Parshas Tzav
1. In our parsha, Rashi quotes from the verse1 the words "אם על תודה יקריבנו" ("If he offers it for a thanksgiving") and explains: "If [he offers it] on account of thanksgiving for a miracle that was performed for him — for example, seafarers, those who travel through deserts, those who were imprisoned, and a sick person who recovered, who are required to give thanks, as it is written regarding them2, 'יודו לה' חסדו ונפלאותיו לבני אדם ויזבחו זבחי תודה' ('Let them thank Hashem for His kindness, and His wonders to the children of man, and let them offer thanksgiving sacrifices') — if he vowed these shelamim on account of one of these, they are thanksgiving-shelamim, and they require the bread mentioned in the passage, and they may be eaten only for a day and a night, as is explained here."
This needs to be understood:
a) "Todah" simply means thanksgiving in general — so how does Rashi know to infer that the "(if for a) thanksgiving" written here means specifically "thanksgiving for a miracle"?
b) Even if Rashi has some compelling reason that the intent is only thanksgiving for a miracle — where does he infer from that only these four miracles are included and no more? And if we say that his proof is from the verse in Tehillim (which Rashi cites immediately in his commentary), "Let them thank Hashem for His kindness," which counts only four kinds of miracle — how do we know, in the plain meaning of Scripture, that the verse intends that only for these miracles is one obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering? One could say that one is obligated for all miracles, and the verse brings examples of different kinds — for it is impossible for the verse to list every possible miracle!
c) Even if it is proven from the verse that only for these four miracles is one obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering, why did Rashi need to list all of them in his commentary here (which is not a book of halachah)? For understanding the plain meaning of Scripture, it would be enough to bring one of them as an example (and to allude to the other three miracles with the word "etc.," concluding "as it is written regarding them, etc."), as is usual in such cases in many places in Rashi's commentary on the Torah.
d) What is Rashi's intent when he adds, after listing the four miracles, "if he vowed these shelamim on account of one of these, they are thanksgiving-shelamim, etc."? All of this is simply the plain meaning of the words "If he offers it for a thanksgiving"!
e) These four who must give thanks, Rashi brings in this order: "seafarers, those who travel through deserts, those who were imprisoned, and a sick person who recovered." Now, what difference does it make? Why did Rashi change from the order in which "it is written regarding them" — in Rashi's own words — in Tehillim: those who travel through deserts, those who were imprisoned, a sick person who recovered, and seafarers?
One cannot say that this change in Rashi's commentary is because, according to simple logic, the miracles must be ordered (or the like) so as to put first what is more common3, unlike in the verse — for we find that this is not the order of what is more common: in the Gemara4 they are brought in a different order (from Tehillim and also from the Rashi before us): "seafarers, those who travel through deserts, one who was sick and recovered, and one who was imprisoned and went free"; and Tosafos5 asks on this: "In Tehillim it does not count them in this order, but counts those who travel the desert first," (and they answer) "the verse took the order of the more dangerous first, and the Gemara took the more common first." So we see that their order in Rashi is not the order of "the more common first" stated in the Gemara6.
Accordingly, the order in Rashi's commentary is even more difficult, since it is neither the order of "the more dangerous first" of the verse nor the order of "the more common first" of the Gemara7!
f) Why does Rashi say "a sick person who recovered" in the singular, and the other three kinds in the plural? Moreover, he also changed in this from the wording of the Gemara: "seafarers, those who travel through deserts (in the plural), and one who was sick and recovered, and one who was imprisoned and went free" (in the singular). On the contrary, plainly it is specifically the Gemara's wording that is understood: in the way of the world, a person does not travel in the desert alone, but in a caravan; and so too "those who go down to the sea in ships" is possible only in a group of people8 — therefore it puts them in the plural; whereas sickness and imprisonment, which ordinarily are a trouble that befalls an individual, are therefore said in the singular. If so, all the more should this wording be used in Rashi's commentary, which follows the plain meaning of Scripture?
2. The explanation of all the above: Parshas Tzav speaks of such offerings as were, in their essentials, already explained in Parshas Vayikra, except that in our parsha further details, not explained earlier, were added to each and every offering; and what is written regarding each one, "וזאת תורת וגו'" ("And this is the law of…"), refers only to these additional details. This is as stated explicitly in Rashi at the beginning of this parsha on the verse "וזאת תורת העולה" ("This is the law of the burnt offering"): "This passage comes to teach about burning the fats and limbs, etc." — that is, for the sake of these details, the verse repeated "This is the law of the burnt offering"; and so it is with the other offerings, that the intent of the passage is to add details about them not yet known, as Rashi states explicitly regarding several of them.
However, regarding the shelamim offering, we seemingly do not find any additional detail in this parsha; for after the verse "וזאת תורת זבח השלמים אשר יקריב לה'" ("And this is the law of the shelamim sacrifice which he shall offer to Hashem"), it says immediately, "If he offers it for a thanksgiving, etc." If so, the words "And this is the law of the shelamim sacrifice" are seemingly superfluous, and it should have begun "If he offers for a thanksgiving, etc.," or the like.
Rashi rejects this question and explains: "If on account of thanksgiving . . he vowed these shelamim, they are thanksgiving-shelamim, and they require, etc." His intent is to say that "If for a thanksgiving" comes as a continuation of "And this is the law of the shelamim sacrifice"; that is, in this passage the verse comes to add a further kind and detail to the "shelamim sacrifice" spoken of in Parshas Vayikra — the thanksgiving offering, which has several laws not found in other shelamim: they "require9 the bread mentioned in the passage, and they may be eaten only for a day and a night, as is explained here"10.
This explanation is proven from the words "If he offers it (yakrivenu) for a thanksgiving" (and not simply "yakriv," "he offers"), meaning he offers it — the "shelamim sacrifice" mentioned in the preceding verse; as if it were written, "If he offers the shelamim sacrifice for a thanksgiving," its law is such and such.
Since the proof for his explanation is from the word "yakrivenu," and also the above question (on the verse "And this is the law of the shelamim sacrifice") arises only once we reach (the following verse) "If he offers it for a thanksgiving, etc." — (for then it appears at first glance that the verse begins to explain a different offering, not shelamim) — therefore Rashi gives his explanation (not on the verse "This is the law of . . the shelamim," but) on the verse "If for a thanksgiving, etc."11
3. Now, although this matter is the main novelty of his commentary on the verse, Rashi nevertheless explains in passing12 (within the words of the above commentary) also something that is plainly understood without his explanation13 (because of the necessity explained in Rashi's own words, as will be discussed below), namely: that the obligation to bring a thanksgiving offering is only for these four miracles. [For this reason Rashi does not explain it in a separate heading (in keeping with the rule, mentioned several times, that where Rashi explains two separate matters on one word, he quotes that word an additional time in order to separate one matter from the other) — because in truth it is self-understood, and he explains it only in passing14.]
The necessity for this: it is plainly understood (and so it is also according to halachah and derash15) that one must always thank the Holy One, blessed be He, for all the good that He bestows upon each and every individual; for every Jew believes in Hashem and knows that everything he has, even if it came to him in a natural way, comes from the Holy One, blessed be He16 — as in the words of Avraham Avinu to the whole world: "ברכו למי שאכלתם משלו סבורים אתם שמשלי אכלתם — משל מי שאמר והי' העולם אכלתם" ("Bless the One of Whose food you have eaten. Do you think you have eaten of mine? You have eaten of that of Him Who spoke and the world came into being")17. Just as one must thank anyone who gives a fine gift, whoever he may be, how much more so must one thank the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He, for His many gifts to each and every person every day, constantly. Therefore our Sages arranged to thank, praise and laud the Holy One, blessed be He, each and every day in prayers, blessings, etc. And we find this in the narratives of the Torah many times (also before Parshas Tzav), even merely for the tidings that good will come, for example: "ויבן שם מזבח לה' וגו'" ("And he built there an altar to Hashem…")18, and Rashi explains: "For the tidings of offspring and for the tidings of the Land of Israel"; and likewise "ויאמן העם וגו' ויקדו וישתחוו" ("And the people believed… and they bowed and prostrated themselves")19. And similarly on many other occasions.
Accordingly, it would seemingly follow that every Jew would be obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering each and every day (or several times a day) — and this is something unacceptable to reason. Even if you say that one a year suffices for the whole year — this too is a great novelty that the Torah would have needed to state explicitly.
Therefore, even in the plain meaning of Scripture, one must say that not for every thanksgiving is one obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering, but only for an unusual thanksgiving (and therefore one also does not fulfill it with a blessing — as one does fulfill it regarding food (which comes about through being blessed in one's livelihood, etc.)); that is, the thanksgiving offering comes only "on account of thanksgiving for a miracle that was performed for him."
But it is still not understood: it was already related earlier that during the forty years20 that Israel was in the desert, the Holy One, blessed be He, gave them bread from heaven every day in a miraculous manner, as it is written21, "הנני ממטיר לכם לחם מן השמים וגו'" ("Behold, I will rain down bread for you from heaven…"); so too they had Miriam's well, as is stated explicitly22, "והכית בצור ויצא ממנו מים ושתה העם" ("And you shall strike the rock, and water shall come out of it, and the people shall drink"); and likewise they always had the cloud to protect them from all undesirable things, as Rashi writes23, "צא והלחם — צא מן הענן והלחם בו" ("'Go out and fight' — go out from the cloud and fight him") — and all of these are miracles24. If one were obligated to bring an offering for every miracle, it would follow that every single one of the six hundred thousand of Israel, while in the desert, was obligated (and consequently also brought) a thanksgiving offering each and every day — something that cannot be said at all.
Therefore one must say that not for every miracle is one obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering, but only for certain miracles. And since in Tehillim, in "Let them thank Hashem for His kindness, etc.," several kinds of miracles are brought, and it states there explicitly "and let them offer thanksgiving sacrifices," it is understood that this is specific — that the thanksgiving offering is brought only for the miracles stated there.
Since one must say that a thanksgiving offering is not brought for every miracle, but only for a special miracle; and although the verses of the Chumash do not explain for which miracle the offering is brought — since in Tehillim several miracles are stated explicitly, it is logical to say (that they are not merely examples, but) that they are specific, and only for these miracles is a thanksgiving offering brought [especially since it took four miracles — and not one or two as an example].
Even so, Rashi is not satisfied with quoting the verse without listing the matters, because this verse, "and let them offer thanksgiving sacrifices," is said explicitly regarding a sick person who recovered, and there would be room to say that it refers only to a sick person who recovered. Therefore Rashi specifies that for all four brought there one is obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering25. Nor is it enough to write "a sick person who recovered, etc."26, for from this we would learn to add only what is written after it, namely seafarers, and no more — so he would need to add also the one before it, "those who travel through deserts, etc." So in any case he would have to mention all four ("those who travel through deserts, etc., a sick person who recovered, etc."). Therefore Rashi writes explicitly all four who must give thanks27.
4. Now, since Rashi lists all four miracles, he needs to list them specifically in the order in which he brings them:
It is plainly understood that when a person is placed under some obligation connected with a particular event, if "it happened to him personally," it is much easier for him to understand the details of the matter, the reason for the obligation, etc.28 Accordingly, it is understood that when the Jewish people were told of the obligation to bring a thanksgiving offering for certain miracles, it is logical to say that they were first told of the obligation regarding the miracle that happened to them themselves. It is likewise understood that if several of the miracles for which one is obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering had happened to them, they needed to be mentioned in the order in which they happened to them, and only afterwards should the obligation of an offering be told for a miracle that had (not yet) happened to them.
Now, of the four miracles for which one is obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering, three happened to the Jewish people — and in the order in which Rashi counts them:
They crossed the sea; afterwards they went into the desert28*; and afterwards the Holy One, blessed be He, decreed that they be shut in the desert [(only their children would leave it, after) forty years. [They knew this from Rashi's commentary29 on the verse29* "תביאמו ותטעמו וגו'" ("You will bring them and plant them…"). And although it says "Moshe prophesied that he would not enter (and not 'they would not enter') the Land," afterwards all the Jewish people sang this too, as it says "Moshe and the Children of Israel sang." But all this is for the sake of debate and sharpening the mind, for it is logical to say in Rashi there (as the plain meaning of the verses implies) that although Moshe prophesied, "he did not know what he prophesied"30. And there is no need for all this, for it is simple] — when the Jewish people were told that they would be delayed in the desert of Sinai forty days until Moshe came down from the mountain, they felt in themselves something akin to "imprisoned in darkness and the shadow of death," etc.].
It is therefore understood that they were told in this order: "seafarers"31, "and those who travel through deserts, and those who were imprisoned," and afterwards they were told the fourth kind, which had not happened to them: "and a sick person who recovered" — that for this too one is obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering32.
Accordingly it is also understood why Rashi writes the first three matters in the plural and the fourth in the singular — because the first three miracles happened to all of the Jewish people, whereas the fourth kind did not33.
However, this does not mean that they themselves were obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering for these miracles that happened to them; for in these events as they took place for the Jewish people then, there was no fear of danger at all, since they traveled "according to the word of Hashem" — "והוי' הולך לפניהם גו' לנחותם הדרך" ("And Hashem went before them… to lead them on the way")33*, and certainly there could be no danger in this. Rather, through the events that happened to them, they could understand that in the natural order, in a similar situation, there is danger, and therefore coming out of such a situation requires a thanksgiving offering.
5. However, this seemingly is not understood: their being in Egypt was a kind of "those who were imprisoned"34; accordingly Rashi should have put "those who were imprisoned" first, for the Exodus from Egypt came first of all, before the splitting of the Sea.
[And although for their leaving Egypt they were not obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering even if the land of Egypt was a prison, since they left there before the command to bring a thanksgiving offering34*, and consequently the obligation35 of a thanksgiving offering did not yet apply to them (and likewise at the splitting of the Sea)36 — nevertheless, as said, the intent here is not that they were obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering for what happened to them, as above, but only to make the situation easy for them to understand, etc.]
This will be understood by first clarifying37 Rashi's wording "(those imprisoned in) a prison" — seemingly it would have been enough had he written simply "those imprisoned"38, and it would be self-understood that the intent is those imprisoned in a prison?
However, Rashi's intent in this is to specify that only one imprisoned in a prison is obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering, as opposed to one confined in a house and the like. His source is the plain meaning of the verse in Tehillim there, which mentions here: "יושבי חושך וצלמות אסירי עני וברזל" ("Those who sit in darkness and the shadow of death, bound in affliction and iron") — which states explicitly that only those imprisoned in a place of "darkness and the shadow of death"39 are obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering.
Accordingly it is understood that one cannot count "those who were imprisoned" first as an allusion to Egypt, for their being in Egypt is not considered a "prison" obligating them in a thanksgiving offering, because their dwelling there was not in the manner of "those who sit in darkness and the shadow of death." On the contrary, they dwelt in the land of Goshen, "the best of the land of Egypt"39*, etc. And the fact that they were worked with rigor is a separate matter [and is not one of the four for which one must give thanks], and it did not make their dwelling in Egypt like being imprisoned in a prison (a place of "darkness and the shadow of death"). The desert, by contrast, is a place of danger, as it is written40, "במדבר הגדול והנורא נחש שרף ועקרב וצמאון אשר אין מים" ("In the great and awesome desert, of fiery serpents and scorpions and thirst, where there is no water")40*. It is therefore understood that one shut in the desert who cannot leave it is among "those who sit in darkness and the shadow of death"41.
6. However, one can raise a difficulty on the above from what the Alter Rebbe writes in his Shulchan Aruch41*: "It is the custom in these countries that the three mitzvah matzos are made from one issaron of flour, like the loaves of the thanksgiving offering, where three loaves were made from one issaron, etc. Therefore we too make three matzos from an issaron, in remembrance of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering, for one who goes out of prison is obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering, and on Pesach we went out of prison, from the bondage of Egypt; therefore we make a remembrance of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering." So we see that Egypt too is considered a prison that obligates a thanksgiving offering42?
But in truth, when one examines it carefully, the difficulty is the other way around: the Alter Rebbe rules43 that "one who was imprisoned in a prison on a capital matter and went free, or on a monetary matter if he was tortured in iron chains," is obligated in the blessing of HaGomel [and so it is with the obligation of a thanksgiving offering, since the source for obligating these four in the blessing of HaGomel is from the fact that they are the ones obligated in a thanksgiving offering44]. If so, how can one say that Egypt was a prison, when they dwelt in the land of Goshen, etc., as above?
7. This may be explained by first raising another difficulty: the Alter Rebbe writes45: "It is the custom in these countries not to say it (Mizmor LeSodah) on Shabbos and Yom Tov, because the thanksgiving offering is not offered on them; and likewise during the days of Pesach the thanksgiving offering is not offered because of the chametz in it; and likewise on Erev Pesach, etc." This states explicitly that one should not make a remembrance of the thanksgiving offering on Pesach even through speech, etc. If so, how is it "the custom in these countries" to perform an action in remembrance of the thanksgiving offering on the night of Pesach?
The matter is a fortiori: the reason for the view that one must say Mizmor LeSodah also on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Pesach, etc., is stated explicitly in the Tur46: "There is no concern that perhaps people will come to offer it when the Beis HaMikdash is rebuilt, because people will not err in this"; and the Beis Yosef explains47: "Because we do not say this psalm in place of the thanksgiving offering but as thanksgiving"; and the Bach there: "It was instituted because our Sages said48, 'All songs will in the future be nullified except for Mizmor LeSodah'; therefore there is no need to withhold it." This implies that those who hold that it is not said on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Pesach, etc. are of the view that it was instituted in place of the thanksgiving offering — and so, seemingly, is the view of the Alter Rebbe.
For he writes49: "One must say the passage of the offerings standing, and likewise Mizmor LeSodah, in the manner of their offering, which was done standing." And regarding the passage of the offerings he explains50: "The Sages said51: 'Whoever engages in the law of the burnt offering is as if he offered a burnt offering, etc.' Therefore it is good to say every day the passage of the burnt offering, the meal offering, the shelamim, the thanksgiving offering52, the sin offering, the definite guilt offering, the conditional guilt offering, and the sliding-scale offering, etc." This implies that saying Mizmor LeSodah, too, is because "whoever engages in the law of the burnt offering, etc."; and accordingly the reason he rules that it is not said on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Pesach, etc. is understood.
But in truth it is not so, for the Alter Rebbe writes explicitly53: "There are places where it is the custom to add, etc., Mizmor LeSodah, because all songs will in the future be nullified except for Mizmor LeSodah; therefore one should draw it out in melody." So he too is of the view that it was not instituted in place of the thanksgiving offering, but "because all songs, etc." If so, why does he rule that it is not to be said on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Pesach, etc.54?
One must say that his reasoning is that although the psalm is not said in place of the offering, nevertheless, since saying it recalls the thanksgiving offering55, it is not to be said at a time when the thanksgiving offering was not offered when the Beis HaMikdash stood. For this reason he also holds (at least in the first edition56) that it must be said standing, since it at least recalls the thanksgiving offering.
If so, if one should not say on Pesach, in speech, a psalm such as this that recalls the thanksgiving offering incidentally [even though it was not instituted for this], how much more so should one not perform an action that is an actual remembrance of the thanksgiving offering. If so, how do we make the three matzos on the night of Pesach from one issaron, in remembrance of the thanksgiving offering57?
8. All this will be understood by first noting that the source of this law, to make the three matzos from one issaron, is in general the Rosh58 and the Mordechai59. However, the reasons of the Rosh and the Mordechai differ from one another:
In the Rosh: three matzos are needed on the night of Pesach so that there are two whole ones as on every Yom Tov, and a broken piece is added to them so that there is "bread of poverty." He then adds: "The custom in Ashkenaz and France is to make them from one issaron, in remembrance of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering, for one who goes out of prison brings the loaves of the thanksgiving offering, and the loaves of the thanksgiving offering come as three kinds of matzah (loaves), wafers and scalded loaves, and three loaves come from one issaron, etc."
The Mordechai, however, writes: "Therefore three matzos are needed in remembrance of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering, as we say, 'Four must give thanks, etc.,' and in the loaves of the thanksgiving offering there were three kinds of matzah. And although in the loaves of the thanksgiving offering there were forty loaves, nevertheless, if he baked four loaves after the fact, he has fulfilled the obligation; three of matzah and the fourth of chametz."
So there is a difference between the Rosh and the Mordechai: for the law of taking three matzos the Rosh writes a different reason, and the reason of remembrance of the thanksgiving offering applies only to making these three from one issaron; whereas for the Mordechai, this is the reason for the three matzos60.
Accordingly, in my humble opinion, one cannot say as the Korban Nesanel writes on the Rosh. He asks on the Rosh: "Although in the loaves of the thanksgiving offering there are forty loaves, and thirty come to the matzah," and answers, "Nevertheless, if he baked four after the fact he has fulfilled the obligation, as stated in Nedarim, page 12; it turns out that for the three kinds of matzah there are three loaves," and he cites the Mordechai.
However, according to the above, from the outset there is no difficulty on the Rosh, for in his view there must be three matzos for another reason, only that these three are made from one issaron, as the three loaves of the thanksgiving offering were made. And even if the law of thirty for the matzah were indispensable even after the fact, the Rosh's words are still understood, because in his view the remembrance of the thanksgiving offering is not in the number of matzos but in the quantity of flour — that is, the quantity of flour (from which the three matzos are made on Pesach) equals the quantity of flour (from which the three loaves were made) in the thanksgiving offering, but the remembrance is not of the number of loaves of the thanksgiving offering. Whereas for the Mordechai, for whom the remembrance of the thanksgiving offering is in the number of three matzos, if the law of thirty were indispensable after the fact, there would be no place for the number.
Furthermore: how can one say that for the Rosh the reason for making the three matzos from one issaron is that if he baked four after the fact he has fulfilled the obligation? For this law applies only if he baked the three matzos from ten issaronim61, whereas in our case the three matzos are made from one issaron. (Whereas for the Mordechai, for whom this is only the reason for there being three matzos, and the remembrance of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering does not deal with the quantity of flour, it does not matter to us that the three matzos would need to be baked from ten issaronim, since only the number of matzos is relevant.)
9. According to the above, it is understood that there is a great difference between the reason of the Rosh and the reason of the Mordechai (regarding our subject): for the Mordechai, the number of matzos is the remembrance of the thanksgiving offering, so one makes in practice, openly, a remembrance of the thanksgiving offering; whereas for the Rosh, the number of matzos is for another reason, only that these three are made from a certain quantity of flour, so openly no remembrance of the thanksgiving offering is evident at all, since the quantity from which the three matzos were made is not openly evident.
Now, the Alter Rebbe writes62 the reason for taking three matzos as the Rosh does — "that besides two whole matzos, over which one must break bread as on other Yamim Tovim, there must be another broken piece because of 'bread of poverty.'" If so, he does not hold the Mordechai's reason in this, and in his view the remembrance of the thanksgiving offering lies only in making these three matzos from one issaron of flour. It follows that the Alter Rebbe's position too is that no open remembrance of the thanksgiving offering is made.
Accordingly it is understood that there is no contradiction to this from the ruling that Mizmor LeSodah is not said on Pesach: Mizmor LeSodah openly recalls the thanksgiving offering, so one refrains from saying it on a day when the thanksgiving offering is not offered; whereas in our case, since the remembrance is not visible, it does not matter to us that a remembrance of the thanksgiving offering is alluded to in a hidden way63.
10. According to the above, that in the view of the Alter Rebbe (the Rosh) the remembrance of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering is not a complete remembrance, one may say that his words "and on Pesach we went out of prison" are similar: Egypt is only like a prison64, and not a prison that obligates a thanksgiving offering. And the meaning of his words is: "Therefore we too make three matzos from an issaron in remembrance (— merely an allusion) of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering . . and on Pesach we went out of prison" (which is only like a prison — merely an allusion, and not actually a prison that obligates bringing a thanksgiving offering).
Accordingly, the Alter Rebbe's addition "from the bondage of Egypt" is well understood. Seemingly, since he writes "and on Pesach we went out of prison," what is the point of adding "from the bondage of Egypt"? Rather, by this he wishes to explain that the intent is not that Egypt was actually a prison, but only that they were under the bondage of Egypt65.
11. The lesson from the above:
As long as a Jew is in "the bondage of Egypt," in exile, which is called "Egypt"66, then despite all the good, etc., that he has, he is still imprisoned in a prison — to the point that it can be compared (at least by way of example) to the prison of "those who sit in darkness and the shadow of death," which obligates bringing a thanksgiving offering.
For in truth, as long as he is still in exile, when G‑dliness does not shine openly, the G‑dliness within him is, as it were, in prison67, held by the "darkness" and the kelipah called "(the shadow of) death"68.
Consequently, it is understood that always, every day, "I await"69 him to come and take us out of the spiritual prison and out of the physical prison, and lead us upright to our Land.
(From the sichos of the month of Nissan, 5728)
Notes
1) 7:12.
2) Tehillim 107:8, 15, 21–22, 31.
3) Note the rule that Rashi wrote several times before Parshas Tzav (Mishpatim 21:28; 22:17; 21:22, 30), "the verse speaks of the usual case" (by the same token it is logical to say this also regarding listing them in order — and in Tehillim one must say that there is a special reason it took them in a different order. Moreover, we find in Tehillim (78) that it changes the order of the plagues. And more).
4) Berachos 54b.
5) S.v. "Arba'ah."
6) Regarding a matter of fact, it is plain that one cannot say that according to the plain meaning of Scripture it is different from how it is according to halachah.
7) Note that it is also not according to the order in the Rambam (Hilchos Berachos 10:8), nor according to the order in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim, beginning of siman 219), nor the order of the Alter Rebbe's Seder Birchos HaNehenin (13:2).
8) Note that they permitted praying before its time so that one would not have to travel alone without a caravan (Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Orach Chaim 89:9), and likewise they permitted desecrating Shabbos so that one not remain alone in the desert (ibid., siman 248, se'if 13–14). And more.
9) Rashi details these laws at the beginning of the subject — similar to his commentary on the other offerings in this parsha, where he details at the beginning of the passage the laws that were added in the passage.
10) As for Rashi writing "he vowed these shelamim" although it is an obligation — one may say: the obligation is after the miracle has occurred; but we find that Yaakov Avinu vowed to bring an offering (as a lesson) while still in a time of trouble, as it is written (Vayetzei 28:20), "Yaakov vowed a vow, saying, if… and this stone which I have set… shall be a house of G‑d" (and so too in Yonah (2:10): "But I, with the voice of thanksgiving, will sacrifice to You; what I have vowed I will pay…" — and in several places). Therefore (since this is the usual way) Rashi writes "vowed," for he certainly vowed the offering before this. [Accordingly one may add an allusion in the word "yakrivenu" (and not simply "yakriv") — the one he already vowed.]
11) As for his repeating "if on account of one of these" [for seemingly he already wrote at the beginning of his words "if on account of thanksgiving, etc.," and he should have said ". . thanksgiving — he vowed these shelamim, etc."], this is according to Rashi's comment in several places even regarding the wording of the verse (see Va'eira 6:29; and so too at the beginning of Vayetzei and in several places): "It is the same statement mentioned above, etc., but since the subject was interrupted, etc., it returned to the subject to begin it again."
12) And also so that one not err in several of the details — as discussed below in the text.
13) As is proven from Rashi's wording, "If on account of thanksgiving for a miracle that was performed for him, for example . . who are required to give thanks, etc." — that is, this is a law already known (otherwise he should have said, in the language of a novelty, "they are required to give thanks" (without the letter shin)).
14) Similar to what is explained in Likkutei Sichos vol. 11, p. 29, section 5, regarding Rashi's comment (Va'eira 8:17), "All kinds of wild beasts, snakes and scorpions intermingled."
15) As our Sages said (Bereishis Rabbah 44:9): "For each and every breath a person breathes, he must praise the Creator, etc."
16) See Tosafos (s.v. Emunas — Shabbos 31a) in the name of the Yerushalmi, that a Jew "believes in the Life of the worlds and sows" (and see Likkutei Sichos vol. 1, pp. 216, 240).
17) Rashi, Vayeira 21:33.
18) Lech Lecha 12:7.
19) Shemos 4:31.
20) Beshalach 16:35.
21) Ibid., 4.
22) Ibid. 17:6. Plainly, they drank from these waters all the days they were in the desert, for we do not find that the Jewish people complained about water (until the death of Miriam), although before this they had complained about it twice (ibid. 15:24; 17:2). Also: Rashi states explicitly (Chukas 20:2), "From here we learn that all forty years they had the well in the merit of Miriam" [and from this wording it is understood that the novelty in Rashi there is that they had the well in the merit of Miriam, but the very existence of the well during the forty years was already known. This is also understood from Rashi's precision "the well" (with the definite article): the well that was already known to have been with them during the forty years came to them in the merit of Miriam].
23) Ibid., 9.
24) And even if you say (at least in a forced way) regarding the cloud and the well that, since the Jewish people had them all the time without interruption, they could be obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering only at the beginning (even though the well and the cloud traveled with them — which is also a miracle) — with the manna they saw several miracles every day.
25) The necessity for this: there is no reason or logic to distinguish between the miracles brought there, since regarding all of them it says, "Give thanks to Hashem, the redeemed of Hashem…" (but Rashi in his commentary lists them so as not to leave room for error).
26) It is understood that he could not write "a sick person who recovered and the like," for then one could say that the meaning is something similar to the sick person of whom it says, "their soul abhorred all food."
27) One may say further: after this passage it is written (verse 16), "But if the sacrifice of his offering is a vow or a free-will offering…," and Rashi explains: "That he did not bring it on account of thanksgiving for a miracle." Seemingly, why did the Torah put the passage of the thanksgiving offering before this passage? There is a rule in Rashi (cited above, note 3), "the verse speaks of the usual case," and plainly thanksgiving for a miracle is not as "usual" as simply bringing a vow or free-will offering? Therefore Rashi specifies that all four of these kinds are included in thanksgiving for a miracle, and so one may say it is more common than a plain vow or free-will offering.
28) See Rashi, Shelach 13:29.
28*) For Eisam was at the edge of the desert (Beshalach 13:20). And see Masei (33:8).
29) One cannot say that they knew this from what is stated in Beshalach (16:35): "forty years, until they came to an inhabited land" — for one must say that when Rashi explains (Mishpatim 24:7) that in the Book of the Covenant was written "from Bereishis until the Giving of the Torah," he does not mean verses such as the above, since it is stated explicitly at its beginning: "And the Children of Israel ate (past tense) the manna forty years…" — which proves that it was written at the end of the forty years (only that Moshe placed it then in its own passage — the passage of the manna. Compare Vayishlach 32:33; ibid. 36:31; and more. This is not the place to elaborate).
29*) Beshalach 15:17.
30) See the commentators on Rashi there. This is similar to Rashi, Mikeitz (42:1). Note also Rashi, Bo (10:10).
31) Accordingly it is better understood* why Rashi did not write "those who go down to the sea in ships," as in the wording of the verse — for the allusion and intent in this is to the splitting of the Sea, where they did not cross the sea in ships.
*) But it is not a difficulty, for it is understood that one goes down to the sea by means of ships — and therefore Rashi did not need to explain it.
32) In the same way one may explain why my father-in-law, the Rebbe [the Previous Rebbe], in the maamar beginning "Baruch HaGomel" (II), 5687 (printed in Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim vol. 1, p. 368), took the four who must give thanks not in their order in the Gemara and the poskim, nor as in Rashi's commentary, but began with "a sick person who recovered and a prisoner who went out of prison" — because he counts them in the order in which they happened to him then.
33) The reason why for the "sick person" Rashi adds "who recovered," unlike the other three where he does not write "who came up" or the like — because here we are speaking of offering a thanksgiving offering, which must be in the Beis HaMikdash, and it is self-understood that one cannot bring an offering while at sea, etc.; whereas with a sick person there is room to say that as soon as there is some improvement he brings a thanksgiving offering. Therefore Rashi adds "who recovered" (as is proven in the verse, "He sends His word and heals them"), that only then is he obligated in a thanksgiving offering. Whereas in the Gemara and poskim, which speak regarding the blessing of HaGomel, one must specify also regarding the prisoner "who went free," for otherwise there would be room to say that even while he is in prison, if his sentence was lightened somewhat, he must recite the blessing of HaGomel; whereas regarding seafarers and those who travel through deserts, even regarding the blessing of HaGomel there is no need to specify, for generally they are in the same danger the whole time they are in the desert or at sea. This is not the place to elaborate.
33*) Beshalach 13:21.
34) Note Rashi's comment on the verse "He brings out the prisoners" (Tehillim 68:7; and so too in Rashi, Bo 13:4, which is from the Mechilta and Tanchuma there), that it refers to the Jewish people in Egypt.
34*) It is understood that this is not related to the question: if one was in danger at a time when he was not obligated in mitzvos, and came out of the danger at a time when he is obligated in mitzvos (he grew up or converted, etc.), do we follow the time of the danger and he is exempt from a thanksgiving offering, or the time of leaving and he is obligated in a thanksgiving offering — since in our case the leaving too was at the time of exemption.
35) What the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded Noach (Noach 7:2), "Of every clean animal take for yourself seven pairs…," and Rashi explains, "So that he may offer from them an offering when he comes out" (and so too in Rashi there 8:20), does not necessarily mean that this was a command of a thanksgiving offering. One may say that mainly it was a permission to take the life of an animal for the sake of an offering (and even so the permission "it shall be food for you" (Noach 9:3) was needed, since this permission was only for offering and not for eating). Furthermore (and mainly): we do not find that this was a command for all generations. Accordingly, it is understood why "(Avraham) did not offer before You a single bull, etc." (Rashi, Vayeira 22:1).
36) Regarding leaving the other exiles (and likewise this last exile), one may say that in general the obligation of a thanksgiving offering does not apply (as for one imprisoned in a prison), because only the Jewish people as a whole (as a community) are imprisoned in exile, not each individual on his own. This requires further study regarding leaving Babylon (Kesubos 110b, end) — perhaps it is different because he is held there by a positive commandment. And see in the text that, even without this, one may say there is no obligation because it is not in the manner of "those who sit in darkness and the shadow of death." Note Ezra 8:35; Horayos 6a. This is not the place to elaborate.
37) It is not an actual difficulty — for in the Talmud too we find: "A prisoner cannot free himself from prison" (Berachos 5b).
38) Whereas in Rashi's commentary on Tehillim (107:10), where he takes the verse's word "bound" — he must add "in prison," for otherwise one could explain it as bound in iron chains, as at the end of the verse there.
39) This requires study (regarding practical halachah) concerning the law of one held on a capital matter under house arrest — perhaps one may say that since it concerns his life, he sits in "the shadow of death." See also Shaar HaKollel, ch. 23.
39*) Vayigash 45:18, and Rashi there.
40) Eikev 8:15.
40*) Although this verse is written after Parshas Tzav — nevertheless it is plainly understood that the desert is like this.
41) It is understood that one could not bring an example of "those who were imprisoned" from "they are entangled in the land, the desert has shut them in" (Beshalach 14:3), which means "confined and silenced" (Rashi there), from the word for prison* — for that was Pharaoh's mistake, but in truth they were not confined at all.
*) The necessity for this explanation is from the end of the verse, "the desert has shut them in."
41*) Siman 458, se'if 5. And so too in the Rema, siman 475, se'if 7.
42) Similar to what was said above in note 6, that in a matter of fact one cannot distinguish between the plain meaning of Scripture and the way of halachah — although it is not entirely similar.
43) Seder Birchos HaNehenin 13:2.
44) Rosh, ch. 9 of Berachos, se'if 3.
45) Siman 51, se'if 1; siman 429, se'if 13.
46) Siman 51.
47) Siman 281.
48) Cited in the Biur HaGra, siman 51, se'if 9.
49) First edition, siman 1, se'if 14.
50) Ibid., se'if 11.
51) End of Menachos.
52) The "passage of the thanksgiving offering" does not mean Mizmor LeSodah (for that is not the passage of the thanksgiving offering), but our passage — as is proven even more from the fact that in the second edition (ibid., se'if 9) he calls the passage of the thanksgiving offering, too, "the passage of the offerings." And here he writes "the passage of the offerings" and afterwards adds "and likewise Mizmor LeSodah." [It is forced to say that this too is one of the differences between the first and second editions.] Accordingly (that the passage of the thanksgiving offering does not mean Mizmor LeSodah), one may say that what he writes in the second edition (ibid.), "but one need not say it standing like the kohen who served standing, since he is not the kohen who serves, but through his reading Scripture regards him as if the kohen had offered for him," retracting what he wrote in the first edition that one must say the passage of the offerings standing — this is only regarding the passage of the offerings, but not regarding Mizmor LeSodah, since according to the above Mizmor LeSodah is not mentioned there in the second edition at all. And although seemingly the reason applies also to Mizmor LeSodah, nevertheless, according to what is written below in the text, that the reason for saying Mizmor LeSodah is not so that it be as if he offered a thanksgiving offering, but "because all songs, etc.," and only because it at least recalls the thanksgiving offering must it be said standing (according to the first edition) — then one cannot infer from this "but through his reading Scripture regards him as if the kohen had offered for him," for what he says, too, recalls (the offering in general, and consequently also) the kohen's offering.
53) Siman 51, se'if 1.
54) Regarding the Mechaber, who also cites (siman 51, se'if 9) the saying of our Sages "that all songs, etc." — one may say that even so he holds that it is not said on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Pesach, etc. (and one need not say that the Rema disagrees with him in this), for he writes: "Mizmor LeSodah should be said with melody, for all songs will in the future be nullified except for Mizmor LeSodah," meaning this is the reason why it must be said with melody, and he does not speak of the reason for saying Mizmor LeSodah in general — and perhaps he holds that it is in place of the thanksgiving offering, and therefore it is not to be said on Shabbos, Yom Tov, Pesach, etc. This is implied somewhat by what the Beis Yosef writes there: "It is written in Sefer Orchos Chaim that Mizmor LeSodah, it is a mitzvah to draw it out in melody and to sing, as we say, 'All songs, etc.,'" meaning this is only the reason that "it is a mitzvah to draw it out in melody." This is proven from the continuation there in the Beis Yosef, where he writes further in the Orchos Chaim that on Shabbos one says "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day," etc. — except that in the Shulchan Aruch he did not want to decide this, and the rules of the Shulchan Aruch require study. In the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, by contrast, the matter that one must "draw it out in melody" is in the manner of "a further matter" that follows from "that all songs, etc.," but the main reason for citing this saying of our Sages is as a reason for saying Mizmor LeSodah in general*.
*) One must say so, for this is the whole flow of the se'if there: it begins that "they instituted saying Pesukei DeZimrah every day, etc.," and afterwards explains "and why did they choose these psalms, etc.," and goes on explaining the reason for saying all the psalms; and when he mentions that there are places that add Mizmor LeSodah, he must explain also the reason for saying this psalm — and he explains it according to the saying of our Sages "all songs, etc." (and only adds that for this reason one must also "draw it out in melody").
55) Especially according to Rashi on Tehillim (100:1): "Mizmor LeSodah — for thanksgiving, to say it over the thanksgiving sacrifices" [and so too in Tosafos s.v. Mizmora (Avodah Zarah 24b); Tanchuma, end of Noach; and see Rashi, Shevuos (15b). But see Yerushalmi Shevuos (ch. 1, halachah 5) that it is named for "and the thanksgiving over it"] — certainly (although it is not in place of the thanksgiving offering, nevertheless) it recalls it, since this psalm was said over this offering. One may say that this is the intent of the Abudraham (in the order of Shabbos Shacharis), where he writes: "In France they were accustomed not to say Mizmor LeSodah on Shabbos and Yamim Tovim because the thanksgiving offering is not brought on Shabbos, and we say in Shevuos that over the thanksgiving offering they would say it, etc." — meaning (that it is not in place of the thanksgiving offering, but) that since it was said over the thanksgiving offering, it recalls it. And see Magen Giborim, siman 51, se'if katan 10.
56) But see above, note 52.
57) One cannot answer that since the remembrance is only through the matzos involved, it is therefore permitted, for it is explained in the text that if it recalls the thanksgiving offering, it is not to be said then. Furthermore: if so, why do we not say Mizmor LeSodah, too, as a remembrance of the matzos in it?
58) Arvei Pesachim, siman 30.
59) End of Pesachim.
60) This is also proven from the Hagahos Maimonios (Hilchos Chametz u'Matzah 8:6), who also writes that the remembrance of the thanksgiving offering is that the three matzos are made from one issaron, and regarding the reason for three matzos in general writes a different reason: because one of each kind is given to the kohen (so three matzos are given to the kohen). [But it is understood that the difference between the reason of the Rosh and the reason of the Mordechai, explained below, does not apply to what the Hagahos Maimonios writes, for although he holds like the Rosh, nevertheless, also according to his reason regarding the three matzos, the remembrance of the thanksgiving offering is made openly.]
61) Rashi s.v. She'afa'an — Menachos 6b.
62) Siman 475, se'if 3.
63) One may say (at least in a forced way) that this is the reason the Alter Rebbe adds again at the end of the se'if, "therefore we make a remembrance of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering" — which seemingly is superfluous — because he wishes to emphasize that therefore we are permitted to make a remembrance of the loaves of the thanksgiving offering.
64) Similar to the explanation of "He brings out the prisoners" — see note 34.
65) And although on Rosh Hashanah the servitude ceased from our forefathers in Egypt (Rosh Hashanah 11b) — the bondage did not cease until the 15th of Nissan, when He brought them out "from bondage to redemption" (Pesachim 117b, Mishnah).
66) As our Sages said (Bereishis Rabbah 16:4): "All the kingdoms are called by the name Mitzrayim (Egypt), because they oppress (metzeros) Israel."
67) See Zohar III, 247a.
68) As our Sages said (Berachos 18b; Bereishis Rabbah 39:7; Tanchuma, beginning of Yisro, end of Berachah; Zohar II, 106b): "The wicked, even in their lifetime, are called dead."
69) Similar to the explanation of "He will do for one who waits for Him" (Yeshayahu 64:3): "Those who press for the matter of wisdom, examine it precisely, and wait for it, to know the clarity of the matter, and recognize their Master" (Zohar I, 130b; quoted in the maamar beginning "VeAvraham Zaken," 5666 and on).
Key Lesson
Rashi's precise wording shows that a thanksgiving offering is brought only for one who escaped real danger, such as one held in a true prison of "darkness and the shadow of death," and that Egypt and the matzos of Pesach are only an allusion to this. Yet as long as a Jew is in exile, whatever good he has, the G‑dliness within him is held captive by darkness. This Sicha therefore teaches that every day we must truly await Moshiach to take us out of both the spiritual and the physical prison and lead us upright to our Land.