4878 —מזונות הבנים מה"ת או מדרבנן, אסמכתא אינה מחדשת דין, ותפלה אף שהיא רשות יש בה גדרים מן התורה

B"H, 28 Marcheshvan, 5717

Brooklyn.

The Rabbi and Gaon, veteran Chassid, G‑d-fearing man, distinguished and honored, occupied with communal needs, our teacher Rabbi Menashe, may he live

Shalom u'Vrachah!

In reply to your letter of 24 Marcheshvan, in which you wrote at length with erudition and keen analysis, continuing the previous letters. But — begging your pardon — I do not know what to make of it, for what you wrote at length is not about the same matter we discussed in the previous letters. I will explain my intention — following the order of the three sections.

a) Regarding the obligation to support children, and whether this is connected with the obligation to support one's wife.

What was discussed is — as you also quote in this letter — that for those who hold that the master's obligation to support his [slave's] wife is from the Torah, which proves that a wife's support (by her husband) is from the Torah, this very derivation proves that children's support (by the father as well) is from the Torah, etc.; and surely the Chochmas Shlomo holds so too. From this it is understood (and even without this it would be understood) that the ruling of those who hold that a husband must support his wife from a different derivation, regarding a father's obligation to support his children, has no bearing on the discussion at hand. And they are the Rambam (Laws of Ishus, ch. 12), and the Tur and the Semag, who copied his wording. — And it is about them that you argue in your letter!

Note: Although it is unrelated to the above: your strained effort to prove that the Rambam holds that the support of even very young children is specifically rabbinic — which is entirely contrary to the plain sense and content of his wording, as Your Honor quotes in your letter — it is not at all clear what compels us to enter into all those difficulties, and to say as well that the Rambam and all who copy his wording regarding very young children intend to hint at several distinctions through the precise wording "as the enactment of the Sages" rather than "from the enactment of the Sages." (Note the Biur HaGra on this, who wrote "this requires study" and did not explain his intention.) — And at the beginning of the passage they use several words, "just as," etc. — whose plain meaning is the opposite: that children's support is from the Torah.

b) As for what I wrote — that even if you say that conduct recorded in Tanach is not always a legal ruling, since it may be only a narrative — there is of course no difference in this between a narrative in the Five Books of the Torah and a narrative in Nach; and you object that we find several rabbinic enactments that were linked to a verse.^[1] It is not clear how this refutes my reasoning, which concerns the manner of Torah study, as in the matter we are discussing, namely: that the Torah's law obligating the master to support the wife is due to a custom — not obligated by the Torah — that the husband supports his wife. On this I said that there is no logical room to distinguish and say otherwise regarding laws brought in Nach in connection with narrative and conduct, and of them too one may say that the conduct was not an obligation but merely optional. And it is obvious that one cannot say that the husband's support of his wife, being rabbinic, is derived from the master's Torah obligation to support his slave's wife — not as an asmachta. For of course rabbinic laws are not brought in the Five Books of the Torah, and an asmachta does not create a law, but merely serves as a reminder of a law that already exists. Incidentally, in this too there is no difference between Torah law, rabbinic law and a halachah given to Moshe at Sinai — that "they linked it to a verse" (see Pesachim 96b; Kiddushin 57b, in Rashi; Eruvin 4b.

And in several more places cited in the Talmudic Encyclopedia, entry Asmachta.)

c) As for what I wrote — that prayer may be optional, yet when one prays several Torah-level limits apply to it, because of the love and fear of G‑d, etc. — you object that the obligations of love and fear apply at all times, not specifically in prayer. Here too it is not clear what the difficulty is, for not at every time and every hour does one stand before the Omnipresent, whereas during prayer one does. And just as this is in the soul, so it is in place: there is no obligation to go up and appear [in the Beis HaMikdash] (except on the three festivals, of course), yet when one goes up and appears, limits apply to him because of reverence for the Sanctuary, etc. The same is true regarding prayer, as in "these great halachos"^[2] on the matter that a drunk person may not pray: although we do not find that this is a Torah law,* it is understood that this applies when the matter is not done in a manner contrary to G‑d's honor — only that he became drunk, and the time for prayer arrived, and he wishes to pray; whereas if the matter were done in a manner of contempt and blasphemy, this is contrary to the fear of G‑d, which is a Torah law.

There is no end to optional matters in the manner of whose performance there are Torah obligations and prohibitions — as I wrote recently in a letter to someone, that it is possible that even according to the view that burial is not from the Torah, nevertheless "one does not bury a wicked person beside a righteous one" would be from the Torah.

And what you write regarding the time of prayer and the text of prayer, etc., is not connected with the love and fear of G‑d, etc., for what all the versions have in common is that they set forth the praise of the Omnipresent, etc.

With respect and blessing.

Publisher's notes

Printed in Likkutei Sichos, vol. 6, p. 323, and in full in Nesi'ei Chabad uVnei Doram, p. 171.

Rabbi Menashe: Klein, Brooklyn. Other letters to him — above, letter 4826, and the sources noted there.

Your letter of 24 Marcheshvan: printed in Nesi'ei Chabad uVnei Doram, p. 169.

*) According to the conclusion of the Talmud in Berachos (31b), "as if he worships idols," and in Eruvin (64a), that "his prayer is an abomination," it would seem one could say that this is a Torah prohibition. But the law of a drunk person in Berachos proves otherwise.

And see the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Orach Chaim, end of section 185.

Notes

[1] Linked to a verse (אסמכוה אקרא): an asmachta — a rabbinic law given a supporting allusion in a verse.

[2] "These great halachos" (הני הלכתא גברוותא): the laws of prayer learned from Chanah's prayer, Berachos 31a–b, including that a drunk person may not pray.

Summary

This letter continues a halachic exchange: views deriving a wife's support from the Torah imply the same for children, and the Rambam implies children's support is Torah law; an asmachta creates no new law; and even if prayer were optional, one who prays stands before G‑d and is bound by Torah duties of love and awe.