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Likkutei Sichos Vol. 22 – Kedoshim 1

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Parshas Kedoshim

1. On the verse1 "וכי תבואו אל הארץ ונטעתם גו' וערלתם גו' פריו שלש שנים יהי' לכם ערלים לא יאכל" ("When you come into the land and plant… you shall treat its fruit as forbidden…; for three years they shall be forbidden to you; it shall not be eaten"), Rashi comments on the words "שלש שנים יהי' לכם ערלים" ("For three years they shall be forbidden to you") and explains: "מאימתי מונה לו משעת נטיעתו" ("From when does one count for it? From the time of its planting").

The commentators2 learn that Rashi thereby means to rule out that the count of the "three years" is "משעה שעושה פרי" ("from the time it produces fruit"); rather, it is "from the time of its planting." And this is derived from the word "ונטעתם" ("and you shall plant")3 — "to say that one counts from the time of planting."

This needs to be understood:

a) If the entire proof that "one counts from the time of its planting" comes from the word "and you shall plant"4 — then Rashi should have cited (also) that word in the dibbur hamaschil (the heading words)?

The question is even stronger: the source of this explanation is Toras Kohanim5, and there the derivation is indeed brought (in continuation of the derashos) on "ונטעתם גו'" ("and you shall plant…") — yet Rashi departs from Toras Kohanim and brings it on the words "For three years they shall be forbidden to you"6, and does not mention the word "and you shall plant" at all.

b) Without the word "and you shall plant" — how does one know, in the plain meaning of the verse, that this is from the time of its planting, and not "its fruit… three years" — three years of the fruit growing*?

c) Why is Rashi so lengthy, both in his citation of the verse7 and in his wording "From when does one count for it"? He should have said briefly: "'Three years' — [OCR unclear]

[Even though this is the wording in Toras Kohanim — nevertheless (as has been discussed many times) it is not Rashi's purpose in his commentary on the Torah to cite the derashos of our Sages in their own wording; rather, he explains pshuto shel mikra, the plain meaning of Scripture. That is why Rashi often alters (and certainly — omits) the wording of our Sages, in keeping with the explanation of the verse according to its plain meaning.]

2. The explanation of this:

What simply troubles Rashi here is the lengthy wording of the verse "For three years they shall be forbidden to you": it already says earlier "וערלתם ערלתו את פריו" ("you shall treat its fruit as forbidden"); why, then, does the verse repeat once again the words "they shall be forbidden to you," and not say briefly: "you shall treat its fruit as forbidden [OCR unclear]

From this Rashi derives that in orlah there are two matters: (a) the prohibition of orlah upon (the tree and) the fruits (the "cheftza," the object) — "you shall treat its fruit as forbidden," and in Rashi's words8: "יהא אטום ונסתם מליהנות ממנו" ("it shall be blocked and closed off from deriving benefit from it"); (b) the count of the "three years" — a law concerning the person (the "gavra") — "(For three years) they shall be forbidden to you"9.

And this is what Rashi means with his lengthy wording "From when does one count for it? From the time of its planting": it must be "one counts for it" — the person counts the "three years"; and since the count is "to you," it stands to reason that the "three years" are reckoned (not from when the tree produces fruit, but) from the action of the person (the gavra) — "and you shall plant"10 — from when he planted the tree.

And accordingly a further practical difference emerges: since "one counts from the time of its planting" because the count must be "to you," it must follow that the three years (from planting) are reckoned not according to the tree, but according to the person ("to you").

The difference between the two approaches — whether one reckons the "three years" according to the "tree" or according to the person's planting — arises in a case where one plants a branch of a tree that is already "three years" old:

If one were to reckon according to the tree, there would be room to say that since the branch has already passed through the years of orlah, the fruits that grow from this branch are permitted immediately;

If, however, one reckons the "three years" according to the person who plants — "to you" — it must follow that one has to begin counting "three years" anew from when the person made his (new) planting.

[Accordingly, Rashi's approach in his commentary on the Torah — according to pshat — accords with the halachic portion of the Torah, where the law is that "אחד הנוטע ואחד המבריך כו'" ("both one who plants and one who layers [a branch] etc.")11 is obligated in orlah12.]

3. Based on this, one will also understand another matter in this commentary of Rashi:

After the words "From when does one count for it? From the time of its planting," Rashi continues — in the same dibbur hamaschil — "יכול אם הצניעו לאחר שלש שנים יהא מותר ת"ל יהי' בהוייתו יהא" ("One might think that if he stored it away until after three years it would be permitted; therefore the Torah says 'they shall be' — in its existing state it shall be").

This needs to be understood: the two matters in Rashi's commentary — (a) "one counts from the time of its planting," (b) "One might think that if he stored it away etc." — seemingly have no connection with each other: "From when does one count etc." is an explanation of the words "three years"13, and "One might think that if he stored it away etc." — of the words "they shall be forbidden to you";

So Rashi should have divided the two matters into two separate dibburei hamaschil (as is his way in many places) — why does Rashi bring them as one continuous comment in the same dibbur hamaschil14?

The question is even stronger: the source of this matter too ("One might think that if he stored it away etc.") in Rashi's commentary is Toras Kohanim15, but there it indeed does not come in continuation of the derivation "From when does one count etc."16; rather, it is a derivation in its own right — so why does Rashi depart from Toras Kohanim and join the two derivations together?

4. According to the above (section 2), this is simply understood:

Since the verse emphasizes "they shall be forbidden to you" — that it is a law in the "gavra" (as above)17 — one could think that this is not only in connection with the detail of "three years" (that the count must be "to you," as above), but that the entire prohibition of orlah is only "to you," that it is an issur gavra (a prohibition upon the person),

(and the words "they shall be forbidden to you" are not an addition to the words "you shall treat its fruit as forbidden" (and a law only regarding the count of three years); rather, they are the explanation and interpretation of "you shall treat its fruit as forbidden" — that it means only "they shall be forbidden to you," a prohibition upon the person):

And if one were to assume that the prohibition of orlah does not take effect upon the fruits themselves (but is only a prohibition upon the person not to eat the fruits during the first three years) — there is room to say that after the three years the prohibition of orlah no longer exists, not even upon the fruits that grew during the three years of orlah.

One would have learned that orlah is an issur gavra ("they shall be forbidden to you") dependent on time ("three years")18 — like the prohibition of eating chametz on Pesach19 and the like — for a certain time the person may not eat it20; and consequently, "if he stored it away until after three years," it is permitted (since the time of its prohibition has already passed).

So one learns from the word "יהי'" ("they shall be") — "בהוייתו יהא" ("in its existing state it shall be") — that the prohibition of orlah remains permanently upon the fruits, even after the three years21.

5. The inner reason for the difference between issurei gavra and issurei cheftza — that is, that it depends on where the vitality (chayus) of the forbidden thing comes from:

Issurei cheftza (where the object itself is forbidden) are when the object receives a forbidden vitality, from the three completely impure kelipos22, which cannot be elevated into holiness; therefore it is an object of prohibition and is forbidden forever;

Issurei gavra are when the thing receives an ordinary vitality, from kelipas nogah22, which can be elevated into holiness; therefore it is a permitted object (only the person may not eat it, and the like).

And the fruits of orlah are an issur cheftza (as explained above at length) — because their vitality is from the three impure kelipos (as the Alter Rebbe states in Tanya23).

This, however, still requires explanation: since the tree itself is a permitted thing24, and the fruits draw their vitality from the tree — how can it be that the tree itself is a permitted thing, while the fruits that come forth from it are an object of prohibition?

If the fruits were always forbidden, one could still explain that this particular part of the vitality25 of the tree, from which the fruits draw their vitality, is from the three impure kelipos:

But since after three years the fruits are permitted, it follows that the part (of the vitality) of the tree, too, is not from the three impure kelipos — so how do the fruits become an issur cheftza?

6. This will be understood by first explaining the wording of the Alter Rebbe in Tanya26 concerning "מאכלות אסורות מהצומח כמו ערלה וכלאי הכרם כו'" ("forbidden foods from the vegetable kingdom, such as orlah and kilayim of the vineyard etc.") — that their "קיום וחיות" ("sustenance and vitality") is from the three impure kelipos. The Rebbe (Rashab) nishmaso Eden27 notes precisely that "regarding orlah and kilayim of the vineyard he did not say 'וקיום גופם' ('and the sustenance of their body')" — unlike earlier, regarding "בעלי חיים הטמאים ואסורים באכילה" ("impure animals that are forbidden to be eaten"), where the Alter Rebbe says that (not only their "souls," but) also "the sustenance of their body" is from the three impure kelipos — and he explains: "שהרי גופם טהור כו'" ("for their body [of orlah etc.] is pure etc.").

Seemingly this is not understood: the fruits of orlah are forbidden forever — so "the sustenance of the body" of the fruits should be from the three impure kelipos; and if [it is not] because the fruits come from the tree, which is a permitted thing — then the vitality of the fruits, too, is from (and through) the tree?

The explanation of this is: the difference between "the sustenance of their body" and "sustenance and vitality" is:

The body and physical matter of a created being was created only once, and afterward one only sustains the existence that was there before; therefore a change from time to time, of its own accord28, does not apply to it (that the place from which "the sustenance of their body" comes should change):

By contrast, the vitality of the vegetable and the inanimate is continually renewed afresh (as explained in several places29 on the meaning of "המחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית" ("Who in His goodness renews each day, continually, the work of Creation"), that "each day" a new vitality is drawn down), and therefore a change can occur in the vitality.

And this is also the explanation regarding the prohibition of orlah: the body and physical matter of the tree, which is a pure thing — remains pure, because no change can occur in it (relative to how it was before):

Whereas the vitality and power with which the tree brings forth the fruits and from which they draw (from the tree) — during the three years of orlah it is a vitality from the three impure kelipos30 — and because of this the fruits become an issur cheftza31 (and are forbidden forever);

And afterward there is bestowed and drawn into the tree30 a new vitality32, so that its fruits (in the fourth year) are not only pure and permitted, but on the contrary — "קודש הלולים לה'" ("holy, for praising G‑d")33.

(From the sichos of Acharon shel Pesach and Shabbos Parshas Kedoshim 5736)


Notes

1) Our parsha, 19:23.

2) Re'em, Gur Aryeh, and others.

3) Gur Aryeh; Be'er Mayim Chaim (by the brother of the Maharal); Devek Tov; and others. And so it is in Korban Aharon on Toras Kohanim here.

4) And see the commentary Maskil LeDavid here (that this is derived from the fact that it does not say "until three years etc."; see there).

5) On the verse.

6) This change in Rashi's commentary can be explained simply: he comes to explain the count of "three years." But it is still not understood (as in the text).

7) The fact that Rashi also cited in the dibbur hamaschil the words "they shall be forbidden to you" refers simply to the continuation in Rashi's commentary, "One might think etc.; therefore the Torah says 'they shall be' etc." But see below in the text, section 2.

*) In the second printing (and in one of the manuscripts of Rashi in my possession) the dibbur hamaschil is "Three years."

8) Here (and see the following note). And in Ibn Ezra here: "that that fruit is considered like orlah, which is מוקח [?] etc." And note the Targum Onkelos here: "ותרחקון רחקא" ("you shall keep it far away"), and Targum Yonasan ben Uziel: "ותגזרון גזרא" ("you shall make a decree") — which emphasize the action of the person. And see below in the text, section 4.

9) But note Rashi earlier (Va'eira 6:12): "'וערלתם ערלתו' — make for it a blockage and covering of prohibition that will separate it from being eaten. 'שלש שנים יהי' לכם ערלים' — blocked, covered and separated from being eaten." This implies that "you shall treat its fruit as forbidden etc." (make for it a blockage etc.) is a matter of the gavra, and "For three years they shall be forbidden to you" ("blocked etc.") is a matter of the cheftza.

10) Although according to halachah planting by a person is not required, since even if it grew on its own it is obligated in orlah (Orlah 1:3) — the verse speaks of the usual case: "and you shall plant." And one may say that according to pshat planting by a person is specifically required, as in the wording "and you shall plant." And see Toras Kohanim here: "'And you shall plant' — excluding that which grows on its own" (and regarding the halachah, see the commentators on Orlah there; Yerushalmi there 1:1 and 2; Rambam, Hilchos Maaser Sheni veNeta Revai 10:5–6; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, end of siman 294; and elsewhere).

11) Rosh Hashanah 9, end of side b, and Tosafos there, s.v. Markiv. Rambam there, halachah 14. Tur and Shulchan Aruch there, se'if 16.

12) And also according to the derashah of Toras Kohanim here, "'And you shall plant' — excluding one who grafts and one who layers" — see Tosafos (and others) on Rosh Hashanah there, that it speaks of a case where [the branch] was not severed from the old tree etc. And see Orlah 1:5 and the commentators there; Yerushalmi there 1:3; Rambam and Tur and Shulchan Aruch there, and וג"כ [?]; and elsewhere.

And also according to what the Ramban writes (cited in brief by the Ran) on Rosh Hashanah there, that according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov (Sotah 43b) one who layers and one who grafts are excluded from orlah (and see Malbim here) — the reason for this is not because one counts according to the tree, but because this is not the manner of planting.

13) And also according to what was explained above in the text, that this explanation ("From when etc.") also pertains to the words "they shall be forbidden to you" — Rashi should have cited these words again and explained "One might think etc.; therefore the Torah says 'they shall be' etc." (as is his way in many places; for example, in our parsha above, 19:3).

14) See the answer given in Maskil LeDavid here. And see note 18.

15) On the verse (with a change of wording).

16) And another derashah interrupts between them.

17) See note 8 above.

18) Based on this, an explanation is also added [?: printed יחוסף] to the answer of the Sifsei Chachamim here (in the name of the Nachalas Yaakov).

19) See Tzafnas Pane'ach on Rambam, Hilchos Chametz uMatzah 1:6, that this is the reason of the view (Pesachim 28, beginning of side b; ibid. 29a) that chametz over which Pesach has passed is forbidden only rabbinically. And according to the view (ibid. 28, end of side a) that it is forbidden by Torah law, this is because "he holds that the obligation lies in the thing and not in the time," for "chametz is a prohibition in itself" that it is forbidden to eat it on Pesach.

20) See at length Asvan D'Oraysa (Klal 10) and Beis HaOtzar (Os Alef, Klal 125) — by Rabbi Yosef Engel — who discuss at length, regarding various prohibitions and categories, whether they are an issur cheftza or an issur gavra. This was explained at length at the farbrengen.

21) Similar to chametz over which Pesach has passed, according to the view that it is forbidden by Torah law (see note 19).

And note the wording of the Alter Rebbe in his Shulchan Aruch (Hilchos Pesach, end of siman 447, se'if 45): "ועכשיו הוא כחתיכת נבילה" ("and now it is like a piece of neveilah"). For seemingly, the Alter Rebbe's intent there is to explain how no change occurs in the name "chametz" when the time of its prohibition arrives, since also before Pesach "its name was chametz." If so, the above words ("for until now the Torah did not forbid it, and now it is like a piece of neveilah" — and not "and now it has become forbidden," or the like) are an emphasis to the contrary? This implies that he holds that chametz during Pesach is an issur cheftza (even though chametz over which Pesach has passed is forbidden only rabbinically — ibid., beginning of siman 448). This requires further study.

22) See Tanya, end of ch. 6 and onward (from Etz Chaim, Shaar 49).

23) Ibid. (from Etz Chaim, ibid., ch. 6). Ibid., beginning of ch. 36 [?: printed רפל"ו]. And see the sources cited in note 30.

24) See Orlah 1:7; Toras Kohanim here.

25) Note the beginning of tractate Orlah: "R. [printed ר"א] [?] said: even if he said the inner [part] is for food and the outer is to fence in the inner, the inner is obligated and the outer is exempt."

26) End of ch. 6.

27) Kitzurim VeHe'aros LeTanya, p. 115.

28) Except when a person makes it into an asheirah and the like. And this requires further study regarding kilayim of the vineyard. And note Rambam, Hilchos Maachalos Asuros (10:6): "whether they grew by themselves . . they are forbidden."

29) See at length the maamarim of Chag HaShavuos 5665 and 5700.

30) See Likkutei Torah on our parsha, maamar Vechi Savo'u, ch. 2; Or HaTorah on the verse; and sources cited there.

31) Even though "their body is pure" (like the tree). Moreover — the tree itself (including the vitality within it) is pure, for the body of the fruits pertains to the body of the tree (also regarding permission and prohibition), and not to the vitality that the tree transmits, which is only like a conduit.

And one may say an example of this — "the power of the son is greater than the power of the father" (Shevuos 48, end of side a). The possibility of this is because the inwardness of the son is drawn from the inwardness of the father (even though it was not revealed in the father) — and afterward it is revealed in the son through the power of the son (and sometimes he does not reveal it, and it is not greater).

32) But it requires further study whether one can say this regarding all time-bound prohibitions, for it is forced to say (especially according to the view that chametz after Pesach is forbidden by Torah law) that there is a change in the vitality of that same thing (unlike our case, where the fruits of orlah are forbidden forever).

33) Our parsha, 19:24. And see Likkutei Torah and Or HaTorah there.


Key Lesson

The fruits of orlah show that the vitality G‑d gives to the world is renewed every day: the very same tree whose fruits drew from the impure kelipos during the first three years afterward receives a new vitality, and its fourth-year fruits become "holy, for praising G‑d." The physical body stays as it was, but the flow of life within it can change entirely.

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