6502 —ניתוח הלכתי של הרמב"ם, הראב"ד, וטהרה בדיני הקרבנות

B"H, Days of Selichos, 5718.

Brooklyn, NY.

Haraha"g vavac"h iy"a nu"n tzm"s ish chai rav pe'alim etc. Shlomo Goren

Shalom u'Vrachah!

With honor and blessing. I acknowledge receipt of your two books Nezer HaKodesh (vol. 1) and Shaarei Taharah on tractate Mikvaot. Surely I will also be honored by the other publishers through you. Many thanks for what has been sent and for what will be sent in the future.

Out of fondness for the matter I have reviewed—despite time constraints—at least briefly between the pages of your book, and here I copy what appears to me in haste at certain points.

Based on our Sages (Bava Metzia 84a): "Be persistent in questioning... thus the teaching is clarified... do I not know...?" And "At Vahav Besufah."

In Sefer Nezer HaKodesh at its beginning: On Rambam Hilchot Pesulei HaMukdashin ch.1 halacha 15 you explain that Rambam holds that a "yotzei" (something that left its boundaries) is impure and transmits impurity, but not regarding hand impurity. With all due respect, it is difficult to attribute to Rambam a novel idea that is not absolutely necessary—especially since it is not hinted at in Rambam's own words (for if he had hinted at it there is no way Kesef Mishneh, Lechem Mishneh, Mishneh Lemelech etc. would have missed it here). Even more so since Rambam should have written this explicitly.

And one cannot say that the reason for omitting it is because his style is only to copy explicit rulings—for according to your explanation the law is explicit in Yerushalmi. Also according to your explanation there remains a difficulty which does not exist in Hilchot Avodat HaKorbanot ch.8 halacha 3: "Pigul... is like the first... therefore they transmit impurity to hands," since there too "yotzei" is like the first yet does not impart hand impurity.

Apparently you were compelled to explain as above: a) To answer Mishneh Lemelech's question there about why Rambam specifically wrote about Pesach meat that left its place being pure—but Mishneh Lemelech already answered that Rambam's intent was to distinguish between doubt and certainty. Therefore even according to you this intent must be attributed to Rambam; otherwise his lengthy wording "even if it's doubtful... therefore it does not impart impurity since doubtful hand impurity is pure" makes no sense.

b) To answer how could Raavad here have overlooked that Rambam ruled (in Avodat HaKorbanot) leniently on a certain question (and also why he did not object there). But even according to your reasoning this remains unresolved; Raavad need not force a novel interpretation onto Rambam or raise an objection—let him leave both aside—and there is also no need to say that Rambam holds all doubts regarding sanctified items must be ruled stringently (and as for why Raavad did not object again in Hilchot Korban Pesach—even you note he did not object there).

Another difficulty: Consider Raavad's lengthy proof that the law follows Ravina; but according to Rambam who holds "anything destined to be cut is considered as cut," then yotzei imparts impurity even without following Ravina—as you yourself noted regarding Lechem Mishneh—and in my opinion Raavad's comments often serve both as critique and as stating his own ruling. If Rambam elsewhere follows his own logic even when Raavad objects, this does not change Raavad's ruling; on the contrary—his objection here extends throughout all branches of this approach in Rambam.

If we accept this general principle about Raavad's intent then many questions raised against him elsewhere are resolved—including Lechem Mishneh's comments here and both foundational points above. It also explains why Raavad elaborates so much proving the law follows Ravina—to clarify that yotzei imparts impurity even if one says "anything destined to be cut is not considered as cut."

In your book above: On Rambam there ch.23: "Therefore such-and-such..." You conclude with a question: What does this add? In my view—what does 'therefore' add? It could simply say: "And such-and-such an act does not constitute valid holacha (carrying), thus invalidating the sacrifice." It seems from Rambam's wording without distinction that this applies in all cases—even when slaughtering beside the altar (as Lechem Mishneh and Mishneh Lemelech write)—and he adds that since proximity alone does not exempt from carrying by foot, therefore (even when proximity is due to a person) such as one who shortens his path while carrying blood or limbs while standing still and throwing them—the sacrifice becomes invalidated.

See Yoma 35b between Ulam and Mizbeach; see also Tamid ch.7 mishna 3; note also that throwing at a distance depends on human strength (Zevachim 64a), as well as one who exceeds others in strength (Yoma 18a). In Mishneh Lemelech he copies "therefore if a Kohen receives...", but apparently was imprecise.

In Sefer Shaarei Taharah at its beginning: On Rosh's commentary regarding drawn water and his explanation in Pesachim—see Rosh on Taharot ch.8 where he explains Pesachim refers to drawn water—the opposite of his explanation in Hilchot Mikvaot. This was already noted by Sefer Golos Aliyot on tractate Mikvaot who left it unresolved; see there where he elaborates on all these points you discussed.

There at its end: In future times I will purify you with an everlasting purity so you will never become impure again—as it says "And I will sprinkle upon you pure water and you shall be purified." In Shaarei Taharah there currently refers to removal of the spirit of impurity from the world etc.; but "I will sprinkle upon you..." refers to purification of people (individuals or all Israel), yet evil still exists in reality (even among animals or mixed multitude), so evil actions remain possible among all Israel.

This differs from "I will remove the spirit of impurity from the earth," which means purification of the world itself—as our Sages put it: bringing forth yetzer hara and slaughtering it (Sukkah 52a). There is nothing new under the sun; similar things already occurred: either one has no yetzer hara because he killed it or transformed it into good (Yerushalmi end Berachos); similarly someone who lived most years without sinning etc. (Yoma 35b). This differs from handing over yetzer hara for idolatry to Anshei Knesses HaGedolah (Yoma 69b; see Chiddushei Aggados).

The practical difference concerns reward and punishment—there still exists a period where although Hashem assists him and purifies him—as always Hashem helps him for otherwise man could not overcome—but still there remains merit or liability (Shabbos 151b). See also Zohar III p.125a—which resolves Kesef Mishneh's question on Rambam Hilchos Teshuvah ch.8 halacha 7 based on this distinction.

The objection of Raavad and Radbaz's commentary on Rambam Hilchos Melachim beginning ch.12; Avodas HaKodesh by R.M. ben Gabai vol II ch.38; Iggeres HaKodesh by Rabbeinu HaZaken end etc.—and much more could be said.

Summary

This letter explores intricate halachic debates about ritual purity laws among leading authorities such as Rambam and Raavad, emphasizing careful textual analysis while highlighting how different approaches affect practical outcomes concerning purity, reward, punishment, and spiritual refinement.