BEITZAH - 020a – ביצה – פרק שני – יום טוב,כ ע”א

… “and I will shave with second-tithe money” — what is the law?^[1]

ואגלח ממעות מעשר שני - the offerings the Torah imposes on a nazir on the day of his shaving, I will buy with second-tithe money.

He said to him: He has vowed, but he does not fulfill his obligation,

נדור - he is bound by his vow of a todah, but does not discharge his chagigah with it.

he is a nazir, but he does not shave.

נזיר ואינו מגלח - with maaser money, but only with unconsecrated money. Once he said “I take upon myself,” he became obligated, for a declaration to the Most High is like delivery to an ordinary person; when he then adds “on condition that,” it counts for nothing.^[2]

A certain man said to them: Give four hundred zuz to so-and-so, and let him marry my daughter.

ההוא גברא - it was the instruction of a man on his deathbed.

Rav Pappa said: He takes the four hundred, and as for the daughter — if he wishes he marries her, and if he wishes he does not.

That is because he said “give him” and then “let him marry.” But had he said “let him marry, and give him” — if he marries her he takes it, and if he does not marry her he does not take it.

Mareimar sat and stated this teaching

להא שמעתא - the teaching of one who says: I take upon myself a todah, and I will discharge my chagigah with it.

in his own name.

משמיה דנפשיה - he did not phrase it as a question but stated it himself: One who says “I take upon myself a todah and I will discharge my chagigah with it,” or “I am a nazir and I will shave with second-tithe money” — he has vowed but does not discharge; he is a nazir but does not shave from maaser.

Ravina said to Mareimar: Is that how you learn it? We learn it as the question Reish Lakish put to Rabbi Yochanan.

אתון הכי מתניתו לה - on your own authority, and not in Rabbi Yochanan’s name? We learn it as the question Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan, to which Rabbi Yochanan answered this.

A Tanna recited before Rabbi Yitzchak bar Abba: “And he brought the olah” (Vayikra 9:16)

ויקרב את העולה - the olah of the eighth day of the miluim, which the Torah imposed on Aharon as an obligation of that day: “Take for yourself a young calf for a chatas and a ram for an olah, unblemished” (Vayikra 9:2).^[3]

“and he did it according to the rule” — according to the rule of a voluntary olah. This teaches about an obligatory olah that it requires semichah.

ויעשה כמשפט - what “rule” is stated for an obligatory olah? It must mean the rule spelled out for the voluntary olah in the opening of Vayikra, where all the laws of olah and shelamim are given. That passage speaks of voluntary offerings — “a man, when one of you brings” implies whenever he wishes — and there it is written “and he shall lean his hand.” So “according to the rule,” written of an obligatory olah, teaches that it requires semichah like the other rules of voluntary offerings.

He said to him:

אמר ליה - Rabbi Yitzchak said to the Tanna.

Whose view does your teaching follow?

דאמר לך מני - this teaching, that a verse was needed for this, rather than deriving it by a binyan av: just as a voluntary offering that is an olah requires semichah, so an obligatory one, which is an olah like it, should require semichah.

It is Beis Shammai, who do not learn obligatory shelamim from voluntary shelamim.

ב"ש היא - who say in our Mishnah that one brings shelamim on Yom Tov, which are obligatory, but does not lean on them. The reason is that semichah is written in Vayikra of voluntary shelamim — “and if his offering is a sacrifice of shelamim … and he shall lean his hand” — and they hold that obligatory is not learned from voluntary. For we can refute: a voluntary offering is common, brought whenever a man chooses to pledge one; can you say the same of an obligatory offering, which comes only when he becomes obligated? Therefore their semichah does not override Yom Tov. And therefore the obligatory olah, too, had the verse not specified “according to the rule,” would not require semichah, since they do not learn obligatory from voluntary.

For according to Beis Hillel, since they do learn obligatory shelamim from voluntary shelamim, an obligatory olah would not need a verse either; they would learn it from the voluntary olah.

But how do you know that Beis Hillel learn obligatory shelamim from voluntary shelamim? Perhaps they learn it from the obligatory olah, and the obligatory olah itself needs the verse!

וממאי דבית הלל כו' - perhaps, in truth, obligatory is not learned from voluntary, but Beis Hillel learn obligatory from obligatory — obligatory shelamim from the obligatory olah. Then the obligatory olah needs this verse, “according to the rule,” to state it explicitly, and without it we would know of semichah neither in an obligatory olah nor in obligatory shelamim; and this beraisa is the view of all.

Why do they not learn from voluntary shelamim — because those are common? From the obligatory olah they cannot learn either — because it is wholly burnt!

It is derived from between the two.^[4]

אתיא מבינייא - in truth the beraisa the Tanna recited is the view of all, and even Beis Hillel need the verse. Once semichah in an obligatory olah is established from this verse, obligatory shelamim follow from both together — from voluntary shelamim and from the obligatory olah. Just as voluntary shelamim require semichah, obligatory shelamim, which are shelamim like them, should too. If you refute: voluntary shelamim are common — the obligatory olah proves otherwise, for it is not common and requires semichah; so I include obligatory shelamim, which, though not common, should require semichah. If you refute: the obligatory olah is wholly burnt, unlike obligatory shelamim — voluntary shelamim prove otherwise. The argument comes round: the one is not like the other. The reason for semichah cannot be tied to being common, since the obligatory olah is not; nor to being wholly burnt, since voluntary shelamim are not, and semichah is written of them. Perforce the reason lies in what the two share: each is an individual’s offering and requires libations [and semichah]. So I include every individual’s offering that requires libations, that it require semichah — and obligatory shelamim come under that reasoning.

And do Beis Shammai hold that obligatory shelamim do not require semichah?

But it was taught in a beraisa: Rabbi Yosi said: Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel did not disagree about semichah itself, that it is required;

לא נחלקו על הסמיכה - with obligatory shelamim, that it is required. Rather, Beis Shammai said: he leans on them on Erev Yom Tov and slaughters them on Yom Tov, and we do not say that the shechitah must follow immediately upon the semichah.

About what did they disagree? About whether shechitah must follow immediately upon semichah: Beis Shammai say it need not, and Beis Hillel say it must.^[5]

He holds like this Tanna, as it was taught: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah said: Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel did not disagree that shechitah must follow immediately upon semichah;

הוא דאמר כי האי תנא כו' על תכף לסמיכה שחיטה שצריך - in anything that requires semichah, as it is written: “and he shall lean … and slaughter.”

about what did they disagree? About semichah itself: Beis Shammai say it is not required, and Beis Hillel say it is required.

על הסמיכה עצמה - whether obligatory shelamim require semichah.

The Rabbis taught: It once happened that Hillel the Elder brought his olah to the Azarah to lean on it on Yom Tov.^[6]

The disciples of Shammai the Elder gathered around him and said to him: What is the nature of this animal?

He said to them: It is a female,

נקבה היא - and an olah is never female.

and I have brought it for shelamim.

ולזבחי שלמים הבאתיה - out of his great humility Hillel altered the facts for the sake of peace.

He swung its tail at them, and they went away.

כשכש להם בזנבה - to mislead them into thinking it was a female.

That day the hand of Beis Shammai prevailed over Beis Hillel, and they sought to fix the halachah according to their view.

There was an elder there, one of the disciples of Shammai the Elder, named Bava ben Buta, who knew that the halachah follows Beis Hillel, and he sent…^[7]

Tosafos

נזיר ואינו מגלח - this holds only because he phrased it this way. Had he said it the other way round — “on condition that I discharge my chagigah, I take upon myself a todah” — it would not hold, and likewise with the nazir. So it is implied just below, where the Gemara says “that is because he said give him and then let him marry.” And so the Kuntres explained, giving the reason that once he has said “I take upon myself” he is obligated, for a declaration to the Most High is like delivery to an ordinary person, and when he then says “on condition,” it counts for nothing.

ויקרב את העולה וכו' - Rashi explained that this refers to Aharon’s olah, stated in parshas Shemini. That is not convincing, for it refers to the communal olah: the verse mentions the goat of the people, and immediately afterward writes “and he brought the olah,” while Aharon’s olah is spelled out in a different verse of the parsha. It therefore seems that it does refer to the communal olah.

למד על עולת חובה שטעונה סמיכה - this is puzzling, for it is said there that among communal offerings only two require semichah, and this is not one of them — only the bull for idolatry and the bull for an erroneous ruling of the court. On Rashi’s explanation, that the verse here speaks of Aharon’s offering, which is an individual’s, it is fine. One may answer that the rule of only two applies to offerings for all generations, whereas this was the offering of the miluim, for that time alone. Still it is difficult: how do we learn later generations from a one-time case, as the Gemara says “this teaches about an obligatory olah that it requires semichah”? And how do we learn an individual’s offering from a communal one, since I explained that “and he did it according to the rule” speaks of a communal offering? On Rashi’s explanation it is fine. One may further answer with a single resolution for both: since the verse “and he brought the olah” has shown us that we learn the one-time case from the permanent law and a communal offering from an individual’s — “a man, when he brings” being written for all generations — so too we may learn the permanent law from the one-time case and the individual from the communal. And the R”M said that Rashi’s explanation can be defended: the plain sense of “and he brought the olah” is indeed a communal offering, and if you object that such an offering does not require semichah, since there are only two semichos in communal offerings — that is so; but since the verse cannot apply to communal offerings, where only two require semichah and this is not one of them, apply it to Aharon’s offerings, which are an individual’s.^[8]

דלא גמרי שלמי חובה כו' - here Rabbi Yitzchak bar Abba holds that the reason of Beis Shammai, who say one does not lean, is that these offerings do not require semichah — not like Rabbi Yosi, who says just below that they disagree about its being immediate. Rashi in the Mishnah gave the reason as the rabbinic prohibition of making use of a living animal, and he explained well, for in perek Ein Dorshin (Chagigah 16b) it is implied that this is their dispute according to Rabbi Yochanan.

דלמא מעולת חובה גמרי - and if you ask: this is something derived by hekesh, since the obligatory olah is known only from the voluntary one through “according to the rule,” and what is learned by hekesh does not in turn teach by a binyan av — one may answer that it is an open question in Zevachim (Zevachim 50a) whether it does in turn teach by a binyan av. Here the Gemara is saying: if you conclude that something learned by hekesh does in turn teach by a binyan av, then they learn it from the obligatory olah, for obligatory is learned from obligatory.

Notes

1. 1. The question is Reish Lakish’s to Rabbi Yochanan, begun at the foot of 19b: a man says “I take upon myself a todah, and I will discharge my chagigah with it,” or “I am a nazir, and I will pay for my shaving offerings with second-tithe money.” An obligatory offering must be paid for with unconsecrated money, so each condition tries to use money the vow cannot use.
2. 2. The principle is that a vow to the Temple takes effect the moment it is spoken, the way handing an object to a fellow man completes a gift. Tosafos below adds that the order of the words matters: the vow must come first and the condition after it, which is why Rav Pappa’s ruling about the four hundred zuz is brought as a parallel.
3. 3. The eighth day of the miluim was the day the Mishkan began its regular service, with Aharon and his sons officiating for the first time. Tosafos below disputes Rashi and holds that the olah in the verse is the communal one.
4. 4. A binyan av “from between the two” (the tzad hashaveh): neither source alone proves the point, since each has a feature that could explain its semichah, but the feature they share — an individual’s offering that takes libations — is present in obligatory shelamim too.
5. 5. The Torah writes the leaning and the slaughter together, and the halachah is that the shechitah must follow at once. Rabbi Yosi’s reading makes the dispute a matter of timing: Beis Shammai would lean before Yom Tov and slaughter on it. Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah, in the next line, reads it the way Rabbi Yitzchak bar Abba did.
6. 6. Beis Shammai hold that an olas re’iyah is not brought on Yom Tov at all, and that obligatory shelamim may not be leaned upon then. Hillel was leaning on his olah on Yom Tov, which would have provoked them on both counts.
7. 7. The account continues on 20b: Bava ben Buta brought in the sheep of Kedar and let anyone who wished lean on them, and that day the halachah was fixed like Beis Hillel.
8. 8. The printed text here carries a stray bracket before the word for “bull”; it appears to mark a word supplied by the editors and has been left as printed on the Hebrew side.