Parshas Mishpatim
1. On the verse "אם כסף תלוה וגו'" ("If you lend money, etc.")1, Rashi in his commentary copies the words "אם כסף תלוה את עמי" ("If you lend money to My people") and explains: "ר' ישמעאל אומר כל אם ואם שבתורה רשות חוץ מג' וזה א' מהן" ("Rabbi Yishmael says: Every 'im' ('if') in the Torah is optional, except for three, and this is one of them").
Rashi's intent, simply, is to explain: Is not gemilus chassadim (lending to others with kindness) a mitzvah and an obligation?2 Why, then, does it say here "If you lend money," which implies that it is something that depends on a person's own will? To this Rashi explains that the word "im" in this verse does not mean "optional," as in the other places; rather, in keeping with the subject discussed here, it is a matter of "obligation." And because of the difficulty of interpreting this word in a way that departs from the rule, Rashi therefore goes on to show that "it has found itself a companion," for in three places in the Torah "im" means "obligation," and they are3 (in addition to this verse): "ואם מזבח אבנים גו'" ("And if you make an altar of stones, etc.")4; "ואם תקריב מנחת ביכורים גו'" ("And if you bring a meal-offering of first grain, etc.")5.
This needs to be understood:
a) In several other places in the Torah the word "im" is used and it cannot be interpreted as "optional" — yet Rashi did not explain there that it is not "optional" but rather "obligation." For example: "אם תטיב שאת וגו'" ("If you improve, you will be forgiven, etc.")6 (and the intent is certainly that Kayin is obligated to improve his deeds7); "ועתה אם שמוע תשמעו בקולי וגו'" ("And now, if you will diligently heed My voice, etc.")8; "אם בחוקותי תלכו וגו'" ("If you walk in My statutes, etc.")9. Why, then, specifically10 in our parsha (and at the end of Parshas Yisro) was Rashi compelled to explain that this "im" is not "optional" but "obligation"?
b) Rashi quotes the precise statement that "every 'im' in the Torah is optional except for three" — yet Rashi himself explained in this manner in five places in the Torah. In addition to the three places mentioned above — those named in Rabbi Yishmael's statement — he explained so on the verse "אם כופר יושת עליו וגו'" ("If a ransom is imposed on him, etc.")11: "This 'im' is not conditional, but it is like 'If you lend money'12, an expression of 'asher' ('that'): this is his judgment, that the court shall impose a ransom on him."
Likewise on the verse "And if you bring a meal-offering of first grain, etc.," Rashi explains: "Here 'im' serves in the sense of 'ki' ('when'), for this is not optional, etc. And likewise 'ואם יהי' היובל וגו'' ('And when the Jubilee shall be, etc.')"13.
c) Rashi's explanation pertains only to the words "If you lend money" in the verse — why, then, does he also copy "to My people"?
d) It is a known rule, as has been discussed many times, that in the vast majority of cases Rashi does not mention the name of the Tanna or Amora who is the author of the explanation he brings. And when (contrary to his usual custom everywhere) he does bring something in the name of the one who said it, we are compelled to say that this too pertains to understanding the plain meaning of the verse. This needs clarification in our case: What does it teach us that it was Rabbi Yishmael who explained as above?
2. In the previous parsha, on the verse "And if you make an altar of stones, etc.," Rashi brings Rabbi Yishmael's statement for the first time14, and he continues, elaborating and saying: "... this 'im' serves in the sense of 'ka'asher' ('when')... for it is an obligation upon you to build an altar of stones, as it says15, 'אבנים שלמות תבנה' ('Of whole stones shall you build'); and likewise 'If you lend money' is an obligation, as it says16, 'והעבט תעביטנו' ('You shall surely lend him')...; and likewise 'If you bring a meal-offering of first grain' — this is the meal-offering of the Omer, which is an obligation, etc."
In the explanation of these words, too, we need to understand:
a) Why does he not spell out the proof that the Omer offering is an obligation, as he explains regarding the altar of stones and lending?
b) Why did Rashi choose to prove that the altar of stones is an "obligation" from the verse "Of whole stones shall you build, etc." — and not from what is stated earlier17: "ובנית שם גו' מזבח אבנים" ("And there you shall build ... an altar of stones")?
c) What is the reason that there, too, Rashi brings the name of the author of the statement (Rabbi Yishmael)?
3. The explanation of all this:
The rule that Rabbi Yishmael stated includes only those places in the Torah whose subject matter falls within the category of "optional" and "obligation." For then the "im" stated in them can be explained in one of two ways: optional ("im" in its plain sense), or obligation ("im" serving in the sense of "when"). It is to this that Rabbi Yishmael referred when he said that all of them are optional except for three.
This is not so where the "im" speaks of a matter that is not in the category of optional or obligation, but is rather a narrative and a condition; or even in a matter that does involve an obligation, but where it is evident that it was not stated as a command and an obligation. All such cases are, from the outset, not included in Rabbi Yishmael's rule, which applies only to an "im" that is to be interpreted as optional or as obligation18.
This is understood simply in the verses: "כי אם הלחם אשר הוא אוכל וגו'" ("except for the bread that he ate, etc.")19; "אם בהמה אם איש לא יחי' וגו'" ("whether beast or man, he shall not live, etc.")20 (which the student has already learned), and many others like them — where it is evident from within them and from their content that the word "im" stated in them does not serve at all for "optional" or "obligation" (but in an entirely different sense: "but," "only," "or")21.
So too is the matter with the word "im" in the following verses (although they are of a different kind): "הלא אם תטיב שאת וגו'" ("Surely, if you improve, you will be forgiven, etc."). The Holy One, blessed be He, certainly said this to Kayin not by way of a command and obligation to improve his deeds — for that is obvious — but as a reason and explanation for what He had said before: "Why has your countenance fallen?" — "Surely (the matter is in your hands): if you improve, you will be forgiven" ("your sin will be pardoned"). Thus this "im" is not a matter of "obligation" or "optional."
Similarly in the verses "If you will diligently heed My voice, etc." or "If you walk in My statutes, etc.," whose intent is not to make known the obligation itself to heed G‑d's voice and to walk in His statutes, for this obligation is already known from many places in the Torah. Rather, these verses come only to set a condition and to make the reward stated afterward depend on them: "If you will diligently heed, etc., (then) you shall be My treasure"; "If you walk in My statutes" — "I will give your rains in their season."
That is to say: in these verses (and the like), where reason dictates that their intent is not a command concerning the "obligation" contained in them, the "im" in them is in its plain meaning (a condition, etc.), and has no connection to the "optional" and "obligation" of Rabbi Yishmael's statement.
4. However, when does this apply (that the "im" is in the sense of a condition, etc.)? When the verse states it regarding a matter whose command and obligation are already known and plain (from the preceding verses, or because it is self-understood). But when the subject is something whose obligation is not yet known, it is impossible to say that "im" is stated in it as a condition (for something whose very essence — its command and obligation — is not yet known).
So it is in the verse in our parsha, "If you lend money to My people, etc." [Although, from the flow of the wording, it could be explained in the sense of a condition, as above — that "if" you fulfill the mitzvah of gemilus chassadim, then "do not be to him as a creditor, etc." — nevertheless,] since up to this verse the command of gemilus chassadim has not been written, it is impossible to say that the verse intends to make another command conditional on it ("If you lend money") while its own command and obligation have not yet been stated.
Therefore Rashi explains that this "im" is an obligation (and serves in the sense of "when" — unlike "every 'im' in the Torah," i.e., every "im" within the category of optional and obligation, whose meaning is "optional"), and that there are two more places in the Torah where the "im" written in them is "obligation":
Also in the verse "ואם מזבח אבנים תעשה לי וגו'" ("And if you make Me an altar of stones, etc."), it is impossible to say that the intent is to set a preliminary condition for what is said afterward, "you shall not build them of hewn stone" — since the obligation to build an altar of stones is not yet known. Likewise, it is not possible to explain in this way the verse "And if you bring a meal-offering of first grain, etc.": since until now we did not know of the mitzvah of the Omer offering, it cannot be explained in the sense of a condition for what is stated afterward, that it shall be "ripe ears roasted in fire, etc."
It follows that in all three of these verses we are compelled to say that the "im" stated in them is not in its plain meaning ("optional," or a condition), but serves in the sense of "when," for an obligation.
5. Based on this, we can understand why Rashi (in Parshas Yisro) brings verses in which it is explicit that gemilus chassadim and the altar of stones are obligatory, yet does not bring a verse for this obligation regarding the Omer offering (as above, section 2). For in bringing these verses regarding gemilus chassadim and the altar of stones, he does not intend (to prove that they are obligatory) but rather to emphasize and make known that the commands concerning them are stated later on, and that their commandment is not yet known (from verses stated before "If you lend money" and "And if ... an altar, etc."), and that therefore it is impossible to explain "im" as a condition, etc., as above. And this is because regarding them (gemilus chassadim and the altar of stones) one could err and say that we already knew that one is obligated in them from what was stated earlier:
Gemilus chassadim — it was already said regarding Avraham22: "כי ידעתיו למען אשר יצוה את בניו ואת ביתו אחריו גו' לעשות צדקה ומשפט גו'" ("For I have known him, because he will command his children and his household after him ... to do charity and justice, etc.");
An altar of stones — it was already said regarding Yaakov: "ויקח את האבן גו' וישם אותה מצבה גו'" ("And he took the stone ... and set it up as a pillar, etc.")23 —
Whereas regarding the Omer offering, where there is no room for such an error, Rashi did not need to bring the verse in which its obligation is stated.
6. According to this explanation — that Rabbi Yishmael's words apply only when the content of the verse is within the category of optional and obligation — we can also understand why the verse "And when the Jubilee shall be, etc."11 is not counted among those where "im" denotes "obligation." The "being" of the Jubilee (at a time when it is in effect) is something that comes about on its own (when its time arrives) and does not depend at all on a person's choice and action; therefore here too it does not apply to say that "im" means optional or obligation.
However, although the "im" of the Jubilee is not similar — in terms of human action, etc. — to the three instances of "im" in Rabbi Yishmael's statement, nevertheless in the interpretation of the word it is similar to them: the "im" of the Jubilee also serves in the sense of "when." This is because of the common factor among them: in all of them the subject is not ("if" of) doubt, but a matter of "certainty" (whether because of an "obligation" upon the person, which is the category in Rabbi Yishmael's statement, or because it is not in the person's hands and will come about on its own and with certainty — the Jubilee)24.
Therefore, when Rashi explains the use of the word "im" in the verse "And if you bring a meal-offering of first grain, etc.," and writes "here 'im' serves in the sense of 'ki,' etc." — meaning "when"25 — he brings an example from "And when the Jubilee shall be, etc.," since there too it serves in the sense of "when"26, as explained above. (But he certainly does not intend to equate them also with respect to "obligation," for "And when the Jubilee shall be" cannot be interpreted either as optional or as obligation, as explained above.)
The same applies to the verse "If a ransom is imposed on him, etc.": the "im" in it is not included in Rabbi Yishmael's enumeration. Although "this is his judgment, that the court shall impose a ransom on him," it nevertheless does not apply to say that it is an "obligation":
The definition of "obligation" applies only to something that comes about in a normal situation and under common circumstances; then it is fitting to say that a duty is placed upon a person to do a certain thing. But in our case, the entire matter of the ransom concerns the occurrence of an event (an uncommon one, and moreover, one contrary to the natural order of the world): when "an ox gores, etc." and kills a man, etc., (then) "this is his judgment, etc." Therefore it does not apply to say that this law, obligating him to pay a ransom, falls in the category of imposing an "obligation" on the court; and in this respect it is not similar to the three in Rabbi Yishmael's statement.
However, in the interpretation of the word "im" stated regarding the ransom — that is, with respect to the certainty in it (after his ox has already killed, etc.) — it is no different from those in Rabbi Yishmael's statement. Therefore Rashi explained there: "This 'im' is not conditional, but it is like 'If you lend money,' an expression of 'asher,' etc."27
7. Now we can explain the reason why Rashi copies from the verse also the words "to My people":
For although gemilus chassadim is a mitzvah and an obligation, it would still be possible to say that this "im" means optional — that is, if we were to say (in order to account for the word "im") that the verse also speaks of a loan to a non-Jew, and that such a loan is merely optional, and for this reason it is stated in the wording "If you lend money, etc.," which in its plain sense means "optional."
Therefore Rashi copies "to My people," thereby negating the above interpretation, as he explains afterward: "And this is its meaning: If you lend money — lend it to My people and not to a non-Jew, etc." That is, the verse speaks only of a loan to a fellow Jew28, and therefore we are compelled to say that the "im" stated here is an obligation and not optional.
However, after all this, there is still another reason (as will follow)29 to explain that the "im" stated here is "optional" and not "obligation." To negate this comes Rashi's addition, "Rabbi Yishmael says, etc." — i.e., it is impossible to say so, since we are dealing with Rabbi Yishmael (and his view), as will be explained below.
8. In the passage of the manna30 (which the student has already learned), it is related that Moshe Rabbeinu commanded the Jewish people to set aside of the manna "מלא העומר ממנו למשמרת לדורותיכם גו'" ("an omer-full of it, to be kept for your generations, etc."). Rashi explains ("for your generations"): "In the days of Yirmeyahu, when Yirmeyahu would rebuke them, 'Why do you not occupy yourselves with Torah?' and they would say, 'Shall we leave our work and occupy ourselves with Torah — from where will we be sustained?' he brought out for them the jar of manna. He said to them, '... With this your forefathers were sustained; the Omnipresent has many messengers to prepare food for those who fear Him.'"
At first glance, it is evident from this explanation that a Jew should not occupy himself with worldly matters for the sake of his livelihood; rather, he should occupy himself with Torah, and the Holy One, blessed be He, will provide him his livelihood in the manner of the manna. And it is understood that when his conduct accords with the Torah's instruction — with complete and true dedication to Torah and its mitzvos — then the livelihood provided to him by the Holy One, blessed be He, is also complete, covering all his needs, and consequently he will not need gemilus chassadim either — like those who ate the manna. And if his livelihood is not found in completeness and he needs to borrow, this itself proves that he did not conduct himself as the Torah demands (but rather occupied himself with worldly matters and exerted himself for his livelihood in a natural way).
According to this, one could say that "If you lend money, etc." is not an "obligation": one who fulfills the Torah's command and instruction will not need gemilus chassadim, and the verse is not speaking of him. We would then be compelled to say that it speaks of one who does not conduct himself according to the Torah's command, and if so:
a) It is unusual for a Jew to conduct himself contrary to the Torah's instruction (in the overall order and conduct of his life) — and in an uncommon situation the term "obligation" is not fitting, as explained above in section 6;
b) Since this is a sin and a blemish, etc., one could say that there is no obligation to lend to him, but only an option, etc.
Accordingly, from where do we know that "If you lend money, etc." is an "obligation," unlike all the places in the Torah (except two)?
Therefore Rashi prefaces that this statement was said by Rabbi Yishmael:
In Tractate Berachos31 we find a dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai: "'ואספת דגנך' ('And you shall gather in your grain')32 — what does this teach? Since it says*32, 'לא ימוש ספר התורה הזה מפיך' ('This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth'), one might think these words are to be taken literally; therefore it teaches, 'And you shall gather in your grain' — 'הנהג בהם מנהג דרך ארץ' ('conduct yourself with them in the way of the world'). These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says: Is it possible that a person plows, etc. — what will become of the Torah? Rather, when the Jewish people do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by others, etc.; and when the Jewish people do not do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by themselves, as it says, 'And you shall gather in your grain,' etc."
Thus, according to Rabbi Yishmael's view, a person must occupy himself with worldly matters for the sake of his livelihood — "conduct yourself with them in the way of the world." And although in this manner too, if he conducts his business affairs properly, being careful of every prohibition, etc., and setting times for Torah study, etc., the Holy One, blessed be He, will provide him the livelihood he needs without his needing a loan33 — nevertheless, since he must exert himself for his livelihood through natural means, he can easily stumble in the measure (the quantity and quality) of his effort and come to a situation in which he needs a loan. And it is obvious that in such a manner, and in such a common situation, where he stumbled in something that is difficult to guard against, there is an "obligation" to lend to him.
It follows, then, that according to Rabbi Yishmael's view it is impossible to say that "If you lend money, etc." means "optional." Therefore Rashi brought this matter in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, in order to allude to his view, according to which this interpretation is compelled34.
9. Now, at first glance one could say that Rabbi Yishmael's words (that "im" may also denote an obligation) apply only where "im" is stated. But where "v'im" ("and if") is stated (with the added vav, connecting it to what was said before it), its meaning (seemingly) is: and if you act differently from what was stated previously. Then it is even more evident that it ("v'im") is conditional and optional, and so it seems reasonable that it cannot be explained as an obligation.
However, from the fact that most (two out of three) of the exceptions to the rule of "optional" occur where "v'im" is stated — "And if ... an altar of stones, etc."; "And if you bring a meal-offering of first grain, etc." — it is evident that even where "v'im" is stated, it can be an obligation (only that the rule establishes that ordinarily it is not so). This is what Rashi was precise about in his wording: "כל אם (and he is not content with this, but continues — and not as an additional vav, as in the usual expression 'every tzaddik and tzaddik') ואם, etc." For his intent in this is [not only to emphasize that everywhere (except for three) it is optional, but] to emphasize that whether "im" is stated or "v'im" is stated, in both Rabbi Yishmael's rule applies and establishes its innovation.
And Rashi, according to his own approach, is compelled to say so:
On the verse "מזבח אדמה תעשה לי גו'" ("An altar of earth you shall make for Me, etc.")35 (which precedes the verse "And if ... an altar of stones, etc."), which speaks of the altar the Jewish people built in the desert, Rashi brings two explanations: "Attached to the earth, that he should not build it upon pillars. Another explanation: that he would fill the hollow of the copper altar with earth at the time of their encampment."
Now, according to the second explanation, one could seemingly say that the verse "And if ... an altar of stones, etc." continues the verse before it and is optional, its meaning being: if you fill the altar in the desert (not with earth but) with stones, "you shall not build them of hewn stone, etc." But according to the first explanation, they cannot be explained as one continuous passage, for their subjects are not the same: "And if ... an altar of stones, etc." speaks of the altar itself, whereas the preceding verse ("an altar of earth"), according to the first explanation, speaks of the manner in which the altar is built. And since this explanation is the first (= the principal one), it is understood that Rashi (according to his approach) is compelled to explain the verse "And if ... an altar of stones, etc." as an obligation and a new command — that is, that they shall build an altar after they cross the Jordan (and it does not refer to the one they built in the desert).
And this is the reason (in addition to the above, which pertains to the explanation of "If you lend money") that Rashi brings Rabbi Yishmael's words in the name of their author in Parshas Yisro: to allude that his explanation of the verse in Yisro, "And if ... an altar of stones, etc." (that the "v'im" does not continue the verse before it, and that its subject is not optional but obligatory) is explained by the fact that it was Rabbi Yishmael who said it. For Rabbi Yishmael is the one who holds that "an altar of earth" means "that he should not build it upon pillars"36. Therefore, according to his view, it is impossible to explain that "And if ... an altar of stones, etc." continues "An altar of earth, etc." before it, as explained above (and is optional); and so we are compelled to say that it does not speak of the copper altar that they built in the desert, but of the obligation to make an altar of stones upon their entry into the Land.
10. However, there would still be room to argue and say that although making an altar of stones is an obligation, "And if ... an altar of stones, etc." is nevertheless optional:
If we say that (sometimes) a brick is also included in "stone"37, one could say that the obligation (stated elsewhere) to make an altar of stones does not exclude an altar of bricks — that is, there is the option to make the altar of stone or of brick. According to this, there is room to explain the "im" in its plain sense (optional): "And if you make an altar of stones (and not of bricks) for yourself38, you shall not build them of hewn stone" (for the matter of "hewn stone" is possible only in an altar of actual stones39).
Therefore Rashi brings his proof of the obligation to make an altar of stones from what is said, "Of whole stones shall you build, etc." (and not from the preceding verse, "And there you shall build ... an altar of stones"). For a whole stone (according to the plain meaning) is possible only with a stone that is not made by human hands, which is whole by its nature and from the time of its creation (by Heaven)40. From this it follows that the obligation to make an altar of stones is for one of actual stones (according to the plain meaning of the verse); and if so, we are compelled to say that "And if ... an altar of stones, etc." is not optional but an obligation.
11. An additional reason why Rashi brings Rabbi Yishmael's words in the name of their author:
We find a dispute in the Gemara41 between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva concerning several matters42, whether they are optional or obligatory. That is, in matters where there is no decisive proof whether they mean optional or obligation, Rabbi Yishmael's view is that they should be explained as "optional," and Rabbi Akiva's view is that they are "obligation."
Rabbi Yishmael's words in our case, that "every 'im' is optional except for three, etc.," accord with his view that where there is no decisive proof, it must be optional. Therefore "every 'im'" (even where there is room to say that it is an obligation) means optional. Consequently it is understood, conversely, that these three exceptions to the rule contain a clear proof that compels interpreting their "im" as an obligation.
And this is also the (additional) reason that Rashi brings this statement in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: to allude that in these three places there is an absolute necessity to explain it as an obligation (for even Rabbi Yishmael, who holds that wherever there is no decisive proof it is only optional, holds here that it is an obligation) — and as Rashi proves from the verses, that we are compelled to say that their subject is an obligation.
12. From the "יינה של תורה" ("wine of the Torah") in this commentary of Rashi:
This dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva — concerning a verse where there is no decisive proof whether to interpret it as optional or as obligation43 — is rooted in the difference between their modes of Divine service:
Rabbi Yishmael was a Kohen44 (a Kohen Gadol45). The essence of a Kohen is that by his birth (by his nature) "קדוש הוא לאלקיו" ("he is holy to his G‑d"), meaning that his mode of service is the service of tzaddikim. Rabbi Akiva was a son of converts46 and began to learn Torah when he was forty years old47; from this it follows that his service was along the path of teshuvah48.
Well known is the teaching of the Maggid of Mezritch49 on the saying of our Sages50, "שלא יאמר אדם אי אפשי לאכול בשר חזיר כו' אבל אפשי ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי כך" ("A person should not say, 'I do not want to eat pork,' etc., but rather, 'I want to, but what can I do — my Father in Heaven has decreed thus upon me'"): this is what one who has never sinned should say. But the baal teshuvah — since "סורו רע" ("his origin is bad")51, so that an attachment to evil is more likely in him — must say, "I do not want to, etc."
So too with regard to optional and obligation: when the subject is a tzaddik, in whom by his very nature anything contrary to holiness is rejected, it suffices for him to serve in other matters, even if he does not occupy himself with refining and purifying the matter that has no decisive proof; his service in this matter is in the category of "optional" (and even if it is only optional, he will likely do it, for he is a tzaddik, and in this matter52 there is a consideration that it may be an obligation). Not so the baal teshuvah, who longs for added alacrity and extra care — if he was accustomed to study one page, he must study two pages53 — for him it must be an obligation.
Therefore Rabbi Yishmael, whose service is the service of tzaddikim, holds that where there is no decisive proof it is optional; whereas Rabbi Akiva, whose service is along the path of teshuvah, holds that it is an obligation.
13. From this comes a clear answer to those who ask and wonder regarding the revelation of the teachings of Chassidus in these generations of ours: "Has the generation become more worthy?" ("אכשור דרא"). On the contrary — specifically in these times, because of their doubled and redoubled darkness, there is a need for greater strengthening and for the granting of special powers in order to stand against every obstacle, etc.
And through our work in spreading the wellsprings outward — "קאתי מר, דא מלכא משיחא" ("the Master comes — this is the King Moshiach"), very soon indeed.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Mishpatim 5727 and 5729)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 22:24.
2) And this the student knows from Rashi's commentary, which he has already learned. See below, section 2.
3) As Rashi explains, Yisro 20:22.
4) Yisro, ibid.
5) Vayikra 2:14.
6) Bereishis 4:7.
7) As is explicit: "ואם לא תטיב לפתח חטאת רובץ גו'" ("And if you do not improve, sin crouches at the door, etc."). See Rashi there. And one cannot say that since another possibility is mentioned — "And if you do not improve, etc." — it is fitting to say "im" even if the first is an obligation, for if so, also in ... [OCR: the rest of this note is cut off in the source]
8) [Note text missing in the OCR source]
9) [Note text missing in the OCR source]
10) [Note text missing in the OCR source]
11) [Note text missing in the OCR source]
12) [Note text missing in the OCR source]
13) Masei 36:4.
14) This is why he elaborates more in his commentary there — detailing the three places, with proofs, etc. — which is not so in our parsha, where he only raises the matter in general and relies on what he wrote earlier.
15) Tavo 27:6.
16) Re'eh 15:8.
17) Tavo 27:5.
18) As is implied from the wording of Rabbi Yishmael himself: "Every 'im' in the Torah is optional, etc., obligation, etc." — and not "conditional" or "doubtful" and the like — for he comes only to explain those that are within the category of optional and obligation: to which of the two types they belong.
19) Vayeishev 39:6.
20) Yisro 19:13.
21) From this it is understood that although Rashi said "Every 'im,' etc.," we are compelled to say that his intent is not literally every place, but a specific category; and when he said "every," he meant every place within this category.
22) Vayeira 18:19.
23) Vayeitzei 28:18. And see Rashi, Re'eh 12:3: "An altar — of many stones; a pillar — of one stone." Thus it is understood that their matter is one, except that a pillar is of one stone. See also Ramban, Vayeitzei, ibid. And see Rashi (Vayeitzei, ibid., 22): "And so he did upon his return from Paddan Aram, when He said to him, 'Arise, go up to Beis El' (Vayishlach 35:1). What is said there (35:14)? 'And Yaakov set up a pillar, etc.'" Yet he was commanded, "And make there an altar, etc." (ibid., 1). See also ibid., 7. This is not the place to elaborate.
24) As for what Rashi writes in explaining the verse "And when the Jubilee shall be, etc.": "From here Rabbi Yishmael would say: the Jubilee is destined to cease" — his intent is not to explain "im" in the sense of a condition (see the Re'em and the Gur Aryeh on Vayikra 2:14, who explained Rashi's words thus. And although this seemingly contradicts what Rashi writes in Vayikra there — [they explain] that in Vayikra Rashi explains according to the plain meaning of the verse, whereas on the verse "And when the Jubilee shall be" he explains (according to the view of Rabbi Yishmael, that there are only three places where "im" is an obligation, and this is) according to the exposition of the Sages; but it is understood that one cannot say that Rashi, in his plain commentary, would explain in one place in contradiction to another place, as above, note 12, and it is also understood that all of Rashi's words follow the plain meaning of the verse), for he writes explicitly in Vayikra (there): "And likewise 'And when the Jubilee shall be, etc.'" Rather, his intent is that although its meaning is "when," the whole matter seemingly is superfluous, for it should have said "And in the Jubilee year" or the like (unlike "And if ... an altar of stones," "If you lend money," and "And if you bring a meal-offering of first grain," where, once Rashi explains that their meaning is "when," the meaning of the verse is that it informs us of the obligation to do them). Therefore Rashi explains that with "And when (im) the Jubilee shall be," the verse informs us that the Jubilee is destined to cease.
25) As for Rashi's writing here that "'im' serves in the sense of 'ki,'" and not in the sense of "ka'asher" as in the other places — one can say that since Rashi already explained (Vayeira 18:15) that "'ki' serves in four meanings," it is understood that where there is room to say that "'im' serves in the sense of 'ki,'" this is preferable, for then it is understood that "im" too serves in several meanings (see the Re'em and the Gur Aryeh). However, in the other places Rashi could not explain that "im" serves in the sense of "ki," for in places where "ki" means "when," the verb comes immediately after the word "ki" (as in Parshas Vayikra: "כי יקריב" (1:2); "כי תקריב" (2:1, 4); "כי תחטא" (4:2; 5:1, 17, 21)). Therefore here, where it says "ואם תקריב" ("im" adjacent to the verb), it is fitting to say "in the sense of 'ki,'" which is not so in "And if you make an altar of stones" and "If you lend money."
26) As for why Rashi brings an example specifically from this verse (and not from the verses "And if ... an altar of stones" and "If you lend money," which the student has already learned), one can say: a) In this verse it is evident from its own content that its meaning is "ki," for the Jubilee comes on its own when its time arrives (unlike the above verses, which require proof from elsewhere that they are obligatory). b) The common factor of the verses "And if you bring, etc." and "And when the Jubilee shall be, etc." is that in both the verb comes immediately after the word "im," unlike in the above places — see above, note 25.
27) As for what the Re'em writes — that this "im" is not among the three enumerated because it is an obligation that depends on something ("if an ox gores, etc.") and is not a matter that will necessarily come about, and therefore it does not have the certainty of the three — besides the fact that it is greatly puzzling how one can distinguish between them regarding certainty, as above, note 12, this is not sufficient, for "If you lend money" also depends on there being a poor person, and is not a matter that will necessarily come about (as the Maskil L'Dovid asked — and it is forced to distinguish between a matter that is closer to certainty and one that is not so close to certainty).
Also, what the Maskil L'Dovid writes — that obligation applies only when one must pursue some matter, which is not so here, where on the contrary he must guard his ox — is not understood, for the subject is not the obligation of the person whose ox caused damage, but the obligation of the court to obligate him to pay a ransom. We are therefore compelled to say as in the main text: it is not called an obligation of the court, since it comes about through an unusual occurrence, etc.
28) As for what Rashi writes there before this, "My people and a non-Jew — My people take precedence," we are compelled to say that Rashi's intent is not that a loan to a non-Jew is included in "If you lend money" (for he writes afterward, "and not to a non-Jew"). Rather, since for "My people" there is an obligation to lend, from "If you lend money," and for a non-Jew there is only an option, it is understood that "My people take precedence"; and this is not like "a poor person and a rich person — the poor person takes precedence," as Rashi distinguishes them afterward. At first he explains the matter in general, and afterward he details and distinguishes between the rich person and the non-Jew.
29) Except that it is not so simple (for a five-year-old beginning to study Scripture), and therefore its negation, too, comes by way of allusion — as has been explained several times.
30) Beshalach 16:32.
31) 35b.
32) Eikev 11:14.
*32) Yehoshua 1:8.
33) For he is poor (at least at that time), and "עבד לוה לאיש מלוה" ("the borrower is a servant to the lender").
34) Rashi chooses to explain the verse according to Rabbi Yishmael's view because, simply and in most cases, a person's conduct must be in this manner — with effort through natural means, etc. — as stated in the Gemara there: "Many did as Rabbi Yishmael and succeeded; as Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, and did not succeed." For the conduct of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai is only for unique individuals, and for the most part conduct must accord with Rabbi Yishmael's view.
However, at special times and as a temporary directive, the conduct of the majority, too, must be so; therefore in the time of Yirmeyahu he rebuked them about this, as above, for at that time it had to be so as a temporary directive.
And this is the precision in Rashi's wording (Beshalach, ibid.), "In the days of Yirmeyahu, when Yirmeyahu would rebuke them, etc." For seemingly "in the days of Yirmeyahu" is superfluous; rather, it alludes that specifically "in the days of Yirmeyahu" it had to be so (as a temporary directive, as above) — at that time it had to be like the manna, which was given to the Jewish people without any effort, etc.
Based on this, the greatest puzzle is resolved: in all the generations from Moshe Rabbeinu until Yirmeyahu (which included several spiritual descents, as related in the Prophets), we do not find that they showed the Jewish people the jar of manna?! And this is the meaning of "for your generations" — i.e., in special times and generations, when the conduct must be like that of the Jewish people in the desert.
35) Yisro 20:21.
36) Mechilta on the verse.
37) And although according to halachah a brick is not included in "stone" (see Magen Avraham, siman 131, subsection 20, and see the Mechilta cited in the following note), nevertheless, from the fact that Rashi did not explain on the verse "ותהי להם הלבנה לאבן גו'" ("And the brick served them as stone, etc.") (Noach 11:3) that the brick was in place of stone (as Ibn Ezra and others explain there), and likewise on "(and the clay served them) as mortar," Rashi explains "to plaster the wall," and not "in place of mud," as Ibn Ezra and others explain there — it is evident that he explains "And the brick served them as stone" literally: that the brick (i.e., the material from which it was made) hardened and became stone (see the Ran's commentary on the Torah: "And the brick served them as stone — that is, they found it strong and hard"). That is, according to the plain meaning of the verse, a brick is also called a stone.
38) See the Mechilta on the verse "And if ... an altar of stones, etc.": "Why does it say 'And if ... an altar of stones'? Rather: if he wishes, he may make it of stones; [if he wishes,] he may make it of bricks."
39) See Rashi on the verse: "An expression of cutting, etc." And cutting means separating something from the place where it is naturally, and not merely dividing something in two.
40) See Torah Or, Mishpatim 77c; and Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 10, first sicha on Parshas Vayeira. This is also so in simple terms.
41) Sotah 3a.
42) To the extent that Rav Papa there considered saying that "throughout the entire Torah they differ in this way."
43) See the explanation of their views in the Haggadah shel Pesach — the explanations at its end — in the Hadran on Tractate Pesachim (11 Nissan 5732).
44) Chullin 49a, bottom (and it speaks of the Rabbi Yishmael who was the colleague and disputant of Rabbi Akiva).
45) In the Shitah Mekubetzes on Chullin, ibid., item 9 (cited in Seder HaDoros, entry "Rabbi Yishmael," section 8, in the name of "some commentaries of Rashi"): "And he is Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha, the Kohen Gadol." But see Seder HaDoros, ibid. See also there, entry "Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha," section 3.
46) See Seder HaDoros under his entry. And see Or HaTorah [volume unclear in OCR] (123a, bottom). Rashi, s.v. "shelo hayah bo" — Yoma 22b.
47) Avos d'Rabbi Nosson, ch. 6:2. See also Pesachim 49b; Kesubos 62b.
48) See Yoma, ibid., that if he becomes arrogant, etc. And note the sequence of matters in the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 58b): "If he was a baal teshuvah, etc.; if he is a son of converts, etc." All this holds also according to what is explained in Tosafos, s.v. "dahavah" (Kesubos, ibid.), that although, when he was unlearned, he would say, "Who would give me a Torah scholar, and I would bite him like a donkey" (Pesachim, ibid.), he was nevertheless observant of mitzvos and was "modest and worthy" even before. But in the Chiddushei HaRitva there, he writes that previously he was not modest and worthy, "but afterward he returned to the good, so that he was modest and worthy" (so it appears in the Shitah Mekubetzes in his name, and so it must read also in the Chiddushei HaRitva there). According to this, he was an actual baal teshuvah (at least in these matters).
49) Cited in Likkutei Torah, Va'eschanan (9d). See similarly in Keser Shem Tov (Kehot edition, siman 398).
50) Sifra, end of Parshas Kedoshim.
51) Mechilta, Mishpatim 22:20 [OCR reads "22:2"], regarding a convert. And see Bamidbar Rabbah 8:2.
52) Note Sotah (44b): "In an optional war, etc."
53) Iggeres HaTeshuvah, end of ch. 9; and there, that it must be "doubled and redoubled."
Key Lesson
Rabbi Yishmael, a Kohen whose service was that of a tzaddik, treats an undecided matter as optional, while Rabbi Akiva, whose path was teshuvah, treats it as an obligation. In our generation, with its doubled and redoubled darkness, we need the extra strength and care of the baal teshuvah, treating even what might seem optional as an obligation. That is why the teachings of Chassidus are revealed now, and spreading them outward brings Moshiach very soon indeed.