Parshas Vayeitzei
1. As has already been discussed several times, Rashi, in his commentary on the Torah, resolves all the difficulties that arise in the plain meaning of the verses (and in a case where Rashi has no answer (according to the way of plain meaning) to a certain difficulty, he then says "איני יודע" ("I do not know")1 or the like). And if there are difficulties here which Rashi does not resolve, it is because he assumes that their answers are so simple to understand that the "בן חמש למקרא" ("five-year-old beginning to study Scripture") will grasp them on his own.
Accordingly, the following is not understood: In this week's Sidrah there is seemingly a puzzling matter, over which a number of commentators and sefarim labor, yet in Rashi's commentary one finds no explanation or resolution of it whatsoever:
In our Sidrah it is related that Yaakov married Leah and Rachel, and afterwards also Bilhah and Zilpah — all of whom were daughters of Lavan.2 The question thus arises: The Patriarchs fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given — and Rashi says so explicitly concerning Yaakov,3 with whom we are dealing. How then was he permitted to take four sisters, since this was forbidden by the prohibition4 "ואשה אל אחותה לא תקח" ("And you shall not take a woman together with her sister")?
And although when the five-year-old student of Scripture learns Parshas Vayeitzei he does not yet know about this prohibition — which is only stated at a later place in the Torah — nevertheless, one does not find in the later Sidros either that Rashi resolves this question.
True, in sefarim there are several answers to this question — but one cannot say that Rashi regards these answers as so easy and simple that he finds it unnecessary to mention them, because: a) in the aforementioned sefarim one finds various differences of opinion, disputes, etc., etc. — not at all simple even according to the way of the Gemara, etc.; b) and principally: the answers found in those sefarim do not hold up according to the way of plain meaning, as will be explained below.5
2. The Ramban6 answers the question by saying that the Patriarchs observed the 613 mitzvos only while they were in Eretz Yisrael, and Yaakov took the two (four) sisters while he was in Charan. According to Rashi, however, this answer cannot be accepted, because, as mentioned, Rashi says explicitly3 that (also) during the time that Yaakov was with Lavan the wicked (in Charan) he observed the 613 mitzvos.
There is another answer: that Yaakov took them by Divine command, in order to establish the twelve tribes.7 But this answer too does not hold up according to the way of plain meaning, and consequently is also not in keeping with Rashi's approach. For (although it is simply understood8 that when there is an explicit instruction from G‑d to do a certain thing, one must do it even when it does not accord with a mitzvah, and even — against a mitzvah that was commanded; nevertheless) one finds nowhere that Yaakov was commanded by G‑d to take Rachel, Bilhah and Zilpah.9 On the contrary, it is proven from the plain meaning of the verses that Yaakov's later taking of Rachel was a consequence of his having wanted to marry her even earlier (before he married Leah); and likewise concerning his taking Bilhah and Zilpah, it is said:10 "ותתן גו' לאשה" ("And she gave … to him as a wife") — not because of a Divine command.
3. In sefarim there is an inquiry: whether the Patriarchs, before the Giving of the Torah, had entirely left the category of Bnei Noach, i.e., also for leniency, or only for stringency.11 And according to the view that they left the category of Bnei Noach also for leniency, the above question is answered12 as follows: Since Rachel and Leah (and likewise Bilhah and Zilpah) certainly converted before they married Yaakov, then — through their conversion — they no longer had the status of sisters, for "גר שנתגייר כקטן שנולד דמי"13 ("A convert who has converted is like a newborn child").
It is understood, however, that according to the way of plain meaning this answer too is not sufficient:
a) According to the plain meaning of the verses, it is nowhere hinted that before the Giving of the Torah the Jews had a different law than the Bnei Noach14 (except for what is explicit, that they were obligated in the mitzvah of circumcision, etc.); for the Patriarchs' observance of the 613 mitzvos15 was merely a stringency that they themselves accepted upon themselves.
[And moreover: this acceptance did not obligate their descendants after them to also observe the 613 mitzvos, as is proven from "ויקח עמרם את יוכבד דודתו" ("And Amram took Yocheved, his aunt").16]
And since there was no general status that set apart the Jews, as Jews, from the Bnei Noach, consequently the whole matter of conversion was also not applicable.*16
[Even if you were to say that the very fact that they accepted upon themselves to observe the 613 mitzvos counted as conversion — it is nevertheless not logical to say that this acceptance, which represents a matter of stringency, should at the same time bring with it the law of "a convert who has converted is like a newborn child," whose content is a leniency. (And although in practice there was no leniency in this case, since Bnei Noach are permitted to marry two sisters, nevertheless, since the content of the law "a convert who has converted is like a newborn child" is a matter of leniency, it is difficult to say that this law applied to them even with regard to a law that is not a leniency.17)]
b) One does not find in Rashi's commentary on the Torah that he cites the law that a convert who has converted is like a newborn child,*17 and it is obvious that [OCR unclear].
c) According to the plain meaning of the verses, one finds nowhere in the Torah that a convert, through his conversion, is regarded as a newborn child. On the contrary: it is contrary to what is perceived — i.e., contrary to the way of plain meaning. (And as is also implied from what G‑d said to our father Avraham:18 "ואתה תבא אל אבותיך גו'" ("And you shall come to your fathers…") — that Terach is designated in the Torah as Avraham's father even after Avraham had converted,19 and that his repentance is good tidings for Avraham. And additionally, and principally — that Avraham "shall come to your fathers.")
d) The prohibition of a wife's sister is not due to the status of ordinary kinship, like other forbidden relations of relatives; rather, it has to do with guarding against destroying the relationship of natural love between sisters:20 since sisters have a natural love for one another, one may therefore not take two sisters and thereby cause them to become rivals and enemies to one another.21
Accordingly it emerges (according to the way of plain meaning) that even if before the Giving of the Torah they had the law of "a convert who has converted is like a newborn child" with regard to all other forbidden relations, there would nevertheless have had to be an exception for them regarding a wife's sister — since even between two sisters who converted the natural love exists,22 one may not cause them to become "זו צרה לזו" ("rivals to one another").23
4. The explanation of this, however, is:24 The Patriarchs' acceptance upon themselves to observe the entire Torah before it was given was, as stated above, a stringency and an addition in piety on the part of the Patriarchs, and for this reason it is counted as a special merit, as it is said:25 "עקב גו' משמרתי וגו'" ("Because [Avraham hearkened to My voice] and kept My charge…"). Consequently it is understandable that when the fulfillment of a certain mitzvah which they had not been commanded was in conflict with a mitzvah which they had been commanded, they did not then fulfill the mitzvah that had not been commanded. For it is simple and clear that a matter of stringency and enhancement cannot override something that is commanded and obligatory.
In other words: in such a case, the fulfillment of the Torah consists in — not doing the enhancement and stringency (since it conflicts with a command that is in force in the meantime).
This, in simple terms,26 is the reason why Avraham did not fulfill the mitzvah of circumcision before he was commanded to do so (which seemingly contradicts what is written:27 "וישמור משמרתי וגו'" ("And he kept My charge…")27*):
On the verse "ואך את דמכם לנפשותיכם אדרוש" ("But your blood of your lives I will require"),28 Rashi says that "your blood" means "one who sheds his own blood." According to the way of plain meaning, this means that a person may not shed his own blood even when it does not lead to the loss of life29 (similar to "דמו לא תאכלו" ("you shall not eat its blood")30 stated in the preceding verse regarding "its blood with its life," where Rashi says explicitly that this means "blood from a living creature"), and even when it does not lead to illness. This is why Avraham was not permitted to circumcise himself as long as he had not been commanded: it would then have involved the prohibition of bloodshed, which is brought about by circumcising oneself (especially since it leads to illness,31 and one can even come to danger32). However, after he was commanded concerning circumcision, the explicit command of circumcision overrides the prohibition of bloodshed.*32
5. Besides the mitzvos that the Bnei Noach were commanded, there were also various matters and restrictions which they — all the Bnei Noach — took upon themselves. As Rashi says:33 "שבאומות גדרו עצמן מן העריות ע"י המבול" ("For the nations had fenced themselves off from forbidden relations on account of the Flood"), meaning that they restrained themselves even from such forbidden relations regarding which they had not been commanded.
And with this is also simply explained what Rashi says elsewhere:34 "שלא יהא הדבר מפורסם לכל ויאמרו לא קיים אברם את כבוד אביו" ("So that the matter should not become known to all and they would say: Avram did not fulfill the honor due to his father") — although the command to honor one's father was only given at Marah35 — because honoring one's father was among the matters of carefulness and good conduct which they themselves took upon themselves.36
Moreover: the matters for which there was no command, but rather "they fenced themselves off" and the like — after they accepted them upon themselves, these acquired binding force according to the laws of the Bnei Noach (and according to the Torah), and one was punished for transgressing them, both at the hands of Heaven37 and at the hands of man.38
From this it is simply understood that if, by fulfilling a certain mitzvah which the Patriarchs had accepted upon themselves, they would thereby have had to contradict a restriction or good practice which all the Bnei Noach had accepted upon themselves — the Patriarchs may not fulfill their stringency and acceptance, since the matters which everyone accepted upon themselves carry greater severity than what only the Patriarchs accepted upon themselves.
6. Among the precautions that were then accepted among the nations was — to guard oneself from deceiving one another. This can be seen from Yaakov's complaint to Lavan, "ולמה רמיתני" ("Why then have you deceived me?"),39 to the extent that even Lavan (the deceiver40) had to defend himself with the justification that "לא יעשה כן במקומנו גו'" ("It is not done so in our place…").41
Accordingly it is understandable why Yaakov took Rachel42 — despite the prohibition "And you shall not take a woman together with her sister": since Yaakov had earlier committed himself to marry Rachel, and had even given her signs in connection with it,43 had he not kept his word to her, he would thereby have committed deception [especially since, as a consequence, there would also have been the concern that she might fall into the lot of Esav, something that would have caused her tremendous anguish44]. Consequently it is understood that the stringency of keeping the prohibition "And you shall not take a woman together with her sister," for which there was then no command, could not override the prohibition of deception.45
7. One of the lessons from this for every Jew is understood quite simply: When someone wishes to be stringent with himself and to observe enhancements, he must first of all make sure that this is not at the expense of others.
On the contrary: we find that G‑d's endearment of our father Avraham — "ידעתיו" ("I have known him," an expression of endearment)46 — was primarily (not because he fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given, but) "למען אשר (לפי שהוא) יצוה את בניו ואת ביתו אחריו ושמרו דרך הוי' לעשות צדקה ומשפט" ("Because he will command his children and his household after him, that they keep the way of the L‑rd, to do tzedakah and justice")46 — that the Jews, the children of Avraham, throughout their generations, will do tzedakah with one another, and in a manner of "משפט" ("judgment"), as Chassidus47 explains — that one must "judge" oneself as to how much one is entitled to — and after all, "ידע עניש בנפשי'" ("he knows the poverty of his own soul") — and give the rest to the other.
And just as this is so in material matters, so it is in spiritual matters: When there is a Jew who knows nothing of Yiddishkeit, and one needs to give him tzedakah in spiritual matters — to tell him about, and show him, the path of Yiddishkeit, etc. — another Jew who is able to accomplish this has no right to argue that he would rather use that time for himself, to advance himself in Torah and Avodah. Rather, he must judge himself: In what way is he more important and finer than the other, that he should have all kinds of spiritual enhancements at the expense of withholding from another Jew the most essential matters?
8. In this week's Sidrah it is related about the work that Yaakov did with the "מקלות" ("rods"), and this service of Yaakov was akin to the mitzvah of tefillin.48 This is therefore the place to arouse once again about strengthening "Mivtza Tefillin" — to exert oneself with every kind of effort so that yet another Jew and yet another Jew should put on tefillin. Especially since in the present situation, this is not only tzedakah in spiritual matters, but also tzedakah in material matters — for every addition in putting on tefillin adds to the "ויראו ממך" ("and they shall be afraid of you")49 and to the "וטרף זרוע אף קדקד" ("and he tears the arm, even the crown of the head"),50 so that in the merit of putting on tefillin, fear will fall upon all the enemies of Israel, and the Jews will be victorious.
And this is also a preparation for the coming of Moshiach Tzidkeinu, after whose coming, and through whom,51 the end of the exile will come; and afterwards — as the Rambam states clearly and distinctly — the "beginning of the redemption" will commence, and afterwards the true and complete redemption, and afterwards, and specifically through Moshiach — the ingathering of the exiles, very soon, speedily in our days.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Mikeitz 5728)
Notes
1) Toldos 28:5. See above, p. 1, note 2, and the sources cited in the marginal note there.
2) Rashi on our Parsha, 31:50.
3) Vayishlach 32:5.
4) Acharei 18:18.
5) Seemingly one could answer that the four Matriarchs were sisters only from the father and not from the mother, and consequently were not sisters at all according to law, for "אין אבות לבני נח" ("Bnei Noach have no [legal] paternity") (Rashi, Vayeira 20:12); and therefore this has no relation to "תרי"ג מצות שמרתי" ("I observed the 613 mitzvos"). For what the Patriarchs fulfilled of the entire Torah before it was given relates specifically to commands (i.e., a situation which after the Giving of the Torah would be forbidden, the Patriarchs refrained from, even though they were not commanded); whereas in our case, where the entire reality of paternal sisters was newly introduced after the Giving of the Torah, and before the Giving of the Torah they were not sisters at all (in terms of Torah reality), Yaakov did not need to be stringent with himself in this. But — this is not so. For: a) Since (according to the way of plain meaning) the reason for the prohibition of two sisters is so as not to contradict natural love, as below in section 3, it is reasonable that this prohibition regarding paternal sisters applies also to Bnei Noach, since they too have the nature of love. See below, note 21. b) From Rashi's words (Toldos 26:5), "שניות לעריות" ("secondary forbidden relations"), it is proven that they were careful also regarding forbidden relations that arise from paternal kinship, for all the secondary relations (except the mother's mother) are through paternal kinship (Yevamos 21a, end).* It must therefore be said that either (a) what they fulfilled of the entire Torah before it was given applies even where the "reality" was newly introduced after the Giving of the Torah; or (b) paternity is a Torah reality even for Bnei Noach, at least with regard to other laws, such as honoring a father (Rashi, end of Noach); inheritance (as is simply proven from the many matters of inheritance before the Giving of the Torah); lineage (see Rashi, Behar 25:45). (See also Ramban, Yevamos 98a.) [But what is written in Rashi, Vayeira (19:33, 37; 20:1) is only a matter of "disgrace" — as stated explicitly in Rashi there. This is also implied from the plain meaning of the verses, that it is not a capital sin. See also Ramban there, 19:32.] c) And principally: the above distinction (whether at the Giving of the Torah only the command was newly introduced, or also the (Torah) reality and relevance) is not so simple that a five-year-old student of Scripture would understand it on his own, without any hint to it in Rashi's commentary.
*) Although on 21b there [the following are counted]: the wife of the mother's maternal brother (and according to the Gemara's conclusion, they decreed concerning her not because of the wife of the mother's paternal brother, but rather because "whatever is a forbidden relation in a female, in a male they decreed his wife as a secondary relation" (see Tosafos there, s.v. Lo: "it is a full reason and not merely a mnemonic"; this requires a little further study in the wording of the Rambam, Hilchos Ishus 1:6)); [there (22a), "the third generation of his wife's daughter" (which means also her daughter's daughter, as in the Rambam there; one cannot say that according to Rashi there, s.v. Ushebevitan, it refers only to the daughter of her daughter's son — for there is no logic to distinguish between them)]; "the fourth generation of his mother-in-law," and Rashi there: "the mother of his mother-in-law's mother" (and according to what Tosafos write (21b, s.v. Eshes), also the sister of his mother's mother) — nevertheless it is simple that the intent of Rashi (in Parshas Toldos) is that Avraham observed (not only some of the secondary prohibitions, but) all the secondary prohibitions. And what is stated in the body of the note, "except the mother's mother," is according to the Beraisa (21a). For it is understood that the main secondary relations are those enumerated in the Beraisa, as is proven from the simple wording: "What are the secondary relations etc." The rest are only a "remainder," as the Gemara says there (21b), "תנא ושייר" ("He taught and left some out"), which wording proves — as has been explained previously — that this is a remainder and not the main thing. And similarly: wherever this expression is cited, it must be explained this way. And only according to this is it understood why specifically those that were left out were not mentioned explicitly (which is certainly not by chance).
6) Toldos, there.
7) Parashas Derachim, Derech Ha'asarim, first discourse (s.v. Ubazeh nevaer), in the name of the Maharash Yaffe. See also Gur Aryeh, Vayigash 46:10.
8) For this reason Rashi did not need to explain any reason for Avraham's stretching forth his hand to slaughter Yitzchak (Vayeira 22:10) — even though the Bnei Noach were warned against bloodshed (Noach 9:5–6) — since this was by Divine command.
9) In Rashi on our Parsha (29:34): "שהאמהות נביאות היו ויודעות כו' ד' נשים ישא" ("For the Matriarchs were prophetesses and knew … that he would marry four wives"). But [in addition to what has been discussed previously, that this does not compel that Yaakov too knew of it (and from what Rashi writes on our Parsha (29:17), "for she thought she would fall etc.," and (30:22), "for she was distressed etc.," it is proven that even the Matriarchs, who knew that he would marry four wives, did not know this beforehand, or did not know whom he would marry)]: (a) this knowledge is not an instruction or command; (b) it is not compelling that he knew who his wives would be; (c) on the contrary — the plain meaning of the verses implies that beforehand it was not at all in Yaakov's mind to marry Leah, and likewise regarding Bilhah and Zilpah, as below in the text.
10) Our Parsha 30:4; there, 9.
11) See at length Parashas Derachim, the discourse cited above. Beis Ha'otzar, section 1.
12) Parashas Derachim there, in the name of the Maharash Yaffe. See also Gur Aryeh, Vayigash there.
13) Yevamos 22a, and sources cited there.
14) On the contrary, the opposite is implied from what was said to Avraham, "ואתה תבוא אל אבותיך" ("And you shall come to your fathers") (Lech 15:15). And one cannot say that Terach converted, for Rashi there states explicitly: his father was an idol worshipper (which is one of the seven mitzvos of the Bnei Noach — see Rashi 4:26; 11:28) … he repented. And nothing more.
15) See Rashi, Bereishis (26:5; 27:3; 32:5; see also 19:3).
16) Va'eira 6:20.
*16) There is no contradiction to this from what Rashi says (Lech 12:5), "אברם מגייר את האנשים ושרי מגיירת את הנשים" ("Avram converted the men and Sarai converted the women") — for [in addition to the fact that this is not the actual plain meaning, since afterwards Rashi writes "and the plain meaning of the verse"] his intent with "converted" is not a change in their [legal] reality — for this is not found before the Giving of the Torah. (Note also the "Erev Rav" [OCR reads "עקב"] (Bo 12:38) and Rashi there and in Ki Sisa (32:6).) Rather, [his intent is] "that he brought them under the wings of the Shechinah," which is also called conversion (but not actual conversion — for before the Giving of the Torah conversion was not applicable, according to the way of plain meaning, as in the text). Accordingly it is understood why at the beginning of his commentary [when explaining the general matter of "אשר עשו" ("that they had made")] he writes "that he brought them under the wings of the Shechinah" — and not "that he converted them" (as in Bereishis Rabbah 39:14: "these are the converts whom they converted"). Only afterwards, when he explains the details — "Avraham … the men, and Sarah … the women" — does he write "converted," since after he has already emphasized in the general matter "that he brought them under the wings of the Shechinah," he need not emphasize again in the details that he does not mean actual conversion. (Note also that Targum Onkelos [which is closer to the plain meaning of Scripture (unlike Targum Yonasan and Yerushalmi)] translates "די שעבידו לאורייתא" ("whom they subjugated to the Torah"), and not "די גיירו" or "דגיירון" ("whom they converted"), as in Targum Yonasan and Yerushalmi.)
17) This is also compelled according to the way of halachah — according to Rashi's explanation [with which we are dealing] of "שניות לעריות" ("secondary forbidden relations") (Toldos there) — for "they did not decree secondary relations for converts" (Yevamos there).
*17) The Sifsei Chachamim (Lech 12:5) explains that Rashi's statement "כאילו עשאום" ("as if they had made them") is because a convert who has converted is like a newborn child. But [in addition to the fact that this is contrary to what is perceived, and consequently contrary to the way of plain meaning, as below in the text] Rashi's intent there with "converted" is only that they brought them under the wings of the Shechinah (as above, note *16) — and even according to the way of halachah, when a ben Noach accepts upon himself the seven mitzvos and the like (but did not convert), he is not like a newborn child. From this it is compelled that Rashi's intent there with "as if they had made them" refers primarily to Avraham and Sarah, as in Rashi's wording, "the verse ascribes to them as if they had made them," but not to "the souls that they had made," for they are not like newborns (although one could say, in a forced way, that "made" here means only (something like) repairing (and the like) — similar to Rashi, Bereishis 1:7). Accordingly it is all the more understood why Rashi heads his comment with "אשר עשו בחרן" ("that they had made in Charan"), and does not quote "את הנפש" ("the souls"), as in Sanhedrin 99b and Bereishis Rabbah 39:14.
18) Lech 15:15. See above, note 14.
19) One cannot prove that the concept of "a convert who has converted is like a newborn" did not apply to Avraham from the fact that Avraham needed to tell Avimelech "אך לא בת אמי" ("but not the daughter of my mother") (Vayeira 20:12) — for it can be said that Avimelech did not accept that a convert who has converted is like a newborn. Likewise one cannot prove it from Rashi at the end of Noach, "so that … they would not say: Avram did not fulfill the honor due to his father," as stated above regarding Avimelech.
20) As stated explicitly in the verse (Acharei 18:18), that the reason for "לא תקח" ("you shall not take") is "לצרור" ("to make her a rival"). See Ramban, Tur HaAruch and Sforno there (see also Chinuch, mitzvah 207), that for this reason the prohibition applies only "in her lifetime." (And see below, pp. 188–9, that according to the way of plain meaning, the same applies to all forbidden relations (except a brother's wife).)
21) Perhaps it can be said that for this reason the prohibition of a wife's sister — according to the way of plain meaning (note that according to the Ramah (Sanhedrin 58a) this is the law also according to the way of halachah, according to the view that the forbidden relations of Bnei Noach are derived from "איש איש") — applies also to Bnei Noach.
22) Note Rashi, Vayishlach 32:7, 12.
23) But according to this, also now, regarding converts, there must be the prohibition of two sisters! And I have not found this in the Responsa and Poskim as of yet.
24) It can also be said (and this is compelled, if we say as above in note 21) that since the reason for "אשה אל אחותה לא תקח" is "to make her a rival" — in our case (regarding Leah and Rachel), since Rachel gave the signs to Leah (Rashi on our Parsha 29:25), and if so she certainly would not be a rival to her* — the prohibition of a wife's sister does not apply (according to the plain meaning).
*) There is no contradiction to this from Rashi, Vayishlach (35:22), "אחות אמי היתה צרה לאמי" ("My mother's sister was a rival to my mother") — for the intent there is (a) to the fact that his bed was constantly placed in Rachel's tent (similar to "shall my mother's sister's maidservant be a rival to my mother?", which was because Yaakov placed his bed in Bilhah's tent; as is understood from the fact that by "disarranging his bed" he wanted to bring about that she should not be a rival etc.); (b) and even in this, the meaning of "rival" is not that she distressed her and hated her (as in the matter of "לצרור" — see the sources cited in note 20), but only in a borrowed sense (for it is simple that Yaakov did not cause two sisters to be rivals to one another, even by constantly placing his bed in Rachel's tent — although it can be said that there is no prohibition in this, for the prohibition of "making one a rival to the other" is specifically "you shall not take," and through his taking them they did not become rivals, as in the body of the note).
25) Toldos 26:5, and Rashi there.
26) For the inner dimension of the matter — see Torah Or, end of Lech. See also above, p. 89, and the sources cited there.
27) The well-known answer (Riva on the Torah, end of Lech) — that since the fulfillment of the mitzvah of circumcision applies only once, he therefore did not circumcise himself until he was commanded concerning it, for "גדול מצווה ועושה כו'" ("Greater is one who is commanded and does etc.") (Kiddushin 31a, and sources cited there) — cannot be said according to Rashi's commentary on the Torah, for: (a) in the plain meaning of the verses and in Rashi's commentary this matter of "greater is one who is commanded etc." is not mentioned. (And one cannot say that this is so simple that the "five-year-old (student of Scripture)" understands it on his own — for even Rav Yosef initially held that one who is not commanded and does is greater (Kiddushin there).) (b) According to this it would emerge that "וישמור משמרתי גו'" applied to only the fewer of his years — only to those years after he circumcised himself and not before, since after all he did not keep this mitzvah [beforehand], and certainly this was not for "עק"ב" (172) years (Nedarim 32a, end). (For the explanation given in the Sicha — see below, note 45.)
27*) [OCR unclear: the text of this note is missing from the source.]
28) Noach 9:5. In the Ramban there: the meaning of "דמכם לנפשותיכם" is the blood that pertains to life, and not the blood of the limbs, on which the soul does not depend. But in Rashi there: a) "his own blood" — without qualification; b) "לנפשותיכם — even one who strangles himself," which does not refer to "your blood."
29) This is also proven from what Rashi says: "לנפשותיכם — אף החונק עצמו אעפ"י שלא יצא ממנו דם" ("of your lives — even one who strangles himself, although no blood came out of him"). And if we were to say that the prohibition of one who sheds his own blood applies only when it leads to death — the verse would not need to say "your blood," for this is already included in "your lives." (And accordingly, the question of the Gur Aryeh (Noach there) is simply answered.) It can be said that Rashi's proof for explaining it this way is from the very fact that the verse specified "your blood."
30) There, 9:4.
31) See Rashi, beginning of Vayeira: "to visit the sick."
32) For this reason one desecrates Shabbos for it (Shabbos 134b). And in Tanchuma (Lech 16): circumcision is a danger to life, therefore etc. Accordingly one can resolve [two points] in the Rambam (Hilchos Milah, end of ch. 1): a) that he writes (and concludes) specifically regarding circumcision "that danger to life overrides everything," although he already stated (Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, beginning of ch. 5) "all the mitzvos stated in the Torah … 'and live by them' — and not die by them," and this applies even in a case of doubt (Yoma 85b) (note also Hilchos Shabbos, beginning of ch. 2); b) that he is not satisfied with this and adds, "it is possible to circumcise later, but it is impossible ever to restore a single soul of Israel."
*32) As for Yosef's telling the Egyptians to circumcise themselves (Rashi, Mikeitz 41:55) — this is explained in Likkutei Sichos vol. 10, p. 138 ff.
33) Vayishlach 34:7.
34) End of Noach.
35) Rashi, Mishpatim 24:3; Va'eschanan 5:16. (And so it is in Sanhedrin 56b.)
36) See Noach 9:23 and Rashi there.
37) As we find that Yaakov was punished for not fulfilling the honor due to his father and mother (Rashi (old editions), end of Toldos; Vayeishev 37:34) — although he was not commanded concerning it.
38) See the commentators on the matter of the killing of the people of Shechem. Below, p. 190.
39) Our Parsha 29:25.
40) See Rashi 29:18.
41) Our Parsha 29:26.
42) Regarding Bilhah and Zilpah — see below, in the first Sicha on Parshas Vayigash.
43) Rashi 29:25.
44) See Rashi on our Parsha 30:22.
45) One cannot ask about what Rashi writes, "ותרי"ג מצות שמרתי" ("and I kept the 613 mitzvos"), and likewise about what is written, "וישמור משמרתי וגו'" (which refers to all the mitzvos), since after all (Avraham) did not fulfill the mitzvah of circumcision, and (Yaakov) the mitzvah of the prohibition of a wife's sister — for Rashi changes [the wording] and is precise: "ותרי"ג מצות שמרתי" ("I kept") (and not "קיימתי" ("I fulfilled"), as in Yoma (28b), "קיים," or "עשיתי" ("I did"), as in Kiddushin (82a), "עשה"). The opposite of "keeping" is specifically when one transgresses a prohibition or neglects a positive command in a forbidden manner, and not when one does so on account of a command of the Torah; on the contrary, that itself is keeping the mitzvos — similar to a positive command overriding a prohibition, saving a life overriding etc., and more, where one fulfills the Torah's command by not fulfilling the mitzvah. And as above in the text.
46) Vayeira 18:19, and Rashi there.
47) See Torah Or 63b; the discourse s.v. Ner Chanukah 5643, sec. 3; [the discourse s.v.] Asher Bara 5689 (Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim vol. 1), sec. 4; and elsewhere.
48) Zohar I, 162a.
49) Berachos 6a. See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 6, p. 271 ff.
50) See Hilchos Ketanos of the Rosh, Hilchos Tefillin, sec. 9, which reads: "Through the fulfillment of the mitzvah of tefillin (which are placed on the arm and the crown of the head) and its proper performance, [the verse] 'and he tears the arm, even the crown of the head' will be fulfilled in the men of war" (see Likkutei Sichos vol. 9, p. 11, note 57; Rabbeinu Bachya, end of Mattos (cited in the marginal note there)).
51) See the Rambam (Hilchos Melachim, end of ch. 11), a clear ruling on this, which reads: "If a king will arise from the House of David who meditates in Torah and occupies himself with mitzvos … and he will compel all Israel to walk in it and strengthen its breaches, and fight the wars of G‑d … if he did so and succeeded, and built the Beis HaMikdash in its place, and gathered the dispersed of Israel etc." (And it is known that the Rambam is precise even in the order of his words. See also the beginning of the chapter there.)
And no Posek disputes this. And the rule is known (see Mishneh LaMelech, Hilchos Kilayim 9:11, and the sefarim cited in Sdei Chemed, Klalei HaPoskim, sec. [OCR unclear], subsec. 1) that where the commentators on the Rambam did not challenge him, this is proof that they agree with his words. And in our case — so too the Raavad, the Kesef Mishneh (the Beis Yosef, Maran the author [of the Shulchan Aruch]), the Radbaz, etc.
And a ruling of practical halachah is found specifically in the books of the Poskim, and not in the Midrashim of the Sages, and not even in the weighty discussions of the Talmud. And certainly, certainly the Rambam knew the statements of the Sages in Sanhedrin and in the Yerushalmi at the beginning of Berachos, etc. And I am astonished that someone should be found who would say that specifically he is the one who understands the statement of the Sages in Sanhedrin etc. — and he is the one who disputes the explicit ruling of the Rambam, the Raavad, Maran the author, etc.
This is in addition to the confusion, obscuring, exchanging and substituting, etc., of the redemption of an individual, or of individuals and many groups, from distress and captivity [although it is called a redemption — Rashi, s.v. Ischalta (Megillah 17b)] — with the redemption from the exile, for "because of our sins we were exiled" etc., and through Moshiach Tzidkeinu we will be redeemed. And in addition to the confusion etc. regarding the "beginning of the redemption" spoken of in various places in the words of the Sages, which are like the beginning that took place at the very first moment after the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash, as stated explicitly in Eichah Rabbah (1:51): when his cow lowed a second time, he said, "The savior and redeemer of Israel has been born," and it specifies his name and city etc. (see Chiddushei Aggados of the Maharsha, Sanhedrin 98b);
— an Aggadah that was cited also with regard to practical halachah, for it is among the reasons (Birkei Yosef, Orach Chaim 559, and Zechor LeAvraham vol. 1, sec. 9 (in the name of Rabbi Chaim Vital)) why "Nachem" is said at Minchah on the day of the destruction (Tishah B'Av), and why the moon is sanctified on the night following that day (Pri Etz Chaim and Mishnas Chassidim, in their place), and why one who has not yet fulfilled the mitzvah of having children, and there is a concern that the match will be cancelled, holds the wedding on the night after Tishah B'Av (Sdei Chemed, Ma'areches Beis HaMikdash, at its end) —
and after this "beginning," the bitterness of the exile began, may G‑d spare us
— and similar to the well-known saying of the Alter Rebbe (cited in Pelach HaRimon, Shemos 7a) "that before lofty souls such as Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai the Temple was not destroyed at all" — yet Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai fled and was in the cave for thirteen years because of the Roman decree etc. —
— [confusing this] with the "beginning of the redemption" from the exile, a redemption that will put an end to the exile and after which there is no exile, etc.
And see Megillah (17b), "in the sixth [year] — sounds; in the seventh … the beginning of the redemption," and Rashi on this in Sanhedrin (97a).
And may it be G‑d's will that the faith in, and anticipation of, the true redemption through Moshiach Tzidkeinu be strengthened, for this itself will bring it closer (see at length the sicha of Acharon shel Pesach 5699) and hasten his coming.
Key Lesson
A stringency one takes on voluntarily can never override what one is actually obligated to do, and above all it may never come at another person's expense — just as Yaakov married Rachel rather than break his word to her. Before seeking extra spiritual enhancements for oneself, one must first "judge" oneself and give others what they need, both materially and spiritually, such as helping another Jew put on tefillin.