Parshas Metzora
1. In this week's Torah portion, the laws of the impurity of niddah are discussed. The reason why the blood of niddah conveys impurity can be understood according to what the Gemara states,1 that this is one of the curses that came as a result of the sin of the Tree of Knowledge. It follows that, by the nature of creation, the blood of niddah would not have existed at all; and since it comes about through a sin — and moreover a sin that is the root and source of all sins2 — therefore the blood is impure.
It will be understood more deeply according to what is known: the punishment of Adam HaRishon, his being driven out of Gan Eden, was not simply a punishment by which he was penalized for the sin of the Tree of Knowledge. Rather, the punishment was — like all punishments that come from Above3 — that the very transgression that a person commits later expresses itself in the form of a punishment. That is to say, the punishment is not a penalty imposed as retribution for the sin, but a direct consequence of the person's own evil, as it is written:4 "תיסרך רעתך" ("Your own evil shall chastise you"). So too regarding the expulsion from Gan Eden: Gan Eden is entirely good, a place that cannot tolerate any existence of evil; consequently, once Adam HaRishon had acquired within himself an existence of evil, he could no longer remain in Gan Eden.
So too regarding the above-mentioned punishment of Chavah: the punishment of the blood of niddah is a direct consequence of the sin of the Tree of Knowledge. The existence of evil that was created within her through the sin becomes (in part) the blood of niddah; and therefore the blood is impure and is "driven out" of a Jewish body.
For a Jew is, after all, "גוי קדוש" ("a holy nation"), entirely good. And not only by virtue of his G‑dly soul — even by virtue of his animal soul he has no connection to what is forbidden (by his nature he desires only permitted things).5 Therefore, as soon as something becomes an existence of evil,6 the Jewish body cannot tolerate it, and it pushes it out of itself.7
However, the very fact that within a Jewish body there can be an existence of evil which it must push out of itself is proof that the body is not as it should be (which came about through the sin) — and therefore it becomes impure blood.
2. Regarding the law that a niddah is forbidden to her husband, there is an inquiry whether the prohibition stems from the impurity of niddah, or whether it is a separate prohibition that has nothing to do with impurity. And there are proofs that it is a prohibition in its own right, and not because of the impurity.8
Man and woman here below, with all their particulars, including the particulars of their laws, are, as it were, an analogue; and their root (like all physical things, each of which derives from its root in spirituality) is the relationship between the Holy One, blessed be He, and Knesses Yisrael,9 who are called "man and woman."
Through sins, Jews become separated — niddah.10 About this it is said: although among them there are matters of impurity, nevertheless, regarding the union with her husband — which is, after all, the essential desire of Jews, truly and in absolute truth, entirely "with all the heart and with all the soul,"11 and it is for this that they fulfill Torah and mitzvos, in order to be united with her husband, the Holy One, blessed be He, to become one with the Above — there it is not, G‑d forbid, a matter of impurity,12 but only a matter of prohibition.
3. The advantage in this: the difference between prohibition (issur) and impurity (tumah) is as follows. Issur is a kind of evil that can be grasped by the intellect; that is to say, a person can understand and feel the evil of the prohibition (as, for example, forbidden foods,13 which "dull" — block up — the head and the heart14). And even when the Torah has permitted a person to eat the forbidden thing — as in the law15 regarding "עוברה שהריחה" ("a pregnant woman who smelled food"), who may eat even something forbidden — it nevertheless produces a bad temperament in the person who eats the forbidden thing.16 Tumah, by contrast, is a kind of evil that cannot be grasped by human intellect and feeling; it is nothing more than "חוקה חקקתי, גזירה גזרתי" ("I have engraved a statute, I have decreed a decree").17
For this reason issur — in general — applies also in the present time, whereas tumah — in general — applies only in the time of the Beis HaMikdash. An evil that is recognizable must be guarded against at all times; but an unrecognizable evil, which is impure only because "I have decreed a decree,"18 contradicts only the lofty level of holiness that existed in the time of the Beis HaMikdash, whereas relative to the more limited level of holiness of the present time, tumah is no contradiction.19 Only Kohanim,20 because of their additional holiness, are warned even today to guard themselves from tumah,21 and even they not from all forms of tumah.
Although the evil of issur can be removed more quickly than the evil of tumah, nevertheless, in one respect, the evil of tumah is more severe than that of issur.22 For precisely because the evil of tumah is not recognizable, one will not repent of it so quickly (where the Torah has forbidden it). And in addition, since tumah is above intellect, it blemishes the encompassing powers (kochos makifim) of the soul, which are above reason and understanding.22
Regarding this it is said that the evil which is created among Jews through sins — and in general, through the sin of the Golden Calf, which is analogous to the sin of the Tree of Knowledge — is (in relation to the union of Knesses Yisrael with the Holy One, blessed be He) only a matter of issur and not of tumah. It is a matter that touches only the inner and limited powers, but it does not touch the encompassing powers; there she remains "חבוקה ודבוקה בך" ("embraced and cleaving to You").
4. The proofs that are brought8 that niddah is issur and not tumah are:
a) The law regarding niddah is that "ספיקא לקולא" ("a doubt is ruled leniently").23 Tosafos asks:24 but the law regarding tumah is that in a private domain even several doubts together are also impure! And they answer that what the Gemara says, "a doubt is ruled leniently," refers only to the law of forbidding her to her husband. We see from this that the prohibition of a niddah to her husband does not stem from tumah.
b) The Gemara25 expounds: "וספרה לה" ("and she shall count for herself") — "for herself"; and from this it is derived26 that "עד אחד נאמן באיסורין" ("a single witness is believed regarding prohibitions"). This is a proof that it is issur and not tumah, for one does not derive issur from tumah — even if regarding tumah a single witness is believed.27
5. Matters of Torah are precise in all their details; and all of them, as they are in the revealed part of Torah, correspond to the way they are in their inner dimension. It is therefore understood that not only the halachah and the conclusion of "issur and not tumah," but also the two above-mentioned proofs for it, correspond to their inner meaning.
A Jew is, after all, "גוי אחד בארץ" ("one nation on earth"): (even when they are) on earth, he is always found "in a private domain" — in the domain of the One G‑d, of the Above, "the Only One of the world." For even at the time of sin the soul remains "באמנה אתו יתברך" ("faithful to Him, blessed be He").*27 Since the Jew is found in a private domain, close to the Above, and therefore even a small sin affects him more there, one might think that even a doubtful evil is already a matter of tumah. About this it is said that in truth the entire matter of (niddah and) distance in a Jew is not a matter of tumah but a matter of issur: it is a deficiency and a distance from G‑d in his inner and limited powers, in his power of intellect, etc. — as our Sages say:28 "אין אדם עובר עבירה אלא אם כן נכנס בו רוח שטות" ("A person does not commit a transgression unless a spirit of folly has entered him") — he does not understand and does not feel in his intellect the greatness of G‑d, etc. And although even the evil of issur prevents the Jew, for the time being, from being united with the Above, this is so only with a definite issur; but a doubt is no obstacle29 to the union of Knesses Yisrael with her husband — even for the time being.
The second proof:
The difference between the above-mentioned single witness and two witnesses is this: the testimony of two witnesses is bound up with a beis din, so that without a beis din their testimony is of no account. That is why the law is that as long as they have not said it before a beis din, they can retract and say otherwise than they said earlier.30 A single witness, by contrast, is not bound up with a beis din; the credibility of a single witness is bound up with the "kashrus" of his G‑dly soul, and he is believed, because all Jews are presumed to be kosher.31
When it concerns the kashrus of a wife to her husband — of Knesses Yisrael to the Holy One, blessed be He — one need not go to any beis din, neither to the beis din below nor to the beis din above; the credibility of the G‑dly soul suffices. When the G‑dly soul sighs sincerely over its deeds that were not good, there is no need to come to a beis din, and the Above gives the Jew [what is due to him] "כמנהג גוברין יהודאין" ("according to the custom of Jewish husbands") — "שאר כסות ועונה" ("food, clothing and conjugal rights") etc. And most importantly, he becomes united with the Above — "ואתם הדבקים בה'" ("And you who cleave to G‑d") — until it comes out in a revealed way, the cleaving of the Above with the Jewish people: "ישראל וקודשא בריך הוא כולא חד" ("Israel and the Holy One, blessed be He, are all one").32
(From the sichos of 19 Kislev 5715)
Notes
1) Eruvin 100b.
2) See Shabbos 146a, beginning of the amud; Zohar I, 52b. Explained at length in the maamar beginning "Al Kein Yomru HaMoshlim," 5691 (in Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim, vol. 1).
3) See the views on this, and the conclusion — Shelah, in the introduction to Beis Acharon.
4) Yirmeyahu 2:19.
5) Tanya, ch. 8.
6) For as long as it has not come out into the outer chamber, it is not impure (Mishnah, beginning of ch. 5 of Niddah).
7) This requires slight examination in light of the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, Mahadura Tinyana, end of siman 4.
8) See Asvan D'Oraisa, Klal 21. And see the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, siman 183 (in Mahadura Basra, in the gloss, 789a). Responsa Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh De'ah, siman 138, end of se'if 1, and siman 139, se'if 3.
9) And all of Shir HaShirim is founded on this, as is known from the Midrashim of our Sages.
10) A term denoting wandering and distance — according to the Targum.
11) Tanya, ch. 41.
12) For impurity does not, G‑d forbid, prevent their union with the Holy One, blessed be He, as it is written (Vayikra 16:16), "Who dwells with them in the midst of their impurity."
13) And even when the prohibition is not due to the food itself but due to a person's thought or speech — such as one who slaughters for the sake of the mountains (Chullin 39b) and the like — it produces a bad temperament in the person who eats it. As we find with Elisha Acher (Rus Rabbah 3:13), whose mother, while she was pregnant, ate from an idolatrous offering, and this caused Acher to go astray. One cannot say that with Acher this came as a supernatural punishment and not by way of nature, for a pregnant woman who smelled food — on the contrary, we feed her, and obviously she is not to be punished. And it is very forced to say that it was an accessory of idolatry of the kind about which one must be killed rather than transgress. Also, the wording "they gave her of that kind and she ate" implies that they had to give it to her. (In the Jerusalem Talmud (Chagigah, ch. 2, end of halachah 1) it is stated that she passed by an idolatrous temple and smelled it, and that smell affected Acher; if so, one could say that according to the Jerusalem Talmud it was by way of punishment. But Tosafos s.v. Shuvu (Chagigah 15a) appears to have the reading in the Jerusalem Talmud as it appears in Rus Rabbah cited above.) According to the above, the ruling of the Taz and the Shach (Yoreh De'ah, end of siman 81) is understood: that a nursing woman who ate something forbidden should not nurse the child, even if she ate it permissibly because of danger to life. And it is understood that one cannot distinguish in this between the severe prohibition of idolatry and the prohibition of pork and the like. On the contrary: if with idolatry, which the Torah forbade only because of the person's intention, even where it was permitted because of danger to life its eating produces a bad temperament — how much more so with pork and the like, whose prohibition stems from the thing itself and its physicality.
14) Ramban on the Torah, Vayikra 11:13; Chinuch, mitzvah 73.
15) Yoma 82a; the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch 617:2.
16) Nevertheless, where there is danger to life, it is a mitzvah for him to eat the food, even though he will thereby cause himself a bad temperament — similar to amputating a limb to save the whole body. Even so, the nature of the food has not changed, as stated above. This is especially so according to the conclusion that (also with regard to a sick person) danger to life overrides the prohibition, and not that it permits it. (Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos, beginning of ch. 2, and the sources cited there in the commentaries. What is written in Tzafnas Pa'neach — by the Gaon of Rogatchov — on the Rambam there requires examination; this is not the place to elaborate. And the wording of the Alter Rebbe (Iggeres HaKodesh, ch. 26), who writes "that he ate because of danger to life, which our Sages permitted, and it became completely permitted," requires slight examination. Perhaps for the above reason the word "completely" is enclosed in brackets, and in several editions it is absent.)
17) Bamidbar Rabbah, beginning of Parshas Chukas; Rambam, end of Hilchos Mikva'os.
18) Similar to how only the eating of sacred offerings (kodashim) is forbidden in a state of impurity, but not ordinary food (chullin). See also Kuzari, part 3, end of section 49.
19) There is a further practical difference even in the present time — regarding the making of a mikveh, the s'chach of a sukkah, etc. This is not the place to elaborate.
20) Further on this: the matter of the priesthood relates to the beginning and foundation of Divine service — kabbalas ol (which is why the Tanna marks the time of the obligation of reciting the Shema (acceptance of the yoke of Heaven) as "from the time that the Kohanim…"), which is above reason and understanding; therefore even the evil of tumah affects it.
21) See similarly above, Parshas Vayikra.
22) See Likkutei Torah, Tavo 43b; ibid., end of Parshas Acharei.
23) By Torah law (according to the view of Tosafos, which is what is being discussed here — as explained in Mallei HaRo'im (and elsewhere), entry "Sfeika d'Oraisa," section 10). And even according to the opinions (and the Tzemach Tzedek, in his Responsa, Yoreh De'ah, siman 61, is among them; see also Derech Mitzvosecha, the mitzvah of the impurity of the metzora, at its end) that a doubt in a Torah law is ruled stringently by Torah law — the fact that a double doubt is ruled leniently (with regard to issur, unlike tumah) proves that even a single doubt changes the matter. Understand this.
24) Tosafos s.v. D'ein, Bava Kamma 11a.
25) Kesubos 72a.
26) Tosafos s.v. Ed Echad, Gittin 2b. See also Tzemach Tzedek, Sha'ar HaMilu'im, Chiddushim on Yevamos (17, 7 – 20, 2).
27) As in the question whether a single witness is believed regarding tumah in a private domain — see Shev Shmatsa, Shmatsa 6 (at its end), who is uncertain about this. (And it requires examination whether the uncertainty of the Shev Shmatsa applies to a nazir, in general; and see Tzemach Tzedek, Sha'ar HaMilu'im, ibid.)
*27) Tanya, ch. 24.
28) Sotah 3a. See also Zohar I, 121a.
29) See above, Parshas Vayikra, that with regard to the encompassing powers, which are above reason and understanding, a doubtful sin can be more severe than a certain one. From this it is understood that this applies mainly to tumah and not to issur.
30) Jerusalem Talmud, Kesubos 2:3; Tosefta, Sanhedrin 6:6; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, siman 29.
31) Compare Sanhedrin, beginning of ch. 3.
32) See Zohar III, 93b, beginning of the amud.
Key Lesson
Even when a Jew sins, the distance it creates touches only his inner, limited faculties; the essence of his soul remains "embraced and cleaving" to G‑d, and the bond of Knesses Yisrael with G‑d is never truly "impure." A sincere sigh of the G‑dly soul over past deeds is enough — no court above or below is needed — to restore that union until it is revealed that Israel and the Holy One, blessed be He, are all one.