1331 —שליחת ספרים לספריה והערות על נושאים הלכתיים

B"H, 3 Teves, 5712.

Brooklyn, NY.

Haraha"g vavac"h iy"a nu"m chov"b etc. Mehor"m Rosen

Shalom u'Vrachah!

On behalf of the Rebbe shlita, I hereby gratefully acknowledge receipt of your book Nezer HaKodesh on Tractate Tamid. Surely you will also send your other works to the Rebbe shlita's library; thank you in advance.

Enclosed is a list of notes from the Rebbe shlita on certain matters in your aforementioned book.

By instruction of the Rebbe shlita, a copy of Sefer HaMaamarim 5700 is being sent to you, which you will surely find of great interest.

With honor and blessing.

Notes at the beginning (5a): You ask what is added by the Tanna stating "in three places"—why do we need this count? In my humble opinion it is simple: because this is the main law—that there must be guarding in three places as derived from Scripture. Afterwards you add that in the Second Temple this was in Beis Avtinas etc. (and seemingly this too is obvious: if guards were placed in three other locations, they would also fulfill guarding—does Scripture specify Beis Avtinas etc.?).

Furthermore: If the Mishnah had said "in Beis Avtinas etc. there must be guards," as you question, there would still remain uncertainty: a) How many places within Beis HaMoked itself did they station Kohanim as guards? b) If it is impossible to station a guard at one of the locations listed in the Mishnah—what is its status? c) What is the law regarding the First and Third Temples (as well as the Mishkan)? All this is resolved by what is written: "In three places Kohanim guard in the Beis HaMikdash" (and we find that Mishkan is also called Mikdash).

(15b) Regarding the law of teshuvah: You ask why Rambam omits "that which Torah says 'and you shall return'—to teach that it is a mitzvah to repent." In my humble opinion, Rambam himself avoids this in Hilchos Teshuvah (7:5), explaining there that this verse is a narrative and a promise to Israel that at the end of exile they will repent (and perhaps his reasoning is that this fits with the plain meaning of Scripture—a narrative about what will happen at the end of days). At the end (16a), you write that Torah does not command matters of the heart; and thus regarding fulfilling tashbitu chametz by mental intent—it is puzzling, for there are several mitzvos involving matters of the heart: unifying Him, loving Him, fearing Him, etc. See also Rambam Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos (14:12), which proves that an animal becomes sanctified through thought alone (not only does one become obligated to verbally sanctify and bring it as a donation). This differs from Rashi and Tosafos at beginning of chapter two of Me'ilah who write "when it was sanctified verbally." See also Sha'ar HaMelech Terumos 4:16; further discussion omitted here.

But what should be questioned here is: since all prophets commanded teshuvah; it is a condition for bringing a sin offering and for Yom Kippur atonement—how can it not be established as a mitzvah? And were I not hesitant since I have not found this explicitly stated so far in any work, it seems clear to me that there is indeed such a commandment in Torah—in Devarim (10:16): "Umaltem es orlas levavchem v'orefchem lo takshu od" (You shall circumcise your heart's foreskin and stiffen your neck no more)—meaning a command to remove spiritual insensitivity already present. The verse does not specify whether one has already sinned or not (i.e., whether it's teshuvah or prevention); thus both cases are included. It also explains why Rambam does not count teshuvah among mitzvos—for teshuvah encompasses all Torah commandments; such general commands are not counted individually, as he writes in Sefer HaMitzvos Shoresh Daled where he cites this same verse. See also R.Y.P. Perla's commentary on Sefer HaMitzvos by Saadya Gaon parsha 42 regarding challenges from various sugyos to Rambam's view that vidui (confession) is central to teshuvah; see also Zohar III 122a; Iggeres HaTeshuvah (by Admor Hazaken author of Shulchan Aruch) chapter 1; Sefer HaMitzvos by tzt"z on vidui and teshuvah; at its end 34b.

Regarding Nusach "LeChai Olamim": He did not explain sufficiently here so things are imprecise and open to error. There are three details: a) LeChai—with one yud or two? b) If with one yud—is it with patach or tzeirei? c) HaOlamim—with or without hei? The difference affects Birkas Shevach (Barchu), Yishtabach, Bnei Or veNer (prayer), and piyut Aderes VeEmunah. There are several opinions: a) Chok Natan at end of Tamid seems to equate them—to say everywhere Chai HaOlamim—even in Aderes VeEmunah. b) In Siman Raavad Gaon printed for Barchu/Yishtabach—Chai with one yud; for Bnei Or veNer—with two yuds; all with patach. c) In Siman Yaavetz rules for Barchu/Yishtabach/Bnei Or veNer—Chai HaOlamim with one yud/patach; but for Aderes VeEmunah—LeChai Olamim with patach. d) In Siman Admor Hazaken—in all these cases Chai HaOlamim with one yud/tzeirei; but for Aderes VeEmunah—LeChai Olamim; so writes Sefer Or Chadash. Magen Avraham OC 287 only clarifies for Bnei Or veNer (should be tzeirei); unclear his reasoning for Barchu/Yishtabach/Aderes VeEmunah; similar doubt exists regarding Gra's view. See also Abudraham, Birkei Yosef & Shaarei Teshuva OC 287; Iyun Tefillah Siman Otzar Hatefillos on Birkas Shevach; Ralatz's glosses on Mishnayos end of Tamid; and others.

Summary

The letter highlights gratitude for scholarly contributions sent to strengthen Torah libraries and shares deep halachic insights into guarding practices in the Temple, principles of teshuvah according to Rambam, and nuances in prayer wording—all encouraging careful study and precision.