1. The Cities of Refuge and the Month of Elul
In Parshas Sheftim, specifically in Hamishi, the Torah discusses the case of someone who kills another person accidentally. The Torah emphasizes the importance of providing easy access to the arei miklot—cities of refuge—where such a person can flee and be protected from the goel hadam—the avenger of blood. The Torah instructs that the roads leading to these cities should be wide and clearly marked with signs, ensuring that anyone in need can find their way without difficulty.
The Rebbe draws a parallel between this concept and the month of Elul. Just as there are physical cities of refuge, Elul serves as a spiritual city of refuge in time. During this month, there is an opportunity for protection and introspection, a chance to escape from the yetzer hara—the evil inclination—that seeks to ensnare us. The clear signs and easy access symbolize the encouragement we must give ourselves and others to take advantage of Elul’s unique potential for spiritual safety and renewal.
2. Intentional Murder and No Pity for the Guilty
The Torah then addresses what happens if someone kills intentionally. Unlike accidental killers, an intentional murderer cannot find sanctuary in a city of refuge. If such a person flees there, he is to be taken out and handed over to the goel hadam. The Torah states explicitly: lo tachos einecha alav—do not have pity on him. This is followed by uviarta dam hanoki mi Yisroel—you shall remove the innocent blood from Israel.
A close reading raises questions about this phrase. What does it mean to remove “innocent blood”? The Targum Onkelos translates uviarta dam hanoki as “destroying” or removing the one who spilled innocent blood, not destroying the innocent blood itself. In other words, it refers to punishing the murderer, not harming any further innocents.
This strict approach is reinforced by Rashi’s comment: One might think that since the original victim is already dead, killing another Jew (the murderer) only increases loss without restoring life. However, the Torah insists: do not pity him—justice demands his removal so that evil is eradicated from among you.
3. The Phrase “Lo Tachus Einecha” Across Different Cases
The expression lo tachus einecha—“do not have pity”—appears several times in Chumash Devarim, including by ir hanidachas—a city led astray into idolatry—and in our parsha regarding intentional murderers. In each case, it signals that one must carry out justice fully, even when it feels harsh or difficult.
This phrase also appears in connection with eidim zomemim—false witnesses who conspire to harm another Jew through their testimony. The Torah says: va’asitem lo ka’asher zamam la’asos le’achiv—do to him as he plotted for his brother—and then again warns: lo tachus einecha. Here too, Rashi explains that one might feel compassion for these witnesses since carrying out their punishment will not undo their intended harm. Nevertheless, justice requires following through without pity.
4. “Ayin Tachas Ayin”—Literal or Monetary?
The Torah lists various forms of retribution: nefesh b’nefesh—a soul for a soul, ayin b’ayin—an eye for an eye, shein b’shein—a tooth for a tooth, yad b’yad—a hand for a hand, and so on. Rashi clarifies that except for capital cases (nefesh b’nefesh, where actual execution is warranted), these phrases refer to monetary compensation rather than literal physical punishment.
If false witnesses claimed someone poked out another’s eye or knocked out a tooth, they themselves do not lose an eye or tooth but must pay damages equivalent to what they tried to inflict monetarily. This principle is derived from other verses and discussed extensively in Gemara Bava Kama.
5. “Lo Tachus Einecha” When Punishment Is Monetary
An interesting question arises regarding why the Torah uses lo tachus einecha, which usually means “do not have pity,” even when discussing cases where punishment is monetary rather than physical (such as paying damages instead of cutting off a hand). For example, later in Parshas Kisseitzei regarding a woman who embarrasses someone during a fight by grabbing him improperly, the verse says: v’katzos es kapah v’lo tachus einecha. Rashi explains here too that “cut off her hand” means she pays compensation for embarrassment rather than literal amputation.
This raises a difficulty: Why would there be any reason for pity when we are being lenient (requiring payment instead of mutilation)? Perhaps it means one should not hesitate even when only monetary compensation is required because justice still demands accountability.
6. Comparing “Lo Tachus Einecha” Across Contexts
The phrase appears multiple times with slightly different implications depending on context. In cases involving capital punishment (nefesh b’nefesh, intentional murder), it means do not let misplaced compassion prevent you from carrying out justice fully. In cases involving bodily injury or embarrassment (yad b’yad, etc.), where Chazal interpret payment rather than literal retribution, it may serve as an assurance that even monetary penalties must be enforced without hesitation or undue mercy.
This distinction may explain why later verses (such as by v’katzos es kapah) are learned specifically from those places where “yad b’yad”, etc., are interpreted monetarily rather than literally or lethally.
7. Evaluating Damages: How Much Is Paid?
The discussion turns practical: How do we evaluate how much someone pays for injuring another? The value is determined by comparing how much a person would be worth as a slave with or without that limb (hand, eye). This market-based assessment provides an objective standard for damages owed under Torah law.
A question was raised whether sometimes extra payment is required because someone could repeat their offense (e.g., using their hand again), but this does not seem supported by sources—the payment reflects only actual damage done at that time according to standard evaluation methods.
8. Open Questions and Further Study
The shiur concludes with unresolved questions about why certain phrases appear where they do and how best to understand their nuances across different parshiyos and halachos—especially regarding when punishments are literal versus monetary and how Chazal derive these distinctions from textual cues like lo tachus einecha. There is mention of needing further study in Mefarshim and possibly insights from Rebbe’s sichos on these topics.