan hu"), and there 46, beginning of side a.)* Whereas according to what is written in the Mahadura Basra of the Commentary on the Mishnah, that onas nedarim means "after twelve for a female and thirteen for a male . . even though they are minors" — the Torah's novelty in this law is that "regarding vows we go only by years (even without signs)" — Tzafnas Paneach on the Rambam here — and consequently it is understood that "even if they said 'We do not know' . . their words stand" (like an adult who has brought signs, who cannot exempt himself with the claim "We do not know" — see Rashi on the Mishnah, Niddah there, s.v. "afilu").
*) See the Smag cited in the following note (and Mishneh LeMelech, Laws of Nedarim there) — who raised a difficulty against the Behag and the Rambam from this Gemara. The commentators have already elaborated with several answers. This is not the place to elaborate.
21) Cited in Smag, negative commandments 242. See also Hagahos Maimoniyos on the Rambam here. And elsewhere [except that the Rashba on Gittin there wrote (following the view of the Behag): "and this is when there are two hairs." See the difficulty raised against him in Shev Shmaatsa, Shmaatsa 5, ch. 2. This is not the place to elaborate].*
*) The Aruch LaNer on Niddah there (46a) has already noted that in the Behag as we have it, the reading is like Rashi's explanation. See the Rashba cited in the text of the note.
22) Laws of Nedarim there, halachah 3 (and see the Rambam's wording, Laws of Nezirus 2:3; Laws of Terumos 4:5). And so wrote the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah there, and the Shach there, sub-par. 2. The Meiri (Niddah there), Kiryas Sefer (on the Rambam there), and others noted the contradiction between the Yad and the Commentary on the Mishnah, and they had not seen the Mahadura Basra of the Commentary on the Mishnah.
23) See Sefer HaMaamarim 5670, end of p. 115. And in many places.
24) Kuntres HaTefillah, ch. 5 (p. 15ff.). Sefer HaMaamarim 5670, p. 115. And elsewhere.
25) Along the lines of what is written in Responsa Chasam Sofer, Even HaEzer, vol. 2, sec. 44 (cited in the Encyclopedia Talmudis referenced in note 7, col. 636), that one who is sometimes sane and sometimes insane cannot be established on his presumption, since he is liable to change. See there. And perhaps regarding the understanding of a minor it is even more so — for since he does not possess daas (decisiveness, etc.), the entire concept of chazakah does not apply here at all, as in the text.
26) See along these lines Chiddushei Chasam Sofer on Niddah there (regarding the difference between the two opinions as to whether, if he consecrated and ate, he receives lashes or not).
27) Note also the discussion in Mei Niddah (on Niddah there) whether the examination is a leniency for him or a stringency upon him. See there.
28) Note the Meiri on Niddah there: "Mufla samuch l'ish means . . that they have completed . . then there is no mufla here" (since their vows are a vow even if they do not know how to distinguish).
29) Tzafnas Paneach on the spot. Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Shabbos 24:11. And so it is implied in Kiryas Sefer on the Rambam there. See there.
30) Laws of Nedarim there, halachah 4.
31) See Tzafnas Paneach there at length. Several Acharonim wrote that according to the Rambam, "mufla samuch l'ish" includes both categories (see Simlas Binyamin on Yoreh De'ah there — cited in Chochmas Betzalel on Niddah there, 46a (and see there that there are two conflicting verses and derivations on this) — and Atzei Levonah on Yoreh De'ah there (printed in the margin of the Shulchan Aruch, Re'em edition, and its photo-offset reprint). See also Biurei Maharshal on the Smag there. See Shev Shmaatsa there, ch. 1. And elsewhere). The Tzafnas Paneach holds that the Rambam cannot be explained this way, for the Rambam states explicitly, "and this matter is from the words of the Torah, that one of discernment who is close to manhood etc.," and in this halachah (and likewise in the preceding halachah) he mentioned only the law of a boy of thirteen (and a girl of twelve) who has not brought two hairs; and he holds that it is a very great strain to say that it refers (in the middle of halachah 4) to what was stated above in halachah 2! [However, the Rambam's wording in Sefer HaMitzvos, "until they grow up and bring two hairs," requires slight further study. Note that in Kiryas Sefer there the word "until they grow up" is omitted. This is not the place to elaborate.] But in the Tzemach Tzedek's Chiddushim on the Talmud, Megillah, end of ch. 3: "From twelve years and one day, as (the Rambam) rules in ch. 1 of Laws of Nedarim, halachah 4, that the vow of one of discernment who is close to manhood is a vow by Torah law." — And see below, section 10.
31*) But even according to the commentators cited in the previous note, that it is Torah law, it is understood that the Torah's novelty here concerns understanding ("knows in Whose Name he vowed") — this being the difference between the two laws of the age of vows: a) a boy of thirteen who has not brought two hairs — on account of age; b) a boy of twelve who knows how to distinguish — on account of understanding.
32) And even if during the year she comes to know how to distinguish, she remains a minor whose vows are nothing. See along these lines Chiddushei Chasam Sofer and Mei Niddah on Niddah there.
33) See Likkutei Torah on our parshah (82, end of side b; 83, end of side b, ff.). The Tzemach Tzedek's Sefer HaMitzvos, Mitzvas Nedarim, at its beginning and end. And elsewhere — based on Kesubos 59b and elsewhere. See Rashi, Niddah 46b, s.v. "terumah."
34) The Tzemach Tzedek's Sefer HaMitzvos there, at the end.
35) Cited above, note 19.
36) Cited in note 29.
37) The Tzemach Tzedek's Sefer HaMitzvos there. See also Maamarei Admur HaZaken 5570 (p. 125).
38) Naso 6:2. And similarly Bechukosai 26:2.
39) The Tzemach Tzedek's Sefer HaMitzvos there. See also Likkutei Torah on our parshah, 62b. And elsewhere.
40) Bereishis Rabbah 1:4. And elsewhere.
41) Sanhedrin 44a, beginning.
42) Note Ohr HaTorah (Vayeitzei, vol. 5, 852a ff.; on our parshah, p. 1297 ff.; there, vol. 6, pp. 1954–1955) — the connection of vows to teshuvah (and as in Ohr HaTorah on our parshah, vol. 6 there: [OCR unclear] therefore the vow takes effect upon a mitzvah).*
*) In addition to what is explained in Ohr HaTorah on our parshah (p. 1278 ff.; p. 1288 ff.; p. 1309 ff.), that the annulment of vows is akin to the matter of teshuvah (like the answer of the Holy One, blessed be He: "Let him do teshuvah," etc.). See there.
43) [OCR unclear] Tehillim (remez 720). And elsewhere.
44) Except that once the Torah revealed that the vow of one of discernment who is close to manhood is a vow, we know that also in vows of consecration (of offerings) his vow is a vow, and likewise that his terumah is terumah (Mishnah Terumos 1:3; Niddah 46b; Rambam, Laws of Terumos 4:5).
45) See the Tzemach Tzedek's Sefer HaMitzvos there: that because of this he has the power to give up his life (mesirus nefesh).
Key Lesson
A Jew's power to make a vow, which draws holiness even onto ordinary objects beyond the limits that apply to offerings, stems from the bond between the Jewish people and G‑d that precedes the Torah. This is why even a young person who is "close to manhood" can make a binding vow: what matters is not mature intellect but the revealed presence of the soul's level of "wonder" that is above wisdom.