Likkutei Sichos Vol. 30 – Mikeitz 2
1. “And they said to one another, ‘Indeed, we are guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the distress of his soul when he pleaded with us and we did not listen; therefore this distress has come upon us.’ And Reuven answered them, saying, ‘Did I not speak to you, saying, “Do not sin against the boy,” but you did not listen? And now, behold, his blood is being required [of us].’”
The commentators explain the meaning of “each man said to his brother” and Reuven’s response to this: According to the brothers, Yosef was liable for death according to Torah law [as they elaborate at length on the reasons for this]. Therefore, they emphasized in their words that “the main guilt is… that they did not listen to him when he pleaded with them…,” and they did not mention that they had sought to kill him, because they thought that regarding the intent to kill him, or to sell him, or to throw him into the pit, there was no guilt upon them. To this, Reuven responded: “Did I not say to you, ‘Do not sin against the boy’? Since he is like a child and is not yet subject to punishment in the heavenly court, he does not deserve the death penalty. Therefore, you are guilty of two sins: for the Holy One, blessed be He, will hold you accountable for the trait of cruelty… and in addition to this, also ‘his blood is being required [of you].’”
But this requires explanation: What benefit did Reuven seek to achieve by saying now that they are guilty not only of the sin of cruelty but also of the sin of “his blood is being required” (that their selling him is considered as if they had shed his blood)? Seemingly, since the brothers are already standing and confessing that they are guilty and are justifying the judgment upon themselves—what place is there to come now with words that add yet another sin to their guilt (and thus—their punishment is even more severe)?
After all, when someone finds himself in distress and anguish, G‑d forbid, which brings him to a broken heart and the recognition that he himself caused this through his actions, proper human conduct requires one to try to speak to his heart and comfort him, not the opposite—to add pain to his pain with words that increase the weight of his guilt. All the more so, this is not the appropriate conduct for Reuven, the firstborn of Israel, and toward his brothers!
2. At first glance, one might explain Reuven’s intent as follows: When the brothers expressed only an acknowledgment of their guilt as the reason for their distress and thus justified the judgment upon themselves, saying, “G‑d is faithful and there is no injustice; righteous and upright is He,” etc., and as they said, “Therefore this distress has come upon us”—Reuven came to add that it is not enough merely to justify the judgment for their distress, but they must also do teshuvah (repentance); that is, the distress that has come upon them is in order that they should return. In the language of the Rambam: “Among the ways of teshuvah is that when distress comes and they cry out over it and sound the shofar, everyone will know that it is because of their evil deeds that this has happened to them… and this will cause the removal of the distress from upon them.”
[One could say that this is also the precise wording of the verse, “And Reuven answered them, saying,” that Reuven’s intent here was to hint that they (the brothers) should “say”—to confess that they sinned against the boy (as if to say: Did I not tell you, “Do not sin against the boy…,” but you did not listen…; therefore you must “say” and confess that you sinned, and return in teshuvah)—for the fact that “this distress has come upon us” is in order that they should confess their sin and do teshuvah for it.]
Therefore, it was necessary to emphasize that “they have two sins”—not only “the trait of cruelty,” but also the very act of selling Yosef (“Do not sin against the boy… and now, behold, his blood is being required”)—so that they would repent for that sin as well.
However, this still does not fit with Reuven’s wording—if his intent was only to inform them that they sinned in their conduct (and therefore they must confess and repent), he could have said briefly: “Did you not sin against the boy, and now his blood is being required,” or something similar. What is the reason for the lengthy wording: “Did I not say to you, saying, ‘Do not sin against the boy,’ but you did not listen,” which seems as if he is coming to prove his own righteousness, that now it is clear he was correct in his words and they were the ones who sinned (by not listening to him)?
This is most puzzling: How is it possible that at the very moment when his brothers are saying, “Indeed, we are guilty…” and are justifying the judgment upon themselves, Reuven comes with a claim that emphasizes his own merit in contrast to his brothers’ sin?
3. The explanation of the matter may be as follows:
The intent of the brothers, too, in saying, “Indeed, we are guilty…” was not (only) to justify the judgment upon themselves (that this trouble has come upon them justly), but (primarily) it was an expression of teshuvah—repentance. And Reuven, in saying to them, “Did I not say to you, ‘Do not sin against the boy,’ but you did not listen,” intended to introduce and clarify the proper manner of teshuvah that was required of them.
This can be understood by first prefacing the words of the Rambam in Hilchos Teshuvah. After he explains in several chapters the details of teshuvah (who is obligated, its essence, its manner, its time, matters that prevent it, etc.), he continues (in chapter 5) that all of a person’s actions are in his free choice, beginning: “Permission is granted to every person—if he wishes to incline himself to the good path and be righteous, the choice is in his hands; and if he wishes to incline himself to the bad path and be wicked, the choice is in his hands.” He concludes (there, halachah 2): “And since this is so (‘that the Creator does not decree upon a person to be good or to be bad’), it follows that the sinner has brought loss upon himself. Therefore, it is fitting for him to weep and lament over his sins and over what he has done to his soul and the evil he has brought upon it. As it is written: ‘Why should a living man complain…’ And he repeated and said: Since our choice is in our hands and of our own will we have done all these evils, it is fitting for us to return in teshuvah and abandon our wickedness, for the choice is now in our hands. As it is written after it: ‘Let us search and examine our ways and return…’”
At first glance, this requires explanation: Why does the Rambam write about free choice (in Hilchos Teshuvah) at the end of Sefer HaMada, in which he writes about “all the mitzvos that are the foundation of the religion of Moshe Rabbeinu, of blessed memory”? After all, the matter of free choice is (in the Rambam’s words) “a great principle… it is the pillar of the Torah and the mitzvah”—meaning, it is a “principle” and a “pillar” of all of Torah and mitzvos (including also teshuvah)!
It can be explained that the connection between free choice and teshuvah is in their very essence. That is: The reason free choice is “a great principle” in the entire Torah is that, without the concept of choice, there could not be the concept of commandment, nor the concept of reward and punishment (as the Rambam explains there). However, the act of a mitzvah could still be possible. In contrast, with teshuvah, free choice is relevant to the very act of teshuvah itself—for if a person does not feel himself responsible for his actions, there is no place for (complete) regret over his improper deeds.
But it may be said that the Rambam is hinting here at something even deeper, as will be explained.
4. True teshuvah is when a person is aroused on his own to return to G‑d, and not because of some external cause that compelled (or at least caused) him to do teshuvah (such as doing teshuvah “out of fear” or “from weakness of strength”). For since the essence of teshuvah is that “He who knows the secrets of the heart will testify that he will never return to this sin again,” if there was an external cause for his teshuvah, there is no complete assurance “that he will never return to this sin again.”
Therefore, the Rambam elaborates here about the matter of free choice, for true teshuvah comes only from a person’s own free choice and “not out of fear and not from weakness of strength,” not from any external reason.
This is the precision in the Rambam’s wording: After he elaborates in two chapters (chapters 5 and 6) about the free choice of a person, he writes (at the beginning of chapter 7), “Since every person has permission, as we have explained, a person should strive to do teshuvah and confess with his mouth from his sins and shake his hands free from his sins, etc.” The reason he uses specifically this language here is because his intent is regarding the manner of teshuvah he began to explain (in chapter 5)—that it comes solely from a person’s own free choice. Therefore, “a person should strive to do teshuvah,” meaning, the matter of teshuvah must be the result of his own effort and will, his completely free choice (as above), that the person himself shakes his hands free from his sins. Certainly, it does not come because he was compelled (from Above) to do teshuvah.
5. This is also the explanation in our case—the statement of the brothers, “Indeed, we are guilty… therefore this trouble has come upon us,” and Reuven’s response, “Did I not say to you, ‘Do not sin…’ but you did not listen…”:
The statement of the brothers, “Indeed, we are guilty, etc.,” is certainly an act of teshuvah and a confession of sin. However, this teshuvah is a result of the trouble that has come upon them (as is also implied by the continuation of their words, “Indeed, we are guilty… therefore this trouble has come upon us”), and such an awakening of teshuvah does not serve as proof that they desire to do teshuvah and return from their sins out of their own free choice. It is straightforward that words of confession which a person says because of, and from within, a state of distress and suffering, do not (so much) reveal the inner will to do teshuvah; rather, the suffering “subdues a person’s heart.”
In other words: When teshuvah has an external cause (and certainly—when it comes as a result of trouble and suffering), and that is what arouses in him regret and teshuvah, then the teshuvah is not (entirely) attributed to the person himself. True teshuvah is specifically when it comes as a result of the person’s own free choice, when he chooses to return and draw close to G‑d. Then, it is entirely attributed to the person, for his teshuvah is with the intention to truly return to Him, blessed be He.
It can be said that this is what is meant by “And Reuven answered them, saying, ‘Did I not say to you, saying: Do not sin against the boy, but you did not listen…’”:
Reuven, who “initiated teshuvah first,” is therefore the one who taught them the path of true teshuvah. That is, teshuvah whose cause is the trouble that has come upon them is not the required teshuvah, and certainly it is not the true concept of teshuvah. Rather, they must remember and recognize what he (Reuven) had told them all along (“saying”), “Do not sin against the boy, but you did not listen”—meaning, they must return in teshuvah because of the very (seriousness of the) sin that he had explained to them at that time.
[It can be said that this is why he added, “And also, his blood—behold, it is required,” to hint that this trouble that has now come upon them is an additional matter, “and also (with a vav of addition) his blood—behold, it is required,” not as they said, “Indeed, we are guilty… therefore this trouble has come upon us,” where they seek to explain the cause of the trouble.]
6. It can be explained on a deeper level, by first analyzing the precise wording of the above-quoted Rambam: “And he went back and said: Since our free will is in our hands, and we did all these evils of our own knowledge, it is fitting for us to do teshuvah and abandon our wickedness, for the choice is now in our hands, as it is written afterwards, ‘Let us search and examine our ways and return…’” It can be said that his intent here is not only to bring proof and sources from the verses that Yirmiyahu (in Eicha) said for all that he wrote previously (as the simple reading of his words suggests)—but also to add an additional emphasis: not only is true teshuvah a matter of a person’s free choice, but at the time of teshuvah, one must also recognize that the sin itself was done by his own free choice. In the Rambam’s words: “And we did all these evils of our own knowledge.”
The explanation is as follows:
As long as a person has an excuse or justification, etc., to attribute (the cause of) his sin to them (even in the subtlest way)—even if he acknowledges that he is at fault, but he thinks that there were also other factors that influenced and led him (in some measure) to sin (whether due to his environment in general, or because of a particular situation or reason that happened to him, and therefore he could not have avoided the sin, and the like)—then his teshuvah is not true teshuvah, that he truly wants to abandon his wickedness and return to G‑d with a whole heart, since he does not have a clear recognition of his sin, that it was done knowingly, and that by his own will he abandoned G‑d.
Only when he has a clear recognition of his sin—“We did all these evils of our own knowledge”—can he truly return in teshuvah and abandon his wickedness. And specifically then, it is teshuvah by his own free choice, “for the choice is now in our hands,” such that this teshuvah is entirely the person’s own, that he himself is the one who abandons his wickedness and returns to G‑d truly and with a whole heart.
And as the Rambam brings as proof, “It is as written afterwards: ‘Let us search and examine our ways and return…’”—that the “return” comes through “let us search and examine our ways.” Then, even if at first it seemed to him that the sin was not entirely his own fault, he will see and recognize that in truth, “we did all these evils of our own knowledge.” For even if there were causes and factors that led to the sin, since even then he was given the strength to overcome those causes and obstacles, ultimately, the commission of the evils was by his own knowledge and by his own choice.
This is also the explanation of Reuven’s words, “Did I not speak to you, saying: Do not sin against the boy, but you did not listen?” In addition to the point that they must do teshuvah on their own initiative and not because of this trouble that has come upon them, there is also this: that the teshuvah must come from a clear recognition that (also) the sin was done knowingly and willingly—“I spoke to you, saying: Do not sin against the boy, but you did not listen.”
7. The explanation of the connection between these two concepts—free choice and teshuvah—on a deeper level:
It is well known what the Rambam writes here in Hilchos Teshuvah, that regarding the matter of free choice it is said, “Behold, the man has become like one of us.” The Alter Rebbe explains that this is because the root of free choice is “from a very lofty level,” for just as regarding the Holy One, blessed be He, “none can prevent Him,” so too is “the choice that was given to man, that there is no one who can prevent him.” That is: since “the second soul in Israel is a veritable part of G‑d above,” therefore he is “like one of us,” similar to the Holy One, blessed be He, so to speak. And just as with G‑d “none can prevent Him,” so too a person has free choice in his actions.
And the (main) revelation of this power of absolute free choice—where “none can prevent him”—is specifically in the service of teshuvah. For when a person is distant from G‑d, to the point that he has separated himself, G‑d forbid, from all matters of holiness, it would seem that his situation leaves no room or possibility for him (according to nature, etc.) to draw close to G‑d and to His Torah and mitzvos. Yet, because he possesses free choice, that “there is no one who can prevent him,” he is able to overcome and create within himself a new movement of drawing close to G‑d—the very opposite of his state in which he cast off the yoke of His sovereignty, may He be blessed.
This can be connected with the theme of Chanukah—which always falls (at least part of its days) during the week of Parshas Mikeitz—based on what is explained regarding the verse, “For a mitzvah is a lamp and Torah is light, and the way of life is the rebuke of discipline.” At first glance, “What is this ‘way of life’ aside from the Torah and mitzvos mentioned earlier in the verse?” Rather, “the way of life” refers to the service of teshuvah (which is the continuation, “and the way of life is the rebuke of discipline”), for through complete teshuvah from the depths of the heart, life is revealed from the innermost point of the soul (which is bound up with the Holy One, blessed be He, the Source of life).
This is also the idea of the Chanukah lights—that they are not only a matter of light alone, “a mitzvah is a lamp and Torah is light,” but they also possess the higher quality of “and the way of life is the rebuke of discipline.” For this is the essence of the miracle of Chanukah—the light that comes specifically out of darkness. After the wicked Greek kingdom prevailed and “defiled all the oils in the Sanctuary,” an intensification of darkness to the utmost, until “they abolished their religion and did not allow them to engage in Torah and mitzvos”—then “the sons of Chashmonei prevailed,” and stood with mesiras nefesh to fight against the mighty and the many, and they also inspired their generation to give up their lives for the sanctification of G‑d’s Name, not to transgress the faith under any circumstances. This strength came from the innermost point of their souls, that “none can prevent him”—and this inner dimension is the “way of life is the rebuke of discipline,” which is higher than “a mitzvah is a lamp and Torah is light.”
(From talks of Shabbos Parshas Mikeitz, 5741, and Shabbos Parshas Eikev, 5728)