Parshas Tazria
1. At the beginning of the section on the negaim (plagues) of a person, it states: "אדם כי יהי' בעור בשרו גו'" ("When a man shall have in the skin of his flesh…").1 The verse here uses the title "Adam," which is the name that expresses the distinction of the Jewish people (and the highest of the four titles for man: Adam, Ish, Gever, Enosh).2
The question is well known:3 How can it be that when a person stands at the level of "Adam," he should have "in the skin of his flesh a swelling…," that is, negaim, when the impurity of tzaraas is among the most severe of impurities,4 and [OCR unclear]5
The Alter Rebbe explains6 that, on the contrary, this itself is the reason: precisely because we are speaking of someone who is at the level of "Adam," which is "a great level… the perfection of all," he is struck with tzaraas:
The fact that the negaim appear "in the skin of his flesh"7 shows that the evil which causes the nega (and accordingly, the nega must resemble it) is not in (the inner core of) the person.
[The Alshich explains that in the case of the wicked, whose "essence is impurity," it does not make an impression to the point that it should be visible "in the skin of his flesh," because "a substance among its own kind does not form a separation."]
Rather, it is only that some "dross" and evil remained in his externality, "at the outer edge of his garments," and therefore it becomes a nega "in the skin of his flesh" (specifically).
With this the Alter Rebbe also explains8 why "the mitzvah of negaim is not practiced in our time, after the Destruction, because they are not found at all… rather they are miraculous events" (as he cites from the Rambam9). For "there is not to be found among us" such people who have no evil at all in their inner being, "since even the tzaddik and the good one still has a little evil in his inner being," and consequently the evil does not cause any negaim.
2. This needs to be understood:
Our Sages say10 that negaim come as a punishment for the sin of lashon hara (evil speech), which is an exceedingly severe sin, to the point that it is equated with the three transgressions concerning which "one must be killed rather than transgress," and "it is as if he denied the fundamental principle [of faith]" (as the Rambam elaborates in Hilchos Deos11). How, then, can one say that such a person is a complete Adam, that his title is Adam, and that all he lacks is the refinement of the external evil?
The difficulty here is even greater: the severity of "one who speaks lashon hara" is brought in the Rambam (also) in that very halachah12 which the Alter Rebbe cites as proof that negaim are miraculous events that are not found nowadays, and there he elaborates how from speaking lashon hara one can come (Heaven forfend) even to denying the fundamental principle. Yet here the Alter Rebbe says that we are speaking of a complete Adam?
3. This will be understood by first explaining the continuation of the Rambam's words in the above-mentioned halachah:
After the Rambam explains that negaim come for the sin of lashon hara (and brings the lesson from Miriam), he continues with a matter that seemingly has no connection to lashon hara (and all the more so no connection to the laws of the impurity of tzaraas). These are his words:
"קל וחומר לבני אדם הרשעים הטפשים שמרבים לדבר גדולות ונפלאות" ("How much more so" [from Miriam!] "for wicked and foolish people who speak at length of great and wondrous things"). "This is the way of the gathering of the wicked scoffers: at first they speak at length of idle matters… and from this they come to speak disparagingly of the righteous… and from this they will become accustomed to speak against the prophets and to find fault with their words… and from this they come to speak against G‑d and deny the fundamental principle… This is the talk of the wicked, which is brought about by sitting on street corners and sitting in the gatherings of the ignorant and sitting in drinking-houses with drunkards. But the talk of the upright of Israel is only words of Torah and wisdom; therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, helps them and grants them merit through it…"
This needs to be understood:
a) Here we are speaking about the prohibition of speaking lashon hara, which causes the impurity of tzaraas. How, then, does a discussion (and at length) of the talk of the wicked in general fit in here — talk which begins with "idle matters" (not lashon hara) and ends with denial of G‑d, Heaven forfend?
[Even if one were to say that since lashon hara is one detail of "the talk of the wicked," therefore, in speaking of lashon hara and its severity, the Rambam needs (because of the gravity of the matter) to explain in this context the disgrace of the talk of the wicked in general, etc. — still, it has no place in the laws of the impurity of tzaraas (which is the punishment for lashon hara alone);
such elaboration would seemingly belong only in Hilchos Deos, where he discusses the detailed laws of how one must guard oneself from forbidden speech.]
b) If the Rambam wishes here to bring out the severity of the prohibition of lashon hara, he should have cited the severe expressions which he writes concerning one who speaks lashon hara in Hilchos Deos.
Moreover: in Hilchos Deos the Rambam brings the saying of our Sages13 "כל המספר בלשון הרע כאילו כופר בעיקר" ("Whoever speaks lashon hara is as if he denied the fundamental principle"), meaning that the sin of lashon hara in and of itself is as severe as "as if he denied the fundamental principle";
whereas here he says that from lashon hara there later results denial of the fundamental principle — "and from this… and from this they come to speak against G‑d and deny the fundamental principle" (but not that lashon hara itself is "as if he denied the fundamental principle").
4. The explanation of this may be said to be as follows:
With this elaboration on the manner of the talk of the wicked, the Rambam comes to explain the definition of "lashon hara," which gives us to understand why the result of lashon hara is "tzaraas":
In lashon hara there are two aspects:
a) Speaking lashon hara (which comes from the bad character traits of the speaker — he has jealousy and hatred, and so on) causes harm, etc., to the person about whom he speaks. That is to say, the main deficiency in it is that his lashon hara brings out his bad traits and harms the other person.
— It is about this aspect of lashon hara that the Rambam speaks in Hilchos Deos, as one sees there from the content of the entire chapter, that he speaks throughout about undesirable speech and conduct between man and his fellow.
b) Lashon hara from the standpoint of the speech itself:14 when someone speaks lashon hara, even without intent, etc., the speech itself drags him into evil.
For although the power of speech is seemingly only an external power (a garment, and an external garment of the soul), it is nevertheless bound up with the very essence of the person15 [to the point that the title of a person is "a speaker"16]. For this reason, when someone speaks lashon hara, the undesirable speech (in and of itself) drags him even further into evil.17
5. This is also what the Rambam brings out through his elaboration, at the end of the laws of the impurity of tzaraas, concerning "the talk of the wicked":
He begins with how one must guard oneself from the conduct of "the wicked and foolish people who speak at length of great and wondrous things" (in which there is as yet no undesirable content), and then he explains "the way of the gathering of the wicked scoffers," that "at first they speak at length of idle matters" (in which speech there is no bad trait or the like), yet these very words drag the speaker down to the utmost evil (as the Rambam continues);
and this is also the definition of lashon hara — "the talk of the wicked," speaking in the manner in which the wicked speak. The emphasis is on the fact that he is not careful, and blemishes, etc., his speech.
And as the Rambam emphasizes at the very beginning of the matter — when he speaks of how negaim come to warn against lashon hara — that when "his skin changes and he becomes a metzora," the person remains "separated and publicized alone, so that he not engage in the talk of the wicked, which is scoffing and lashon hara" — for seemingly, who mentioned "the talk of the wicked" and "scoffing" here?
Rather, by this the Rambam intends to explain that lashon hara (which brings on negaim) is a detail of, and stems from, "the talk of the wicked" in general (a deficiency in the speech — the externality — of the person), because the matter of negaim is (as explained above) that "the skin of his flesh" — the externality of the person — is not as it should be.
6. In light of this, it will be all the more understandable why the Rambam elaborates on how this matter (that negaim come because of lashon hara) is learned from the episode of Miriam — "ועל ענין זה מזהיר בתורה . . התבוננו מה אירע למרים כו'" ("And concerning this matter the Torah warns… 'Consider what happened to Miriam…'"):
The punishment of negaim for lashon hara is (not because of the (first) aspect of lashon hara mentioned above, that one's bad traits harm another, but only) because of the speech itself.
For with Miriam it was the very opposite: "she raised him on her knees and endangered herself to save him from the river." Her speech was not at all intended to disparage him;18 and even more (says the Rambam): "she did not speak disparagingly of him; she only erred concerning him"; and also on Moshe's part, "he did not take offense at any of these things…" —
In her speech there was no evil or harm whatsoever (neither on Miriam's part nor on Moshe's part); it was an entirely external matter,19 and nevertheless "she was immediately punished with tzaraas."
7. According to what has been said above, we will also understand why the Rambam brings (at the beginning of the above-mentioned halachah) the order in which the negaim come "to warn them against lashon hara":
"The walls of his house change" (negaim of houses); afterwards, if "he persists in his wickedness… the leather utensils in his house change… and if he persists in his wickedness… the garments he wears change," and only afterwards — "if he persists in his wickedness… his skin changes and he becomes a metzora" —
because this corresponds to the above-explained content of lashon hara and its progression:
When one begins to speak lashon hara, the speech is an entirely external matter which "does not touch him," and therefore (only) the house, which is completely separate from him, is struck;20 but the more he speaks, the more the speech itself drags him in, the evil becomes more internal to him, and therefore the negaim come upon things which are closer to him — his utensils, his garments, and finally the skin of his flesh.
(When, however, the evil penetrates the actual inner being — then the whole matter of negaim does not exist, as explained above in section 1.)
Based on the above, it is understood how the above-mentioned explanation of the Alter Rebbe — that negaim come specifically to a complete Adam who has rectified everything except "the outer edge of his garments" — not only does not contradict the words of the Rambam, but, on the contrary, both explanations are in full harmony —
because the caution against lashon hara brought out in the Rambam is caution in speech as such, which is an external matter.
8. According to all the above, we will also understand why the remedy (purification) of negaim is specifically through a kohen.
For seemingly this is not understood: since we are speaking of a complete Adam, as explained above, who has the power to refine all his inner matters and has actually done so — how is it that he himself cannot refine the external evil within him?
The explanation is: the fact that a complete Adam can stumble in lashon hara, even though he has already refined all his inner matters, is because there can be a hidden evil (the depth of evil) that is deeply rooted in the person and does not come out openly in him;
and this hidden evil expresses itself in a person's speech21 [as explained above, that speech is bound up with the very essence of the person], and in speech of the kind that is seemingly a merely external matter, without any actual evil content22
[for speech with evil content is not relevant to a complete Adam, who has already refined the evil within his inner being],
and therefore the rectification for lashon hara is by rectifying the hidden evil in his soul.
And therefore it is specifically through a kohen, who is "Supernal Kindness,"23 and therefore he has the power to purify the hidden evil;
and therefore the speech of the kohen, "טהור אתה" ("You are pure"),24 is required — because through his speech he draws down an exceedingly lofty light which rectifies the hidden evil, until the metzora becomes completely pure.
(From the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Tazria 5741)
Notes
1) Our parsha 13:2.
2) Zohar on our parsha (48a, and in many places). See also Sefer HaErchim Chabad, vol. 1, entry "Adam," section 9, and sources cited there.
3) See Zohar ibid.; Alshich at the beginning of our parsha. See also Likkutei Torah on our parsha 22b (and the glosses there in Ohr HaTorah, Vayikra, p. 252).
4) For his dwelling is outside the camp, outside all three camps, and (even) other impure people may not dwell with him (our parsha 13:46; Toras Kohanim and Rashi on the verse; Pesachim 67a).
5) Nedarim 64b.
6) Likkutei Torah on our parsha, ibid.; the discourses beginning "Adam Ki Yihyeh" 5666 and 5675. On all this, see also Alshich ibid.
7) Ibid.
8) See also Alshich ibid. (but he does not cite the words of the Rambam).
9) End of Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas. (See the above-mentioned discourse beginning "Adam Ki Yihyeh" (note 6), that the intent in Likkutei Torah is to what the Rambam writes in this halachah: "it is not of the natural order of the world, but rather was a sign and wonder in Israel." And what Likkutei Torah writes, "as the Rambam writes," refers to what precedes it, "that they are not among the common illnesses," and afterwards it explains "that the mitzvah of negaim… they are not found at all…" — but it is explicit in the Rambam (Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 1:12) that it applies both in the time of the Beis HaMikdash and when it is not standing. — See Torah Sheleimah, Shemos, Miluim, ch. 10, for the views on this. — See also the Commentary on the Mishnah, Negaim 12:5; Moreh Nevuchim III, end of ch. 47; Likkutei Sichos vol. 18, p. 136, notes 35–36.) See also below, p. 72, note 36; p. 75, note 53.
10) Arachin 15b. — In Arachin ibid. (16a) it says "for seven things…," but in the Rambam ibid. only "to warn them against lashon hara" is brought as halachah.
11) Ch. 7, halachah 3.
12) Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas, ibid.
13) Arachin 15b.
14) See also, at length, Akeidah, beginning of Parshas Metzora.
15) See the discourse beginning "Lulav Va'aravah" 5659, and in many places. See also the sources cited in the next note.
16) See Likkutei Sichos vol. 6, end of p. 115 ff., and the sources cited there; Likkutei Sichos vol. 27, p. 212.
17) See also Sefer HaMaamarim 5659, p. 5 (in the name of Rabbeinu Chaim), that a remedy for the trait of anger is not to speak at that time; see there at length.
18) Rashi, Behaaloscha 12:1. See also Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Orach Chaim 156:10; ibid., Choshen Mishpat, Hilchos Ona'ah etc., section 29.
19) See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 18 (p. 145 ff.). See there that this is the precise wording of Rashi (beginning of Parshas Shelach) "matters of slander" (dibah), and not lashon hara.
20) It may be said that this is the (inner) reason for what the Sforno writes (end of Parshas Tazria) regarding negaim of houses: "And since the generations did not rise to a level worthy of this distinction (compassion), there is no record among the early ones that negaim of houses were ever found, to the point that some of our Sages of blessed memory said (Sanhedrin 71a) that they never existed" — because the evil that is refined through negaim of houses is so external (like a house, which is the most distant surrounding), that one must be on "a level worthy of this distinction" in order to refine even this evil. And perhaps it may be said that this is also the (inner) reason why specifically regarding negaim of houses and garments it is stated explicitly in the Rambam that they are "a sign and wonder" (see below, p. 72, note 36).
21) See Derech Chaim, in the introduction; and elsewhere.
22) As in the Rambam's explanation (as cited above in the text) regarding Miriam.
23) Likkutei Torah ibid. See also Akeidah ibid.
24) Rambam ibid., ch. 9, halachos 2–3. See also Likkutei Torah ibid.
Key Lesson
This Sicha teaches that speech is not merely an outer garment: it is bound up with the essence of a person, and careless words, even without ill intent, can draw a person step by step into evil. Even one who has refined his inner self must guard his speech, for a hidden evil can surface through it, and its rectification comes through the kindness and the purifying words of the kohen.




