Parshas Kedoshim
1. At the end of the parsha, on the verse "ואיש או אשה כי יהי' בהם אוב או ידעוני מות יומתו" ("A man or a woman in whom there shall be an ov or a yid'oni shall surely be put to death"), Rashi cites the words "כי יהי' בהם אוב וגו'" ("in whom there shall be an ov, etc.")1 and asks: "כאן נאמר בהם מיתה ולמעלה3 כרת" ("Here it states death for them, and above it states kares"). (He answers that the verses speak of two separate cases, as explained below in Section 2.)
This raises several difficulties:
a) The question "Here it states death for them, etc."4 is about the words "מות יומתו" ("shall surely be put to death"). Seemingly, then, Rashi should have quoted those words explicitly. Why does he only allude to them by adding "etc."3?
b) Earlier in the parsha,2 where it says "והכרתי" ("I will cut him off"), the verse reads "והנפש אשר תפנה אל האובות ואל הידעונים" ("And the soul that turns to the ovos and to the yid'onim"). Rashi's question ("Here it states death for them, and above it states kares") therefore applies not only to ov but also to yid'oni.4 Why, then, does Rashi quote (explicitly) only "ov" and not "yid'oni"?
c) To emphasize that the law "shall surely be put to death" is stated "בהם" ("regarding them"), that is, regarding the very same matter (ov and yid'oni) about which "I will cut him off" was stated earlier, it would be enough to cite only "ov, etc." Why does Rashi also quote the preceding words "כי יהי' בהם" ("in whom there shall be")?
2. To the question "Here it states death for them, and above it states kares," Rashi answers: "עדים והתראה בסקילה, מזיד בלא התראה בכרת" ("With witnesses and a warning, the punishment is stoning; if he acted intentionally without a warning, it is kares").
We need to understand: From where does Rashi learn, according to the plain meaning of the verse, that our verse speaks of a case with witnesses and a warning, while the verse "I will cut him off" speaks of an intentional transgression without a warning?
A simple reading suggests the following: since stoning is more severe than kares, it makes sense to say that "I will cut him off," a lighter punishment, speaks of a case where there was no warning, while "מות יומתו באבן ירגמו אותם דמיהם בם" ("they shall surely be put to death; they shall pelt them with stones; their blood is upon them"), an extremely severe punishment,5 speaks of a case where there was a warning. For committing a sin despite having been warned brings a much harsher punishment.
But this is not understood. Rashi himself says that liability for stoning applies only when there are "witnesses and a warning," meaning that witnesses come and testify before the beis din that so-and-so transgressed the sin of ov or yid'oni. For without witnesses the beis din cannot know for certain that this person is liable to death.
It is therefore difficult: From where does one learn that the difference between the two verses ("shall surely be put to death" and "I will cut him off") lies in the manner in which the person committed the prohibition (whether with a warning or without a warning)6? It could be that both verses speak of one and the same manner (with a warning7), and the difference between them is only this: when there are witnesses, the beis din sentences him to stoning; and when there are no witnesses, in which case the beis din cannot sentence him to death, he is punished by Heaven with the punishment of kares8?
A further and even greater difficulty: The punishment "I will cut him off" for a sin that carries liability for stoning also appears earlier in the same parsha,9 regarding the sin of "יתן מזרעו למולך" ("giving of his offspring to Molech"). There the verse itself explains that the punishment "I will cut him off" applies in a case where "העלם יעלימו עם הארץ את עיניהם גו' לבלתי המית אותו" ("the people of the land hide their eyes ... so as not to put him to death"), in which case "ושמתי אני את פני גו' והכרתי אותו גו'" ("I will set My face ... and I will cut him off ...").
Seemingly, then, one should say that it is the same regarding ov and yid'oni: "I will cut him off" speaks of a case where (the beis din) "hide their eyes" from punishing him. From where does Rashi derive that the two punishments (stoning and kares) for ov and yid'oni apply to two separate manners of committing the sin10?
3. After Rashi answers "With witnesses and a warning ... kares," he adds two more points. One point (concerning ov and yid'oni) is "ושגגתם חטאת" ("and for their inadvertent transgression, a sin-offering"), meaning that for the sin of ov and yid'oni committed inadvertently one must bring a sin-offering. The second point is "וכן בכל חייבי מיתות שנאמר בהם כרת" ("and so it is with all those liable to death regarding whom kares is stated"), meaning that for all sins for which both a death penalty and kares are stated, the explanation is that the death penalty applies with witnesses and a warning, and kares applies when the sin was intentional without a warning.*10
This is not understood: To answer the question "Here it states death for them, and above it states kares," all that is needed is to explain the cases of which the two verses speak. Why is it relevant here which offering is brought for an inadvertent sin, and that the same applies "to all those liable to death regarding whom kares is stated"?
4. The explanation is as follows:
The words "Here it states death for them, and above it states kares," with which Rashi opens his commentary, are [not Rashi asking about a contradiction, for, as said above (Section 2), one could say that "I will cut him off" speaks of a case where there are no witnesses, or where the beis din turns a blind eye and does not punish the sinner, as is stated explicitly earlier regarding Molech; rather, these words are] the beginning of Rashi's commentary and explanation, with which he answers a different question that is difficult in the verse, namely in the words "כי יהי' בהם אוב" ("in whom there shall be an ov").
Since the question is about "in whom there shall be an ov," and the words "shall surely be put to death" ("Here it states death for them, etc.") answer that question, Rashi therefore quotes explicitly from the verse only "in whom there shall be an ov," and alludes to "shall surely be put to death" with "etc."
5. What is difficult about "in whom there shall be an ov"?
a) Earlier11 it says "And the soul that turns to the ovos, etc.," so the same wording could have been used here as well. Why does it say here "in whom there shall be an ov"12?
b) Since our verse, too, speaks of ov and yid'oni, the same matter discussed earlier in the parsha (except that here the death penalty is added), the verse should have been placed next to the earlier verse "And the soul that turns to the ovos, etc." (just as the death penalty and kares for giving one's offspring to Molech are placed next to each other13). Why does our verse appear only at the end of the parsha, after an interruption of many laws13?
Rashi explains (and thereby these questions fall away): "Here it states death for them, and above it states kares." The fact that the verse "in whom there shall be an ov, etc." stands "here," while the verse "And the soul that turns to the ovos, etc." stands "above" (and they are not next to each other), is because they speak of two separate matters: "here" speaks of "death," and "above" speaks of "kares."
But Rashi cannot be satisfied with this alone, because (a) it does not explain why our verse says "יהי' בהם" ("there shall be in them") and not "אשר תפנה" ("that turns"), as earlier; and (b) even regarding the fact that the verse stands "here" and not "above," this answer is not yet sufficient. With giving one's offspring to Molech there are also two separate punishments, kares and death, and nevertheless they stand next to each other, because the acts for which the punishments come are the same. So why are the liabilities for ov and yid'oni placed apart from each other?
Rashi therefore continues: "With witnesses and a warning, the punishment is stoning; if he acted intentionally without a warning, it is kares." That is, the two punishments stated for ov and yid'oni are distinguished (not only in the punishment, as with giving one's offspring to Molech, but also) in the (manner of) the sinful act of ov and yid'oni: "here" speaks of ov and yid'oni "with witnesses and a warning," and "above" speaks of "intentional without a warning." That is why they are placed apart, because they are two different modes of ov and yid'oni.14
This is also the reason our verse says "in whom there shall be" and not "that turns," as earlier: the words "there shall be in them" indicate witnesses and a warning, as explained below.
6. The expression "יהי'" ("there shall be") indicates an established (and) clear reality.15 That is, the judges, who must issue the verdict "they shall surely be put to death; they shall pelt them with stones ...," must know clearly that the sin of ov or yid'oni took place. And since the judges cannot know this clearly unless there are witnesses, "there shall be" means: with witnesses.
What does "בהם" ("in them") mean? When a person performs some act (against his will, or) inadvertently, it is not "bound up" with him; it does not touch him, it does not "take hold" of him. The greater his (will and) intent, the more he is in the act, and the more the act is in his inner being.
From this it is understood that when it says that the ov or yid'oni who is liable to stoning is in a state of "there shall be in them," it means that the intent involved was very strong. That is why Rashi learns that this means "with a warning," for then it is truly intentional, "in them." When someone commits a sin in disregard of the warning he was given, it is a far greater act of wantonness, as is plainly understood.
7. The law (derived from this verse) that the death penalty applies only with a warning can be understood in two ways: a) The warning is what defines (and creates) the wantonness.16 That is, when a person sins knowingly but without a warning, then although it is not inadvertent, it is still not called intentional, "with a high hand"17 (according to Torah). b) Even without a warning it is called wantonness, and the reason there is no death penalty without a warning is that imposing the death penalty requires a greater degree of wantonness, namely wantonness after a warning.
The practical difference is this: If we learn as in the second way, that even without a warning it is wantonness, but regarding the death penalty the verse reveals that a warning is also needed, then it makes sense to say that the difference between liability for kares and liability for death lies only in that kares does not require a warning. But kares too applies only to intentional sin, since it is not reasonable to say that someone would be punished with kares for a sin he committed inadvertently.
If, however, we accept the first way, that the warning is what defines intentional sin, it would follow that liability for kares, since it applies even without a warning, could also apply to an inadvertent sin. For we see that even for an inadvertent act a person is guilty,18 and the proof is that he must bring an offering (a sin-offering or a guilt-offering), he needs atonement19 and forgiveness, and of this it is said "ונשא עונו" ("and he shall bear his iniquity"), etc.
This raises the question: From where does Rashi know to assume that liability for kares applies only to intentional sin?
Rashi resolves this question by adding "and for their inadvertent transgression, a sin-offering." Since there is an obligation to bring a sin-offering for transgressing ov and yid'oni inadvertently (as Rashi already said in an earlier sidrah20 that one who inadvertently transgresses a prohibition punishable by kares is liable to a sin-offering), it is understood that liability for kares applies only to intentional sin.
8. After all the above, it is still not understood why the verse "in whom there shall be an ov, etc." stands "here" and not together with the law of kares for ov and yid'oni. True, there it speaks of a case without a warning and here of a case with witnesses and a warning; but since both laws concern ov and yid'oni, both verses should have stood together*20?
Rashi therefore adds "and so it is with all those liable to death regarding whom kares is stated." That is, the verse "in whom there shall be an ov, etc." stands "here" and not "above" in order to teach from it about all those liable to death regarding whom kares is stated, that their liability for kares also applies "without a warning."
For there would otherwise have been reason to say that the punishment of kares stated for those liable to death was said only for a case where the sin was committed in a manner that carries liability for death (except that since the beis din, for some reason, did not punish the sinner with death, he is punished from Above with kares). But where he committed the sin without a warning, in which case he is not liable to death, there would also be no liability for kares.
And although with ov and yid'oni the liability for kares applies even without a warning (as is proven from the fact that the Torah says "(there shall be) in them," which indicates (witnesses and) a warning (as above, Section 6), specifically in the verse "shall surely be put to death"), one would still have said that this law of kares without a warning applies only to ov and yid'oni. With all other sins liable to death, however, the punishment of kares would apply only when he commits the sin in a manner that makes him liable to death (as with "giving of his offspring to Molech," where the Torah itself says that "I will cut him off" applies only when "they hide their eyes").
That is why the verse "in whom there shall be an ov, etc." (from which we learn that the liability for kares for ov and yid'oni applies even without a warning) stands "here" and not "above": to teach from it about "those liable to death regarding whom kares is stated" that are written between "above" and "here" (and consequently about all similar cases). In other words, from "above" until "here" (both of which speak of the same thing, ov and yid'oni) is one "unit" that includes several details.
This follows the principle of interpretation21 "כל דבר שהי' בכלל ויצא מן הכלל ללמד לא ללמד על עצמו יצא אלא ללמד על הכלל כולו יצא" ("Anything that was included in a general rule and was singled out from the rule to teach something was not singled out to teach only about itself, but to teach about the entire rule"). Here too it teaches about all those liable to death regarding whom kares is stated, that their kares too applies without a warning. The "I will cut him off" of ov and yid'oni was included in the general rule of all those liable to death regarding whom kares is stated, of which one would have said (were it not for the lesson of "there shall be in them") that it applies only with a warning, when he is liable to death. Afterwards, at the end of the sidrah, it was "singled out from the rule to teach" that it applies even without a warning. It was therefore not singled out to teach only about itself, but to teach about the entire rule: for all those liable to death regarding whom kares is stated, kares applies even without a warning.
9. Rashi's commentary also contains "wondrous matters"22 from the halachic part of Torah. We see in our Rashi how, through the style of his wording (in a single word), he alludes to a matter of Torah law:
Rashi's wording is "מזיד בלא התראה בכרת ושגגתם חטאת" ("intentional without a warning, kares; and for their inadvertent transgression, a sin-offering"). Seemingly, since regarding kares he uses the expression "מזיד" ("one who acts intentionally," and not "זדונם," "their intentional transgression"), he should likewise have said regarding the sin-offering "ושוגג חטאת" ("and one who acts inadvertently, a sin-offering"). Why does he say "ושגגתם" ("their inadvertent transgression," in the plural)? Through this he alludes to a matter of halachah:
When a person commits the two transgressions of "ov" and "yid'oni" in a single lapse of awareness, there is a dispute in the Gemara23 whether he is liable to only one sin-offering or to two. Rabbi Yochanan holds that since "שניהן בלאו אחד נאמרו" ("both were stated in a single prohibition"), as in the prohibition "אל תפנו אל האבות ואל הידעונים" ("Do not turn to the ovos and to the yid'onim")24 they are stated together, "and to the yid'onim" (and not as a separate "do not ... to the yid'onim"), there is one obligation of a sin-offering for both. Reish Lakish holds that he brings two sin-offerings for them, because "חלוקין הן במיתה" ("they are separated regarding the death penalty"): in the verse "shall surely be put to death" the verse lists them separately, "an ov or a yid'oni."
This is what Rashi alludes to through the change in wording, "their inadvertent transgression" (plural) instead of "one who acts inadvertently." For an inadvertent transgression of them (of ov and yid'oni25) in the manner of "ov, etc." (specifically "or a yid'oni") comes "a sin-offering," in the singular. But when it is otherwise, the law is also different: if "there shall be in them an ov and a yid'oni," meaning he commits both (in a single lapse of awareness), he is liable to two sin-offerings.26
Rashi also alludes to this by quoting only the words "in whom there shall be an ov" and omitting (and separating off) yid'oni, to allude that ov and yid'oni are separate.
10. One may further explain why Rashi alludes to matters of halachah specifically here. And further (and mainly): why does he explain according to Reish Lakish, which is not the halachah, given that in disputes between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish the halachah follows Rabbi Yochanan27?
The answer: By adding the halachah "and for their inadvertent transgression, a sin-offering," a point in the plain meaning of the verse is also made smooth27*:
In the prohibition of ov and yid'oni it says "Do not turn to the ovos and to the yid'onim." In the liability for kares, too, it says "And the soul that turns to the ovos and to the yid'onim." In both these verses "and to" means (and is a shortened form of) "or to."28 Why, then, does it say here "an ov or a yid'oni"28*?
This nuance, too, is resolved by the change in wording "and for their inadvertent transgression, a sin-offering" and by the omission of "or a yid'oni." The fact that here it says "or" explicitly ("they are separated regarding the death penalty"29) is in order to teach from it that only for "ov" alone, or for the "etc." ("or a yid'oni") alone, does one bring a sin-offering, in the singular; but for ov and yid'oni (in a single lapse of awareness) one brings two sin-offerings.
11. In light of the above we can also understand the connection of "A man or a woman in whom there shall be an ov or a yid'oni shall surely be put to death ..." to Parshas Kedoshim.
[For, as has been said many times,30 the name of a sidrah reflects the content of the entire sidrah, down to its very last words. On the contrary: since "נעוץ תחילתן בסופן וסופן בתחילתן" ("their beginning is wedged in their end and their end in their beginning"),31 the name of the sidrah, which is connected with (and, moreover, taken from) its beginning, is expressed especially in the conclusion of the sidrah.]
Seemingly, what connection does the death penalty for ov or yid'oni in the last verse have with "קדשים" ("holy things")?
The connection of liability for kares in general with "holy things" can be explained according to what the Rambam writes31: Tractate Kerisos was placed in the Order of Kodashim because "כל שזדונו כרת שגגתו חטאת" ("whatever is punishable by kares when done intentionally requires a sin-offering when done inadvertently"), and a sin-offering is an offering, a matter of "holy things." So too here: since kares is connected with "holy things," it has a connection with "Kedoshim." But what is the connection between the death penalty (at the end of the sidrah) and holy things?
According to what was said above, from this verse we also learn the obligation of a sin-offering, and even more: from the fact that the death penalty for ov and yid'oni was stated separately, "an ov or a yid'oni," we learn that two sin-offerings are brought for them, "Kodashim" in the plural. It is thus understood how the last verse, too, is connected with "Kedoshim."
12. Here we also see a wondrous thing: how the last verse of the sidrah is connected with the last topic discussed in Likkutei Torah on this week's sidrah.
In the maamar beginning "והדרת פני זקן" ("And you shall honor the presence of an elder"), a verse that comes immediately after the verse "Do not turn to the ovos and to the yid'onim ...," the Alter Rebbe says that every person must know the entire Torah and engrave it in the memory of his mind. However, since "because of the pressures of the times, etc." this is a very difficult thing, he should at least make an effort to engrave in the memory of his mind "the five books of the Torah of Moshe," and, of the Oral Torah, the Order of Kodashim (which is connected with Parshas Kedoshim, as above), "which is called 'wisdom' in the words of our Sages, of blessed memory,32 and which atones for a person's sins, as the Arizal writes."
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Kedoshim, 5725)
Notes
1) So it reads in most printings. In the first printing, Rashi quotes only "in whom there shall be."
2) Our parsha, 20:6.
3) Especially since it is not certain that the word "etc." also refers to "shall surely be put to death," for one could say that it refers only to the preceding words "or a yid'oni."
4) And as Rashi puts it, "Here it states for them, etc.," in the plural. It is strained to say that "for them" (plural) refers to "a man or a woman" in the verse, for that adds nothing new, and he should then have written only "Here it states death, etc." From the fact that he adds "for them" it is evident that he is making some new point by it. Furthermore (and mainly), Rashi should then have also quoted the words "A man, etc." See below, Section 9 and note 26.
5) Accordingly, Rashi's wording "With witnesses and a warning, stoning" becomes clearer, even though his question is "Here it states death for them" (of whatever kind). Since his proof that our verse speaks of a case with a warning is from the severity of the punishment, he cites (as is the case) stoning, which is the most severe death penalty (Sanhedrin 59b ff.), for from this it is most strongly proven that the verse here speaks of a case with a warning.
6) In Rashi's commentary on the Talmud (Sanhedrin 40b, end), the reason kares does not require a warning is that "before Heaven it is revealed whether he acted inadvertently or intentionally." But Rashi's wording here, "intentional without a warning, etc.," implies that even without a warning he certainly acted intentionally, and the warning adds severity to the sin. Indeed, simply speaking, when he is warned and sins nevertheless, this shows greater brazenness, etc. See also Tosafos, s.v. Minayin lehasra'ah (Sanhedrin, ibid.).
7) But one cannot say that both verses speak of a case without a warning, for all death penalties imposed by the beis din apply only with a warning (see Rashi, Mishpatim 22:2; Ki Sisa 32:20; ibid. 35).
8) It is also not understood: Since the difference between liability for stoning and liability for kares lies in the matter of the warning (for since the sin with a warning is more severe, its punishment is more severe), and the matter of witnesses that he mentions is only because otherwise the beis din cannot punish him,* why does he write "witnesses" here, since this is obvious?
*) That is why regarding kares he writes "intentional, etc." (for there is no difference at all whether there are witnesses or not), since before Heaven it is revealed. This is simple.
9) 20:2-5.
10) Moreover: at the end of his comment he adds "and so it is with all those liable to death regarding whom kares is stated" (and consequently giving one's offspring to Molech is also included), yet the verse states explicitly that the kares for giving one's offspring to Molech applies "if they hide their eyes ..."!
*10) Perhaps one may say that this also refers to "and for their inadvertent transgression, a sin-offering," even though that comes here only as an addition and not to resolve "the plain meaning of the verse." See below, Section 7.
11) Our parsha, 20:6. And also before it (19:31), as a prohibition: "Do not turn ...."
12) In Rashi's commentary on the Talmud (Sanhedrin 65a, s.v. Be'azharah), "Do not turn" is a prohibition for one who consults them. Accordingly one could answer that "Do not turn," and likewise "And the soul that turns ...," refer to one who consults them (as in the question of Tosafos there, that one who consults should also be liable to kares), while "in whom there shall be ..." refers to the practitioner of ov. But in his commentary on the Torah, Rashi explains explicitly that "Do not turn to the ovos" is a prohibition for the practitioner of ov.
13) After the laws of those liable to death, and also after "ושמרתם את כל חוקותי . . והייתם לי קדושים גו'" ("You shall observe all My statutes ... and you shall be holy to Me ...").
14) For a further explanation of this, see below, Section 8.
15) See Rashi on our parsha, 19:23 (from Toras Kohanim on this verse): "Yihyeh: it shall be in its existing state." Note also Rashi on Bereishis 1:6: "Let there be a firmament: let the firmament be strengthened."
16) See Sanhedrin (8b, end, and the sources cited there): "The warning was given only to distinguish between inadvertent and intentional." (See Radbaz, Kesef Mishneh, etc. on Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin 12:2, that the Rabbis also hold this; but from Tosafos s.v. Minayin (Sanhedrin 40b, end) it is implied that this reason is only according to Rabbi Yehudah ben Zakkai; see there.) This, however, is according to halachah (that the warning serves to distinguish between inadvertent and intentional). According to the plain meaning, one may say that through the warning the wantonness is created (and grows). (See also above, note 6.)
17) Rashi, Shelach 15:30. See also Rashi, Yisro (18:11): "Zadu: they acted wickedly," and elsewhere.
18) See Rashi (Shevuos 2a), s.v. Toleh. See also Iggeres HaKodesh (end of Epistle 28), that they derive from the gevuros, etc.
19) Vayikra 5:17. Note Rashi's commentary there.
20) Vayikra 4:2.
*20) See Rashi, Mishpatim (21:16, at the end): "and the subject was interrupted, etc."
21) Cited in Rashi's commentary on the Torah, Bo 12:15; Re'eh 16:8.
22) Shelah, in his Tractate Shevuos (181a).
23) Sanhedrin 65a; Kerisos 3b.
24) So it reads explicitly in Rashi's commentary on Sanhedrin, ibid. Several commentators also emend Rashi on Kerisos, ibid., accordingly.
25) One cannot say that it refers to "a man or a woman," since those words are neither quoted nor alluded to in Rashi's commentary.
26) And since the verse says "or a yid'oni" (which Rashi alludes to with "etc.") and Rashi writes "their inadvertent transgression," this also alludes that one is liable to a sin-offering for yid'oni too (even though it is a prohibition that involves no action; see Sanhedrin and Kerisos, ibid.).
27) Yevamos (36a) and elsewhere. This is no difficulty, for it is known (Yad Malachi, Rules of Rashi and Tosafos, Rule 1) that Rashi, even in his commentary on the Talmud, "is accustomed to explain closer to the plain meaning even though the halachah does not follow it, for that is the way of the Talmud as well, etc." All the more so in his commentary on the Torah, where he writes (cited in Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 5, p. 1, note 1) that he explains according to the plain meaning of the verse. In many, many places he explains not in accordance with the halachic conclusion.
27*) Note Rashi's commentary on Bereishis (3:8): "But I have come only to explain the plain meaning of the verse and the Aggadah that settles the words of the verse, etc." (See also Likkutei Sichos, ibid., note 2.)
28) Since this is the simple meaning, Rashi did not need to explain it. See there, nearby (20:9): "his father ... and his mother ... and his mother ...," and Rashi's commentary on Mishpatim (21:15), s.v. Aviv. This is not the place to elaborate.
28*) It is very strained to say that, because of the wording at the beginning of the verse, "or a woman," the verse departs from the two previous instances and writes "or a yid'oni." On the contrary, it should rather have written "and a woman," in keeping with the continuation "and a yid'oni."
29) See at length above, pp. 24-25, and in the notes there.
30) Sefer Yetzirah 1:7.
31) In his introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah (s.v. Veha-chelek hashishi). Also quoted in Tosafos Yom Tov at the beginning of Tractate Kerisos.
32) Shabbos 31a.
Key Lesson
Every word of Rashi is precise: a single plural form, "their inadvertent transgression," both settles the plain meaning of the verse and alludes to a halachic dispute. Likewise, even the last verse of a sidrah expresses the theme of its name, here "Kedoshim." This shows how every part of Torah, down to its final words, is one unified whole. The Alter Rebbe's call to engrave at least the Chumash and the Order of Kodashim in our memory reminds us that Torah study itself brings holiness and atonement.