Parshas Bo
1. In the Laws of the Pesach Offering1, the Rambam rules that although a minor who came of age between Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni is obligated in Pesach Sheni
— because the halachah follows the opinion of Rebbi that Pesach Sheni is "רגל בפני עצמו" ("a festival in its own right"), and therefore the obligation of Pesach Sheni can take effect even upon someone who was not obligated on Pesach Rishon2 —
nevertheless, "אם שחטו עליו בראשון פטור" ("if they slaughtered [the Pesach offering] on his behalf on the first [Pesach], he is exempt")3.
The well-known question on this (as the Kesef Mishneh asks4) is: "אטו קטן בר חיובא ופטורא הוא" ("Is a minor, then, subject to obligation and exemption?") — how can the slaughtering on his behalf on the first Pesach (when he was not subject to obligation) exempt him from Pesach Sheni?
The Kesef Mishneh brings the answer of Rabbi Yosef Korkos5: since the Torah included a minor, so that one may slaughter on his behalf and register him [as is learned6 from the verse "שה לבית" ("a lamb for each household")7 — "this teaches that a person may bring and slaughter on behalf of his minor son and daughter"], he is thereby exempted from the second.
The Minchas Chinuch asks on this8:
According to the conclusion of the Gemara in Nedarim9 (and so too is implied by the Rambam10), "שה לבית אבות" ("a lamb for each father's house") is not a Torah law; that is, by Torah law there is no law of registration for a minor11 (and registering a minor son for a Pesach offering12 is only Rabbinic).
2. In the Chiddushei Rabbi Chaim HaLevi (on the Rambam13) it is explained that "the fact that 'a lamb for each father's house' is not a Torah law applies (only) with regard to obligation" (that there is no obligation upon the father to offer the Pesach on behalf of his minor children), but "with regard to the essential law of registration, minors too were included by the verse 'a lamb for each household,' so that the father may register them without their consent"14, and the law of registration and ownership of the Pesach applies to them by Torah law.
On this basis he resolves the above ruling of the Rambam: although "minors were not included in the obligation of the Pesach offering" (since a minor is not subject to obligation), nevertheless "the Pesach counts for them," and consequently he is exempt from Pesach Sheni, "since he has already fulfilled the offering of the Pesach and its mitzvah on the first."
Going further, we find in the Tzafnas Paneach (of the Rogatchover)15 the explanation that there are two laws by which a minor may eat of the Pesach offering:
a) By virtue of the law of "a lamb for each father's house"16 — in which case the minor is not counted among the "members of the group" and has no connection to the offering and making of the Pesach; and the fact that he eats of the Pesach offering is only because he is "subsumed under the father."
b) If his father registered him for his Pesach — whereby he becomes one of the "members of the group"17 (and in this manner the minor must be one who is able to eat a kezayis18, and he must be a ben daas, one possessing understanding19).
And the Rambam's ruling, "if they slaughtered on his behalf on the first, he is exempt," speaks only of a case where the minor became one of the members of the group through registration — "they slaughtered on his behalf" — because then the making of the Pesach is also for his sake.
3. However, this answer (that even according to the view that "a lamb for each father's house" is not a Torah law, a minor is within the category of registration by Torah law) requires further explanation:
Tosafos20 says that according to the view that "a lamb for each father's house" is not a Torah law, the Pesach offering is a forbidden thing for the minor, because the Pesach offering may not be eaten by one not registered for it [and the fact that one may feed the minor from the Pesach offering is only because "there is the mitzvah of chinuch" (training in mitzvos)]. That is to say, according to Tosafos a minor (according to the view that "a lamb for each father's house" is not a Torah law) is not within the category of registration21; not only is he not within the category of obligation, but he is forbidden in it, not within the scope of the offering — by Torah law it is forbidden even to feed him from the Pesach offering.
And the Alter Rebbe cites the view of Tosafos as halachah, in these words22: "כל דבר שהוא משום חינוך מצוה מותר לספות לו איסור בידים כגון להאכיל פסח לקטן שהגיע לחינוך אע"פ שלא נמנה עליו ואין הפסח נאכל אלא למנויו אעפ"כ כיון שמתכוין לחנכו במצות מותר" ("Anything that is for the sake of training in a mitzvah — it is permitted to directly feed him something forbidden; for example, to feed the Pesach offering to a minor who has reached the age of training23, even though he was not registered for it and the Pesach is eaten only by those registered for it; nevertheless, since one intends to train him in mitzvos, it is permitted") [and the source of this law (from the Magen Avraham24, who cites it) is the above-mentioned Tosafos].
According to the above explanations of the Rambam, it would turn out that the ruling of the Alter Rebbe (following Tosafos) contradicts the ruling of the Rambam25.
But it is a strained thing to say so: we do not find an opinion that disputes the Rambam,
and from the fact that the commentators on the Rambam do not remark on this, it is understood26 that all accept the Rambam's ruling.
4. Seemingly, one could resolve this on the basis of a precise reading of the wording of (the Magen Avraham and) the Alter Rebbe — "it is permitted to directly feed him something forbidden; for example, to feed the Pesach offering to a minor... even though he was not registered for it and the Pesach is eaten only by those registered for it":
From the wording "even though he was not registered for it" (and not "he is not eligible for registration" or the like), it is implied that for a minor too the category of registration applies; only here it is the eating of a forbidden thing because it speaks of a case where (in actual fact) "he was not registered for it."
On this basis one could seemingly say that the Alter Rebbe27 takes the words of Tosafos only with regard to the matter of chinuch: that on account of "training in a mitzvah" one may feed the Pesach offering to a minor even when it counts as a forbidden thing for him.
But the prohibition here is [not, as Tosafos holds, that since "a lamb for each father's house" is not a Torah law a minor may not eat of the Pesach offering at all; rather it is] because here we speak of a case where "he was not registered for it." If, however, the father registered the minor for his Pesach, the minor may (must) eat of the Pesach offering by Torah law (since he is one of the "members of the group").
— Accordingly, the ruling of the Alter Rebbe does not contradict the ruling of the Rambam, since the Rambam speaks (as above) of a case where "he was registered for it," whereas the Alter Rebbe speaks of a case where "he was not registered for it."
5. But on precise examination one cannot say so (that according to the Alter Rebbe's ruling the category of registration applies to a minor),
because the source that permitted feeding a minor from the Pesach offering "not for those registered for it" on account of "training in a mitzvah" is, after all, the words of Tosafos cited above. Now, according to the view of Tosafos that a minor is not within the category of registration — one is compelled to say that it was permitted on account of "training in a mitzvah," in order to answer the question (of Tosafos): "והאיך מאכיל פסח שלא למנויו" ("How can one feed the Pesach to one not registered for it?").
But if one holds that by Torah law a minor is within the category of registration (and of eating the Pesach) — what reason is there to say that if the father did not register his son for his Pesach, one should permit him "to directly feed him" a forbidden thing on account of "training in a mitzvah"?!
Especially according to the ruling of the Alter Rebbe28 that "to directly feed him something forbidden is forbidden to every person by Torah law" — it would follow that the permission to feed him on account of "training in a mitzvah" — and chinuch is a mitzvah of Rabbinic origin29 — overrides a Torah prohibition?!30
6. We must therefore say that according to the ruling of the Alter Rebbe there is no law of registration for a minor by Torah law.
As for the Alter Rebbe's use of the wording "even though he was not registered for it" (and not "he is not eligible for registration" or the like), we will have to interpret his intent:
a) With the words "he was not registered" he means to say that the minor does not become "registered for it"; that is, even if the father registered him for the Pesach, he is "not registered" — he is not within the category of registration31.
b) One may further say that the wording means it literally — that the father did not register him; and although in any case he is not within the category of registration, there could have been a reason and logic that one should be required to register him on account of chinuch in order to feed him from the Pesach offering (and this is what the Alter Rebbe comes to negate: "even though he was not registered for it," one may feed him from the Pesach offering).
The explanation of this: immediately after the above law (concerning the Pesach offering) the Alter Rebbe continues: "אבל מצוה שלא שייך בה חינוך דהיינו שלא יוכל לעשותה כשיגדל... אע"פ שזהו צורך מצוה מ"מ כיון שכשיגדל יאסור לו לכן גם עכשיו אסור" ("But a mitzvah to which training does not apply, that is, which he will not be able to do when he grows up... even though this is for the needs of a mitzvah, nevertheless, since when he grows up it will be forbidden to him, it is therefore forbidden now too").
For this very reason there are opinions32 that in our case, since an adult may not eat of the Pesach offering without registration, the permission on account of "training in a mitzvah" too applies only in a case where his father "registered" him.
[Or in a somewhat different manner: there could be a reason that one overrides the Torah prohibition of "directly feeding him" for the sake of "training in a mitzvah" (which is only of Rabbinic origin) only if the father's act of training is complete — and in our case, that he includes the minor in the making of the Pesach through registration, etc.33]
— The Alter Rebbe says that "even though he was not registered for it," one may feed the minor for the sake of training.
In light of all this, the question returns to its place: how does the ruling of the Alter Rebbe accord with the ruling of the Rambam?
7. The explanation of this may be given according to the principle that the Rogatchover34 derives from the above ruling of the Rambam: that "even one who is exempt (an act of a mitzvah performed while he is exempt), since his act endures, he is exempted even at the time when he becomes obligated"35.
He brings several examples of this, among them:
a) From the Behag36 it is implied that according to the view that a minor can father children, he fulfills the mitzvah of "פרו ורבו" ("Be fruitful and multiply") through the children born during his minority37.
b) A non-Jew who circumcised himself for the sake of the mitzvah — even though he does not do it for the sake of conversion — "if he later converts, he need not draw the blood of the covenant"38.
c) The mitzvah of knowing the Torah is fulfilled with the words of Torah one learns as a minor, since "through the study... he will have knowledge when he is an adult"39.
From the above examples it is understood that the Rogatchover's reasoning is a separate explanation40 of the above ruling of the Rambam. That is to say: what he writes — "even one who is exempt, since his act endures, he is exempted even at the time when he becomes obligated" — does not refer specifically to mitzvos in which the Torah explicitly included a minor in the law of performing the mitzvah (only that he is "exempt" — the minor is not obligated in it)
— similar to the Rogatchover's earlier explanation, that a minor is connected to the making of the Pesach by Torah law (he can become registered by Torah law for the Pesach offering as one of the members of the group), only being a minor he is ("exempt") not obligated in it41 —
but even in mitzvos where we do not find that the minor has any connection to the law of performing the mitzvah — his act of the mitzvah as a minor (and exempt), if it endures (continues), exempts him at the time of his adulthood.
As in the first two examples above42 — a minor is not included in the mitzvah of "Be fruitful and multiply," and all the more so the circumcision of a non-Jew, who is not at all within the category of the mitzvah of circumcision — yet the Rogatchover says that (also) in these cases, "since his act endures, he is exempted even at the time when he becomes obligated."
So too in our case (a Pesach offering slaughtered on behalf of the minor): even if one says that the minor is not within the category of registration by Torah law (as in the above ruling of the Alter Rebbe), nevertheless, since he was registered for the Pesach, he participated in the Pesach offering; and since the Pesach offering is a matter whose "act endures" (as will be explained in sections 8–9), it exempts him "even at the time when he becomes obligated" (on Pesach Sheni).
8. But seemingly this still requires explanation:
Granted, in the above examples the act of the mitzvah is a (physical) reality — children, circumcision, knowledge of the Torah — which the "exempt" person (a minor, etc.) brought about through his act.
In our case, however — the Pesach offering — the offering and the mitzvah are (not only the eating of the Pesach but) the slaughtering of the Pesach and its offering; and since by Torah law a minor is not within the category of registration, this means that by Torah law the minor did not have the reality, and all the more so not the act of the mitzvah — the offering was not brought for the minor (since he is not within the category of registration)43.
This will be understood by first explaining the words of the Rogatchover regarding the making of the Pesach, that "his act endures." For seemingly:
Until [OCR unclear] the time of eating the Pesach, the Rogatchover44 explains that the mitzvah of making the Pesach continues throughout the time of eating (as he brings the practical halachic difference, that there are conditions at the time of eating that invalidate the slaughtering; for example, "uncircumcision at the time of eating the Pesach invalidates the slaughtering as well"45).
And as is proven from the very fact that "הפסח אינו נאכל אלא למנויו" ("the Pesach is eaten only by those registered for it") (and the registration must be "before the slaughtering of the Pesach"46), because the slaughtering of the Pesach and the eating of the Pesach are one continuum — "the Pesach... came from its outset only for eating"47.
But what is the source for saying that "his act" (of making the Pesach) "endures" after the time of the Pesach has passed and it is forbidden to make it or eat it, and chametz is permitted, etc. — that it endures until Pesach Sheni (on account of which [OCR unclear] he is exempt from Pesach Sheni)?
9. One may say concerning this:
According to the view that Pesach Sheni is a festival in its own right (which is how the Rambam rules, as mentioned at the beginning of section 1), Pesach Sheni is an obligation in its own right, and it is counted in the enumeration of the mitzvos (in the Rambam48) as a separate mitzvah.
[Moreover: according to the opinion of the Rambam in his Sefer HaMitzvos49, even if "(he acted willfully on the first and) offered on the second," he is liable to kares, because since Pesach Sheni is (not "compensation for the first" but) a festival in its own right, it does not exempt him from the liability of kares of Pesach Rishon] —
nevertheless, even according to this opinion, if he brought a Pesach Rishon he is exempt from Pesach Sheni. The reasoning for this is as stated explicitly in the verse — that Pesach Sheni is one matter with Pesach Rishon: both are as their name — "Pesach," an offering for the Exodus from Egypt, and the time extends from the time of Pesach Rishon until the time of Pesach Sheni50. Therefore, the making of Pesach Rishon is a continuing act (not only until the time of its eating, but) until Pesach Sheni.
Therefore, although Pesach Sheni is an obligation separate from Pesach Rishon51, one who offered the Pesach on the first is not obligated in Pesach Sheni, because he has the act of the offering (of Pesach Rishon) until Pesach Sheni; the act of making the Pesach offering (of the first) endures until Pesach Sheni.
10. On this basis we will also understand the case of a minor who came of age between Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni — prefaced by what was once discussed52 at length regarding a minor in general:
From the very fact that the Torah obligates a Jew in mitzvos immediately when he comes of age, one is compelled to say that a minor is obligated to learn the laws of the mitzvos (such as the Shema, tefillin and the like) before he becomes an adult53. That is to say, even without the obligation of chinuch (which is only of Rabbinic origin and is a command upon the father), by the command of the Torah a minor is obligated to prepare himself (while a minor) for the mitzvos in which he becomes obligated immediately when he comes of age54, for otherwise he will not be able to fulfill them in his adulthood (similar to hechsher mitzvah, preparation for a mitzvah).
With this it was explained55 regarding the discussion about a minor who came of age on Purim of walled cities (15 Adar) that fell on Shabbos, when the obligation of reading the Megillah is moved forward for everyone to 14 Adar, but in our case he is then (on 14 Adar) still a minor: it turns out that a minor fulfills an obligation in which he is obligated as an adult — and is obligated to read the Megillah!
According to the above principle this is understood: since, in order to have the reading of the Megillah on the 15th, he must read it on the 14th, then (even though from the standpoint of the 14th itself it is not applicable to obligate him in reading the Megillah) in this calendar configuration a full obligation (not only on account of chinuch) takes effect upon him to read the Megillah on the 14th, as a preparation for his obligation on the 15th.
According to the above — that a minor becomes obligated by Torah law in the matters that prepare him for his obligation in adulthood — one may say (going even further56) in our case:
Although by Torah law a minor has no connection at all to the making of the Pesach — in a case where he came of age between Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni, when (in this year) the minor has the matter of Pesach (for he will become an adult before Pesach Sheni) — since Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni are one continuum of one time (as explained in section 9), the minor therefore has the matter of Pesach Rishon57, as a preparation for his obligation on Pesach Sheni.
In somewhat different terms: since Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni are one matter, as above, and he is obligated in Pesach Sheni — the obligation of making the Pesach already pertains to him at the beginning of the matter, on Pesach Rishon.
Therefore, although one cannot say that he could fulfill the mitzvah of making the Pesach offering on Pesach Rishon (when he is still a minor), nevertheless, through the fact that "they slaughtered on his behalf on the first," he has the act (not the fulfillment of the obligation) of offering the Pesach (as a preparation for his obligation on Pesach Sheni); and consequently — "since his act endures, he is exempted even at the time when he becomes obligated."
(From the sichos of the night following Shabbos Parshas Tzav, Acharon shel Pesach, and the night following Shabbos Parshas Shemini, 5730)
Notes
1) Ch. 5, halachah 7.
2) Pesachim 93a. Rambam, ibid., halachah 1 (and onward).
3) See Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Terumos 2:2 (43c), that the Rambam's source is the Jerusalem Talmud, Pesachim 8:1; see there. So too writes the Ridbaz on the Jerusalem Talmud there (while Korban HaEdah and Pnei Moshe explain the words of the Jerusalem Talmud differently).
4) On the passage. Turei Even (Avnei Milu'im) on Rosh Hashanah 28a also raises this question, and others.
5) See also the answer in Kiryas Sefer (by the Mabit) on the passage.
6) Pesachim 88a. See also below, note 12.
7) Our parshah, 12:3.
8) Mitzvah 5, subsection 2 (near its end).
9) 36a.
10) From what he writes in the Laws of the Pesach Offering (2:8) — that for adults it must be with their consent (and if he held that "a lamb for each father's house" is a Torah law, a person could bring a Pesach for his fellow without his consent, as in Nedarim there). So writes the Minchas Chinuch there (and others) regarding the Rambam's view. But note that according to several authorities (Kehillas Yaakov (Algazi), cited in Yad David on Pesachim there, and others) the Rambam ruled that "a lamb for each father's house" is a Torah law (and the discussion is well known whether there are conflicting passages on this — see Tosafos, Gittin 25a; Ramban and Ritva there; Shitah Mekubetzes, Nedarim there; see also Tosafos, Gittin 64b; Kiddushin 42a, and elsewhere; this is not the place to elaborate). But see below in the text (section 3 and onward) that the Alter Rebbe (who surely does not differ with the Rambam) rules as halachah according to the view of Tosafos (Pesachim 88a; ibid. [OCR unclear], end of side a) that "a lamb for each father's house" is not a Torah law.
11) See Tosafos, Ran, and Tosafos HaRosh on Nedarim there; Shitah Mekubetzes there; Tosafos, s.v. Seh, Pesachim 88a. See also below, note 21.
12) See Sukkah 42b and the commentators there; Rambam, Laws of the Pesach Offering 2:4.
13) On the Laws of the Pesach Offering 5:6.
*) See there the discussion of what the Rambam writes in the Laws of the Pesach Offering 2:4, and the Kesef Mishneh there; this is not the place to elaborate.
14) On this basis he explains the words of Rabbi Zeira in Pesachim (88a), "a lamb for each household — in any case," in their plain sense (as Rashi explains there; so too in Rabbeinu Chananel there; see also Shitah Mekubetzes, Nedarim there), that the minor's consent is not required — unlike the interpretation of Tosafos, Pesachim there (cited below in the text). See there also his explanation of the continuation of the Gemara's discussion in Nedarim there.
15) Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Terumos 2:12 (43c–d). See also Responsa Tzafnas Paneach (Dvinsk), vol. 2, simanim 8–14 (copied (mostly) in Tzafnas Paneach on the Torah, our parshah, p. 59ff.).
16) See his wording in Responsa Tzafnas Paneach, ibid., beginning of siman 9 (and see there that this is unlike Tosafos, Pesachim, cited above in note 14). — And the statement in Nedarim that "a lamb for each father's house is not a Torah law" he explains (in the Laws of Terumos there) thus: that is, whether "a lamb for each father's house" by Torah law requires that he have them in mind, or (if it is not a Torah law) it is so automatically, and it does not help even if he intends not to slaughter on their behalf (see there). See also Shitah Mekubetzes, Nedarim there: "a lamb for each father's house is not a Torah law... and it is a decree of Scripture to feed the Pesach [OCR unclear] to the members of his household."
17) Cited in note 12. See also Rambam, ibid., ch. 5, halachah [OCR unclear].
18) Rambam, Laws of the Pesach Offering 2:3 (from Sukkah 42b).
19) Responsa Tzafnas Paneach, ibid., siman 8: "that he be a ben daas, like the case in Sukkah, page 42" (see there, side b).
20) Pesachim, ibid.
21) Even according to the Ran (and Tosafos, Rashbam) on Nedarim there, that minors eat by Torah law — they wrote that there is no prohibition here of "not for those registered," because they are not subject to the law of registration. This proves that this is a law only regarding eating (that they are permitted to eat sacred food), but they have no connection to the making of the Pesach [and the slaughtering of the Pesach and its eating are two mitzvos — the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvos, positive commandments 55–56, and elsewhere. See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 16, p. 102ff.].
22) In the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 343:8 (from the Magen Avraham there, subsection 3).
23) These words are not in the Magen Avraham. One may suggest that the Alter Rebbe added them to emphasize the practical difference between the view of Tosafos and the view of the Ran, etc., regarding the reason why it is permitted to feed the Pesach offering to a minor without this being a violation of "not for those registered" — whether it is permitted to feed it also to a minor who has not reached the age of training (and this is in addition to the practical difference in the Magen Avraham there regarding a deaf-mute and a mentally incompetent person).
24) Orach Chaim, ibid., subsection 3. See also below, note 27.
25) Note the Chiddushei Chasam Sofer on the margin of the Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, ibid.
26) As in the well-known principle (see Mishneh LaMelech, Laws of Kilayim 9:11, and the works cited in Sdei Chemed, Principles of the Halachic Authorities, siman [OCR unclear], subsection 1) that where the commentators on the Rambam did not challenge him, this is proof that they agree with his words.
27) And all the more so in the Magen Avraham, who cites it in the name of Tosafos: one can say (at least in a strained manner) that his intent is only to bring a proof from the words of Tosafos for the law that one may directly feed a minor something forbidden when this involves training in a mitzvah (but regarding the Pesach offering he does not hold like Tosafos, but like the Ran, etc., that from the outset there is no prohibition of "not for those registered" for a minor).
28) Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, ibid., seif 5. — Whereas in Tosafos, Pesachim, cited above, it is not stated that directly feeding him something forbidden is a Torah prohibition. See also Encyclopedia Talmudis, entry Chinuch, section 12 (p. 195), and the sources cited there.
29) The Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, ibid., seif 2; the Alter Rebbe's Laws of Torah Study, at their beginning; and the sources cited there.
30) And here we are speaking of the prohibition of "not for those registered," which is a Torah prohibition. See Derush VeChiddush of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, ma'arachah 8 (s.v. VehaShaar HaMelech), Yad David, and the works cited in Shitah Mekubetzes on Pesachim (by Rabbi Y. Gershuni) on the words of Tosafos there — who asked how it is permitted to directly feed something forbidden by Torah law on account of Rabbinic chinuch. See also the Minchas Chinuch cited below, note 32.
31) Note the wording of the Magen Avraham there: "And so wrote Tosafos... that it is permitted... even though he was not registered for it" — while according to Tosafos the Gemara's intent is that a minor is not within the category of registration (even if he was registered for his father's Pesach).
32) Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah 7 (at its end), and elsewhere — and he interprets Tosafos this way. But in the Magen Avraham and the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch it states explicitly "even though he was not registered for it," the plain meaning of which is that his father did not register him, as in the text.
*) Note that from the fact that the Minchas Chinuch there cites the words of the Magen Avraham (regarding the reading of the Shema on Shabbos), it seemingly appears that he interprets the view of the Magen Avraham this way too. One must say that he interprets the words of the Magen Avraham in the first manner given in the text. See also above, note 31.
33) The reason may be explained in several ways, among them: a) Since the registration is done by the father, the concern "שמא יסרך בכך" ("lest he become accustomed to it") does not apply. b) Since even if his father registered him, he does not become registered (by Torah law) for the Pesach (since he lacks understanding), unless it is to train him in registration. And other ways.
34) Laws of Terumos, ibid. See also Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Circumcision 3:9; Responsa Tzafnas Paneach cited above, siman 8 and siman 14. See also Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Nezirus 2:9 (2a).
35) The wording of the Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Terumos, ibid. (43, end of column c).
36) Laws of Kesubos.
37) Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Circumcision, ibid.; Responsa Tzafnas Paneach, ibid., siman 10. — And he cites there (see also in the Responsa there, siman 8, end of subsection 1) the dispute in Yevamos (62a) regarding a convert, whether he fulfills "Be fruitful and multiply" through children born to him while a gentile. But see Turei Even [OCR unclear] (28a), that in this respect even Noahides are [OCR unclear]. See also Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah 306.
38) Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Circumcision, ibid., halachah 6 (see there, that he interprets the Rambam's wording there in this way).
39) Responsa Tzafnas Paneach, ibid., siman 10.
40) A further explanation is in Responsa Tzafnas Paneach, ibid., siman 10: that the Rambam speaks of an adult who had not shown two hairs, who then becomes an adult retroactively; see there. This requires great investigation, since it is a very great stretch to interpret that what the Rambam writes of a "minor" without qualification refers specifically to such a case.
41) See his wording in the Laws of Nezirus, ibid.: "since it exists in part" (and so too in our case (the Pesach offering) he writes there: "although then it was not an obligation... since nevertheless there is a mitzvah in it").
42) Whereas regarding the example of knowledge of the Torah one can say that since there is a Torah obligation upon the father to teach his son Torah, it follows that the Torah included the minor and brought him into the performance of this mitzvah. See Responsa Tzafnas Paneach, ibid., and elsewhere. Well known are the words of the Tzemach Tzedek in his Piskei Dinim, vol. 2 (novellae on the Rambam, at the beginning), that "perhaps a minor too (from when he has awareness) has an obligation (in Torah study) by Torah law." See at length on this (and also in explanation of the Rambam's words that a minor on whose behalf they slaughtered on the first is exempt) Likkutei Sichos vol. 6, p. 233ff.
43) For what does the father's intention (and registration) accomplish here if the minor is not within the category of registration at all? [And in the Minchas Chinuch cited in note 8: "since in any event he was obligated by Rabbinic law, he is exempted by Torah law... and the matter is lengthy whether a Rabbinic law becomes a Torah law." See also below, note 57.]
44) Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Terumos, ibid. So too in Responsa Tzafnas Paneach, ibid., end of the siman, and elsewhere.
45) His wording in Tzafnas Paneach, Laws of Terumos, ibid.
46) Pesachim 61a, end of side a.
47) Mishnah, Pesachim 76b.
48) In Sefer HaMitzvos and in the enumeration of the mitzvos at the beginning of the Yad (positive commandments 57–58). So too in the heading of the Laws of the Pesach Offering; ibid., 5:1.
49) Positive commandment 57. — And although in the Yad (Laws of the Pesach Offering 5:2) he retracted, it is obvious that there is reasoning and explanation for his first opinion in his Sefer HaMitzvos. Rashi too (Pesachim 93a, s.v. Tashlumin deRishon) holds this way (as the Tzlach interprets there; but in Or Chadash on Pesachim there, that Rashi wrote this only according to the view of Rabbi Nassan and not according to the view of Rebbi; see there; this is not the place to elaborate).
50) See also Tzafnas Paneach on the Rambam, at its beginning (1, end of column b) [and he connects this with the view of the Rambam in the Yad that one who acted willfully on the first and offered on the second is exempted from kares. And according to what is explained in the text, perhaps one may say similarly also according to what he writes in Sefer HaMitzvos, that he is not exempted]. See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 8, p. 126ff.
51) Whereas according to the view that it is compensation (or a remedy) for the first, it does not necessarily follow that it is a continuing act; rather, the Torah gave compensation to this person who did not fulfill the mitzvah in its time.
52) Likkutei Sichos vol. 10, p. 70. See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 35, p. 61ff. (and there, p. 65ff., another approach to this is explained; see there).
53) And even more so with a convert who converted [OCR unclear] before he converted (see Chiddushei Aggados of the Maharsha, Shabbos 31a, s.v. Amar lo; Responsa of Rabbi Akiva Eiger, siman 41; Sdei Chemed, Principles 3, subsection 155 (26); ibid., Pe'as HaSadeh [OCR unclear]). And even more so — [OCR unclear], that "they inform him, etc." (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 268:2).
54) As with a minor who comes of age on 15 Tishrei, who requires "ולקחתם לכם" ("you shall take for yourselves") — from your own (Sukkah 26b), and must [OCR unclear] prepare the Four Kinds while still a minor.
55) See Likkutei Sichos, ibid. [OCR unclear], p. 69, and the sources cited there.
56) For in the above examples the minor must necessarily do it while a minor (since otherwise it is impossible), whereas in our case of the Pesach offering (it is possible to bring Pesach Sheni). But on the other hand, in the above examples the minor is obligated to perform a mitzvah, whereas in our case it is not being said that there is an obligation upon the minor to perform Pesach Rishon, but only that he is within the category of making the (first) Pesach while a minor ("if they slaughtered on his behalf"), as a preparation for his obligation on Pesach Sheni.
57) And not only on account of Rabbinic chinuch (see above, note 43). — Note that according to what is explained in the text, one may say similarly regarding the well-known discussion of a minor who comes of age in the middle of the days of the Counting of the Omer (see Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah 306; and at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 1, p. 271; vol. 8, p. 55), that his counting while a minor is effective for him by Torah law once he comes of age. Note also Responsa Eretz Tzvi, siman 6; this is not the place to elaborate. Similarly one may note regarding other discussions of this kind — for example, in our subject: a minor who comes of age on the night of the 15th, whether the registration made during his minority is effective (see Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah 6, subsection 2).
Key Lesson
Pesach Rishon and Pesach Sheni form one continuous span, so a minor who will come of age before Pesach Sheni is already connected to Pesach Rishon as a preparation for his coming obligation, and the offering made on his behalf endures to exempt him. Likewise, what a child does and learns before adulthood is not just practice: it is the real groundwork that lets him fulfill his obligations fully once they arrive.