Parshas Mikeitz
1. On the pasuk "ואת בנימין גו' פן יקראנו אסון" ("But Binyamin, etc., lest disaster befall him"),1 Rashi quotes the words "lest disaster befall him" and asks: "ובבית לא יקראנו אסון" ("And at home, would disaster not befall him?") — why should he, Binyamin, meet with misfortune sooner when going to Mitzrayim than when remaining at home? And Rashi answers: "אמר ר' אליעזר בן יעקב, מכאן שהשטן מקטרג בשעת הסכנה" ("R. Eliezer ben Yaakov said: From here we learn that the Satan accuses2 at a time of danger").3
This is difficult to understand:
a) This very concern, "that the Satan accuses at a time of danger," is seemingly no less applicable to the other brothers than to Binyamin [and on the contrary: since Yaakov already knew at that point that they bore guilt for Yosef's being lost,4 he should have reasoned that because of this there is more room for accusation against them than against Binyamin]. Why, then, did Yaakov send them to Mitzrayim without fearing that misfortune might befall them, as he feared regarding Binyamin?5
b) What danger lay in going to Mitzrayim?6 One cannot say (in the plain meaning) that at that time traveling on the roads in general involved danger — because:
First, the earlier parshiyos relate how Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov, each of them, traveled on the road from place to place7 — and no misfortune befell any of them on the way. And not only they themselves: as their agents, others also set out on the road to other places:8 Avraham sent Eliezer, Yitzchak sent Yaakov, and Yaakov sent Yosef. Had this been a matter of danger, they surely would not have taken upon themselves the responsibility of sending another person into a place of danger.9
Second, in Parshas Lech Lecha10 Rashi says (regarding the time that the A-lmighty said "Lech Lecha" ("Go for yourself") to Avraham and blessed him): "לפי שהדרך גורמת לשלשה דברים: ממעטת פריה ורביה וממעטת את הממון וממעטת את השם, לכך הוזקק לשלש ברכות הללו כו'" ("Because the road causes three things: it lessens fruitfulness and increase, lessens wealth, and lessens renown; therefore he needed these three blessings, etc."). Now, if traveling on the road were a danger, G‑d should first of all have blessed Avraham that he would remain whole and unharmed on the road, before blessing him regarding the remaining "three things."11 It is thus proven that concerning his very survival there was no particular danger on the road, and he therefore had no need of a special blessing on this point.11
c) Even if we accept that Rashi holds that going to Mitzrayim was in itself bound up with danger, it is still not understood why he gives for this the reason "that the Satan accuses at a time of danger" [especially since it is evident from Rashi's wording, "From here we learn that the Satan accuses at a time of danger," that this is taken as a novel point that must first be derived "from here"]. It is plainly understood (even without the concern of accusation12) that because danger is involved, he feared13 "lest disaster befall him." Why does Rashi need to say [and how indeed is it derived "from here"] "that the Satan accuses, etc."?
d) Why does Rashi need to write that the explanation "that the Satan accuses, etc." was stated by R. Eliezer ben Yaakov — what bearing does it have on understanding the pasuk who stated the explanation?
2. There is another point of precision in this comment of Rashi, one which relates (mainly) to the explanation of a different pasuk:
From the wording "From here we learn that the Satan accuses, etc." it is evident14 that Rashi means here to underscore that the matter is learned "from here," and not — as one could seemingly have derived it — from another pasuk.
The question here is: which pasuk does Rashi come to exclude?15
Further on in the parsha16 it is related that after the sons of Yaakov returned from Mitzrayim and told him that the ruler of Mitzrayim had ordered them to bring Binyamin back with them, Yaakov answered: "לא ירד בני עמכם גו' וקראהו אסון בדרך גו'" ("My son shall not go down with you, etc., and disaster will befall him on the road, etc."). One would therefore have thought that from "and disaster will befall him on the road" too it could be derived that the rule "that the Satan accuses at a time of danger" [applies] — on account of the same question, "And at home, would disaster not befall him?" [especially since in the Midrash and Yerushalmi there, the statement of R. Eliezer ben Yaakov (also with the wording "from here"17) is in fact cited on that pasuk]. Therefore Rashi stresses "From here we learn that the Satan accuses, etc.": this can be derived only from our pasuk and not from "and disaster will befall him on the road," because there Yaakov's fear was connected with a different matter, not with the fact that "the Satan accuses at a time of danger."18
One can say simply that Yaakov's fear, "and disaster will befall him on the road" (after learning of the demand of the ruler of Mitzrayim), had to do with a specific concern (not with accusation in general): he thought that the ruler of Mitzrayim was intent on doing something harmful to Binyamin (especially as he had seen that man's conduct toward Shimon). Accordingly, there is no proof from there that "the Satan accuses at a time of danger."19
According to this, however, a difficulty arises: further on, in Parshas Vayigash,20 it is related how Yehudah repeated Yaakov's words, "and disaster will befall him," in connection with their wanting to take Binyamin along to Mitzrayim — seemingly the very same words, "and disaster will befall him," by which Yaakov had meant, with them, a specific concern of danger, as above — and there Rashi does explain "that the Satan accuses at a time of danger"!21
3. In addition to the three above-mentioned pesukim that tell of Yaakov's fear that no misfortune should happen to Binyamin, there is a fourth pasuk: "ועזב את אביו ומת" ("And he would leave his father and he would die");22 with these words the brothers expressed their fear that Binyamin might die on the road.
Rashi pauses there on these words and explains: "אם יעזוב את אביו דואגים אנו שמא ימות בדרך שהרי אמו בדרך מתה" ("If he leaves his father, we are worried that he may die on the road, for his mother died on the road"). Now seemingly, Rashi could have explained Yaakov's fear in the same way (and then it would be plainly understood why Yaakov was afraid specifically for Binyamin's safety and not regarding his other brothers). On what basis does Rashi distinguish, that the fear of the Shevatim was because "his mother died on the road," whereas Yaakov's fear stemmed from the fact that "the Satan accuses at a time of danger"?23 And regarding Yaakov himself — on what basis does Rashi draw the distinction that "lest disaster befall him" and "and disaster will befall him" (in Parshas Vayigash) are on account of the reason "that the Satan accuses, etc.," whereas "and disaster will befall him" (in our parsha) has a different reason?
4. The explanation of all the above:
The reason why "But Binyamin (specifically) etc. he did not send, etc., lest disaster befall him" is explained in the pasuk itself: after the words "But Binyamin" the pasuk adds "the brother of Yosef," thereby indicating that because Binyamin was "the brother of Yosef" — and according to Yaakov's understanding, the misfortune that had happened to Yosef ("חיה רעה אכלתהו", "a wild beast has devoured him"24) came about because he was on the road (where wild beasts are found25) — he therefore feared that to his brother Binyamin too a similar disaster might happen on the road.
And although it is obvious that a single misfortune, Heaven forfend, does not necessitate that the circumstances in which it occurred be regarded as a permanent danger for all time and for the entire family26 — Rashi has already said in an earlier parsha27 that Rachel's passing too came about because of her being "on the road." And since the "road" had already been the cause of two tragic events, and in the very same family, Yaakov therefore had sufficient grounds to assume that for Binyamin too danger existed there.
This is similar to what was explained in an earlier parsha28 concerning Tamar and those who had married her: after the second death, Yehudah no longer wanted to give her to Shelah as a husband, "כי אמר פן ימות גם הוא כאחיו" ("for he said: lest he too die like his brothers") — because since death had already happened twice through Tamar, and both times with Shelah's brothers, she is established as a katlanis (a woman presumed fatal to her husbands) with regard to Shelah.29
5. One can, however, ask on this: Rachel's passing came about mainly (not on account of the "road," but) because of Yaakov's curse, "עם אשר תמצא את אלקיך לא יחיה" ("With whomever you find your gods, he shall not live"),29* and in natural terms, on account of "ותקש בלדתה" ("and she had difficulty in her childbirth");30 and the "road" was no more than an additional contributing factor.31 Why, then, was Yaakov so afraid that the "road" alone could harm Binyamin?32
Therefore Rashi says: "that the Satan accuses at a time of danger." The "road" by itself would indeed not have been sufficient cause for the fear "lest disaster befall him"; but to this is added [yet] another concern: that then, at a time of danger, "the Satan accuses." And since with regard to Binyamin the "road" did present a certain danger (since it had, at any rate, also been a contributing cause of Rachel's death, and Yosef's loss too was (in Yaakov's opinion) connected exclusively with the condition of the "road"33) —
Yaakov therefore feared "lest disaster befall him," because the existing danger of the road could cause, could call forth, the Satan's accusation (similar to the death of Rachel, where the "road" caused Yaakov's curse to harm her).
6. This reason applies only with regard to Yaakov's fear, "lest disaster befall him." When we come, however, to the pasuk "And he would leave his father and he would die," which the sons of Yaakov said, the question arises: they, the sons of Yaakov, knew that the "road" had not caused Yosef any harm.34
(And as for Rachel's passing on the road — first, that was a single occurrence, and second, even in that one case the "road" was only secondary, as above.)
They could therefore not say that a danger threatens Binyamin on the road. What, then, did they mean by their fear, "And he would leave his father and he would die"?
On this Rashi explains there: "We are worried that he may35 die on the road, for his mother died on the road"36: since after all "his mother died on the road," then even if because of this the "road" cannot yet be regarded as a certain danger, it is nevertheless enough to arouse in them worry, a concern "that he may, etc."37
7. The second expression of Yaakov's fear, "and disaster will befall him on the road, etc.," Rashi likewise cannot explain by saying that "the Satan accuses at a time of danger":
On an earlier pasuk38 Rashi says: "מלמד שחשדן שמא הרגוהו או מכרוהו כיוסף" ("This teaches that he suspected them of perhaps having killed him or sold him, like Yosef"). That is, by then39 Yaakov already had the thought that Yosef's "being no more" was not through "a wild beast has devoured him." This being so, it is plainly understood that his not wanting to send Binyamin with them was not on account of "the Satan accuses at a time of danger," because:
(a) the reason for Yaakov's fear, "and disaster will befall him," [OCR unclear: text missing here] to do him some harm40 [or that they would at any rate not exert themselves to protect him in Mitzrayim,41 so that he not be arrested and the like42], as they had done regarding Yosef and Shimon.43
(b) Since Yaakov thought that Yosef's "being no more" was not through "a wild beast has devoured him," and consequently not connected with the "road," he could not hold that the "road" was a danger for Binyamin, since the whole reason he had previously held so was because Binyamin was "the brother of Yosef."
And when he said "and disaster will befall him on the road," his emphasis was not on the words "on the road" but on "on the road on which you will go," as he also stresses in the continuation of the pasuk: "My son shall not go down with you."44
8. It is different, however, with the pasuk "and disaster will befall him" in Parshas Vayigash, where Yehudah repeated these words of Yaakov before the ruler of Mitzrayim. There it is plainly understood that the suspicion against them, which Yaakov had expressed in these words, they could not bring out before the ruler of Mitzrayim. So Rashi learns there that before the ruler of Mitzrayim they interpreted Yaakov's meaning in the words "and disaster will befall him" in another way: "the Satan accuses at a time of danger."
And for this reason they prefaced this with what Yaakov had said,45 "ואומר אך טרוף טורף" ("And I said: he has surely been torn to pieces") — that he (Yaakov) assumes that Yosef perished through a wild beast, on the road; because it is specifically after this preface that the reason "that the Satan accuses at a time of danger" holds up, as explained at length above.
9. After all this explanation there still remains a question on the explanation "that the Satan accuses at a time of danger," a question which Rashi answers by stating that this explanation was said by R. Eliezer ben Yaakov (but since in the plain meaning this is not a great difficulty — (and will come only later, as will be explained below) — Rashi therefore contents himself with an explanation by way of remez, by citing the name of the author of the statement).
A chazakah (established presumption) is generally determined by three times, and as the student will learn further on, in Parshas Mishpatim,46 regarding the law of a shor ha-mu'ad (an ox established as a gorer) — it is specifically because it "has gored yesterday and the day before," when it has already gored three times, that it becomes established as a goring ox. This being so, one can ask: the harm caused by the "road" to Binyamin's family is found in only two cases — once with his mother Rachel and once with his brother Yosef — so how could Yaakov already take it as an established presumption of danger for Binyamin? Rashi forestalls this difficulty by saying that this explanation, "that the Satan accuses at a time of danger," is said by R. Eliezer ben Yaakov (as will be explained below, section 12).
10. The same question can also be asked earlier, on the words "lest he too die like his brothers," where Rashi explains "מוחזקת היא זו שימותו אנשיה" ("This woman is established as one whose husbands die"): how can Tamar be described as "established as one whose husbands die" when this actually happened only twice (the case of Er and then of Onan)?
And according to the above, the matter is thus unavoidable: if in our case Rashi finds it necessary to forestall this difficulty, he should have forestalled it also regarding Tamar's being "established"; and if there he does not pause on it — accepting that this does not contradict the requirement of specifically three gorings with a shor ha-mu'ad, because it may be that in certain matters there is no chazakah except through three times and in others two times are enough — then accordingly Rashi could seemingly have managed without this precaution in our case as well, without citing the name of R. Eliezer ben Yaakov.
And the explanation of this: in the Gemara47 there is a dispute between Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: Rebbi says that with two times a chazakah is established, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that with three times a chazakah is established. The Gemara concludes there that with marriage and malkos (lashes) the law remains like Rebbi; and with vestos (menstrual cycles) and shor ha-mu'ad the halachah is like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
What does the distinction between marriage (and malkos) and (vestos and) shor ha-mu'ad consist of? There are those48 who explain the distinction by saying that marriage and malkos are more severe than vestos and shor ha-mu'ad, and therefore with them we are more stringent, taking a chazakah into account even with two times.
According to this view it would be well: just as with "lest he too die like his brothers" — a matter of marriage — she becomes "established" even through two times, because there the severity of danger to life is present, so too is it understood in our case: since here too the "road" is connected with danger to life, merely two times are enough for concern.
But Rashi says there in the Gemara: "איכא מילתא דמחזקינן לה בתרי זימני ואיכא מילתא דבעינן תלתא זימני" ("There are matters that we establish with two times, and there are matters where we require three times"), meaning that the fact that with marriage (and malkos) the chazakah comes through two times is (not on account of their severity relative to the others, but) because these are such matters where reason allows that a chazakah should already be created through "two times."
11. The difference between marriage and shor ha-mu'ad is so simple, even according to the plain meaning, that Rashi (even in his commentary on the Torah, which he also wrote for a five-year-old student of Scripture) has no need to explain it at all:
When we deal with a case in which the chazakah determines that the same results must come again, because the very existence of the thing thus established necessitates and causes them — as is the case with a "katlanis": becoming "established as one whose husbands die," it is assumed that her "source"49 has the nature of causing death — then merely two times suffice to create the chazakah.50
But it is different where we speak of a case in which, even after becoming established as causing such results, they remain dependent on yet another added cause
[and so it is with a shor ha-mu'ad: even after the chazakah, the ox does not turn into something whose existence alone must naturally bring about the harm of goring (as with a katlanis, whose causing death is a natural matter, entirely independent of her will); for this it is required that it also perform the act of goring (and this does, after all, depend on a certain expression of "will" on the part of the ox)51]
— here there is already less likelihood, and therefore one can understand why in such a case the chazakah comes only after the third time.
Accordingly, one must say that in our case too — since even within the family itself the "road" did not bring about the "disaster" directly; it is only that the road provided the opportunity for the operation of the cause of the fatal misfortune — it must follow (and all the more so than with shor ha-mu'ad) that merely two times should not be enough to create a chazakah, and thus the question returns to its place.
Therefore Rashi says that this explanation was said by R. Eliezer ben Yaakov, according to whose view it becomes understandable why with the "road" a chazakah is established even through two times.
12. Regarding the time from which one begins to transgress "bal te'acher" ("do not delay" — when someone is late in bringing the pledged vows and donations to the Beis HaMikdash), there is a dispute in the Gemara:52 there is an opinion that this begins after three festivals have passed (since he vowed or pledged) and he has still not brought the vows and donations (and Rashi in his commentary on the Torah53 takes this view) — but R. Eliezer ben Yaakov holds: "כיון שעברו עליהם שני רגלים עובר בבל תאחר" ("Once two festivals have passed over them, he transgresses 'do not delay'").
And we see that the prohibition of "bal te'acher" is connected with the "road," as Rashi54 gives the reason why one should try from the outset to offer the vows and donations right at the first festival: because "שמא יקשה לו לחזור ולעלות לירושלים ולהקריב נדריו ונמצא עובר בבל תאחר" ("perhaps it will be hard for him to come back up to Yerushalayim and offer his vows, and he will thus transgress 'do not delay'").
Now, since R. Eliezer ben Yaakov holds that with the matter of "bal te'acher," bound up as it is with the difficulties of "coming back up" — of traveling "on the road" — one transgresses "bal te'acher" when merely "two festivals" have passed, it is understood from this that according to the view of R. Eliezer ben Yaakov the "road" must create a chazakah at two times in our case as well.
And here we see (as one sees in many places in his commentary) the "ענינים מופלאים" ("wondrous matters")55 that are found in Rashi's commentary; and how all of Rashi's explanations are bound up with one another, to the point that in order to understand not only the plain meaning but also the hints and wondrous matters of one comment of his in Parshas Mikeitz, one must also know what he teaches us in his commentary on Tractate Yevamos and in Parshas Pinchas.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Mikeitz and Shabbos Parshas Vayigash 5729)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 42:4.
2) In the Yerushalmi and Bereishis Rabbah (cited in the next note): "The Satan accuses only at a time of danger." But according to the plain meaning, the Satan also accuses not at a time of danger (see Rashi, Vayeira 22:1), except that at a time of danger he accuses more. And although Rashi cites this statement in the name of R. Eliezer ben Yaakov (as in Bereishis Rabbah; in the Yerushalmi: R. Achai ben Yaakov), one can say: (a) Rashi had a different reading; (b) along the lines of what is written in Chiddushei Aggados, Sanhedrin (38b), s.v. "unless." (The same answers also apply to what Rashi says, in the name of R. Eliezer ben Yaakov, "From here we learn that the Satan accuses, etc.," although in the Yerushalmi and Midrash "from here" is said on the pasuk (42:38) "and disaster will befall him on the road." All the more so since the Midrash and Yerushalmi on this basis reject Rashi's explanation, as below, note 17.)
3) Yerushalmi, Shabbos 2:6. Bereishis Rabbah 91:9. And see the previous note.
4) See Rashi, our parsha, 42:36 (but see below, note 39).
5) In Targum Yonasan here: "he is a youth." So too in Ramban, Vayigash (44:29): "Because he was young and tender, he had not tried traveling on the road." But (besides the fact that according to this Rashi would not have needed the reason "that the Satan accuses, etc." — and see below, question c) this answer is not understood (for a "five-year-old" student), for Binyamin was by then about "thirty years old,"* and it is not plausible to call him tender (on the contrary: "at thirty, strength" — Avos, ch. 5). It should also be noted that in the plain meaning, even tender children, when they walk without haste, are not endangered by the road (see Vayishlach 33:13–14 and Rashi there).
*) For he was born before Yaakov came to his father Yitzchak (35:18, 27), when Yaakov was ninety-nine (Rashi, end of Toldos), and in our parsha, at the beginning of the years of famine, Yaakov was about one hundred twenty-nine (Rashi there); so Binyamin was at least close to "thirty years old."
6) As Rashi explains in the Midrash (Bereishis Rabbah, there): "at a time of danger — that is, on the road." (And in Matnos Kehunah there: "and all roads are presumed dangerous.")
7) Noach 11:31. Beginning of Lech Lecha; 13:1 ff. Vayeira 20:1. Toldos 26:23; 28:5. Beginning of Vayeitzei. And elsewhere.
8) Chayei Sarah 24:3 ff. Toldos 28:2 ff. Vayeishev 37:13 ff.
9) See Baer Heitev, end of siman 603 (in the name of the Rema). This is also Rashi's proof (Vayishlach) for his explanation "actual angels": since Yaakov feared (as was indeed the truth) that Esav "was still in his hatred," he was forbidden to send people to Esav as his agents, for there was a concern of danger in this. On this basis it is understood why Rashi writes his explanation "actual angels" on "And Yaakov sent angels" (for seemingly he needed to quote from the verse only "angels") — because his proof for this explanation is from "And he sent, etc." See below, p. 390 ff. And see Likkutei Sichos vol. 10, p. 100, note 5.
10) 12:2.
11) One cannot say that this is already understood on its own from "And I will make you a great nation, etc.," because [besides the implausibility of not blessing him explicitly regarding his very life (if the road were a danger)], the plain meaning of Rashi's wording, "that the road causes three things," implies that it causes only these things, and not danger to life. (And it is very forced to say that Rashi is not concerned with the count and cites these three specifically to give a reason why Avraham needed these three blessings, for this is contrary to his writing "causes three things.")
12) And there is no contradiction to this from what Yaakov said (Vayeitzei 28:20), "and guard me on the road," because on the contrary: the precise wording there is "and guard me on this road" (and see Rashi there, 28:15, that he needed "I am with you" "because he was afraid (on this journey of his) of Esav and of Lavan" — although one may distinguish between "I am with you" and "I will guard you"); but had he been traveling on another road, he would not have needed special protection. And what Rashi says (28:11), "for he was afraid of wild beasts," is likewise no difficulty, for from there the opposite is also proven: that it is possible to protect oneself from wild beasts, as he himself defended himself against them with stones — or in some other way.
In any case, this has no bearing on the subject at hand, for it is plainly understood (even if we say that Yaakov then needed special protection) that one must distinguish between one who travels alone on the road and those who travel in a caravan. And it must necessarily be said, from the fact that Yaakov sent his sons, that on this road there was no element of danger, as in the text.
13) This is why Yaakov sent to Esav "actual angels" — see above, note 9. Likewise Yehudah did not give Shelah to Tamar "lest he too die like his brothers."
14) One cannot say that Rashi's intent in stressing "from here" is because this rule also applies to other pesukim —
like "But we are guilty, etc., therefore this has come upon us, etc." (42:21): for seemingly, since "we are guilty concerning our brother," why did the "trouble" come upon them only after so many years? And the answer to this is that since they were then in danger, specifically then the Satan accused them —
for even if Rashi had not written "from here," it would have been understood that the Satan accuses at every time of danger.
15) One cannot say that his intent is to exclude the pasuk "and guard me on this road," because the plain meaning of guarding is from the danger of wild beasts and the like, and not from sudden death coming on account of the Satan's accusation at a time of danger from wild beasts.
16) 42:38.
17) This stresses even further that according to the Midrash one cannot learn from the pasuk "lest disaster befall him" "that the Satan accuses at a time of danger." Accordingly, the difference between Rashi's explanation and the Midrash is (not only in the explanation of the pasuk "and disaster will befall him on the road," as below in the text, but) also in the explanation of "lest disaster befall him."
18) One cannot say that Rashi's intent in stressing "from here" is because the Midrash explains that this lesson is (from another pasuk and) not from here (as in the previous note), and Rashi explains that it is also from here — the difference between Rashi and the Midrash being only in the explanation of "lest disaster befall him" and not in "and disaster will befall him on the road" — because to make clear that according to the plain meaning "that the Satan accuses, etc." can also be learned from this pasuk, it is enough that Rashi explains "that the Satan accuses, etc." on "lest disaster befall him," and he would not need to write "from here." And see below, note 21.
19) On this basis the change in the wording of the verses would also be understood: there it says simply "and disaster will befall him," and not "lest disaster befall him" — for with regard to the ruler of Mitzrayim it is reasonable to say that he wants to bring false charges, etc. (as in the text), whereas with regard to the Satan it is not at all certain that he will find something to accuse about, and that he will accuse, and that his accusation will be accepted. But see below, note 35.
20) 44:29.
21) From this too it is proven that "and disaster will befall him" in our parsha is not for the reason that the Satan accuses — for if we say that it is for this reason, and Rashi does not explain it there because he relies on what he explained earlier (42:4), he would not have needed to explain this in Parshas Vayigash either.
(Rashi nevertheless stresses "from here" to exclude this explanation, so that the student should not be in doubt about this until he comes to Parshas Vayigash.)
22) 44:22.
23) One cannot say that the intent of "at a time of danger" in Rashi's explanation here and in Parshas Vayigash (44:29) is also on account of his mother having died on the road, because (a) it is not Rashi's way to rely on what he will explain later (in Parshas Vayigash) (and if the matter is so obvious that Rashi need not explain it, then in Parshas Vayigash too this is superfluous); (b) from his explanation in Parshas Vayigash it is implied that the very fact that "his mother died on the road" is the reason for "we are worried, etc.," so why then did he need "the Satan accuses, etc." here?
24) Vayeishev 37:33.
25) See Rashi, 28:11. (But even so, this was a danger only for Binyamin — see above, note 12.)
26) As is plainly understood. Note also that specifically after the death of (Er and) Onan, Tamar was not given to Shelah, "lest he too die like his brothers" (Vayeishev 38:11), but after the death of Er — since it had happened only once — Yehudah said to Onan (even though he was Er's brother), "Go in to your brother's wife, etc." (there, 38:8).
27) Vayeitzei (31:32).
28) Vayeishev 38:11.
29) In Rashi there: "that her husbands die." But from what is written, "lest he too die like his brothers," it must be that with regard to Shelah she is more strongly established,* to such an extent that even after it became clearly established that she is not a katlanis with regard to the whole world, she was forbidden to Shelah on account of "lest he too die like his brothers" (as explained above, p. 189, note 37).
*) For the reason why Rashi writes "that her husbands die," although the verse says "like his brothers," see above, p. 189, note 37.
29*) Vayeitzei (31:32) and Rashi there.
30) Vayishlach 35:16.
31) To the extent that in the account of Rachel's death (unlike in Parshas Vayechi, 48:7) the Torah does not mention (at least explicitly, although one can say that it is hinted at in what is written, "And they journeyed, etc., and there was still a stretch of land to come to Efras") that it was on the road.
32) It is different with "for he said: lest he too die like his brothers" (where she was forbidden to Shelah even after it became clear that she was not a katlanis with regard to the whole world, as in note 29 above), because with regard to this family she had become established as a katlanis [and note that in halachah too there is a view (cited in Otzar HaPoskim on Even HaEzer, siman 9, section 1 (subsection 5)) that with two brothers she is established as a katlanis only with regard to the remaining brothers and not with regard to the whole world], whereas in our case, even with regard to this family the road was only an additional contributing factor.
33) Therefore the pasuk says "But Binyamin, the brother of Yosef, etc." and not "the son of Rachel" (although on account of "the brother of Yosef" itself he would not have feared that disaster might befall him, as above, section 4) — because [besides the fact that the second occurrence of disaster on the road was with Yosef, and it was specifically then that the road became established as dangerous] in the disaster of Yosef, the "road" was the only cause.
34) For their having sold him does not depend on his having been on the road.
35) And although in our pasuk too it is written "lest disaster befall him," "pen" ("lest") does not express as much doubt as "shema" ("perhaps"). Therefore in Parshas Vayeishev too it is written "lest he die, etc.," although she is established, etc.
Furthermore: also regarding eating from the Tree of Knowledge — although it is stated (Bereishis 2:17), "For on the day you eat from it you shall surely die" — it says "lest you die" (there, 3:3; and see Radak there, in the second interpretation).*
*) In the first interpretation in Radak there: "And as for her saying 'lest,' which means 'perhaps' .. for He forbade even touching, lest we come from touching to eating and die." But from what Rashi writes (3:4), "He said to her: just as there is no death in touching, so there is no death in eating," it is proven that she held that even by the touching itself they would die (and for her this was a certainty, etc., to the point that from the fact that she did not die right after touching, the serpent proved to her that there is no death from eating either). From this it must be that according to Rashi's explanation, the word "lest" applies also to a matter of certainty.
36) And as for Rashi's saying there, "If he leaves his father," although the reason for this is the road and not leaving his father — his intent in this is to answer: it has already been said "The youth cannot leave his father," so why does it immediately repeat "And he would leave his father"? Therefore Rashi explains that these are two matters: a) "The youth cannot leave his father," because "his father loves him"** (there, v. 20), but this is not a reason for fear of death.*** b) Even "if he leaves his father" (despite the difficulty in this, a difficulty such that the term "cannot" applies to it), nevertheless "we are worried that he may die on the road, etc."
**) The intent of this is that Yaakov would be unable to bear the youth's leaving him. (But not that Binyamin would be unable, because of his love — for if so, they would have needed to say (in the preceding verses) "and he loves his father," and not "and his father loves him.")
***) Also regarding Yaakov (unlike the explanation of Ibn Ezra (cited in Ramban) and Rashbam), for from what is said further (v. 31; and see Rashi there), "And when he sees that the youth is not there, his father will die of his distress," it is proven that his leaving his father for a short time is no cause for fear of "and he would die."
37) [OCR unclear: the text of this note is not in the source.]
38) [OCR unclear: the text of this note is not in the source.]
39) [OCR unclear: the text of this note is not in the source.]
40) As in Sforno, 43:2.
41) See Rashi, 43:8: "perhaps he will be seized, etc."
42) On the basis of what is said in the text, one will understand why Yehudah said "I will be his guarantor, etc." — for seemingly (a) how can one be a guarantor that disaster will not befall him on the road, since this does not depend at all on Yehudah? (b) Why did he say only "perhaps he will be seized" (and did not take care to answer Yaakov's main claim, that disaster (death) might befall him, which is worse than being seized)? Because then Yaakov was not concerned about the danger of the road, only that he might be seized or that they might lose him (as in the text). And since accordingly the concern is only that he might be seized, Yehudah said only this in his argument (except that in his guarantee he also added "and I will set him before you — that I will not bring him to you dead but alive" — that they would not lose him).
43) See also Targum Yonasan here: "Yosef, you said a beast, etc., and Shimon, you said, etc., and Binyamin you wish to take." See also Targum Yerushalmi here. On this basis the question of the Ohr HaChaim here is simply answered: "How could he be concerned about the doubtful case of Binyamin over the certain case of Shimon?"
44) As for why it also says in verse 4, "But Binyamin, the brother of Yosef, Yaakov did not send with his brothers," the intent of the verse in "with his brothers" [is not a reason for "did not send," but] to stress that although he sent his brothers and did not fear the danger of the road, he nevertheless did not send Binyamin, because he was the brother of Yosef.
45) 44:28.
46) 21:29, 36.
47) Yevamos 64b.
48) Rosh there, beginning of 65a. Nimukei Yosef there. See also Responsa of the Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh De'ah, siman 3, subsection 7, and the sources cited there.
49) And all the more so according to the ruling that her mazal (fortune) causes it.
50) And as for vestos being established specifically with three times, although this too is a natural matter — vestos go further still, for even after three times, when a chazakah is established according to all opinions, it is only Rabbinic. The reason is because most of a woman's days are days of purity and she stands in a presumption of purity, and there is a chazakah — a nature — (and a majority) opposing the nature of the cycle (see Responsa of the Tzemach Tzedek, there).
51) And as for malkos being established with two times, although he is not compelled to sin — this is according to R. Eliezer ben Yaakov — "with whom we are dealing" — who explains that he transgressed [OCR unclear: the rest of this note is not in the source].
52) Rosh Hashanah 4a–b.
53) Teitzei 23:22.
54) Pinchas 29:39.
55) Shelah in his Tractate Shevuos (161a).
Key Lesson
This Sicha shows how a single comment of Rashi, including even his naming of the sage who said it, rests on an exact chain of reasoning about Yaakov's fears and the Shevatim's fears for Binyamin. All of Rashi's commentary is bound together, so that one comment in Parshas Mikeitz is fully understood only through what he teaches elsewhere, in Yevamos and in Parshas Pinchas; every word in it deserves careful study.