Parshas Vayeishev
1. On the verse, "זנתה תמר כלתך גו' הוציאוה ותשרף" ("Your daughter-in-law Tamar has acted immorally… Take her out and let her be burned"),1 Rashi pauses at the end, on the word "ותשרף" ("and let her be burned"), and says:2 "אמר אפרים מקשאה משום ר' מאיר בתו של שם היתה שהוא כהן לפיכך דנוה בשריפה" ("Efraim Miksha'ah said in the name of Rabbi Meir: She was the daughter of Shem, who was a kohen; therefore3 they sentenced her to burning").
This is not understood:
a) The law that a kohen's daughter who acted immorally deserves burning is first mentioned in Parshas Emor.4 Before the time of that command (even after the Giving of the Torah5), burning was not due for this. How, then, could Tamar be judged according to this law, so long beforehand?
b) Even after the law had been commanded, it takes effect specifically when "זנתה מן האירוסין או מן הנשואין" ("she acted immorally while betrothed or married"), and "הכל מודים שלא דיבר הכתוב בפנוי'" ("all agree that the verse does not speak of an unmarried woman").6 Tamar, however, was at that time an unmarried woman, since this took place after her husband's death.7
2. There are commentators who explain that in those generations the practice was that a shomeres yavam (a widow awaiting levirate marriage) who acted immorally was sentenced to burning, because a shomeres yavam was then regarded as a married woman.8
But one cannot read into Rashi that Tamar was sentenced to burning as a kohen's daughter who acted immorally because, as a shomeres yavam, she bore the status of a married woman,9 because:
a) Nowhere in Rashi's commentary is it mentioned that a shomeres yavam was ever regarded as a married woman.
b) According to Rashi it is evident that Tamar did not have the law of a shomeres yavam at all, as will be explained below.
3. It has already been discussed at length that one of the reasons why, in his commentary on "וכל בנותיו" ("and all his daughters"),10 Rashi does not suffice with the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah that "his daughters" means literally that, Yaakov's daughters, but also brings the opinion of Rabbi Nechemiah that it means "his daughters-in-law" (although the plain meaning of "his daughters" is daughters), is this: according to Rabbi Yehudah's explanation it follows that the tribes married their sisters11 (from their father's side, who are permitted to the Children of Noach12), whereas the plain assumption is that the tribes, at least during Yaakov's lifetime, observed the entire Torah before it was given.13
Further still regarding the prohibition of a yevamah marrying an outsider: since we find regarding the mitzvah of yibbum that Yehudah in general observed this mitzvah, for he said to Onan, "בא אל אשת אחיך ויבם אותה גו'" ("Go to your brother's wife and perform yibbum with her…"),14 plain logic also requires that he observed (even according to Rabbi Yehudah) the prohibition, "לא תהי' אשת המת החוצה לאיש זר" ("The wife of the deceased shall not marry outside, to a stranger"), since this negative command grows out of the obligation that "יבמה יבא עלי' גו'" ("her brother-in-law shall come to her…").15
If so, there is a difficulty in Rashi's explanation16 that "ולא יסף עוד לדעתה" ("and he did not continue to know her again") means (according to the second explanation) "לא פסק" ("he did not cease"). How can one say that Yehudah afterwards took Tamar? She was a shomeres yavam awaiting Shelah,17 who was by then grown!
And even if one were to explain that according to Rabbi Yehudah, Yehudah indeed did not observe the prohibition of a yevamah marrying an outsider (distinguishing between the positive command, "her brother-in-law shall come to her," and the prohibition, "The wife of the deceased shall not marry outside…"; or explaining that in saying "perform yibbum with her" Yehudah did not intend to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum, but only that this was then the custom18), so that one could answer that the explanation "he did not cease" holds only according to Rabbi Yehudah, whereas according to Rabbi Nechemiah "לא יסף" is to be translated, as Rashi explains in his first interpretation, "he did not do so again"19 —
— a difficulty will nevertheless remain:20 According to Rabbi Nechemiah, that the tribes (at that time) did observe the entire Torah before it was given, it emerges that, however it may have been, Yehudah earlier transgressed a prohibition in the episode with Tamar (except that the prohibition was committed unknowingly, for "לא ידע כי כלתו היא" ("he did not know that she was his daughter-in-law")21). How, then, could it be said (a) that from Above22 he should be led to this,23 and (b) that King David and so on, up to King Moshiach, should descend from a union that was forbidden, according to the conduct they had taken upon themselves?24
The explanation of this, however, is that according to the plain meaning there is no question in this whole matter to begin with. The prohibition, "The wife of the deceased shall not marry outside…," emerges, as was said, as a consequence of the directive, "her brother-in-law shall come to her." Therefore, in our case (even if one says that the tribes were stringent and observed the entire Torah), since Shelah was not permitted to perform yibbum with Tamar because "מוחזקת היא זו שימותו אנשי'" ("this woman is presumed to be one whose husbands die"),25 the whole matter of a yevamah marrying an outsider automatically falls away. For the same reason she was also not subject to chalitzah, because the whole matter of chalitzah (also according to the plain meaning) applies specifically when "לא יחפוץ האיש לקחת את יבמתו" ("the man does not wish to take his yevamah"),26 but not when he may not perform yibbum with her.27
4. At first glance one could still ask a question (according to Rabbi Nechemiah): Tamar was Yehudah's daughter-in-law, so surely the prohibition applied here of "ערות כלתך לא תגלה" ("You shall not uncover the nakedness of your daughter-in-law")?28 The truth, however, is that in our case (according to the plain meaning) the prohibition of a daughter-in-law is not relevant:29
a) On "ערות אשת אביך" ("the nakedness of your father's wife"),30 Rashi says, "לרבות לאחר מיתה" ("to include after death"). Since a special inclusion is needed to forbid a father's wife even after the father's death, it follows that according to Rashi's approach, and particularly when studying according to the plain meaning, with other similar forbidden relations, among them "your son's wife," the prohibition falls away after death. Since Tamar was a widow, she was therefore not forbidden to Yehudah as his son's wife.
b) Even if one were to say31 that from a father's wife we also derive the prohibition after death regarding all the other forbidden relations,32 the prohibition of "your daughter-in-law" differs from the rest. Since the verse explains the reason for the prohibition33 as "תבל עשו" ("they have committed a perversion"), meaning, "מבלבלין זרע האב בזרע הבן" ("they mix the seed of the father with the seed of the son"),34 it stands to reason that after the son's death (or when she is divorced35), when the concern for this reason of mixing no longer exists, she is permitted to his father.
c) Further still: even if one grants that in general the reason for the prohibition also applies after death, because even seed of the son from earlier on is later called "תבל" ("perversion")36 with respect to the father, this does not apply at all in our case. Since Er and Onan destroyed their seed,37 the whole matter of "perversion" does not fit here.
5. According to the above (section 3), that Tamar did not have the law of a shomeres yavam, it follows that (not only did she not transgress a prohibition punishable by death, since she was an unmarried woman, but) she did not transgress any prohibition at all, not even a negative command. If so, the question becomes stronger still: why, nevertheless, was she sentenced to burning?
This will be understood by first noting what is related in the previous parshah,38 that Shimon and Levi killed "את חמור ואת שכם בנו" ("Chamor and his son Shechem") and also "כל זכר" ("every male") of the city of Shechem. At first glance: how were they permitted to do this? It is the prohibition of bloodshed (which the Children of Noach are also commanded against39)!
One must say that the fact that "האומות גדרו עצמן מן העריות" ("the nations fenced themselves off from forbidden relations")40 was accepted in such a manner that whoever would breach this fence would incur the punishment of death for it. Shechem therefore deserved death according to law, because the fence had the force of law.41
[Further still, we find: even when an individual took upon himself a certain matter in such a manner that if he would not carry it out, death should come upon him (or upon someone wholly within his authority), it is evident from the plain meaning of the verses that this undertaking had the force of law.42 This is the explanation of what Reuven said, "את שני בני תמית אם לא אביאנו אליך" ("You may slay my two sons if I do not bring him to you"),43 (and Yaakov too rejected this only on the ground44 "וכי בניו הם ולא בני" ("Are they his sons and not my sons?"), and not because the pledge concerned something forbidden to do). For (according to the plain meaning) before the Giving of the Torah one could confirm an undertaking of a certain matter, whether to bind oneself or one's children, according to law, with the punishment of death for not carrying out this undertaking.45]
According to this one can say similarly regarding Tamar: she was sentenced to burning (not because of the prohibition in the verse, "ובת איש כהן גו'" ("And the daughter of a kohen…") of Parshas Emor,46 but) because the fence of that time regarding a kohen's daughter47 was accepted in such a manner that if she acted immorally, burning would come upon her for it.48
6. It must still be understood, however: if, as a kohen's daughter who acted immorally, Tamar did then deserve burning, why did this punishment no longer apply to her after Yehudah made known, "ממני היא מעוברת" ("She is pregnant by me")?49
The explanation is: on "הכזונה יעשה את אחותנו" ("Should he treat our sister like a harlot?"),50 Rashi says, "הכזונה — הפקר" ("like a harlot — ownerless").51 This means that a zonah is specifically one who abandons herself to immorality. (Therefore it is written regarding Dinah, "like a harlot," with the prefix kaf of comparison, because with her it happened by force.)
From this it is understood regarding our subject: when it became known that Tamar was pregnant, it was assumed that "זנתה תמר גו' הרה לזנונים" ("Tamar has acted immorally… she is pregnant through immorality"). But when Yehudah made known that "She is pregnant by me," they saw that she was not abandoned to immorality, and no punishment was due her.52
7. It has already been said many times that when Rashi copies an explanation of our Sages from the Gemara or Midrash, he does not cite the name of the author of the statement, even when the Gemara or Midrash does give it, except where this answers a certain difficulty in the explanation. (But since the difficulty is not a severe one and is not compelling in the study of the plain meaning of Scripture, Rashi does not find it necessary to address it explicitly, and suffices with a hint to the answer by giving the name of the author of the statement.)
What is the difficulty or the lack of smoothness in our verse that is answered by knowing that this explanation was said by Efraim Miksha'ah in the name of Rabbi Meir?
The episode of Yehudah and Tamar took place (at least) close to seventy years after the death of Shem.53 Moreover, by then Tamar had already been married twice, and through marriage the bond with her father's house is severed54 (which is why nowhere in the verse is she mentioned as the daughter of Shem, but rather as Yehudah's daughter-in-law). How, then, could she be sentenced to burning because "she was the daughter of Shem"?
Rashi hints at the answer to this by saying that this explanation was said by Efraim Miksha'ah in the name of Rabbi Meir:
We find the view of Efraim Miksha'ah in the name of Rabbi Meir55 (on the reason why specifically Ovadiah said the prophecy of the downfall of Edom, in these words): "עובדי' גר אדומי הי'" ("Ovadiah was an Edomite convert"), and therefore specifically through him was the prophecy of the downfall of Edom said, because "מיני' ובי' אבא ניזיל56 בי' נרגא" (from the forest itself comes the handle for the axe, to chop down the forest).
This is not understood: Ovadiah lived while the First Beis HaMikdash stood, and the downfall of Edom (foretold in Ovadiah's prophecy) will take place only (very soon indeed) in the days of Moshiach, at the time of "ועלו מושיעים בהר ציון לשפוט את הר עשו והיתה לה' המלוכה" ("And saviors shall ascend Mount Zion to judge the mountain of Esav, and the kingship shall be G‑d's").57 What, then, is the connection between Ovadiah, who long ago was an Edomite, and the time and state of Edom so many years later, in the Time to Come? From this we have proof that Efraim Miksha'ah in the name of Rabbi Meir holds that despite the long distance in time, with the many changes over the years, it nevertheless remains the same matter.58
There is another statement of Efraim Miksha'ah in the name of Rabbi Meir59 (on the reason why Avraham, together with the "חמאה וחלב ובן הבקר" ("butter, milk and the young calf"),60 did not also bring bread to the angels, although he had said to Sarah, "לושי ועשי עוגות" ("Knead and make cakes")61): "אברהם אבינו אוכל חולין בטהרה הי', ושרה אמנו אותו היום פרסה נדה" ("Avraham our father ate ordinary food in purity, and Sarah our mother became niddah that day"). The question arises: from the very wording, "Avraham ate ordinary food in purity," it is evident that eating ordinary food in purity is an enhancement that only Avraham observed, whereas the guests were not obligated to be so meticulous. Particularly since Avraham took them for idol worshippers,62 he, as one who welcomes guests in the most exemplary fashion, should surely have given them the bread to eat as well.63
One must say that Efraim Miksha'ah in the name of Rabbi Meir holds: when someone is in another person's home, he must conduct himself according to all the stringencies and enhancements of the master of the house, even when, on his own, the guest is far from such conduct. Accordingly the reason is understood why Avraham did not give the guests the bread, for since they were then in his home (Avraham's home), they too had to take care to eat ordinary food in purity.64
Through these two statements of Efraim Miksha'ah in the name of Rabbi Meir, it is understood why Tamar was sentenced to burning:
a) Because, regardless of the distance in time and the change in circumstance, she still remained the daughter of Shem, and retained a connection with him even now.
b) And further: since Yehudah told her, "שבי אלמנה בית אביך" ("Remain a widow in your father's house"),65 and she obeyed him, she therefore had to conduct herself in accord with her father's house, as a kohen's daughter.
8. It has already been said many times that although the main purpose of Rashi's commentary on the Torah is the plain meaning of Scripture, it also contains matters of halachah, and (all the more so66) matters of the inner dimension of the Torah; in the words of our Rebbeim, "יינה של תורה" ("the wine of Torah").67
So too here: by Rashi writing that the explanation, "she was the daughter of Shem…," was said by Efraim Miksha'ah in the name of Rabbi Meir, a matter of halachah and a matter of the inner dimension of the Torah are understood.
9. The Alter Rebbe rules as halachah68 "שלא נאמר את אבי' היא מחללת אלא כשישנה בעדים והתראה וכשהעידו בפני סנהדרין" ("that 'she desecrates her father' was said only when there are witnesses and a warning, and when they testified before a Sanhedrin").69 Accordingly the question arises: how could Tamar be sentenced to burning as a kohen's daughter? This punishment comes upon her only because "she desecrates her father,"70 and with Tamar there were no witnesses and no warning, and no testimony before a Sanhedrin!71
Rashi resolves this difficulty by adding the words, "Efraim Miksha'ah said in the name of Rabbi Meir." For Efraim Miksha'ah follows his own approach, that even when the connection is very remote (in reality, in time or in subject), a bond and connection always remains. Therefore, even when she acted immorally without witnesses and so on, it is still "she desecrates her father," and so the verdict is "Take her out and let her be burned."
10. On the verse, "Take her out and let her be burned," it is stated in the Zohar:72 "בשתהובי טירדא" ("in flames of [OCR unclear]"). Through the descent of the soul (which is called "the daughter of a kohen"73) into exile, "Take her out" means into exile, and similarly through its descent below into the body (even in the time of the Beis HaMikdash), it is aroused "in flames" ("and let her be burned"), with sparks of fire and love for G‑d,74 Who is called "Kohen."75
This is not understood: since the soul is already in a state of "Take her out," having left her father's house, how can it be aroused with a love of sparks of fire? The explanation of this is "Efraim Miksha'ah in the name of Rabbi Meir": since the soul derives from G‑d, whatever descents and changes it may undergo, even to the point of "Take her out," it always remains "the daughter of a Kohen," and within it there comes about "and let her be burned."
According to this the precise wording of the verse is also understood, "ויאמר יהודה הוציאוה ותשרף" ("And Yehudah said: Take her out and let her be burned"):
The soul is, after all, in a state of "Take her out, into exile." For the "and let her be burned" to come about within it, the essence of the soul, which did not go into exile,76 must be revealed in it. One must therefore come to the level of Yehudah, the service of acknowledgment77 and kabbalas ol, which touches the essence of the soul78 and draws it down and reveals it also in the soul within the body.
11. With this the two "opposite views" regarding Tamar will also be understood. At first it was assumed that because "Your daughter-in-law Tamar has acted immorally," there must be "Take her out," and, as the Zohar explains, into exile. Afterwards, in connection with this very episode of Tamar, a Heavenly voice went forth: "ממני יצאו הדברים כו' להעמיד מלכים בישראל" ("From Me these matters came forth… to establish kings in Israel"),79 meaning that this came about in order that Peretz and so on should be born, up to Moshiach, whose purpose is redemption.
The explanation is: the entire intent of exile, which came "מפני חטאינו" ("because of our sins"),80 is that through refining the darkness of exile, the advantage of light should emerge in the future Redemption. Therefore, although at the beginning of the matter Tamar's action is indeed regarded as a deficiency, whose consequence must be "Take her out and let her be burned," later, after "ויאמר יהודה צדקה ממני" ("And Yehudah said: She is more righteous than I"),79 after the service of (Yehudah) acknowledgment, which brought about that through exile ("Take her out") "הצמאון והתאבה בחילא יתיר" ("the thirst and longing become all the stronger")74 ("and let her be burned"), it is then revealed that "From Me and through Me these matters came forth… to establish kings in Israel." In this there was from the outset a Supernal intent, that from it should emerge Peretz and so on, up to "עלה הפורץ לפניהם" ("the breaker has gone up before them"),81 who will break through all boundaries (even the boundaries that existed in the time of the Beis HaMikdash, and similarly before the descent of the soul below), and he will come and redeem us very soon indeed.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Mikeitz and Shabbos Parshas Va'eira 5728)
Notes
1) Our parshah 38:24.
2) This is in Bereishis Rabbah 85:10; Tanchuma (Buber) on our parshah, 17.
3) See also Targum Yonasan here: "Is she not the daughter of a kohen…"
4) 21:9.
5) As with the blasphemer: although even earlier they knew that it was a severe prohibition [which is why "they placed him in custody…" (Emor 24:12)], nevertheless "they did not know whether he was liable to death" until the command about it came. The same applies to the wood-gatherer (Rashi there). It should be noted that a married woman who acted immorally (which, before Parshas Emor was said, included a kohen's daughter as well, and before Parshas Ki Seitzei — 22:24 — a betrothed woman as well) is not sentenced to burning, as is also explained in Rashi on the Torah (Kedoshim 20:10).
6) Rashi, Emor 21:9.
7) As the Ramban here asks. [OCR unclear: opening words missing] in the commentators on Rashi here, that even had she not been a kohen's daughter they would have sentenced her to death [because the generation was unrestrained, or because the court of Shem decreed death for an unmarried woman who acted immorally (Avodah Zarah 36b)], and that what Rashi writes, "therefore they sentenced her to burning," means that the sentence of burning specifically (and not another form of death) was because she was a kohen's daughter. (So too in Targum Yonasan there: "Why did he say 'let her be burned' and not 'let her be killed'? Efraim Miksha'ah… the daughter of Shem…" See also Tosafos s.v. "Einah" (Sanhedrin 56a), that she became liable to death only "when they were stringent with her, to hold her liable to death like a yevamah who acted immorally; they established it as the death of a kohen's daughter, by burning."*) But in addition to the fact that it is not mentioned at all in Rashi, even by hint, that an unmarried woman who acted immorally (even if not a kohen's daughter) was then sentenced to death (and as for the passage in Avodah Zarah there, the way of study in the Gemara is not the way of Rashi on the Torah, the plain meaning of Scripture), it is evident from what is written, "She sat at the entrance of Einayim — at the crossroads" (our parshah 38:14; Rashi there), in such a way that she was taken for a harlot (and was not afraid of a death penalty), that at that time a harlot was not sentenced to death. Further still: from the fact that Yehudah came to her it is evident that there was no prohibition in this at all. This does not contradict what Rashi writes (Vayishlach 34:7), "that the nations fenced themselves off from forbidden relations," even though Dinah too was then unmarried, because it is explicit in Rashi there: "'And so shall not be done' — to violate the virgins." According to this, what Yehudah said is all the more fitting, "הבה נא — prepare yourself and your mind for this" (our parshah 38:16 and Rashi there), for at first glance it would have sufficed for him to say "Let me come to you"; he said this so that there should be no trace of violation in it.
*) So too in Chizkuni here, and from it the words of Tosafos will be understood. See also Eliyahu Rabbah [OCR unclear: "בא"י"] and other commentators on the Tur, Even HaEzer, end of 9:26 [OCR unclear].
8) Radak here. See also Rashbam and Ramban here.
9) See Sifsei Chachamim here, in the name of the Maharshal.
10) Our parshah 37:35.
11) As Rashi writes there: "and they married them." See the explanation of this below in the second sicha of Parshas Vayechi.
12) Rashi, Vayeira 20:12.
13) See all this at length in the sicha mentioned above.
14) Our parshah 38:8. See also Bereishis Rabbah 85:5: "Yehudah began with the mitzvah of yibbum first." (However, from the fact that the Rambam (Hilchos Melachim, beginning of ch. 9) does not mention this among the mitzvos that existed before the Giving of the Torah, it is implied that he does not hold so.)
15) Seitzei 25:5.
16) Our parshah 38:26.
17) In Radak here on verse 24 (see also Ramban on verse 8; Daas Zekeinim of the Baalei Tosafos on the verse; Ohr HaChayim on verse 24), that at that time the father of the deceased also performed yibbum (except that a brother took precedence over a father). According to this one could seemingly answer that yibbum, which was customary among the nations as well, overrode the prohibition of a son's wife, which they had not been commanded (similar to what was explained above, p. 145 ff.). But in Rashi one cannot say so, for then Rashi would have had to state this novelty, that a father too performed yibbum and married his son's wife, especially since this is found nowhere in Tanach, Mishnah, Gemara and so on. And what our Sages said in Bereishis Rabbah (85:5), that Yehudah fulfilled the mitzvah of yibbum, refers to the verse "and perform yibbum with her" (as is explicit in Shir HaShirim Rabbah on the verse "Yishakeini" (1:2 (5)) and Vayikra Rabbah (2:10)), which speaks of a brother and not of a father. It should be added that even according to the Ramban and others, that before the Giving of the Torah yibbum applied to a father as well, this requires investigation: since after she conceived by him the matter of yibbum was already fulfilled, why did he not cease from her afterwards? (One could answer, with difficulty, that even before the Giving of the Torah yibbum was not only "and raise up seed" for the deceased, but also "build the house" of the deceased through "and take her as a wife." It is simpler to answer that since she had already become his wife, he did not wish to separate from her and cause her anguish (Rashi above 31:3) because of the prohibition of a son's wife, which they had not yet been commanded.)
18) As in Radak here on verse 8. But the prohibition, "The wife of the deceased shall not marry outside to a stranger," was not then customary.
19) According to this it would be understood why Rashi needed the two explanations: according to Rabbi Nechemiah one must explain "he did not do so again,"* and according to Rabbi Yehudah it is more reasonable to explain "he did not cease," for since "she is righteous," why would he "not do so again"? One cannot ask from the fact that Rashi puts first the explanation "he did not do so again," although above (37:35) he puts Rabbi Yehudah's explanation first, because the plain meaning of "ולא יסף" (in this verse) is "he did not do so again" (for according to the explanation "he did not cease," Rashi needed "and its fellow" [the parallel verse]).
*) According to the explanation that Tamar did not have the law of a shomeres yavam (as below in the text), one must say that the preference for the explanation "he did not do so again" is because this is the plain meaning of "ולא יסף," as below in the text of this note.
20) In addition: even according to Rabbi Yehudah one cannot answer as above in section 2, for if we say that a shomeres yavam was permitted to a stranger, this itself proves that she was not regarded as a married woman.
21) Our parshah 38:16.
22) See Rashi 38:26: "ממני ומאתי יצאו הדברים כו'" ("From Me and through Me these matters came forth…").
23) This would be the very opposite of what is written (Vayeira 20:6), "I too knew that you did this with a pure heart, and I also withheld you from sinning against Me." And it is said, "לא יאונה לצדיק כל און" ("No iniquity shall befall the righteous") (Mishlei 12:21), and in Rashi there: "no transgression will come his way unknowingly." Although according to the view of Tosafos (Gittin 7a, and sources cited there) this applies specifically to matters of eating [this can be explained according to what is stated in Tanya, ch. 8, that "from all food and drink there immediately forms blood and flesh of his flesh." And according to what is explained in Tanya (chs. 7 and 8), that forbidden foods are in the kelipos [OCR unclear: "בנקה"ט"], what Tosafos there writes is all the more fitting, that there is a difference whether the prohibition lies in the food itself or is only at the time of the prohibition], nevertheless (a) from Rashi's wording (Mishlei there), "a transgression" without qualification (and also from the plain wording of the verse, "any iniquity"), it is implied that this applies to all prohibitions. Note also Rashi's commentary on the Talmud (Yevamos 99b; Kesubos 28b), who reads "now their animals…" and not as in Tosafos. See also Likkutei Dibburim (vol. 1) 39, beginning of side b. (b) Even according to the view of Tosafos, in our case it was brought about from Above: "From Me and through Me these matters came forth…"
24) It is therefore not comparable to Moshe, who came about through "Amram took his aunt Yocheved." See Sanhedrin 58b; Chizkuni, Shemos 6:20.
25) Our parshah 38:11; Rashi there. Since bloodshed is one of the seven mitzvos commanded to the Children of Noach, it cannot be set aside for the mitzvah of yibbum, which they were not commanded (similar to what was explained above, p. 146, on the reason why Avraham did not circumcise himself until he was commanded). In addition: even if they were commanded regarding yibbum, it is obvious that one need not endanger oneself to fulfill the mitzvah of yibbum (see Be'er Heitev (Even HaEzer 9:2) and Pischei Teshuvah (there, 4), that even according to halachah there are several opinions that a woman presumed to be fatal to her husbands is forbidden to undergo yibbum). And according to the plain meaning [and according to Tosafos s.v. Ben Noach (Sanhedrin 74b), according to halachah as well; see also Parashas Derachim, Derech HaAsarim, Derush Sheni], the law of "let him transgress and not be killed" applies even without the verse "and live by them" (for according to Rashi (Acharei 18:5) the meaning of "and live by them" is "in the World to Come"), as is evident from Rashi, Shemos 4:26.
26) Seitzei 25:7. Especially since "and she shall spit before him" (there, 25:9) is, in simple terms, a disgrace for "he refused to perform yibbum with me" (there, 7; see Ramban here, verse 8), and accordingly this does not apply at all when it is forbidden to perform yibbum with her.
27) And similar to what, according to halachah as well, "whoever is not eligible for yibbum is not eligible for chalitzah," and if the Torah had not intended "his yevamah," it would have been so even with those forbidden by negative commands (Yevamos 20, end of side a).
28) Acharei 18:15.
29) As for what is written (our parshah 38:16), "for he did not know that she was his daughter-in-law," the meaning is that had he known she was his daughter-in-law, he would not have come to her, since "she is presumed to be one whose husbands die." What is written in Seforno requires great investigation.
30) Acharei 18:8.
31) But this requires great investigation: on what basis?
32) From the fact that Rashi needed to explain "in her lifetime" (there, 18), one cannot prove that all forbidden relations are permitted after death, for a wife's sister is different, since it is said about her (a) "a woman to her sister — both together" (as Sifsei Chachamim explains there), (b) "to cause distress" (see Ramban and Seforno there; see also above, p. 145).
33) Although the reason "they have committed a perversion" is stated in Parshas Kedoshim regarding the punishment (and not in Parshas Acharei (18:15) regarding the prohibition), it is nevertheless evident from this that "perversion" is also the definition of the prohibition stated in the preceding parshah. Such instances are too many to count. See Rashi's rule (Bereishis 1:27): "The plain meaning of the verse: here it informs you… and did not explain… and explained it to you elsewhere."
34) Kedoshim 20:12; Rashi there. Although the explanation "they mix…" in Rashi there is "another interpretation," the difference between the explanations is only in the meaning of the word "תבל," but they need not differ in the law. Further, one can say that even according to the first explanation, "תבל — disgrace," one must say that the disgrace is the very fact that they mix, for this alone is common to the two matters whose disgrace is called "תבל" (Acharei 18:23; Kedoshim 20:12).
35) But other forbidden relations remain forbidden after divorce. And why a verse is needed for this regarding a wife's sister is understood according to what is written above, note 32.
36) This is far-fetched, for that is not the meaning of "mingled with oil." See also Rashi, end of Noach (11:7): "ונבלבל (Let us confuse)… this one asks for a brick and that one brings (meaning he answers the question, but mistakes it and interprets it as) mortar."
37) Our parshah 38:7 (and Rashi there), 9. Even if one grants that Yehudah did not know at first that Er and Onan destroyed their seed, after a Heavenly voice went forth, "I decreed that kings shall descend from her and from the tribe of Yehudah," and that it therefore had to be through Yehudah and Tamar, the reason it did not happen earlier through Er and Onan was surely clarified.* Nevertheless, he did not cease from her, and this did not involve the prohibition of a yevamah marrying an outsider, for although he saw that she was not presumed to be fatal to her husbands, she had not left the concern of being fatal regarding Shelah, "פן ימות גם הוא כאחיו" ("lest he too die like his brothers")** (38:11), and similar to (42:4) . . . "ואת בנימין אחי יוסף (דל" ("And Binyamin, Yosef's brother…") [OCR: note breaks off here].
*) But it is obvious that one cannot prove that he did not know, for if he had known, he would also have known that they died through their sin and she is not fatal, and he should have given her to Shelah. For even if he knew their conduct, (a) at the least she had not left the concern of doubtful fatality; (b) this in no way compels that they would die, for (i) they were then (13 years and) under 20 years old, and thus not liable to punishment (Rashi, beginning of Chukas); (ii) even if they were liable to punishment, how do we know that the punishment for this sin is death? Only after it was clarified with certainty that she is not fatal, was it then known that their death was because of the sin, and accordingly we know that the punishment for this is death at the hand of Heaven.
**) And Yehudah said "like his brothers," though in his eyes she was presumed to be one whose husbands die, only to emphasize more the reason for not giving her to Shelah.
38) [OCR unclear: note text not in the source.]
39) [OCR unclear: note text not in the source.]
40) [OCR unclear: note text not in the source.]
41) According to this it is understood why Rashi writes (Vayechi 49:6), "these are Chamor and the men of Shechem," and omits Shechem. It is nevertheless obvious that the killing of Chamor and all the men of Shechem was also according to law [for it is obvious that Yaakov's sons did not shed innocent blood, G‑d forbid, as is also evident from the fact that Yaakov said to them only, "You have troubled me…" (Vayishlach 34:30), and did not rebuke them on the matter itself, the prohibition of bloodshed]. One can say that they became liable to death because they did not protest against Shechem (as in Radak there, verse 28) [one can say that in addition to the plain logic that whoever is able to protest must protest, the plain meaning of the verses proves that a severe punishment is due for this; for otherwise, why did Avraham need to ask, "האף תספה צדיק עם רשע" ("Will You also sweep away the righteous with the wicked?"), when he should have asked only, "Perhaps there are… will You not forgive the place…" (Vayeira 18:23–24)? According to this the question of the commentators on Rashi is also answered regarding "You have condemned them along with them" (there 19:17), for it is explicit, "lest you be swept away in the sin of the city" (there 19:15). See also Rashi (there, end of verse 4: "one who protests… righteous…")], or because of other transgressions (as in Ramban there, verse 13). And what Yaakov said to them, "You have troubled me…," is because the matter was not given over to Yaakov's sons to carry out judgment on them, and they did this out of their anger; therefore Yaakov said (Vayechi there, 7), "Cursed is their anger." See also above, p. 150 ff., and note 21 there.
42) See also above, p. 147.
43) Mikeitz 42:37.
44) Rashi there, 38.
45) Note the matter of Yiftach's daughter. This is not the place to discuss it.
46) According to this it is simply understood why Rashi here differs from what is written in Bereishis Rabbah here, and omits the verse, "And the daughter of a kohen…"
47) The proof that this decree was specifically regarding a kohen's daughter (which is why Rashi needed to explain, "the daughter of Shem…"): see above, note 7.
48) This decree regarding a kohen's daughter specifically, although the student has not yet learned Parshas Emor, that a kohen's daughter desecrates her father, is similar to what is explicit in Scripture before our parshah, "את בת יעקב" ("the daughter of Yaakov") (Vayishlach 34:7); "את אחותנו" ("our sister") (there, 31), and therefore her punishment is also severe: burning.
49) Our parshah 38:26; Rashi there.
50) Vayishlach 34:31.
51) See also Rashi, Seitzei (23:18): "abandoned… to immorality." See also the glosses of the Raavad, Hilchos Ishus 1:4.
52) And what he said, "כי על כן לא נתתי' לשלה בני" ("for I did not give her to my son Shelah"), is not given as a reason for exempting her from punishment (burning), but rather that "she acted rightly" (for had it been permitted and had he intended to give her to Shelah, she would have been transgressing the prohibition of a yevamah marrying an outsider).
53) For Shem died in Yaakov's 50th year [since Shem lived five hundred years after begetting Arpachshad (Noach 11:11), and from Arpachshad's birth until Yaakov's birth were 450 years]. It emerges that at the time of the sale of Yosef (who was then seventeen — beginning of our parshah) it was 58 years after the death of Shem (since Yaakov begot Yosef at age 91 — see Rashi, end of Toldos). Yehudah's marriage to the daughter of a Canaanite man was after the sale of Yosef (our parshah 38:1; Rashi there), and from then until he took Tamar for Er his firstborn at least about ten years passed (for one less than nine years old is not fit for marital relations — see Daas Zekeinim of the Baalei Tosafos 38:1; and in Sanhedrin (69b), those eight years old), and from then until the episode of Tamar also passed at least about two years (from Er's marriage until his death; Onan's marriage and death, and only afterwards the period until she saw that Shelah had grown and she was not given to him as a wife).
54) Although the law of "the daughter of a kohen… shall be burned with fire" applies also "while married" (Rashi, Emor 21:9), and in Parshas Emor there Rashi does not bring "Efraim Miksha'ah…," one can say: a) Because when the marriage ends through divorce or death, "she returns to her father's house" (Emor 22:13; note Sanhedrin 51a). But nevertheless in our parshah Rashi needed to bring "Efraim Miksha'ah…," because the law "she returns to her father's house" is a novelty regarding eating terumah, and therefore before the Giving of the Torah one can say that through marriage the bond is severed. b) It is for this reason that Rashi adds there (s.v. "es aviha"), "that this one he begot" (and does not suffice with "that this one he raised" (as in Parshas Seitzei 22:15, 21)): since the law of the daughter of a kohen applies also when she acted immorally while married (unlike Parshas Seitzei, which speaks of a betrothed woman), he had to add "that this one he begot," for on this account she disgraces her father's honor even after the bond has been severed through marriage, since her nature and temperament resemble the temperament and nature of her father. See Likkutei Sichos vol. 9, p. [OCR unclear]6, note 32; and see Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham, Orach Chayim 128:62, that on this account there is reason to distinguish between a daughter and a son. (But nevertheless he also writes "that this one he raised," because on account of "he begot" alone the disgrace is not so great.) One can say that even according to the view of Efraim Miksha'ah one must add "that this one he begot," for marriage after the Giving of the Torah is different: because of its force (which is why it can be dissolved only through a "bill of divorce" — Devarim 24:1), it is a husband's acquisition (see Rambam, beginning of Hilchos Ishus), and even according to the view of Efraim Miksha'ah the connection with her father is severed through it.
55) Sanhedrin 39b.
56) In Tanya, beginning of ch. 31: "לשדי'" ("into it").
57) Ovadiah 1:21. Rashi, Vayishlach 33:14.
58) Except that it is nevertheless only like the handle of the axe and not the axe itself. According to this it is understood why the Alter Rebbe cites (in Tanya there) the two expressions, "From it and in it the forest…" and "it was struck by its like" (Shabbos 121b), because these two expressions follow the two preceding expressions "of its kind and its likeness" (explained at length at the farbrengen; copied in Likkutei Biurim by Rabbi Y. Korf, pp. 389–90 (in the 5734 edition, pp. [OCR unclear]); Likkutei Perushim on Tanya there, pp. 585–587).
59) Bava Metzia 87a.
60) Vayeira 18:8.
61) There, 6.
62) Rashi, Vayeira there, 4; Bava Metzia 86b.
63) It is understood (see above, p. 148) that there is no room to be stringent even with oneself at another's expense, and all the more so there is no room at all to withhold from another… Especially since bread is the main part of the meal, and every food is called by its name (but this requires slight investigation, Rashi, Vayeitzei 31:54).
64) As for why Rashi in Parshas Vayeira (18:8) does not bring this explanation in the name of Efraim Miksha'ah: this is because Rashi there omits "and Avraham ate ordinary food in purity," and adds "and the dough became impure" (as in Bereishis Rabbah (48:14), and unlike Bava Metzia 87a). His intent in this is that since she became niddah (from the expression "excluded from contact with every person" — Rashi, Metzora 15:19), her dough was excluded, impure in essence (and not only for those who are meticulous; see Ramban, Vayeitzei 31:35). Therefore he did not bring "Efraim Miksha'ah…"
65) Our parshah 38:11.
66) See above, p. 1, note 3.
67) Hayom Yom, p. 24.
68) Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 128:54.
69) In the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch there it is evident that if there are witnesses and so on, she desecrates her father "even if she is married or has converted out." But this is no proof for the view of Efraim Miksha'ah, for one can say that this is because of "that this one he begot" (as in note 54), and the like.
70) Although Tamar's "Take her out and let her be burned" was not because of the law of Parshas Emor, "the daughter of a kohen… shall be burned with fire," but only because they had so fenced themselves (as above, section 5), it nevertheless stands to reason that this fence regarding a kohen's daughter specifically was because "she desecrates her father," like the law of "shall be burned" after the Giving of the Torah.
71) It is obvious that one cannot say that since it was "about three months" and her belly was evident, no witnesses were needed (on the contrary: the disgrace in this is greater still than when there are witnesses), for this is no proof that she was abandoned to immorality [since she may have been exclusive with one man, or it may have happened only once (and in such a way she is not a "zonah" — see above, section 6)]; further still, she may have conceived by Shelah. On the contrary, from what the people of the place said, that there was no kedeshah here, it could be shown that she conceived not through immorality. And although before Yehudah said, "She is pregnant by me," they said [OCR unclear: "ברואות"] (though this requires investigation: on what basis? One can connect this with: the presumption of fitness of a child of Noach, the definitions of the above-mentioned fence regarding forbidden relations and the breach in it, and so on; this is not the place to discuss it) "Tamar has acted immorally… she is pregnant through immorality," to the point of sentencing her to burning, nevertheless, regarding disgrace, this is specifically when there are witnesses to the immorality; as long as there are no witnesses, she does not disgrace her father, since she may have conceived not through immorality, and her pregnancy is no proof of this.
72) Vol. 3, 72a.
73) Zohar vol. 2, 95a.
74) Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar 2c.
75) Sanhedrin 39, end of side a.
76) See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 3, p. 864.
77) Torah Ohr, beginning of Vayechi (on the verse, "Yehudah, you your brothers shall acknowledge"). According to what is written in Bereishis Rabbah (98:8) on this verse (see Sotah 10b), "you acknowledged in the episode of Tamar…," the acknowledgment of Yehudah is especially connected with our subject.
78) This is why this level exists "in every one of Israel," even in this lowly generation (see Torah Ohr 99a; the maamar "Umaheh Alav" 5719, sections 18–19; and elsewhere).
79) Rashi, our parshah 38:26.
80) But it is obvious that the intent is not in the sins themselves, G‑d forbid, for they are the opposite of the Supernal Will, and they will never have an elevation (for the fact that willful sins become like merits refers only to the sparks of holiness that fell into them, but not the willful sins themselves, G‑d forbid), rather, their breaking is their remedy (the maamar "Nun-Ches," 5670 [OCR unclear]). See Likkutei Sichos vol. 3, p. 976, note 19 (vol. 27, p. 363, and in the notes there). See also above, p. 167 and in the notes there.
81) Michah 2:13. See also Radak here on verse 28: "With Tamar… and the one from whom the kingship descended breaks through the boundary, as it says, 'the breaker has gone up before them.'" And in Bereishis Rabbah here (85:14): "All who break through from you… shall establish 'the breaker has gone up before them,'" and in the commentators there, [OCR: note breaks off here].
Key Lesson
This Sicha teaches that however far a Jewish soul descends, even into exile, it always remains "the daughter of a Kohen," and its bond with G‑d is never severed. It is precisely through acknowledgment and kabbalas ol, the service of Yehudah, that the essence of the soul is revealed, turning the descent into a fiery longing for G‑d. The exile itself thereby leads to the Redemption through Moshiach, the descendant of Peretz, who will break through all boundaries.