Parshas Vayikra
1. At the end of the Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar (Hilchos Issurei Mizbeach), after the Rambam enumerates the kinds of oils that are fit for the Menorah1 and concludes, "אבל למנחות כולן כשירין" ("But for menachos [meal-offerings], they are all fit"), the Rambam continues in a separate halacha2:
"ומאחר שכולן כשרין למנחות למה נמנו כדי לידע יפה שאין למעלה ממנו והשוה והפחות שהרוצה לזכות עצמו יכוף יצרו הרע וירחיב ידו ויביא קרבנו מן היפה המשובח ביותר שבאותו המין שיביא ממנו. הרי נאמר בתורה והבל הביא גם הוא מבכורות צאנו ומחלביהן וישע ה׳ אל הבל ואל מנחתו. והוא הדין בכל דבר שהוא לשם הא-ל הטוב שיהי׳ מן הנאה והטוב. אם בנה בית תפלה יהי׳ נאה מבית ישיבתו. האכיל רעב יאכיל מן הטוב והמתוק שבשולחנו. כסה ערום יכסה מן היפה שבכסותו. הקדיש דבר יקדיש מן היפה שבנכסיו וכן הוא אומר כל חלב לה׳ וגו׳" ("Since they are all fit for menachos, why were they enumerated? In order to know which is the finest, above which there is none, and which is equal, and which is inferior — so that one who wishes to bring merit to himself should subdue his evil inclination, be generous, and bring his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy of the kind from which he brings. Behold, it says in the Torah: 'And Hevel also brought from the firstborn of his flock and from their fat3, and G‑d turned to Hevel and to his offering.' And the same applies to everything that is for the sake of the good G‑d — that it be of the beautiful and the good. If he builds a house of prayer, it should be more beautiful than his own dwelling. If he feeds the hungry, he should feed him from the good and sweet of his table. If he clothes the naked, he should clothe him from the finest of his clothing. If he consecrates something, he should consecrate from the finest of his possessions. And so it says: 'All the fat is to G‑d4,' etc."5).
This needs to be understood: The law that one must bring "מן המובחר" ("from the choicest") the Rambam already stated earlier, at the beginning of the chapter6: "לא כל דבר שאינו פסול מביא אותו לכתחילה כו׳ אלא כל שיביא לקרבן יביא מן המובחר" ("Not everything that is not disqualified may be brought lechatchilah [from the outset]… rather, whatever one brings as an offering, he should bring from the choicest"). And this is derived from the verse7 (as the Rambam already cited earlier in these laws8) "מבחר נדריך" ("the choicest of your vows") (nidreichem9). What, then, is the new law that the Rambam adds and innovates here, which (a) is derived from the fact that the levels and kinds of oils "were enumerated," (b) is connected with a person's will ("one who wishes to bring merit to himself"), and (c) for which he brings further proofs: "Behold, it says in the Torah: 'And Hevel brought…'" and "'All the fat is to G‑d,' etc."?
2. Simply, one could explain that in the matter of "from the choicest" with regard to offerings there are several levels, as is implied in the Rambam himself: There is the lower kind of "choice" that must be present in an offering10 — that without it, the animal is forbidden for the altar (even though it is not blemished).
This is similar to what the Rambam says in chapter 211: "ארבעה חוליים אחרים ([OCR unclear] לובן עינו, יבלת שאין בו שער, אם נגממו קרניו כו׳) אם נמצא אחד מהם בבהמה אין מקריבין אותה לפי שאינה מן המובחר והכתוב אומר מבחר נדריך" ("Four other ailments ([OCR unclear] the white of its eye, a wart that has no hair, if its horns were cut off, etc.) — if one of them is found in an animal, it is not offered, because it is not of the choicest, and the verse says, 'the choicest of your vows'")12.
Above this there is a kind of "choice" that excludes not only an animal in which one of these ailments or the like is found (which are forbidden for the altar13), but also (and primarily) a "שה כחוש וכעור" ("a lean and ugly lamb")14, which is not at all fine and good. That is, even if [only] the "choice" quality is lacking, one should not bring it lechatchilah. As the Rambam says at the beginning of chapter 7 (quoted above): "לא כל דבר שאינו פסול מביא אותו לכתחילה כיצד הי׳ חייב עולה לא יביא שה כחוש וכעור ויאמר הרי אין בו מום ועל זה נאמר וארור נוכל וגו׳ אלא כל שיביא לקרבן יביא מן המובחר" ("Not everything that is not disqualified may be brought lechatchilah. How so? If one was obligated to bring a burnt-offering, he should not bring a lean and ugly lamb and say, 'Behold, it has no blemish'; and concerning this it is said15, 'Cursed is the deceiver,' etc. Rather, whatever one brings as an offering, he should bring from the choicest")16.
(And as is also understood from the Rambam's words in the Laws of the Procedure of Offerings17: "מי שנדר שור או איל או כבש או עגל וכיוצא בהם לא יביא כחוש ביותר שבאותו המין כו׳ ואינו חייב להביא היפה השמן ביותר שאין שם למעלה ממנו אלא יביא הבינוני. ואם הביא הכחוש יצא ידי נדרו" ("One who vowed an ox, a ram, a sheep, a calf, or the like, should not bring the leanest of that kind…; but he is not obligated to bring the finest and fattest, above which there is none; rather, he should bring an average one. And if he brought the lean one, he has fulfilled his vow"). There, it speaks of a vow, and the Rambam does not state there at all that one should bring a fine and fat animal because of "the choicest of your vows.")
And at the end of the Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar, the Rambam introduces a new point: "הרוצה לזכות עצמו יכוף יצרו הרע וירחיב ידו ויביא קרבנו מן היפה המשובח ביותר" ("One who wishes to bring merit to himself should subdue his evil inclination, be generous, and bring his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy") — not merely one that is not lean and ugly, an average one, or even above average, but "the finest and most praiseworthy."
And the Rambam derives this not from "the choicest of your vows," but from the fact that the kinds of oils "were enumerated," and he brings in support of this "And Hevel also brought from the firstborn of his flock and from their fat" and "All the fat is to G‑d" — and specifically from this one derives "and the same applies to everything that is for the sake of the good G‑d — that it be of the beautiful and the good" (whereas the law of "the choicest of your vows" is a law specific to offerings).
So too is evident from the continuation of the Rambam's wording here: "Since they are all fit for menachos, why were they enumerated?" For seemingly this is not understood: The Rambam has already said in an earlier halacha18, "אע״פ שכולן כשרין למנחות הראשון אין למעלה ממנו ואחריו השני כו׳" ("Although they are all fit for menachos, the first has none above it, and after it the second, etc.") — so the reason "why they were enumerated" is self-evident. After all, the Rambam already cited the law of "the choicest of your vows" earlier; one must therefore know the levels of the oils in order to be able to fulfill "from the choicest"!
From this itself it necessarily follows that the obligation of "from the choicest" does not require knowing the levels19, because "from the choicest" excludes only "lean and ugly," but there is no obligation to bring the most praiseworthy.
Therefore the Rambam says "why were they enumerated," and the reason applies only to one who "wishes to bring merit to himself"20.
3. However, this needs to be understood:
Since the law in the Rambam is not connected specifically with offerings (unlike the law of "the choicest of your vows," which applies specifically to offerings, as mentioned above), but is a general law regarding everything connected with G‑d — in the Rambam's words, "everything that is for the sake of the good G‑d" (and as he brings examples of this) — why does the Rambam state it only here, in the Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar, and not earlier, in the Laws of Gifts to the Poor21 (in keeping with the example here itself, "האכיל רעב כו׳ כסה ערום כו׳" ("he feeds the hungry… he clothes the naked…")22) — as in the Shulchan Aruch, where the Rambam's law is copied in the Laws of Tzedakah23; or even earlier — in the Laws of Prayer (in keeping with the first example in the Rambam, "he builds a house of prayer…")?
Moreover: In the Laws of Prayer24, the Rambam brings several laws about the manner of building a synagogue — how it must be "גבוהה מכל חצרות העיר כו׳" ("higher than all the courtyards of the city…"). It would have been fitting to state there that "one who wishes to bring merit to himself" should build a house of prayer in such a way that "it be more beautiful than his own dwelling," and in continuation of this, to bring all the detailed laws included in the general obligation of "All the fat is to G‑d."
Also, the examples the Rambam brings for "everything that is for the sake of the good G‑d — that it be of the beautiful and the good" need to be understood: "he builds a house of prayer… he feeds the hungry… he clothes the naked… he consecrates something…." For seemingly:
The Gemara states25 the obligation of "התנאה לפניו במצות" ("Beautify yourself before Him in mitzvos") (which is derived from the verse26 "זה א-לי ואנוהו" ("This is my G‑d and I will glorify Him")), and brings the examples: "עשה לפניו סוכה נאה ולולב נאה ושופר נאה ציצית נאה ס״ת נאה כו׳ בדיו נאה בקולמוס נאה בלבלר אומן וכורכו בשיראין נאין" ("Make before Him a beautiful sukkah, a beautiful lulav, a beautiful shofar, beautiful tzitzis, a beautiful Sefer Torah… with fine ink, with a fine quill, by a skilled scribe, and wrap it in beautiful silks"). Why does the Rambam bring other27 examples here28?
4. The explanation of this may be said to be as follows:
As one learns at first glance, it turns out that the difference between the law in the Rambam at the end of the Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar and the law of "the choicest of your vows," which the Rambam discusses earlier, consists in this: "the choicest of your vows" is a law in the object (cheftza) ("your vows"); it pertains to the very sanctity of the offering, and therefore there may be no inferiority in it — not even (in appearance) lean and ugly — similar to "disgrace of holy things"29; whereas the law at the end of the Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar, "he should bring his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy," is not a law in the object of the offering, but a law in the person (gavra), as is precise in the Rambam's wording, "one who wishes to bring merit to himself should subdue his evil inclination…." Therefore it is also not a specific law regarding offerings, but a general law regarding "everything (that the person connects) that is for the sake of the good G‑d" — also regarding other mitzvos. It is an enhancement in the person's deed30, "one who wishes to bring merit to himself"31: that everything he does and brings for the sake of G‑d should be "of the beautiful and the good."
It may be said that the Rambam qualifies this by deriving the law from menachos ("Since they are all fit for menachos, why were they enumerated?") and by bringing the proof "Behold, it says in the Torah: 'And Hevel brought,' etc." Thereby he shows that "he should bring his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy" is connected with the definition of offerings (menachos), which pertains (not only to the person's deed, but also) to the object of the offering.
And this is emphasized in the proof, "Behold, it says in the Torah: 'And Hevel also brought from the firstborn of his flock and from their fat, and G‑d turned to Hevel and to his offering'": The Rambam does not suffice with the words "And Hevel also brought from the firstborn of his flock and from their fat," but also brings the continuation of the verse — and not only "and G‑d turned," etc., but also "to Hevel and to his offering." For thereby he emphasizes that bringing the offering "from the finest and most praiseworthy" is not merely a matter relating to the person's deed, but also pertains to the object of the offering: "G‑d turned" not only "to Hevel" (by virtue of his "subduing his inclination"), but also (and as a separate matter) "and to32 his offering."
5. The explanation of this:
[It lies in] the difference between the fulfillment of mitzvos and the matter of offerings (in general) in relation to the object:
The fulfillment of mitzvos is essentially an act of the person: the person fulfills G‑d's command that is upon him. But the fulfillment is carried out through the object. There are several levels in the effect that is accomplished in the object33: articles used for a mitzvah (tashmishei mitzvah), articles of holiness (tashmishei kedushah). All this, however, is not the intent of the person's deed. His concern is his fulfillment of the mitzvah; only, through the person's action, an effect is accomplished in the object (articles used for a mitzvah, articles of holiness, etc.).
With offerings, however34, the definition of the mitzvah is the sanctity of the offering itself — that is, his consecrating the thing and giving it away to G‑d. There is also, in this, his fulfillment of the mitzvah: he thereby fulfills the vow he took upon himself to bring an offering and the like, or he fulfills his mitzvah to bring the specific offering he is obligated to bring. Here, however, the main thing is not the person's fulfillment of the mitzvah, but chiefly the action in the object — offering a sacrifice to G‑d, giving away the animal, etc., to G‑d. The order in this is that first the person consecrates the animal, then he brings it to the Beis HaMikdash, etc., until it is offered (as the agent of the owner of the offering35) upon the altar.
Put more simply: in all mitzvos — even after the object with which one fulfills the mitzvah becomes an article used for a mitzvah and the like — it remains in the person's ownership. The thing36 that a Jew gives away to G‑d, and G‑d "takes" it from him, is in the offering of a sacrifice.
6. And this is the difference between the law of hiddur mitzvah (beautifying a mitzvah), which the Gemara derives from the verse "This is my G‑d and I will glorify Him," and the law in the Rambam, "he should bring his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy":
The law of hiddur mitzvah exists — like the mitzvah itself — not (so much) on account of the object, but on account of the person's fulfillment of the mitzvah, as in the Gemara's wording, "Beautify yourself before Him in mitzvos": that the mitzvah the person fulfills should be "and I will glorify Him," and consequently, "Make before Him a beautiful sukkah and a beautiful lulav, etc." Through the item with which he performs the mitzvah being beautiful, the person's fulfillment of the mitzvah is in a manner of "beautifying oneself before Him" — before G‑d.
With offerings, however, bringing offerings "from the finest and most praiseworthy" is not (merely) on account of the person's "beautifying oneself before Him"; on the contrary, it is a part and detail of the very definition of an offering to G‑d: that the offering to G‑d, which consists of sanctification and offering to G‑d (giving away to G‑d), be in completeness and with extra beauty37.
7. And this is the reason why the Rambam states this law only in the Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar — because the matter pertains to the definition of the "altar." Moreover: it pertains to the Laws of "(Things Forbidden on the) Altar" even more than (even) to the Laws of "the Procedure of Offerings":
The essence of the matter of an offering is an offering to G‑d. And although the person's action in this begins with his consecrating the offering, the main point and culmination of the offering is its being offered upon the altar. For then, when it becomes "the bread of the altar"38, there is "the eating of the altar"39, and it becomes part of the Supernal Table.
Therefore, the matter of "he should be generous and bring his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy," which expresses the completeness of giving to G‑d in an offering, pertains not so much to the very definition of "consecrated things," or to "the procedure of offerings" — in which all the details of the act of offering are included, not merely the detail of offering upon the altar — but rather to the Laws of "(Things Forbidden on the) Altar": the culmination and completion of the offering's sanctity, which is in its being brought upon the altar40.
8. This answers why the Rambam gives the examples of "he builds a house of prayer, etc." (that with them the same law of "it should be of the beautiful and the good" applies) — and not the examples in the Talmud:
Here, it does not speak of the definition of hiddur mitzvah, an enhancement in the item with which one performs the mitzvah, but of "everything that is for the sake of the good G‑d" — everything that is similar to an offering upon the altar, in that one gives it "for the sake of the good G‑d":
"He builds a house of prayer" — for G‑d41; and similarly, "he consecrates something" — its content is that he gives it for the sake of G‑d.
And similarly the two middle cases, "he feeds the hungry… he clothes the naked…": The Rogatchover42 explains that in tzedakah there are two categories — tzedakah "in the category of a mitzvah," and "tzedakah in the category of atonement." And this is the emphasis in the Rambam, "he feeds the hungry… he clothes the naked," because these matters of tzedakah are connected with "tzedakah in the category of atonement"43, as in the content of the verse44 "פרוס לרעב לחמך ועניים מרודים תביא בית כי תראה ערום וכסיתו" ("Break your bread for the hungry, and bring the moaning poor into your house; when you see a naked person, clothe him"), where the prophet speaks of the actions a Jew must do on a fast day45 for his teshuvah and his atonement (similar to offerings).
9. The explanation of the connection between the two aspects of the law "he should bring his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy" — (a) as a law in "(Things Forbidden on the) Altar," which is connected with the object of the offering (and its being offered upon the altar), and (b) the person's deed — "one who wishes to bring merit to himself should subdue his evil inclination and be generous…":
The culmination and completion of the offering's sanctity to G‑d, which is in its being offered upon the altar, is itself the cause of the acceptance46 and of the person's atonement that an offering accomplishes.
Therefore, the more "he should subdue his evil inclination, be generous, and bring his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy" is present in the person's giving to G‑d, the more this adds to the completeness of the person's atonement and acceptance47 (which the altar effects) — "to bring merit to himself." This is similar to how we find several types in the acceptance of an offering (connected with the person's intention): "it atoned" and "it did not atone"48; the difference between the acceptance of a sin-offering and the acceptance of a burnt-offering49; and more50.
— This is even better understood according to what is brought in the commentators, and especially in the Ramban on the Torah, regarding the reasons for the mitzvah of offerings:
The Ramban51 explains the reason why offerings atone: "שיחשוב האדם בעשותו כל אלה כי חטא לאלקיו בגופו ובנפשו וראוי לו שישפך דמו וישרף גופו לולא חסד הבורא שלקח ממנו תמורה . . דמו תחת דמו נפש תחת נפש" ("so that a person should think, as he does all these things, that he has sinned against his G‑d with his body and his soul, and it would be fitting that his blood be spilled and his body burned, were it not for the kindness of the Creator, Who took from him a substitute… its blood (of the offering) in place of his blood, a life in place of a life")52.
Since this is so, it is understood that "subduing his evil inclination" is not a side matter in offering a sacrifice upon the altar, or at most just another detail in the matter of the offering; rather, it is the entire definition of the offering — "he should subdue his evil inclination" — and in this consist the acceptance and the atonement of the offering.
10. Accordingly, one can explain the reason why the law of "he should subdue his inclination… and bring his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy" is derived specifically from the oils for menachos:
The content of the matter of an offering is53 that a Jew gives himself over to G‑d (through subduing his inclination, etc.). But when is this truly and completely so? When his giving himself over is entirely to G‑d, without calculations; and only then does it bring acceptance and atonement — a complete and total atonement.
And this is also the reason why it is derived specifically from the oils for menachos, similar to the saying of our Sages54 that specifically regarding the meal-offering it is written "ונפש כי תקריב" ("And when a soul offers") — "אמר הקב״ה מי דרכו להביא מנחה עני מעלה אני עליו כאילו הקריב נפשו לפני" ("The Holy One, blessed be He, said: Who usually brings a meal-offering? A poor person. I regard him as though he offered his soul before Me"). Specifically with the meal-offering — where he does not bring a fat and large ox, but the poorest of the poor of offerings — is there greater emphasis on "he offered his soul before Me." For in him there is no feeling that he is offering a sacrifice with beauty and completeness, that "he" is a "fine Jew" who brings an offering, and with beauty:
In him one senses true brokenness of heart, the subduing of the inclination to the point of slaughtering the inclination; and therefore it is "as though he offered his soul."
11. And through this manner of offering, in which "he subdues his evil inclination… and brings his offering from the finest and most praiseworthy," comes the conclusion and culmination of the Laws of "(Things Forbidden on the) Altar": after the beginning of the effects of the altar — "atonement of his soul"55, "atonement of what is bound" (bound and tied56) — the effect of the altar is drawn forth and accomplished in its completeness: "ונרצה לו לכפר עליו" ("and it shall be accepted for him, to atone for him") — "to atone before G‑d," bringing gratification to his Maker57, as our Sages say: "מזבח מזיח ומזין מחבב מכפר" ("The altar removes (evil decrees from Israel58), and sustains (the world is sustained58), endears (Israel to their Father58), atones (for sins)")59.
And when the cause of the destruction and exile — sins ("our sins") — is nullified, immediately and automatically the effect — "we were exiled from our land" — is nullified, and "they are redeemed immediately"60 through Moshiach Tzidkeinu,
who "will build the Sanctuary in its place"61, and in particular the altar62, "whose place is most exact"63;
and "will gather the dispersed of Israel"61 — speedily in our days, mamash.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Savo 5745)
Notes
1) Ch. 7, halachos 8–10.
2) Halacha [OCR unclear].
3) Bereishis 4:4.
4) Our parsha, 3:16.
5) In the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, [OCR unclear] 248, the Rambam's wording is copied (except for its opening, "Since… inferior," and "and bring his offering… and the same applies"), though with variations ([OCR unclear] in manuscripts) — and this was explained at the farbrengen.
6) Beginning of ch. 7.
7) Re'eh 12:11.
8) Ch. 2, halacha 8.
9) This is seemingly how it should read, as in the verse.
10) In addition to the law of "choice" that the Rambam states at the beginning of these laws (beginning of ch. 1), which one can say is a detail of [the requirement that offerings be] unblemished — as is understood from the fact that he included them together: "It is a positive commandment that all offerings be unblemished and choice, as it says, 'It shall be unblemished to be accepted' [OCR unclear]" (and similarly at the beginning of ch. 7 there); or that it is a separate matter — see Likkutei Sichos vol. 2, p. 130, in the notes. This is not the place to elaborate.
11) Halacha 8.
12) But "the old… the sick when it trembles because of its illness and the failing of its strength" — this is a blemish (and not merely "not of the choicest") — Rambam, Laws of Entering the Sanctuary, ch. 6, halacha 2.
13) See ch. 3, halacha 11, of the Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar: "Thus all those forbidden for the altar are fourteen, and these are they: a blemished animal, and one that is not of the choicest, etc." However, in ch. 2 there, [OCR unclear]: "And if he offered them, it appears to me that they are accepted." And note the Kiryas Sefer (by the Mabit) there, that "'the choicest of your vows,' which is written, is a mitzvah, not a disqualification." Accordingly, it would seemingly not be a different category from what is written [OCR unclear] there. See below, note 16. This requires further study.
14) On the definition of "lean" with regard to consecrated animals — see Tziyunim LaTorah (by Rabbi Yoel Engel), principle 13; Tzafnas Pa'neach (compiled edition), Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar, beginning of ch. 6, and the sources cited there; Likkutei Sichos vol. 2, ibid.
15) Malachi 1:14.
16) The Kiryas Sefer on the Rambam, Laws of Unintentional Sins, ch. 2, halacha 15, writes (that the Rambam interprets [the phrase] in the Gemara (Menachos 64a), "it was found lean in its innards," to mean that it was found to be treifah in its innards) "and it uses [the term] 'lean' because a lean animal is also disqualified, on account of 'Offer it, now, to your governor,' wherever there is a fat one available" (and as in Rashi there, s.v. "Afilu nimtzeis"). And in the Rambam, Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar, ch. 2, halacha [OCR unclear], he writes the reason of "Offer it, now, to your governor" with regard to the forbidden treifos. See Tzafnas Pa'neach (compiled edition) ibid., as cited in note 14.
17) Ch. 16, halacha 14.
18) Halacha 9.
19) But see Menachos [OCR unclear], in Rashi (manuscript), s.v. "Shavin lamenachos." See also the following note.
20) Also with regard to oils for menachos — see the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah (Menachos, Mishnah ibid., side a): "That is to say, they are equal for menachos, and there is no advantage of one over another except for one who wishes the mitzvah in the choicest manner." From the plain continuation of his wording it is implied* that even among those that are "equal for menachos" there is "an advantage of one over another… for one who wishes the mitzvah in the choicest manner"** ("equal" meaning in their fitness, and also with regard to the law of "the choicest of your vows"). And what he concludes, "But one who wishes the beautiful and the good — their superiority in quality is already known" — he means according to their order in the Mishnah, where the second of the first [grade] precedes the first of the second (and similarly with the rest). See the wording of Rashi and [OCR unclear] there, beginning of side b. And note that Sefer HaYad [the Mishneh Torah] enumerates them in ordinal numbers (and not as in the Mishnah) — from 1 to 9.
Accordingly, the addition in Sefer HaYad here [OCR unclear], relative to halacha 9, is all the more understandable: Halacha 9 deals only with the law of "the choicest of your vows," and in this there is no practical difference regarding the superiority among the equal oils themselves; and to this he adds in halacha 11 that "one who wishes to bring merit to himself… and bring… from the finest and most praiseworthy" — even among the equal oils themselves.
*) See the Kafich translation there. Seemingly there is a printing error there, and the word "except" is missing.
**) See similarly [OCR unclear] on the Rambam there, who explains thus according to the view of Tosafos (there, side b, s.v. "Shavin lamenachos") — except that according to his interpretation, the first of the second [grade] is choicer than the second of the first also with regard to menachos (as with the Menorah). And note the Rosh cited in the Lechem Mishneh there.
21) In ch. 7 or ch. 8.
22) As in ch. 7, halacha 7, of the Laws of Gifts to the Poor.
23) Yoreh De'ah, siman 248.
24) Ch. 11, halacha 2.
25) Shabbos 133b, and the sources cited there.
26) Beshalach 15:2.
27) The above matters are not cited in the Rambam's book (and in general, he does not cite the exposition of "This is my G‑d and I will glorify Him — beautify yourself before Him in mitzvos"). However, the Ein Mishpat refers to two places in the Rambam — Laws of Sefer Torah, ch. 7, halacha 4, and ch. 7 of the Laws of Lulav, halacha 6 — and this requires study:
In the Laws of Sefer Torah there, he writes "he writes in the most beautiful, proper script," but seemingly this is not based on the Gemara's exposition there, as is evident from the fact that he does not cite the rest (also) regarding a Sefer Torah (though the Kesef Mishneh there refers to the Gemara and also copies the rest). And in the Laws of Lulav there, the Rambam writes, "It is the choicest manner of the mitzvah to bind the lulav, hadas and aravah and make the three of them one bundle." Seemingly this, too, is not the matter of "a beautiful lulav" in the Gemara there, whose plain meaning is that the lulav itself be beautiful. However, regarding binding the lulav, too, it is stated in the Gemara (Sukkah 11b) that the mitzvah is because it says "This is my G‑d and I will glorify Him" (cited in the Maggid Mishneh and Hagahos Maimoniyos there). See Encyclopedia Talmudis, s.v. Hiddur Mitzvah (p. 276).
28) Seemingly it may be said (as written by the later authorities; but see Shaagas Aryeh, siman 50) that the Rambam holds that the halacha does not follow this Tanna in the Gemara, who interprets "This is my G‑d and I will glorify Him" as "beautify yourself before Him in mitzvos," but rather Abba Shaul in the Gemara there, that "'Ve'anvehu' means 'be like Him: just as He is gracious and compassionate, so should you be, etc.'" — which the Rambam does cite (Laws of Character Traits, ch. 1, halacha 6), though not from the verse "Ve'anvehu"; or like the view of Rabbi Yosei ben Dormaskis in the Mechilta, Beshalach there, who interprets: "I will make before Him a beautiful Sanctuary, and 'naveh' means only the Beis HaMikdash, etc." — which, too, the Rambam cites in the Laws of the Chosen House, ch. 1, halacha 11 (though there, too, he does not cite the verse "Ve'anvehu"). This requires further study. This is not the place to elaborate.
29) See the beginning of the Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar, [OCR unclear].
30) Note (even more so) the Ritva, Shevuos (16a, s.v. "Ela gedolos"), that the law of "the choicest of your vows" (and the other expositions regarding an offering being of the choicest) is "because there is a mitzvah to do it of the choicest, so that the offering be important in his eyes, as we say elsewhere, 'Beautify yourself before Him in mitzvos,' so that mitzvos should not be lowly to him, etc." (and see the wording of the Ramban there). This is also implied in the Shaagas Aryeh, siman 50.
31) Therefore, specifically here it must be "more beautiful than his own dwelling," and similarly with the rest, that it must be from the finest that he has. For this pertains only to "to bring merit to himself, he should subdue his evil inclination," and not to the offering itself, etc. And note the Rambam's wording in the Laws of the Chosen House there: "And they glorify it and beautify it according to their ability; if they are able to plate it with gold and to enhance its workmanship, this is a mitzvah."
32) This is why "and to" is stated [OCR unclear] (similar to "al al," which separates the matter — Moed Katan 26a).
33) See Megillah 26b; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, siman 154; Yoreh De'ah, siman 282. See also the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, siman 42, se'if 6.
34) It may be said that something similar applies to the writing of a Sefer Torah, the essence of which is that he sanctifies it through his writing, and especially the Divine Names in it, as is plainly understood. Accordingly, the Rambam's words in the Laws of Sefer Torah there are better understood.
35) See Kiddushin 23b and Tosafos there, and the sources cited there.
36) Note the discussion (Mefane'ach Tzefunos, ch. 1, [OCR unclear], and the sources cited there) whether a Sefer Torah has ownership of its substance, like any other object belonging to its owner, or only kinyan hato'ar, since the reading is a holy matter and belongs to the Above, and "wherever it is, it is in the treasury of the Merciful One" (and see there, where he distinguishes between the Sefer Torah of an individual and that of the public).
37) Accordingly, one can add an explanation of the difference regarding the law of hiddur mitzvah: with circumcision, for shreds that do not invalidate the circumcision, one does not go back for them after he has removed his hand (Shabbos 133b, and Rashi there), whereas when one slaughtered a lean animal on Shabbos, he must go back and slaughter the fat one (Menachos 64a) — see Encyclopedia Talmudis ibid. (p. 278), and the sources cited there.
38) See Zevachim 83, beginning of side b; Rambam, Laws of Disqualified Consecrated Offerings, ch. 3, halacha 12; and Rashi there, side a, on the Mishnah: "'The altar sanctifies' — even a disqualified thing that went up on the altar, the altar sanctified it to become its bread, etc."
39) Zevachim 13b, and the sources cited there. Toras Kohanim, Tzav 7:18.
40) Note the kal vachomer in the Mishnah, Menachos [OCR unclear], end of side a: "By right, all the menachos should require pure olive oil: if the Menorah, which is not for eating, etc., then menachos, which are for eating, should they not all the more require pure olive oil?" And in Rashi (manuscript) there: "which are for eating — the eating of the altar."
41) Unlike the fact that in building the Beis HaMikdash "they glorify it and beautify it, etc." (Laws of the Chosen House there), which is not only in order "to bring merit to himself, etc.," but because "this is a mitzvah" (Laws of the Chosen House there). This is not the place to elaborate.
42) Cited in Tzafnas Pa'neach HaMefuanach on Sefer Avodah, Laws of Things Forbidden on the Altar, here (although there he explains the Rambam's words here in the opposite way).
43) Unlike [what follows] from the category of the mitzvah of tzedakah — "a naked person… if they knew him, they clothe him in keeping with his dignity" (Rambam, Laws of Gifts to the Poor, ch. 7, halacha 6), and the law (the enhancement) that he should clothe him "from the finest of his (the giver's) clothing" is not cited there.
44) Yeshayahu 58:7.
45) As in the verses there before it.
46) Note Rashi on our parsha, 2:2, s.v. "Azkarasah."
47) Note Rashi (s.v. "Utzrichi") — Yoma 34, beginning of side b; 70, end of side b.
48) See Zevachim 6a ff.
49) Ibid. 7, end of side a, ff.
50) See Likkutei Sichos vol. 2, p. 13ff.
51) Our parsha, 1:9. See also the Shelah, Maseches Ta'anis (211b), [citing] the Recanati.
52) See also above, p. 6ff., and elsewhere.
53) As is known, the interpretation of "אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן לה'" ("When a man among you brings an offering to G‑d") — [that he brings an offering] "of you" (Kuntres Limmud HaChassidus, ch. 2; the maamar "Ushe'altem" 5701 (in Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim, vol. 2), ch. 3; Basi LeGani 5718, ch. 2; and elsewhere. See also Likkutei Torah on our parsha, the maamar "Adam ki yakriv," and its explanation).
54) Menachos 104b. Cited in Rashi on our parsha, 2:1.
55) Iggeres HaTeshuvah, beginning of ch. 2.
56) Tanya, ch. 7.
57) Kesubos 10, end of side b.
58) Rashi there.
59) Atonement that comes after (out of) endearment — "and it shall be accepted."
60) Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah, ch. 7, halacha 5.
61) Rambam, Laws of Kings, beginning of ch. [OCR unclear], and its end.
62) See Zevachim 62a. This is not the place to elaborate.
63) Rambam, Laws of the Chosen House, beginning of ch. 2. See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 8, [p.] 362, in the note; vol. 24, p. 652, in the note; vol. 30, p. 70.
Key Lesson
Giving to G‑d from the finest one has is not merely an added beautification of a mitzvah; it is the very essence of offering oneself to G‑d, as with a korban on the altar. The more a person subdues his evil inclination and gives wholeheartedly, without calculations, the more complete his atonement and acceptance before G‑d, hastening the Redemption.