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Parshas Mishpatim
1. "ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם" ("And these are the ordinances that you shall set before them"). Our Sages draw a precise inference from the word "לפניהם" ("before them") that appears in the verse, and learn from it several lessons:
a) The ordinances must be "לפניהם — ולא לפני עובדי כוכבים" ("before them — and not before idolaters")1: every dispute between Jews must be brought "before them," before Jewish judges who rule according to the laws of the Torah, and not before non-Jewish judges — even when it concerns cases in which "דיניהם כדיני ישראל" ("their laws are like the laws of Israel"), where their laws are similar to the laws of the Torah.
b) "Before them" — that the learning with a student must be in a manner of "להראות לו פנים" ("to show him the face [of the matter]")2: one must explain the reason and the understanding of the halachah that has been studied, until it settles in the student's mind, and not tell him: "This is the law, and you must try to understand the reason by yourself."
c) The Alter Rebbe interprets3 "אשר תשים לפניהם" ("that you shall set before them") as "לפנימיותם" ("to their inwardness"): the aspect of Da'as (knowledge) of G‑dliness should be drawn into the inwardness of Jews, into the "סתים" (the deeply hidden and concealed levels) of the soul. Like all matters of Chassidus, this too is alluded to in the revealed part of Torah. In the Yerushalmi it states4 on "asher tasim lifneihem" that "tasim" derives from the term "סימה" ("simah"), a treasure — that which is hidden, the inwardness and the concealed part of Torah. And the concealed part of Torah arouses the concealed and inner part of the soul5.
It has already been said several times that the different interpretations of the same word of the Torah are connected with one another6. We must therefore understand: what is the connection between the three interpretations of the word "before them" cited above?
We must also understand why the Torah gives the directive that it should be "before them" (according to all the interpretations) specifically regarding mishpatim — that the "ordinances" must be "before them." As is known7, the mitzvos of the Torah are divided into three categories: chukim (statutes), eidus (testimonies) and mishpatim (ordinances). Their difference lies in how far they can be understood and grasped. Chukim are mitzvos that have no explanation in the intellect; one fulfills them only because the Almighty so commanded — "חוקה חקקתי גזירה גזרתי" ("I have enacted a statute, I have issued a decree")8. Eidus are mitzvos that have a place in the intellect: had the Torah not commanded them, the intellect by itself would not have obligated them, would not have said that such mitzvos must be fulfilled; but once the Torah has commanded them to us, one can explain the "testimonies" and understand them with the intellect. Mishpatim are the category of mitzvos which human intellect by itself understands must be fulfilled (not merely that it gives them a place), as our Sages say9: "אילמלא לא ניתנה תורה (ח"ו) היינו למידין צניעות מחתול וגזל מנמלה" ("Had the Torah not been given (G‑d forbid), we would have learned modesty from the cat and [the prohibition of] robbery from the ant"). Even if the Torah had not commanded these mitzvos, the intellect by itself would have obligated their fulfillment. And it is specifically regarding this category of mitzvos, regarding mishpatim, that the Torah directs that it should be "before them."
Seemingly, why is the directive of "before them" more fitting with regard to mishpatim than with regard to chukim and eidus? According to the first interpretation it is understandable, because with mishpatim there is the possibility that the judges of the nations of the world will judge just as the judges of Israel do. With the category of eidus, and certainly with the category of chukim, there is no need to command that one should not go to non-Jewish judges. It is self-evident, since the judges of the nations of the world have no connection to such laws: their rulings can come only from the side of intellect, not from what is above intellect. But with mishpatim, where it is possible that they will judge just as the judges of Israel do, the Torah must command that one should be judged specifically before the judges of Israel.
But according to the second interpretation, "to show him the face" — that the learning should settle well in the student's understanding — it would seemingly be more important to give this directive regarding the category of eidus, and even more so regarding chukim: although the intellect does not obligate eidus, and chukim are entirely above intellect, nevertheless the learning of these categories should and must be in a manner of "before them." But with the category of mishpatim, since these are mitzvos that human intellect obligates, it is simpler that their study will be in a manner that settles in the student's mind.
So too according to the interpretation "before them — to their inwardness": in order to fulfill mishpatim, one seemingly does not need specifically to reach the arousal of the inwardness of the soul, since they are understood even by ordinary intellect. It is different, however, with chukim, which are above intellect; with them there must be the arousal of the inwardness of the soul. For without that arousal — even if he will fulfill them, it will be only because he is compelled, because he must do so ("I have enacted a statute, I have issued a decree"), but his doing will be without inner vitality, since they do not settle in his mind. And in order for the chukim to settle in his mind, so that he fulfills them with inner vitality, he must awaken the inwardness of the soul, which is above intellect.
2. It is indeed true that "המעשה הוא העיקר" ("action is the main thing") — the main thing is to fulfill the mitzvos in actual deed. For example, with the mitzvah of tefillin (to which "הוקשה כל התורה כולה לתפילין" — "the entire Torah is compared to tefillin"10): if someone were to have in mind all the intentions of the mitzvah of tefillin, but in practice did not put the tefillin on his arm and on his head, he is a "קרקפתא דלא מנח תפילין" ("a head that has not put on tefillin"), G‑d forbid. On the other hand, if in practice he puts on tefillin but does not have the intentions of the mitzvah — and even if he is someone who, by his level, is capable of having the intentions and nevertheless does not do so — he fulfills the mitzvah of putting on tefillin, and he must make the blessing with G‑d's Name and Kingship*10, and so on. So too with other mitzvos, because "action is the main thing."
The Supreme Will, however, is that the mitzvos should permeate a person's entire stature, all the parts and powers of the person11: not only his power of action and his power of speech, but also his power of thought, and even his emotions and intellect, up to the encompassing powers of will and pleasure — all of them should become permeated by the mitzvos. That is to say: not only those mitzvos that are general and essentially depend on the feeling of the heart and the understanding of the mind — such as the mitzvos of love and fear [of G‑d], the mitzvah of believing in and knowing G‑dliness, and the like — but also all the particular mitzvos, even the mitzvos that depend on action, must permeate the entire being of the person, down to his deepest powers, and especially the power of pleasure (for the fulfillment of the mitzvos, whichever mitzvah it may be12, must be with joy and gladness of heart, and it is said: "כל חלב לה'" ("All the fat is for G‑d")13).
Therefore, it is required that not only mishpatim, but also chukim — since the Torah has commanded them — he must fulfill not only with his power of action alone, but it must also settle in his intellect that they must be fulfilled. Not merely that he fulfills them because he has no other choice: since the Almighty has issued a decree he must obey it, even though it is a matter that has no reason and no purpose. Rather, the mitzvah must permeate his entire being and all his powers; since the Almighty has so commanded, the mitzvos of the category of chukim also settle in his intellect.
(This does not mean that he fulfills the chukim because he holds that, owing to the limitation of his human understanding, he has no reason for them in his own intellect, but someone else — and certainly the Almighty, the One who commands the chukim — has an understanding and reason for them. That is not the true meaning of fulfilling the chukim. For such a manner of fulfillment is still not the true matter of kabbalas ol (accepting the yoke), above intellect, reason and understanding; on the contrary, he fulfills them because they have a very deep understanding which only a great sage comprehends. The [true] fulfillment of the chukim is that he fulfills them solely out of accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, without any calculations14.) But his kabbalas ol must be with such strength of vitality that his intellect is not merely not opposed; on the contrary, his intellect too accepts it, and it settles in his mind that one must do as the Almighty commands, without any calculations whatsoever.
With this we also understand the precise wording of our Sages15: "חוקה כו' אין לך רשות להרהר אחרי'" ("It is a statute... you have no permission to question it") — you have no permission to ponder over the chukim. Seemingly, it should have said: "and you have no permission not to fulfill it." But the explanation is: fulfillment with the power of action alone is not enough; it must settle also in his intellect and in his thought, to the point that he does not question at all, does not ponder over it. And not only that if a thought should occasionally enter his mind that chukim have no purpose, etc., he immediately drives the thought away (in the manner explained in Tanya16 regarding other matters); rather, "there is no [permission] to question" — such thoughts do not enter his mind at all from the outset. And although the fulfillment of the chukim does not come from an explanation (not even from the explanation that Above there is certainly an intellectual reason for it), nevertheless he is so thoroughly permeated with the feeling of simple faith and accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven that it affects his power of intellect too, so that he does not question, G‑d forbid. It is accepted and settled in his intellect to such an extent that he does not think otherwise: "you have no permission to question, etc."
It follows from this that in order to fulfill the chukim as it should be, one must have "before them — to their inwardness," to arouse the inwardness of the soul, which can bring it about that the chukim settle well also in the revealed powers, such as intellect and emotions, and so on. Without the inwardness of the soul, a person will not be able to bring himself to the point that he does not question, even if in practice he fulfills the chukim out of accepting the yoke. But through the arousal of the inwardness of the soul, he gains a reason and a delight even in a matter that is above reason and understanding — which is the second meaning of "before them," "to show him the face," that the laws of the Torah become settled in his head and heart. With mishpatim, by contrast, one would seemingly not need the directive of "before them": since the mishpatim are mitzvos of the intellect, he will in any case have a delight in them — so why should one need to call forth the inwardness of the soul for them?
3. This will be understood by first introducing another exposition of our Sages17 on the verse "And these are the ordinances": "ואלה מוסיף על הראשונים" ("'And these' adds to the earlier ones"). The vav of "V'eileh" ("And these") shows that the mishpatim come as a continuation of the Ten Commandments — the mishpatim too were given at Sinai.
As has already been said18, the Ten Commandments unite within themselves two kinds of mitzvos that are utterly different in their foundation: the first commandments express the deepest matters of the Oneness of G‑d, whereas the other commandments contain such simple directives as "לא תרצח" ("You shall not murder") and "לא תגנוב" ("You shall not steal"), which are self-evident even to the simplest human intellect; and the Ten Commandments unite both extremes together. This teaches us that the fulfillment of "You shall not murder" and "You shall not steal" too must be because they were commanded by the Almighty, by "אנכי הוי' אלקיך" ("I am the L‑rd your G‑d"). And this is the meaning of "'And these' (the ordinances) adds to the earlier ones": the ordinances of the Torah too were given by the Almighty on Mount Sinai — they too were given with all the tempest that accompanied the Giving of the Torah, from the "Anochi" (I) of "מי שאנכי" ("Him Who is I"); and consequently one must fulfill them too because they were given at Sinai, and not merely because the intellect understands that one must do so.
And this is explained in the first interpretation of "before them — and not before the judges of the nations of the world": although they rule in the same way as the judges of Israel, their judgments are not connected with "I am the L‑rd your G‑d," and consequently their verdict is not a judgment of Torah — and all the affairs of a Jew must be only according to and in the way of Torah.
This also accords with the interpretation of the Alter Rebbe that "before them" means "to their inwardness," the inwardness of the soul: the study and fulfillment of the ordinances of the Torah too must come not merely from human intellect but from the inwardness of the soul, just like the study and fulfillment of the chukim. With mishpatim too one must work to ensure that their settling in his intellect comes not merely because the intellect by itself so obligates, but from the inwardness of the soul, which must affect his entire stature, until it brings about the settling [of the mitzvos] in the intellect as well19.
And this is the connection between the three above-mentioned interpretations of the word "before them," which is written specifically regarding mishpatim: with mishpatim too — the rational mitzvos — their fulfillment must be not merely from understanding, but because "they were given at Sinai," with an acceptance of the yoke that comes from the inwardness of the soul (according to the Alter Rebbe's interpretation). For this reason one may not bring the mishpatim before the judges of the nations of the world, [that is,] human intellect (the first interpretation). And although mishpatim require acceptance of the yoke, they must also settle in his intellect, "to show him the face" (the second interpretation) — specifically through the unification of the inwardness of the soul.
4. The reason that even in the mitzvos of the category of mishpatim one may not rely on human intellect ("before them — not before the judges of the nations of the world") is twofold.
First, when the fulfillment of the mitzvos comes from the fact that this is what the intellect of the animal soul obligates, in the end there will result from it what our Sages say20: "היום אומר לו עשה כך ולמחר א"ל וכו' עד שאומר לו עבוד ע"ז" ("Today he tells him, 'Do this,' and tomorrow he tells him, etc., until he tells him, 'Worship idols'"). And my revered father-in-law, the Rebbe [the Previous Rebbe], explains this: at the outset the evil inclination does not have the latitude to persuade a Jew to commit a transgression, G‑d forbid. Rather, his first approach to a Jew is actually regarding a mitzvah. When a Jew wants to do a mitzvah, the evil inclination tells him "Do this" — fulfill the mitzvah. But since the evil inclination "tells him, Do this," that the person should fulfill the mitzvah because the intellect of the animal soul so understands, and not because the Almighty so commanded in the Torah, he thereby tears him away, G‑d forbid, from the Almighty, and afterwards he can already lead the Jew lower and lower — "and tomorrow he tells him, etc." — until he can bring him to idol worship, may G‑d save us.
Another reason why the fulfillment of the mitzvos must not come from human intellect is that even if he does in practice fulfill the mitzvos, an essential element will still be missing from his fulfillment of them — the feeling that this comes from and is connected (mitzvah — from the term tzavsa, togetherness and connection) with "I am the L‑rd your G‑d," that this is a matter of Torah.
5. As has already been said18, in the fact that the Ten Commandments unite both extremes within themselves there is a twofold directive. First, "העליונים ירדו לתחתונים" ("the higher ones shall descend to the lower ones"): the commandments of "Anochi" ("I am") and "לא יהי' לך" ("You shall have no [other gods]") must descend and be felt also in the commands of "You shall not murder" and "You shall not steal," so that their fulfillment too is because they were commanded by the "Anochi."
And [second], "והתחתונים יעלו לעליונים" ("and the lower ones shall ascend to the higher ones"): even the people who, in and of themselves, stand far lower than the category of the animal (and do not learn "robbery from the ant," etc.), to the point that the Almighty Himself, the "Anochi" of "Him Who is I," must command them "You shall not murder" and "You shall not steal" — even of them it is required that they "ascend to the higher ones," that they should have faith, contemplation and knowledge of G‑dliness, up to the "Anochi" of "Him Who is I."
These two directives are repeated once again at the beginning of Parshas Mishpatim — "'And these' adds to the earlier ones." One directive is that even the fulfillment of the mishpatim must be "before them," from the inwardness of the soul, which is the "higher ones shall descend to the lower ones"21.
At the same time, it also directs that "the lower ones shall ascend to the higher ones": even those who are lower in knowledge of the Torah, young students who cannot sort things out by themselves — one must learn with them and prepare everything for them "כשלחן הערוך ומוכן לאכול לפני האדם" ("like a table that is set and ready for a person to eat")22;
— and even more: even those who are lower in conduct, for the verse speaks about litigants (although "before them" means before the judges, the ordinances are nevertheless connected with litigants), one of whom sometimes argues falsely —
even regarding these "lower ones" there is the command "they shall ascend to the higher ones" — "you shall set before them": one must give them the "simah," the treasure of the inner dimension of the Torah. For by virtue of the "before them," the inwardness of the soul, all Jews are "כשרין" ("fit")23 in potential, capable of receiving the treasure — the deep matters of the Torah. Only, the inwardness of the soul is concealed in them, and one must help them reveal it: "you shall set before them." And the very fact that one will learn with them the hidden treasure will reveal still more of the "before them," their inwardness, until it will come to permeate also the revealed powers, mind and heart — "משים בלבו" ("placing it in his heart") — until through this "setting before them" it will become: "יעשה אותם" ("he shall do them"), and in a manner of "וחי בהם" ("and he shall live by them")24.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Mishpatim, 5722)
Notes
1) Gittin 88b. Cited in Rashi at the beginning of Parshas Mishpatim.
2) Eruvin 54b. See also the Alter Rebbe's Laws of Torah Study, ch. 4, sec. 8.
3) Torah Ohr, maamar beginning "V'eileh HaMishpatim."
4) [Yerushalmi] Avodah Zarah ch. 2, halachah 6, and the Pnei Moshe there.
5) See Zohar III, 73a; Likkutei Torah, Vayikra 5c; and elsewhere.
6) See above, p. 782.
7) See the maamar beginning "Im Bechukosai" 5700, ch. 4, and elsewhere. See also the Torah commentators on Va'eschanan (6:20), and the commentators on the Haggadah on the question of the Wise Son.
8) Bamidbar Rabbah 19, [Parshas] Chukas.
9) Eruvin 100b, at the end of the page. See also above, Parshas Yisro, note 12.
10) Kiddushin 35a.
*10) See Iggeres HaTeshuvah, ch. 1: "without any doubt or double doubt in the world."
11) This is well understood from [the rule] that one who is engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from [another] mitzvah, whichever it may be. See also Tosafos, s.v. "Sheluchei" (Sukkah 25a).
12) See Rambam, end of the Laws of Lulav.
13) See Torah Ohr 29d; Likkutei Torah, Pinchas 78b.
14) See also above, p. 815.
15) Rashi at the beginning of Parshas Chukas.
16) Ch. 12. However, the [forbidden] thought spoken of in Tanya there concerns committing a transgression or neglecting the fulfillment of a positive mitzvah (but not a thought or doubt about the truth of the matter itself), whereas in our case the questioning is (a kind of) doubt in faith.
17) Shemos Rabbah, Tanchuma and Mechilta (cited in Rashi), at the beginning of Parshas Mishpatim.
18) See above, Parshas Yisro, and the sources cited there.
19) See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 2, Parshas Mishpatim (Letters, p. 672).
20) Shabbos 105b.
21) Included in the directive "the higher ones shall descend to the lower ones" is also the obligation of Torah scholars to occupy themselves with simple people, to teach them and to guide them. See the Midrash (Shemos Rabbah 30:13) on this: "'A king establishes the land through justice... but a man of terumos destroys it' — this is a sage who knows halachos, midrashos and aggados... [who says:] 'I am busy with my learning, I am not free.'" See also above (at the beginning of the sicha) that all the interpretations in the words of our Sages on one verse are connected with one another.
22) Rashi at the beginning of Parshas Mishpatim; it is from the Mechilta there.
23) The wording of the Yerushalmi there.
24) See Shemos Rabbah 30:22; Or Torah of the Maggid, Parshas Acharei.
Key Lesson
Even the mitzvos that human reason fully understands must be kept because G‑d gave them at Sinai, and not merely because they make sense, for a mitzvah kept only because it is logical can later be argued away. When the inner core of the soul is aroused, the mitzvos come to permeate a person's intellect and heart, and that inner treasure of Torah should be shared with every Jew, even those who stand lowest.