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Likkutei Sichos Vol. 17 – Vayikra 2

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Parshas Vayikra

1. The order of the offerings whose laws appear in our parsha is: first — the olah (burnt offering), the minchah (meal offering) and the shelamim (peace offering), which are voluntary offerings1, as Rashi explains right at the beginning of the parsha2 on "אדם כי יקריב מכם" ("When a man of you brings an offering") — "כשיקריב, בקרבנות נדבה דיבר הענין" ("When he brings — the subject speaks of voluntary offerings"); and afterwards — the chatas (sin offering) and the asham (guilt offering), which are obligatory offerings.

This is not understood: It is true that Rashi has a compelling proof from the verse that "the subject speaks of voluntary offerings"3, but the question arises on the verse itself: Why does the Torah begin with voluntary offerings? First and foremost, it would seemingly be necessary to know the laws of the obligatory offerings, which a Jew must bring, and only later — the laws of offerings that are merely voluntary.

And since this is a difficulty in the plain meaning of the verses — Rashi should have resolved it. We must therefore say that according to the plain meaning of Scripture this is not a difficulty to begin with (or that it is resolved by an earlier explanation of Rashi)4.

2. Seemingly one could answer (at least in a strained way) based on Rashi's commentary on the verse5 "ונרצה לו לכפר עליו" ("It shall be accepted for him, to atone for him"): "It shall be accepted for him — for what does it bring acceptance etc.? For a positive commandment, and for a negative commandment that is linked to a positive commandment." That is to say: although the olah is indeed a voluntary offering which one is not obligated to bring, nevertheless the offering brings acceptance and removes an obligation — a person's liability to punishment. It thus emerges that the olah, too, is connected with obligation.

Accordingly, the order is understood — first the olah, later the chatas, and afterwards the asham: It is more likely6 that a Jew should, Heaven forbid, transgress and consequently need to bring an olah7, which brings acceptance for a lighter transgression — a positive commandment, or a negative commandment that is linked to a positive commandment — than a chatas, which comes to atone for severe transgressions — "דבר שזדונו לאו וכרתו" ("a matter whose willful violation is a prohibition punishable by kares")8; and the chatas, in turn, comes before the asham — because the chatas [OCR unclear — the text breaks off here and some lines are missing]

[OCR unclear] … (not because it is a voluntary offering, but) because it is connected with obligation ("it brings acceptance etc. for a positive commandment etc.") — then surely there is no place to interrupt (between the olah and the chatas) with other voluntary offerings — the minchah and the shelamim?

We must therefore say that the verse does indeed wish to place voluntary offerings before obligatory offerings; and the olah stands before the chatas because the olah is a voluntary offering9.

3. This will be understood by first prefacing another question: Why does the Torah begin here with the (obligatory) offerings of an individual, and not with communal offerings? Seemingly the opposite is more logical: first one should instruct about what concerns the entire community, and only afterwards — about individuals?

Seemingly one could answer10: communal offerings pertain (mainly) to special times of the year (Shabbos, Yom Tov, etc.), whereas individual offerings (voluntary and obligatory) can be brought at any time. Therefore the passage of the offerings begins with individual offerings11 [and the laws of the tamid offering — which is brought twice every day — do indeed appear earlier, in Parshas Tetzaveh12].

This, however, is only a reason for placing individual offerings before communal offerings. But it is puzzling and requires a reason why the laws of communal offerings are not mentioned at all in Parshas Vayikra13 (or Parshas Tzav), but only in Parshas Acharei14, Emor15, and (principally in) Parshas Pinchas16?

4. The explanation of all this:

From the plain meaning of the verses it emerges that the passage of the offerings in our parsha and (the first part) of Parshas Tzav were said before (what is related afterwards) "קרא משה לאהרן גו' קח לך עגל וגו'" ("Moshe called to Aharon… Take for yourself a calf etc.")17 — the order of the inauguration of Aharon and his sons on the eighth day of the miluim (the days of inauguration). It is thus simply understood why it was necessary to instruct the laws of the olah and so on: because Aharon and his sons needed to know the laws of the offerings in order to be able to offer them on the eighth day of the miluim18.

And just as this applies to the commands to Aharon and his sons — that they needed to know how to offer the offerings on the eighth day of the miluim — so too it applies to the commands (in Parshas Vayikra and Tzav) to all Jews: they needed to know what kind of offering they could (or had to) bring immediately at the erection of the Mishkan, on the eighth day of the miluim.

Especially if one were to say19 that (also) Parshas Vayikra and Parshas Tzav were said at the beginning of the seven days of the miluim20 — then the laws of Parshas Vayikra and Tzav could certainly be relevant21 (not only on the eighth day of the miluim, but) for all eight days of the miluim22.

Therefore there was no need here to instruct about the communal offerings (of Yom Tov, etc.) which appear in Parshas Acharei, Emor and Pinchas, for here only those offerings were said which are (or could be) relevant immediately, at that very time.

And even the communal offerings that were offered during the days of the miluim which are not among "אותן שנצטוו בו ביום" ("those that were commanded on that day")23 (such as the musaf offering of Shabbos and Rosh Chodesh24) — nevertheless, since the one who offered the communal offerings during the days of the miluim was Moshe (as Rashi already said earlier25), there is no necessity to instruct all Jews here (as at the beginning of the parsha — "דבר אל בני ישראל" ("Speak to the children of Israel")) about these offerings26. For Moshe surely knew what kind of offering it was and how it had to be brought27, just as he knew the detailed laws of all the offerings that he offered during the seven days of the miluim (including — the Shabbos day, the chatas, etc.).

5. Accordingly it is understood why the Torah begins with voluntary offerings (and not obligatory offerings): During the days of the miluim it is not likely that Jews would commit sins28 and become obligated to bring an obligatory offering; especially on the eighth day of the miluim, when the Shechinah rested in the Mishkan29, which is "עדות לישראל שויתר להם הקב"ה על מעשה העגל" ("a testimony to Israel that the Holy One, blessed be He, had forgiven them for the incident of the Calf")30.

On the other hand, it is indeed likely that the Jews, who had given to the work of the Mishkan with exceedingly great generosity31, brought voluntary offerings after the erection of the Mishkan, at the very first opportunity31*.

Therefore the Torah places first the offerings that were likely and close at hand to be brought during the days of the miluim — voluntary offerings — and only afterwards the laws of obligatory offerings.

6. The explanation of why the Torah begins with voluntary offerings — in the inner dimension of matters — will be understood by first prefacing:

It is known regarding offerings that the main thing in them is the intention and thought of the person at the time he brings the offering, as our Sages say32: "אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט ובלבד שיכוון לבו לשמים" ("Whether one gives much or one gives little, provided he directs his heart to Heaven"). Even with offerings that come to atone for a person, the atonement comes mainly by virtue of the person's thought, as the Ramban33 explains, that when bringing an offering the person offering it must think "כי חטא לאלקיו בגופו ונפשו וראוי לו שישפך דמו וישרף גופו לולא חסד הבורא שלקח ממנו תמורה כו' דמו תחת דמו נפש תחת נפש כו'" ("that he has sinned against his G‑d with his body and his soul, and it would be fitting for his blood to be spilled and his body burned, were it not for the kindness of the Creator, who took from him a substitute… its blood (of the offering) in place of his blood, a life in place of his life…"), and this is what causes the offering to atone.

One sees this also in the very name korban (offering), one of whose meanings is — from the term kiruv (drawing close), meaning that the service of an offering is to draw one's faculties and senses close to the Almighty34.

Accordingly, this is not understood: Since the main thing in offerings is (not the act of offering, but) the person's thought before and during the offering, how is it that the Torah says nothing at all about the thought and intention, etc.35?

Therefore the Torah first sets out the laws of voluntary offerings — whose entire offering is solely out of generosity of heart (for the sake of Heaven). Thereby the Torah tells us that the intention of the heart is the general preface to the entire matter of offerings: it is the central point of all offerings, including obligatory offerings.

And this is also why Rashi is precise in his wording, "the subject speaks of voluntary offerings"36: the "subject" of offerings — all offerings — is essentially voluntary offerings, since in all offerings the main thing is the generosity of heart and the intention of the one who brings the offering.

7. More deeply: the intention and generosity of heart required in all offerings is essentially and inwardly present in every single Jew. It is only that in voluntary offerings — which a person brings (not because he is obligated and compelled to, but) as a donation of his own good will — his inner self is seen openly.

And therefore there is no command about this in the Torah; rather, Rashi relates the reality — "the subject speaks of voluntary offerings": all offerings are voluntary offerings, because every Jew possesses generosity of heart and intention by virtue of his inner self and his soul.

This is also what we find regarding offerings in the ruling37: "יקריב אותו מלמד שכופין אותו, יכול בעל כרחו ת"ל לרצונו, הא כיצד כופין אותו עד שיאמר רוצה אני" ("'He shall offer it' — this teaches that we compel him. Could it be against his will? Therefore the verse says 'of his own will.' How so? We compel him until he says 'I want to'"), as the Rambam38 explains (regarding a get): "מאחר שהוא רוצה להיות מישראל ורוצה הוא לעשות כל המצות ולהתרחק מן העבירות, ויצרו הוא שתקפו, וכיון שהוכה עד שתשש יצרו ואמר רוצה אני, כבר גרש לרצונו" ("Since he wants to be part of the Jewish people, and he wants to perform all the mitzvos and to keep away from transgressions, and it is only his inclination that overpowered him — once he was beaten until his inclination weakened and he said 'I want to,' he has already divorced of his own will").

And just as this is so with "of his own will," so it is with all the intentions required of the one who brings the offering, up to — korban from the term kiruv, drawing the faculties and senses close to the Holy One, blessed be He, as mentioned above: this is present in the inner self of every Jew, as in the well-known teaching of the Alter Rebbe39: a Jew neither wants to, nor is he able to, be separated from G‑dliness.

8. Accordingly it is also understood why the Torah here calls the Jews by the name "adam" — "When a man [adam] of you brings an offering" (the Jews40, to whom this was said): the name "adam" derives from "אדמה לעליון" ("I will be likened to the Most High")40*41 — the soul, which is "חלק אלוה ממעל ממש" ("truly a part of G‑d above")42; and which is present in "כל איש ישראל" ("every Jewish man")43, "אחד צדיק ואחד רשע" ("whether righteous or wicked")44 — by virtue of which all Jews possess the generosity of heart and the desire to be close to G‑dliness.

And this is also the reason (according to the "wine of the Torah") why Rashi explains "adam" as follows: "למה נאמר, מה אדם הראשון לא הקריב מן הגזול שהכל היה שלו אף אתם לא תקריבו מן הגזול" ("Why is it said? Just as Adam, the first man, did not offer from stolen property, since everything was his, so too you shall not offer from stolen property"). For seemingly this is not understood: We find in the Gemara45 that stolen property is excluded from the word "mikem" ("of you") — why does Rashi learn that stolen property is excluded from the word "adam," which is merely an allusion — "just as Adam, the first man, etc."?

The explanation of this is:

The fact that "everything was his" for Adam, the first man, was only at the beginning of his creation, while he was in Gan Eden before the sin of the Tree of Knowledge46. And this is the allusion in Rashi's commentary: the "adam" — "I will be likened to the Most High" — which is present in every Jew, is like Adam, the first man, as he was before the sin.

He is at such a level that he is above the matter of sins47; at the least, an obligation to bring an offering of atonement for sin does not pertain to him. And this "comes to expression" in voluntary offerings, which come (not because of a sin, but) out of a Jew's generosity of heart, to be close (korban from the term kiruv, as above) to G‑dliness.

On the other hand, this is present in all offerings as well (even in offerings that come because of a sin), as mentioned above. For as soon as a Jew decides to bring an offering to atone for his sin, the "adam" within him is revealed, which is above the matter of sins (like Adam, the first man, before the sin, as above)47* — and by this power it becomes "to atone for him": the sin is wiped away entirely48.

9. In light of the above it is also understood why the Torah here prefaces "ויקרא אל משה" ("And He called to Moshe"), and why Rashi writes at length that this is "לשון חבה, לשון שמלאכי השרת משתמשין בו וכו'" ("an expression of affection, the expression that the ministering angels use, etc."). For seemingly: a) Why does the Torah write it specifically at the passage of the offerings? b) Why does Rashi elaborate so much that "Vayikra" is an expression of affection, etc.?

The explanation is this: As said earlier, the first thing that the Jews wanted to do after the erection of the Mishkan was to bring voluntary offerings, which demonstrates the exceptional love the Jews had for the Mishkan, etc.

And "כמים הפנים לפנים כן לב האדם לאדם" ("As water reflects face to face, so does the heart of man [reflect] to man")49 [the Supernal Man50] — the Almighty, too, showed here the greatness of G‑d's love for the Jews. And therefore Rashi, too, elaborates on this.

10. A further point in this: It is known51 that "And He called to Moshe" is the granting of power for the service of the offerings, the main element of which is generosity of heart, as explained above at length.

And this is why the Torah prefaces "And He called to Moshe," which is an expression of affection: this generosity of heart of the Jews toward the Almighty derives from "And He called to Moshe" — from the affection that the Almighty shows to the Jews52.

Accordingly it is also understood why Rashi concludes: "אבל לנביאי אומות העולם נגלה עליהן בלשון עראי וכו'" ("But to the prophets of the nations of the world He revealed Himself with an expression of happenstance, etc."). For seemingly: what relevance does the difference between the "Vayikra" said to Moshe and the "Vayikar" said to Bilaam (a prophet of the nations) have here?53 — But the point of this is as explained above:

In this generosity of heart of every Jew, regardless of his external state, the difference between Jews and the nations of the world finds expression: Jews are essentially good and holy, and the undesirable things in them come only from (in the Rambam's words) "his inclination overpowered him"; whereas regarding the nations of the world, "אם יש בהם איזה דבר טוב הרי זה דבר נוסף" ("if there is some good thing in them, it is an additional thing")54.

And the root of the difference stems from the fact that with Jews there is "And He called to Moshe" — the affection of the Holy One, blessed be He, for the Jews; and by virtue of this affection and the Almighty's choice of the Jews, they are always bound inwardly with G‑dliness.

(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Vayikra 5732 and 5733)


Notes

1) Apart from "the meal offering of the first fruits" (2:14 and Rashi there). And incidentally — "the offering of the first" (ibid. 12, and Rashi there).

2) 1:2.

3) See the commentators on Rashi. This is explained at length in Likkutei Sichos vol. 20, the first sicha on Parshas Vayikra.

4) As has been discussed several times. And see Likkutei Sichos vol. 16, p. 458, and the notes there; and the sources cited there.

5) Ibid., 4. — And although the difficulty would seemingly be on Rashi's earlier comment (verse 2) — since it is a difficulty [OCR unclear — the rest of this note is missing from the OCR].

6) [OCR unclear — the text of this note is missing from the OCR source.]

7) [OCR unclear — the text of this note is missing from the OCR source.]

8) [OCR unclear — the text of this note is missing from the OCR source.]

9) But one can say that one of the reasons the olah is placed before the other voluntary offerings is that it also contains some element of obligation, as in the text.

10) In a strained way one could say: a) An individual needs to be warned more than the community, since he may be negligent etc. (compare Beitzah 5b: "Testimony is entrusted to the court; is an egg entrusted to everyone?"). b) The community is a matter of individuals, and therefore it begins with the laws of the offerings of an individual, and afterwards — the offerings of the community, which is made up of individuals.

*) And although the community is an entity in its own right, and not (merely) a combination of many individuals (see the saying of our Sages, Yevamos 57a: "A congregation of converts is not called a congregation"; and elsewhere. And see Horayos 6a and Temurah 15b, 16a, that "the community does not die," and Beitzah 6, beginning of side b, that it needs to be transmitted very carefully; and see Tzafnas Pa'aneach, ch. 4), nevertheless it is impossible to have a community without individuals preceding it. And see Sefer HaMaamarim 5700–5701, p. 31, in the note there. This is not the place to elaborate.

11) Seemingly one could also use this to explain the reason voluntary offerings are placed before obligatory offerings — since (an individual's) obligatory offerings depend on a particular occurrence (a sin, etc.) of a particular person, whereas with voluntary offerings anyone can bring a voluntary offering at any time. But this still lacks explanation, for in the end it should have placed first the laws that one must know (those of obligatory offerings), and afterwards those that are merely voluntary.

12) 29:38 ff.

13) Apart from what is cited in note 1. The communal sin offering — 4:13 ff.

14) 16:5 ff.

15) Chapter 23.

16) Chapters 28–29.

17) Beginning of Parshas Shemini.

18) See Tzav 6:12 ff. And see Rashi, Shemini 9:16: "And he performed it according to the law — that is set out… in Vayikra."

19) See Ramban, Pekudei 40:2; end of Parshas Pekudei; Tzav 8:2; Naso 7:1.

20) And although Rashi writes (only) in the middle of Parshas Tzav (8:2), "This passage was said seven days before the erection of the Mishkan, for there is no chronological order in the Torah" — so that accordingly one could say that the beginning of Sefer Vayikra and (part of) Parshas Tzav before it follow on from the end of Parshas Pekudei (40:17 ff.), where the erection of the Mishkan on the eighth day of the miluim is discussed (see Rashi, Pekudei there, 29, 31; beginning of Parshas Shemini; Ramban, Pekudei 40:2; unlike Ibn Ezra there and at the beginning of Parshas Shemini) — one can nevertheless say that there [in Tzav 8:2] it is compelling that it was said at the beginning of the days of the miluim, and therefore Rashi explains that "this passage was said (definitely) seven days before the erection of the Mishkan"; whereas regarding Parshas Vayikra and (part of) Parshas Tzav the matter is in doubt, and it can be explained in both ways.

21) And it requires further examination whether, according to halachah, individual offerings were offered during the seven days of the miluim.

22) In Gur Aryeh, Shemini (9:23), he writes that — according to Rashi — "he certainly offered during the days of the miluim only the offerings that pertained to the miluim etc., just as he did not offer the tamid offerings etc." — but see Rashi, Pinchas 28:4. And see at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 230, and in the note there (that according to Rashi they performed all the services during the seven days of the miluim).

23) Which Aharon offered — see Rashi, Pekudei 40:29.

24) See Rashi, Shemini 10:16. And see Ibn Ezra, Pekudei 40:2; the commentators on Rashi, Tzav 8:2.

25) Tetzaveh 29:22; ibid. 24; Pekudei 40:29 ("Even on the eighth day etc., and he offered communal offerings etc.").

26) And also the passage of the tamid in Parshas Tetzaveh was not said to the Jewish people, but to Moshe (mainly) for the days of the miluim; the command to the Jewish people (for all generations) is in Parshas Pinchas (28:1 ff.) — see Rashi, Pinchas there, 4.

*) See Chizkuni, Pinchas 28:4 — according to Rashi's view.

27) Except that the Torah states an explicit command only regarding the tamid offering.

28) Compare Rashi, Tetzaveh 29:36; Shemini 10:17; Naso 7:16.

29) Pekudei 40:34.

30) Rashi, beginning of Parshas Pekudei. And see Rashi, Shemini (9:23), that during all seven days of the miluim… Israel were ashamed and saying, etc.: "All the effort we exerted, so that the Shechinah should rest among us and we would know that the sin of the Calf had been forgiven us, etc."

31) Vayakhel 35:21 ff.; 36:5–7.

31*) And although the Nesi'im (tribal princes) made their donation "first, at the dedication of the altar" (Rashi, Vayakhel 35:27) — the entire donation of the Nesi'im took place on the eighth day of the miluim (as is the plain meaning of the verses, Naso 7:1 ff. — immediately when he had finished anointing the Mishkan etc.). And after this (also on the eighth day of the miluim) all the Jews could bring voluntary offerings [in addition to the fact that one can say (as above in the text) that they also brought them during the [seven] days of the miluim (before the "dedication of the altar")]. And in Rashi on Naso (7:3) he alters and writes (and explains) the words of Rabbi Nassan, "to make a donation here first," which refers to the wagons and the oxen — and with these, the giving to the Levi'im was also at the beginning of the day. And see Likkutei Sichos vol. 16, p. 424, note 3.

32) End of Menachos. Cited in Rashi on our parsha, 1:14 [likely 1:17]. And see Rashi on our parsha, 2:1.

33) On our parsha, 1:9. And see Sforno there, 2; and elsewhere.

34) See Sefer HaBahir, sec. 46 (109). And see also Zohar III, 5a; Shelah, Maseches Taanis (211b); Pri Etz Chaim, Shaar HaTefillah, ch. 5.

35) Only that it must be "of his own will" (verse 3). And see below in the text, section 6.

*) See Likkutei Levi Yitzchak on the Zohar, Beshalach, pp. 69–70 (and in Likkutei Sichos vol. 2, p. 13 ff.). This was explained in the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Beshalach 5736.

36) See Likkutei Sichos vol. 2, p. 1, note 2 (the explanation according to the plain meaning).

37) Kiddushin 50, beginning of side a; and the sources cited there. Cited in Rashi here, verse 3. Rambam, Hilchos Maaseh HaKorbanos 14:16.

38) Hilchos Gerushin, end of ch. 2.

39) See Hayom Yom, p. 73; and elsewhere.

40) According to the plain meaning of Scripture — to the exclusion of non-Jews. And even according to halachah (Toras Kohanim here), it continues that this is "to atone for a positive commandment etc.," as above. And see Menachos 73b (and elsewhere) that non-Jews are included from a different verse. And see Toras Kohanim here: "adam — to include converts" (and the Malbim elaborates in his commentary). This is not the place to elaborate. And see Likkutei Sichos there, p. 5 ff.

40*) In the words of the verse — Yeshayahu 14:14.

41) Shelah, Torah Shebiksav section, Parshas Vayeshev, Drush Tzon Yosef, at its end (301b); and elsewhere. Asarah Ma'amaros, Ma'amar Em Kol Chai, part 2, ch. 13 [OCR unclear]; and elsewhere.

42) Tanya, beginning of ch. 2.

43) Seemingly one could say that this is how he was created, but through his free choice he can afterwards fall to a state of "my heart is void within me," in which he has no evil inclination (as above in ch. 1), or the opposite, that he has no portion in the G‑d of Israel (Iggeres HaTeshuvah ch. 4 ff.; Iggeres HaKodesh sec. 6 [OCR unclear]; and see also Tanya, end of ch. 33). But it seems more correct to say that this is always so, as is evident from the Rambam's reason (ibid.) in his ruling that a coerced get is valid — that this applies also to those who have no portion etc., and even though one who has sinned is still a Jew, as is said regarding Achan (Sanhedrin 44, beginning of side a). And regarding "my heart is void within me" — this means only that he has no inclination etc. (similar to what is said, "the inclination of man's heart etc."), but its existence, in the manner of having been slain — that he has. — And compare Sukkah 52, beginning of side a: "And they will mourn etc." — over the evil inclination that was slain.

44) Tanya ch. 1. And one can say that this is the precision here, "one… and one": in general — after saying "every Jewish man," what does "whether righteous or wicked" add? One can say that it comes to teach that both the righteous and the wicked are (in their true reality) on the level of "one." And see the well-known explanation of the saying of our Sages (in the Haggadah): "One wise, and one etc." (Sefer HaSichos 5703, p. 74).

45) Sukkah 30, beginning of side a. And see Tosafos there, s.v. "ki."

46) This is according to the Tanchuma (Tzav 1): "for [Adam] did not steal from others, since he was alone in the world" — and Adam was alone only before the sin. And even then, on the day Adam was created Chavah was created (Rashi, Bereishis 1:27), and on that same day Kayin and Hevel and the daughters etc. were born (Rashi there, 4:1; and there: "before he sinned and was driven out of Gan Eden") — see about all this Likkutei Sichos there (pp. 6–7).

And even according to what is explained in Likkutei Sichos there, that Rashi's intent in "everything was his" implies that this applied throughout all the days of his life, the reason being that when he was created everything became his and afterwards his ownership did not lapse (see there at length) — nevertheless, "everything was his" in its plain sense applied only while he was alone, for Kayin and Hevel had a field and sheep etc. (there, 2). And simply, this was through Adam the first man giving all this to his sons as a gift. See about all this in Likkutei Sichos there.

47) See Zohar III, 15a; and see there, 13b. And see the maamar beginning "Basi LeGani" 5713, sec. 2. Above, p. 5 ff.

47*) In Likkutei Torah on our parsha (1b) it states that the small alef of "Vayikra" is "the illumination of Kesser… and in Divrei HaYamim 'Adam' is written with an alef of the large letters, and this is the level of Adam the first man as he was before the sin, etc." And in Or HaTorah here (vol. 3, p. 726) — based on Likkutei Torah of the Arizal here — it states that the small alef of "Vayikra" comes from the descent in Moshe because of the sin of the Calf, etc.

And this does not contradict what is explained in the text, that the "adam" mentioned here is like the level of Adam the first man as he was before the sin — for in our case there is no difference between one who was righteous from the outset (a large alef) and a baal teshuvah (who must be in a state of humility etc. — a small alef), for "to atone for him" here comes after the sin, the source of all of them being the sin of the Calf.

And this applies even at the level where one must be compelled until he says "I want to" — all the more so the humility and small alef of the baalei teshuvah of the days of the miluim of the Mishkan (which was a proof that the sin of the Calf had been atoned, and in the manner of "I have forgiven as you have asked") and of the Mishkan and Sanctuary in general — as is known from the Alter Rebbe on this [OCR unclear] (Sefer HaSichos 5700, p. 68; explained at length above, p. 1 ff.).

48) See Iggeres HaTeshuvah ch. 2: "And similarly, 'and it shall be accepted' etc."

49) Mishlei 27:19.

50) See Or HaTorah on this verse; and the sources cited there.

51) The maamar beginning "Basi LeGani" 5720, ch. 5, at its beginning.

52) "For every single soul of the House of Israel contains something of the level of Moshe Rabbeinu, peace be upon him" (Tanya ch. 42; and see Iggeres HaKodesh, end of sec. 27 (the explanation)).

53) Quoted above in the text, section 6.

54) The maamar of Shabbos Parshas Bereishis 5659.


Key Lesson

The Torah opens the laws of the offerings with voluntary offerings to teach that the heart's generosity and intention are the core of every offering, even an obligatory one. This generosity is inwardly present in every Jew, righteous or wicked, because the "adam" within him, a part of G‑d above, wants to be close to G‑dliness. It flows from G‑d's own affection for the Jewish people, expressed in "And He called to Moshe."

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